J 



:h!I; 



H 

EUlif 



IH — ■ 




Rfflifl 



ffi 



J 111111 

nUfflHOcU 



iiHHn wtfil mUHBTfrnt 



bih tfufljra Rttfl 

■HUnH^HMflll 



I 



His 
■ II 



■ 

m 

I if 1 ! 




Hi 

MfBill 



/& 



THE 

MADISON PAPERS. 



THE 



PAPERS 



OF 



JAMES MADISON, 

PURCHASED BY ORDER OF CONGRESS; 

BEING 

HIS CORRESPONDENCE AND REPORTS OF DEBATES DURING 
THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION 



AND 



HIS REPORTS OF DEBATES 



IN THE 



FEDERAL CONVENTION; 



NOW PUBLISHED FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS, DEPOS- 
ITED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BY DIRECTION OF 
THE JOINT LIBRARY COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS, 
UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE 



OF 



HENRY D. GILPIN 



VOLUME II. 



WASHINGTON: 

LANGTREE & O'SULLIVAN. 

1840. 




h 



i 



* 






■ 



^ 



CONTENTS 

OF THE SECOND VOLUME 



DEBATES IN THE CONGRESS OF THE CON- 
FEDERATION, FROM FEBRUARY 19th, 1787, TO 
APRIL 25th, 1787. 

Monday, February 19th . . . . 581 

Insurrection in Massachusetts — Enlistment of troops by Congress 
— Motion to stop it rejected. 

Wednesday, February 21st . . . 587 

Report of the Convention at Annapolis, proposing a Federal Con- 
vention — New York Delegates move for a Convention — Views of 
different Members — Congress sanction it. 

Tuesday, March 13th . . . 590 

Refusal to remove the the military stores from Springfield — Con- 
ference of Mr. Madison and Mr. Bingham with Mr. G-ardoqui rel- 
ative to the navigation of the Mississippi — Discontents in the West- 
ern Territory — Posts held by the British. 

Tuesday, March 20th 595 

Mr. Jay's report relative to the effect of British treaty of peace — 
Obligations imposed on the States by treaties. 

Wednesday, March 21st . 595 

Effect of treaties on the States. 



IV CONTENTS. 

Friday, March 23d .... 597 

Proposal to reduce salaries — Civil List. 

Wednesday, March 28th ... 598 

Discontinuance of enlistments — Military establishment — Seizure 
of Spanish property by General Clark — Representations of Virginia 
relative to disturbances in the Western Territory. 

Thursday, March 29th . f 598 

Ordinance for settlement of public accounts — Complaints from Illi- 
nois — Seizure of Spanish property by General Clark — Unsettled 
state of the Western Territory — Navigation of the Mississippi — 
Conference of Virginia Delegates with Mr. Gardoqui. 

Friday, March 30th .... 602 

Mr. Jay's report on the admission of Mr. Bond as British Consul — 
Subject postponed — Representations of North Carolina relative to 
discontents in the Western Territory — Navigation of the Missis- 
sippi — Negotiation between Mr. Jay and Mr. Gardoqui. 

Monday, April 2d 604 

Resolution to lay the negotiation between Mr. Jay and Mr. Gar- 
doqui before Congress. 

Tuesday, April 10th . . . . 605 

Future seat of Congress. 

Wednesday, April 11th . . . . 605 

Future seat of Congress. 

Wednesday, April 18th .... 606 

Negotiation between Mr. Jay and Mr. Gardoqui — Motion to send 
Mr. Jefferson to Madrid — Referred to the Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs. 

Thursday, April 19th .... 608 

Representations of Virginia relative to the navigation of the Mis- 
sissippi. 

Monday, April 23d .... 609 

Mr. Jay's report against sending Mr. Jefferson to Madrid. 

Wednesday, April 25th .... 609 

Motion that a vote of nine States is requisite to authorize suspen- 
sion of the use of the Mississippi, not decided by Congress. 



CONTENTS. 



CORRESPONDENCE DURING AND SUBSEQUENT 
TO THE DEBATES IN THE CONGRESS OF 
THE CONFEDERATION, FROM FEBRUARY 15th, 
1787, TO NOVEMBER 2d, 1788. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, February 

15, 1787 615 

Insurrection in Massachusetts. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, February 

18,1787 615 

Navigation of the Mississippi — Treaty of peace with England — In- 
fraction of it by the States — Federal Convention — Views of it by 
the States — Enlistment of troops on account of the insurrection in 
Massachusetts — Dutch Minister complains of preferences in treaty 
with France — Seizure of Spanish property by General Clark. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, February 

25, 1787 ... .619 

Congress sanction the Federal Convention — Embarrassment of the 
treasury — Prospect of disunion. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, March 11, 

1787 620 

Insurrection in Massachusetts — Appointments by States of Dele- 
gates to the Federal Convention — Negotiations between Mr. Jay 
and Mr. Gardoqui. 

To Thomas Jefferson. New York, March 19, 

1787 . .' 622 

Mr. Jay's report relative to the effect of the British treaty of peace 
— Navigation of the Mississippi — Opinions of several States in re- 
gard to it — Disturbances in the Western Territory on account of it 
— Views of French about it — Dutch Minister complains of prefer- 
ences in the treaty with France — Insurrection in Massachusetts — 
Vermont — Survey of public lands — Paper money in Virginia. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, March 25, 

1787 ...... 627 

Mr. Henry — Navigation of the Mississippi — Views of France about 



VI CONTENTS. 

it — Time of meeting of the Federal Convention — Resolutions of 
Congress on the effect of treaties on the States. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, April 2, 

1787 629 

Mr. Gardoqui — Representations of Virginia relative to the seizure 
of Spanish property by General Clark — Views of several States 
relative to the Mississippi — Rhode Island against the Federal 
Convention. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, April 8, 

1787 630 

Marriage of French subjects in America — Propositions in the Fed- 
eral Convention expected from Virginia — Mr. Madison's ideas of a 
Federal Constitution. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, April 15, 

1787 634 

General "Washington as President of the Federal Convention — Doc- 
tor Franklin also a Delegate — Claims of British creditors under the 
treaty of peace — Approaching meeting of the Federal Convention 
— Debates relative to the future seat of Congress — Number of 
States required to authorize a suspension of the use of Mississippi. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, April 22, 

1787 . . ... 637 

Sale of public lands — Land jobbers — Copper coinage — Opinions in 
Massachusetts and Connecticut relative to the Federal Convention t 

To Thomas Jefferson. New York, April 23, 

1787 639 

Resolutions of Congress on the effect of treaties on the States — 
Survey and sale of public lands — Government of the Western Ter- 
ritory — Settlement of public accounts and claims of the States — 
Navigation of the Mississippi, and views of the States on it — Pro- 
ceedings of States relative to Federal Convention. 

To General Washington. New York, Sep- 
tember 30, 1787 .... 643 

Debates in Congress on Federal Constitution — Proposal to amend 
it there — Transmitted to the States — Opinions on it. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, October 7, 

1787 647 

Requisitions on the States — Western Territory — Indians — Opin- 



CONTENTS. Til 

ions in Massachusetts on Federal Constitution — Mr. Adams is to 
return home. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, October 

21, 1787 649 

Opinions on Federal Constitution in different States. 

To Thomas Jefferson. New York, October 

24, 1787 650 

Proposal of amendments by Congress — R. H. Lee — Dana — Mason- 
Return of Mr. Adams — Reappointment of Mr. Jefferson — Exchange 
of French for Dutch creditors not approved— State of foreign loans 
— Sales of public lands. 

To General Washington. New York, Octo- 
ber 28, 1787 .... 652 
Prospects for establishment of Federal Constitution — Mr. Charles 
Pinckney — Navigation of Potomac. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, November 

18, 1787 654 

Opinions on Federal Constitution. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, December 

2, 1787 654 

Dissensions in Holland — Commencement of the Federalist — Pro- 
ceedings of States on Federal Constitution. 

To Thomas Jefferson. New York, December 

20, 1787 .... 656 

Tobacco contract with France — Proceedings of States on Federal 
Constitution — Prohibition by Virginia of certain imports — Reduced 
state of the Treasury — Indians— British ports. 

To General Washington. New York, De- 
cember 20, 1787 .... 659 

Mr. R. H. Lee's views on Federal Constitution — Mr. Mason's — 
Mr. Jay's — Navigation of Potomac — Proceedings of States on Fed- 
eral Constitution. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, January 

10, 1788 . . . . . 661 

Mr. Randolph's views of Federal Constitution — Mr. Henry's — Mr. 

S. Adams's — Proceedings of States on it — Proposal of second Coi> 

vention. 

Vol. II.— A* 



Vlll CONTENTS. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, January 

20, 1788 665 

European news — Proceedings of States on Federal Constitution. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, January 

27, 1788 .... 666 

Mr. C. Griffin elected President of Congress — Proceedings in Con- 
vention of Massachusetts — Mr. Gerry and Mr. Dana — Criticisms 
on views of Mr. Randolph, Mr. Gerry, and Col. Mason. 

To General Washington. New York, Febru- 
ary 3, 1788 668 

Proceedings in Convention of Massachusetts. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, March 3, 

1788 670 

Proceedings of States on Federal Constitution. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, July 2, 

1788 . . . . . . 671 

Mr. Jefferson's opinions on Federal Constitution — Future seat of 
Congress. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, July 16, 

1788 672 

Proceedings in Convention of New York. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, July 22, 

1788 672 

Proceedings in Convention of New York. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, August 

11,1788 673 

Future seat of Congress. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, August 22, 

1788 674 

George Clinton's views on Federal Constitution. — Proposal for sec- 
ond Convention. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, Septem- 
ber 14, 1788 ..... 675 
Proceedings of Congress for organizing the Federal government — 
Future seat of Congress. 



CONTENTS. IX 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, September 

24, 1788 ..... 676 

State of trade in Virginia — British debts : — British ports— Naviga- 
tion of Mississippi. 

To General Washington. New York, Septem- 
ber 26, 1788 677 

Resolutions of Congress relative to navigation of Mississippi. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, October 

18, 1788 . . . . . 679 

Effect of American Revolution on reform in Europe — Mr. Madi- 
son's sentiments on being a candidate for Congress. 

To Edmund Randolph. New York, November 

2, 1788 680 

Feelings of opponents of Federal Constitution towards Mr. Madi- 
son — His sentiments on being a candidate for Congress. 



DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 
FROM MONDAY, MAY 14th, 1787, TO MONDAY, 
AUGUST 6th, 1787. 

Introduction 685 

Confederacies — Meeting of Colonial Deputies at Albany, in 1754 — 
Congress of 1774 — Declaration of Independence — Articles of Con- 
federation — Difficulties arising from the public lands, and duties 
on foreign commerce — Want of a permanent revenue — Resolution 
of Virginia for a Convention — Meeting of the Convention at An- 
napolis, in 17S6 — Recommends Federal Convention — Proceedings 
of Virginia and other States — Previous suggestions for a Conven- 
tion by Pelatiah Webster, General Schuyler, Alexander Hamilton, 
Richard H. Lee, and Noah Webster— Defects to be provided for 
by a Constitution — Mr. Madison's sketch — Meeting of Federal 
Convention in 1787 — Manner in which the Reports of the Debates 
were taken. 



X CONTENTS. 

Friday, May 25th, . . . . . 721 

Organization of Convention — General Washington chosen Presi- 
dent, and Major Jackson Secretary — Delaware credentials — Com- 
mittee on Rules. 

Monday, May 28th .."'.. . . . 723 

Rules reported — No yeas and nays required — Vote by States — Let- 
ter from Rhode Island. 

Tuesday, May 29th .... 727 

Additional rules — Keeping of minutes — Convention goes into Com- 
mittee of the Whole — Mr. Randolph submits fifteen propositions— 
His remarks — Propositions stated — Mr. Charles Pinckney submits 
a plan of a Constitution — Plan stated. 

Wednesday, May 30th . . . 746 

Mr. Randolph's first proposition withdrawn, and a substitute offer- 
ed — The proposed government to be National, and to consist of a 
Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. 

Mr. Randolph's second proposition — The right of suffrage in the 
National Legislature, to be proportioned to the quotas of contribu- 
tion, or the number of free inhabitants as is best in different cases 
— Postponed. 

Thursday, May 31st .... 753 

Mr. Randolph's third proposition — The National Legislature to 
have two branches — Agreed to. 

Mr. Randolph 'sfourt h proposition — First branch of the National 
Legislature to be elected by the people — Agreed to — Qualifications 
&c. of members of first branch — Postponed. 

Mr. Randolph's fifth proposition — Second branch of the National 
Legislature to be chosen by the first branch, from nominations by 
State Legislatures — Disagreed to — Qualifications of members of 
second branch — Not considered. 

Mr. Randolph's sixth proposition — Powers of the National Leg- 
islature — Each branch to originate laws — Agreed to — National 
Legislature to possess all the legislative powers of the Congress 
of the Confederation, to pass laws where State Legislatures are 
incompetent ; or where necessary to preserve harmony among the 
the States ; and to negative State laws contravening the articles 
of union or foreign treaties — Agreed to — The National Legislature 
authorized to exert the force of the whole against a delinquent 
State — Postponed. 



CONTENTS. XI 

Friday, June 1st 762 

Mr. Randolph's seventh proposition — The National Executive to 
possess the Executive powers of the Congress of the Confedera- 
tion — Amended, to possess power to execute the National laws, 
and appoint to offices not otherwise provided for — Amendment 

agreed to — To be chosen for a term of years — Amended, for 

seven years — Amendment agreed to — To be chosen by the Nation- 
al Legislature — Postponed. 

Saturday, June 2d . . . . . 768 

Mr. Randolph's seventh proposition — The National Executive to 
be chosen by the National Legislature, resumed — Agreed to — To 
receive fixed compensation — Amended, to receive no salary, but ex- 
penses to be defrayed — Amendment postponed — To be ineligible a 
second time — Amended, to be removable on impeachment — Clause 
and amendment agreed to — To consist of persons — Postponed. 

Monday, June 4th 781 

Mr. Randolph's seventh proposition — The National Executive to 

consist of persons, resumed — Amended, a single person — 

Agreed to. 

Mr. Randolph's eighth proposition — A Council of Revision, to 
consist of the National Executive, and a convenient number of the 
National Judiciary, to have a negative on acts of National Legisla- 
ture unless again passed by Members of each branch — Amended, 

to give the National Executive alone that power, unless overruled 
by two thirds of each branch of the National Legislature — Amend- 
ment agreed to. 

Mr. Randolph's ninth proposition — The National Judiciary to be 
established — Agreed to — To consist of one or more supreme tri- 
bunals and of inferior tribunals — Amended to consist of one supreme 
tribunal and of inferior tribunals — Amendment agreed to. 

Tuesday, June 5th . . . . . 792 

Mr. Randolph's ninth proposition — The National Judiciary to be 
chosen by the National Legislature — Disagreed to — To hold office 
during good behaviour and to receive fixed compensation — Agreed 
to — To have jurisdiction over offences at sea, captures, cases ol 
foreigners and citizens of different States, of National revenue, im- 
peachments of National officers, and questions of National peace 
and harmony — Postponed. 

Mr. Randolph's tenth proposition — New States to be admitted — 
Agreed to. 

Mr. Randolph's eleventh proposition — Republican government 



Xll CONTENTS. 

and its territory, except in case of voluntary junction, to be guar- 
anteed to each State — Postponed. 

Mr. Randolph's twelfth proposition — The Congress of the Con- 
federation to continue till a given day, and its engagements to be 
fulfilled — Agreed to. 

Mr. Randolph's thirteenth proposition— Provision to be made 
for amendments of the Constitution, without the assent of the Na- 
tional Legislature — Postponed. 

Mr. Randolph's fourteenth proposition — National and State offi- 
cers to take an oath to support the National Government — Post- 
poned. 

Mr. Randolph's fifteenth proposition — The Constitution to be 
ratified by Conventions of the people of the States recommended 
by the State Legislatures — Postponed. 
£ Motion to strike out " inferior tribunals" in the ninth proposition 
— Agreed to. 

Motion to amend the ninth proposition, so as to empower the 
National Legislature to institute inferior tribunals — Agreed to. 

Wednesday, June 6th . . . . 816 

Motion to amend fourth proposition so as to provide that the first 
branch of the National Legislature be elected by the State Legis- 
latures — Disagreed to. 

Motion to reconsider the vote on the eighth proposition, so as to 
unite a convenient number of the National Judiciary with the Na- 
tional Executive in the revision of the acts of the National Legis- 
lature — Disagreed to. 

Motions to supply the blank occasioned by the disagreement to 
Mr. Randolph's fifth proposition relative to the mode of choosing 
the second branch of the National Legislature — To be elected by 
the people divided into large districts — Disagreed to — To be ap- 
pointed by the National Executive out of nominations by the State 
Legislatures — Disagreed to — To be chosen by the State Legisla- 
tures — Agreed to. 

Friday, June 8th . . ... 821 

Motion, on a reconsideration of that part of the sixth proposition 
which gives the National Legislature power to negative State laws 
contravening the articles of union, or foreign treaties, to extend the 
power so as to authorize the National Legislature to negative all 
laws which they should judge to be improper — Disagreed to. 

Saturday, June 9th .... 828 

Motion, on a reconsideration of that part of the seventh proposition 



CONTENTS. Xlll 

which declares that the National Executive shall be chosen by the 
National Legislature, to substitute therefor that the National Exe- 
cutive be elected by the Executives of the States, their proportion 
of votes to be the same as in electing the second branch of the 
National Legislature — Disagreed to. 

Monday, June 11th 835 

Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's second proposition, as to the 
right of suffrage in the National Legislature, which had been post- 
poned — Agreed to — Motion to substitute therefor that the right of 
suffrage in the National Legislature ought not to be according to 
the rule in the Articles of Confederation, (an equality, each State 
having one vote therein,) but according to some equitable ratio of 
representation — Agreed to — Motion that this equitable ratio of re- 
presentation should be according to the quotas of contribution — 
Postponed — Motion that this equitable ratio of representation 
should be in proportion to the number of free citizens and inhabit- 
ants, and three fifths of other persons in each State — Agreed to — 
Motion that there should be an equality of suffrage in the second 
branch of the National Legislature, each State to have one vote 
therein — Disagreed to — Motion that the right of suffrage should 
be the same in each branch — Agreed to. 

Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's eleventh proposition, guaran- 
teeing republican government and its territory to each State, which 
had been postponed — Agreed to — Motion to amend it, so as to guar- 
antee to each State a republican Constitution, and its existing laws 
—Agreed to. 

Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's thirteenth proposition, provi- 
ding for amendments to the Constitution, which had been post- 
poned, agreed to — Motion that provision for amendments ought to 
be made — Agreed to — That the assent of the National Legislature 
ought not to be required — Postponed. 

Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's fourteenth proposition, requi- 
ring oaths of National and State officers to observe the National 
Constitution, which had been postponed — Agreed to — Motion to 
strike out the part requiring oaths of State officers — Disagreed to 
— Proposition agreed to. 

Tuesday, June 12th .... 846 

Mr. Randolph's fifteenth proposition relative to ratification of the 
Constitution by State Conventions considered and agreed to. 

Motion to consider that part of Mr. Randolph's fourth proposi- 
tion relative to the qualifications of the members of the first branch, 
which had been postponed — Agreed to — Motion that the members 



XIV CONTENTS. 

of the first branch shall be elected every three years — Agreed to — 

Shall be of years of age — Disagreed to — Shall be allowed a 

fixed compensation, to be paid out of the National Treasury — 
Agreed to— Shall be ineligible to State or National offices during 
their term of service, or for one year after — Agreed to — Shall be 

incapable of re-election for years after, and subject to recall 

— Disagreed to. 

The part of Mr. Randolph's fifth proposition relative to qualifi- 
cations of the members of the second branch, considered — Motion 
that the members of the second branch shall be of the age of 
thirty years — Agreed to — Shall hold their offices for the term of 
seven years — Agreed to — Shall be entitled to no compensation — 
Disagreed to — Shall be subject to the same qualifications as to 
compensation and ineligibility as the members of the first branch 
—Agreed to. 

Wednesday, June 13th .... 855 

The part of Mr. Randolph's ninth proposition relative to the juris- 
diction of the National Judiciary was struck out — Motion that 
National Judiciary shall have jurisdiction in cases of national rev- 
enue, impeachments of national officers and questions of national 
peace and harmony — Agreed to — Motion that the judges of the 
supreme tribunal be appointed by the second branch (Senate) of 
National Legislature — Agreed to. 

Motion to amend that part of the sixth proposition which em- 
powers each branch to originate acts by restraining the second 
(senatorial) branch from originating money bills — Disagreed to. 

State of the resolutions (nineteen in number) as adopted by the 
Committee of the Whole ; and founded on Mr. Randolph's fifteen 
propositions. 

Friday, June 15th . . . . . 862 

Mr. Patterson submits nine propositions to be substituted for those 
of Mr. Randolph — Propositions stated. 

Saturday, June 16th . . . . 867 

Mr. Patterson's first proposition — The Articles of Confederation to 
be revised and enlarged — Adjourned. 

Monday, June 18th .... 879 

Mr. Patterson's first proposition — The Articles of Confederation to 
be revised and enlarged, resumed — Motion to amend so as to pro- 
vide for an adequate government of the United States — Post- 
poned. 

Mr. Hamilton submits eleven propositions as amendments which 



CONTENTS. XV 

he should probably offer to those of Mr. Randolph — Read but 
not moved. 

Tuesday, June 19th . . . 893 

Motion to amend Mr. Patterson's first proposition so as to provide 
for an adequate government of the United States, resumed — Dis- 
agreed to — Motion to postpone Mr. Patterson's first proposition — 
Agreed to. 

Motion for the Committee of the Whole to rise and report the 
nineteen resolutions founded on Mr. Randolph's propositions as 
amended and adopted in committee — Agreed to. 

First resolution establishing a National Government to consist 
of a Legislative, Executive and Judiciary, considered by the Con- 
vention. 

Wednesday, June 20th .... 908 

First resolution, establishing a National Government, resumed — 
Motion to amend so as to establish a government of the United 
States — Agreed to. 

Second resolution that the National Legislature consist of two 
branches — Motion to amend by striking out National — Agreed to 
— Motion to amend by declaring that legislation be vested in the 
United States in Congress — Disagreed to. 

Thursday, June 21st .... 920 

Second resolution, that the Legislature consist of two branches, re- 
sumed — Agreed to. 

Third resolution, fixing election, term, qualifications, &c. of the 

first branch of the Legislature — Motion to amend so as to provide 

that the election of the first branch be, as the State Legislatures, 

direct — Disagreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that the 

s term of the first branch be for two years— Agreed to. 

Friday, June 22d , 931 

Third resolution fixing election, term, qualifications, &c. of the 
first branch, resumed — Motion to amend so as to provide that the 
compensation of members of the first branch shall be fixed by the 
National Legislature — Disagreed to — Motion to amend, by stri- 
king out its payment from the National Treasury — Disagreed to — 
Motion to amend so as to provide that the compensation shall be 
fixed — Agreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that the 
members of the first branch shall be twenty-five years of age — 
Agreed to — Motion to amend by striking out the ineligibility of 
members of the first branch — Disagreed to. 
Vol. II.— B 



XVI CONTENTS. 

Saturday, June 23d .... S38 

Third resolution for fixing the qualifications, fee. of the first branch, 
resumed — Motion to amend by striking out the ineligibility of the 
members to State offices— Agreed to — Motion to amend by confer- 
ring their ineligibility to such National offices as had been estab- 
lished, or their emoluments increased while they were members — 
Disagreed to— Motion to confine their ineligibility to National 
offices, during one year after their term of service is expired — 
Agree^ to. 

Monday, June 25th . . . . . 945 

Fourth resolution, fixing election, term, qualifications, &c. of the 
second branch of the Legislature — Motions to amend the clause 
relating to their term of office by making it six or five years — Dis- 
agreed to. 

Tuesday, June 26th . . . . 961 

Fourth resolution relative to the term of the second branch of the 
Legislature, resumed — Motion to amend so as to make their term 
nine years, one third to go out every third year — Disagreed to — To 
make their term six years, one third to go out every second year 
— Agreed to — Motion to amend by striking out their compensation 
— Disagreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that their com- 
pensation be paid by the States — Disagreed to — Motion to provide 
that their compensation be paid out of the National Treasury — 
Disagreed to — Motion to amend by striking out the ineligibility of 
the member to State offices — Agreed to — Motion to confine their 
ineligibility to National offices during one year after their term of 
service is expired. 

Wednesday, June 27th .... 973 

Fifth resolution authorizing each branch to originate acts — 
Agreed to. 

Sixth resolution defining the powers of the Legislature — Post- 
poned. 

Seventh resolution fixing the right of suffrage in the first branch 
of the Legislature, considered. 

Thursday, June 28th .... 976 

Seventh resolution, fixing the right of suffrage m the first branch, 
resumed — Motion to amend so as to provide that the right of suf- 
frage in the first branch should be the same as in the Articles of 
the Confederation, (an equality, each State having one vote there- 
in) — Postponed. 



CONTENTS. XV11 

Friday, June 29th . . ... 987 

Amendment proposed to the seventh resolution, so as to give each 
State an equal suffrage in the first branch, resumed — Disagreed to 
— Remaining clauses of seventh resolution postponed. 

Eighth resolution, fixing the same right of suffrage in the second 
branch of the Legislature as in the first — Motion to amend so as 
provide that each State should have an equal suffrage in the sec- 
ond branch — Adjourned. 

Saturday, June 30th . . . . 998 

Amendment proposed to the eighth resolution, so as to give each 
State an equal suffrage in the second branch, resumed — Proposi- 
tion to amend so as to provide that each State should send an 
equal number of members to the second branch ; that in all ques- 
tions of State sovereignty and of appointments to office, each State 
shall have an equal suffrage, and that in fixing salaries and appro- 
priations, each State shall vote in proportion to its contributions to 
the Treasury" — Not moved. 

Monday, July 2d ... 1016 

Amendment proposed to the eighth resolution, so as to give each 
State an equal suffrage in the second branch, resumed — Disa- 
greed to. 

Motion to refer the clauses of the seventh and eighth resolutions, 
relating to the suffrages of both branches of the Legislature, to a 
Committee — Agreed to. 

Thursday, July 5th .... 1024 

Report of Committee to amend the seventh resolution so as to pro- 
vide that the proportion of suffrage of each State in the first branch, 
shall be one member for every forty thousand inhabitants of the 
description mentioned in that resolution, that each State shall have 
one member in the first branch ; that all bills for raising or appro- 
priating money shall originate in the first branch, and not be alter- 
ed m the second ; and that no payments shall be made from the 
Treasury except on appropriations by law. 

Report to amend the eighth resolution so as to provide that each 
State shall have an equal suffrage in the second branch. 

Friday, July 6th . . . . . 1036 

Clause of the report on the seventh resolution, providing that the 
proportion of suffrage of each State in the first branch, should be 
one member for every forty thousand inhabitants, resumed — Refer- 
red to a Committee— Clause of the report on the seventh resolution 



XV111 CONTENTS. 

providing that all money bills shall originate in the first branch, 
resumed — Agreed to. 

Saturday, July 7th .... 1046 

Report on the eighth resolution, providing that each State shall 
have an equal suffrage in the second branch, resumed — Agreed to. 

Monday, July 9th . . . . 1051 

Report of the Committee, to amend the clause of the seventh res- 
olution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the first branch, by 
fixing at present the whole number therein at forty-six, and appor- 
tioning them in a certain ratio among the States, considered — Re- 
ferred to another Committee. 

Report of the Committee, providing that the future number of 
members of the first branch may be altered from time to time and 
fixed by the Legislature, on the principles of the wealth and num- 
bers of inhabitants of each State — Agreed to. 

Tuesday, July 10th . . . . 1056 

Report of the Committee on the seventh resolution, providing that 
at present the whole number of members in the first branch shall 
be sixty-five and apportioning them in a certain ratio among the 

States — Agreed to — Motion that a census be taken every 

years, and the representation in the first branch be arranged by the 
Legislature accordingly — Adjourned. 

Wednesday, July 11th . . . 1064 

Amendment to the seventh resolution, requiring the future repre- 
sentation to be arranged by the Legislature according to a periodi- 
cal census, resumed — Motion to amend it by requiring the Legis- 
lature to arrange the representation according to a census of the 
free inhabitants, taken at least every fifteen years — Agreed to — 
Motion farther to amend by requiring the census to include three 
fifths of the negroes — Disagreed to. 

Thursday, July 12th . . . . 1079 

Seventh resolution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the first 
branch, resumed — Motion to provide that representation and direct 
taxation shall be in the same proportion — Agreed to — Motion to 
provide that for the future arrangement of representation, a census 
shall be taken within six years, and within every ten years after- 
wards, and that it shall be made according to the whole number 
of inhabitants, rating the blacks at three fifths of their number — 
Agreed to. 



CONTENTS. XIX 

Friday, July 13th . ".. . . . 1087 

Seventh resolution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the first 
branch, resumed — Motion to provide that until the first census be 
taken, the proportion of the representatives from the States in the 
first branch, and the moneys raised from them by direct taxation 
shall be the same — Agreed to — Motion to strike out the amend- 
ment heretofore made for regulating future representation on the 
principle of wealth — Agreed to. 

Saturday, July 14th . . . . 1094 

Seventh resolution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the first 
branch, resumed — Motion that the number of representatives in 
the first branch from neAv States, shall never exceed those of the 
present States — Disagreed to. 

Eighth resolution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the 
second branch, resumed — Motion to provide that the second branch 
shall consist of thirty-six members, distributed among the States 
in certain proportions — Disagreed to. 

Monday, July 16th .... 1107 

Seventh and eighth resolutions as amended, and fixing the suffrage 
in both branches, resumed — Agreed to. 

Sixth resolution defining the powers of the Legislature, resumed 
— Motion to amend by giving a specification of the powers not 
comprised in general terms — Disagreed to. 

Tuesday, July 17th . . -'. 1114 

Sixth resolution, defining the powers of the Legislature, resumed — 
Motion to amend, so as to provide that the National Legislature 
should not interfere with the governments of the States in matters 
of internal police, in which the general welfare of the United 
States is not concerned — Disagreed to — Motion to amend so as to* 
extend the power of the Legislature to cases affecting the general 
interests of the Union— Agreed to — Motion to agree to the power 
of negativing State laws — Disagreed to— Motion to provide that 
the acts of the Legislature, and treaties made in pursuance of the 
Constitution, shall bind the several States — Agreed to. 

Ninth resolution, relative to National Executive — Motion to 
amend so as to provide that the Executive be chosen by the people 
— Disagreed to — That he be chosen by Electors appointed by the 
State Legislatures — Disagreed to — Motion to amend by striking 
out the provision that the Executive is to be ineligible a second 
time— Agreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that the 
term of the Executive should be during good behaviour — Disa- 



XX CONTENTS. 

greed to — Motion to amend by striking out seven years as the Ex- 
ecutive term — Disagreed to. 

Wednesday, July 18th .... 1130 

Tenth resolution, giving the Executive a negative on acts of the 
Legislature not afterwards passed by two thirds — Agreed to. 

Eleventh resolution, relative to the Judiciary — Motion to amend 
so as to provide that the supreme judges be appointed by the Exe- 
cutive — Disagreed to — That they be nominated and appointed by 
the Executive, with the consent of two thirds of the second branch 
— Disagreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that their com- 
pensation shall not be diminished while in office — Agreed to. 

Twelfth resolution, relative to the establishment of inferior Na- 
tional tribunals, by the Legislature — Agreed to. 

Thirteenth resolution, relative to the powers of the National Ju- 
diciary—Motion to amend by striking out their power in regard to 
impeachment of National officers — Agreed to — Motion to amend 
so as to provide that their power shall extend to all cases arising 
under the National laws, or involving the National peace and har- 
mony — Agreed to. 

Fourteenth resolution, providing for the admission of new States 
— Agreed to. 

Fifteenth resolution, providing for the continuance of the Con- 
gress of the Confederation and the completion of its engagements 
— Disagreed to. 

Sixteenth resolution, guaranteeing a republican government and 
their existing laws to the States — Motion to amend so as to pro- 
vide that a republican form of government, and protection against 
foreign and domestic violence, be guaranteed to each State- - 
Agreed to. 

Thursday, July 19th .... 1141 

Ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed — 
Motion to amend so as to provide that the Executive be chosen by 
Electors chosen by the State Legislatures — Agreed to — Motion to 
amend so as to provide that the Executive shall be ineligible a 
second time — Disagreed to — Motion to amend by making the Exe- 
cutive term six years — Agreed to. 

Friday, July 20th . . . . 1152 

Ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed — Mo- 
tion to provide that the number of Electors of the Executive to be 
chosen by the State Legislatures shall be regulated by their re- 
spective numbers of representatives in the first branch, and that 



CONTENTS. XXI 

at present it shall be in a prescribed ratio — Agreed to — Motion to 
amend by striking out the provision for impeaching the Executive 
— Disagreed to — Motion to provide that the Electors of the Execu- 
tive shall not be members of the National Legislature, nor National 
officers, nor eligible to the supreme magistracy — Agreed to. 

Saturday, July 21st : 1161 

Ninth resolution, relative to National Executive, resumed — Motion 
to provide for the payment of the Electors of the Executive out of 
the National Treasury — Agreed to. 

Tenth resolution, relative to the negative of the Executive on the 
Legislature, resumed — Motion to amend by providing that the 
Supreme Judiciary be associated in this power — Disagreed to. 

Eleventh resolution, relative to Judiciary, resumed — Motion to 
provide that the Judges be nominated by the Executive, and ap- 
pointed, unless two thirds of the second branch disagree thereto — 
Disagreed to. 

Monday, July 23d . . . . . 1175 

Seventeenth resolution, providing for future amendments — Agreed to. 

Eighteenth resolution, requiring the oath of State officers to sup- 
port the Constitution — Agreed to. 

Nineteenth resolution, requiring the ratification of the Constitu- 
tion by State Conventions — Motion to amend by providing for its 
reference to the State Legislatures — Disagreed to — Motion to a 
second Federal Convention — Not seconded. 

The eighth resolution, relative to the suffrage in the second 
branch, resumed — Motion to amend so as to provide that the rep- 
resentation consist of two members from each State, who shall 
vote per capita — Agreed to. 

Tuesday, July 24th . . 1188 

Ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed — Mo- 
tion to amend so as to provide that he be appointed by the National 
Legislature, and not by Electors chosen by the State Legislatures, 
Agreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that the Executive 
be chosen by Electors taken by lot from the National Legislature 
— Postponed. 

The resolutions as amended and adopted, together with the 
propositions submitted by Mr. Patterson, and the plan proposed by 
Mr. C. Pinckney, referred to a Committee of Detail, to report a 
Constitution conformable to the resolutions. 

Wednesday, July 25th : 1197 

Ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed— 



XX11 CONTENTS. 

Motion to appoint the Executive by Electors appointed by State 
Legislatures, where the actual Executive is re-eligible — Disagreed 
to — Motion to appoint the Executive by the Governors of States 
and their Councils — Not passed — Motion that no person be eligible 
to the Executive for more than six years in twelve — Disagreed to. 
— Motion to authorize copies to be taken of the resolutions as 
adopted — Disagreed to. 

Thursday, July 26th . . . . 1207 

The ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed 
— Motion that the Executive be for seven years, and not re-eligible 
— Agreed to. 

The third and fourth resolutions, relative to the qualifications 
of the members of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to require 
property and citizenship — Agreed to — Motion to exclude persons 
indebted to the United States — Disagreed to. 

Statement of the resolutions as amended agreed to, and referred 
to the Committee of Detail. 

Plan of a Federal Constitution, offered by Mr. Charles Pinckney 
on the 29th May, referred to the Committee of Detail. 

Propositions offered by Mr. Patterson on the 15th June, referred 
to the Committee of Detail. 

Monday, August 6th .... 1226 

Report of Committee of Detail. 
Draught of a Constitution, as reported by the Committee. 



DEBATES 



IN THE 

CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION, 

FROM 

FEBRUARY 19TH, TILL APRIL 25TH, 1787. 



DEBATES 



IN THE 



CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION, 

FROM FEBRUARY 19TH TILL APRIL 25TH, 1787. 



In Congress, Monday, February 19, 1787.* 

Mr. Pinckney, in support of his motion entered on 
the Journal, for stopping the enlistment of troops, 
argued that he had reason to suppose the insurrection 
in Massachusetts, the real, though not ostensible ob- 
ject of this measure, to be already crushed; that the 
requisition of five hundred thousand dollars for sup- 
porting the troops had been complied with by one 
State only, viz. Virginia, and that but in part ; that 
it would be absurd to proceed in the raising of men 
who could neither be paid, clothed nor fed, and that 
such a folly was the more to be shunned, as the con- 
sequences could not be foreseen, of embodying and 
arming men under circumstances which would be 
more likely to render them the terror than the 
support of the Government. We had, he observed, 
been so lucky in one instance — meaning the dis- 
banding of the army on the peace — as to get rid of 
an armed force without satisfying their just claims; 
but that it would not be prudent to hazard the 
repetition of the experiment. 

Mr. King made a moving appeal to the feelings of 

* From 1783 till this period Mr. Madison was not a member. 



582 DEBATES. [1787. 

Congress, reminding them that the real object in 
voting the troops was, to countenance the exertions 
of the Government of Massachusetts ; that the silent 
co-operation of these military preparations under the 
orders of Congress had had a great and double effect, 
in animating the Government and awing the insur- 
gents ; that he hoped the late success of the former 
had given a deadly blow to the disturbances, yet 
that it would be premature, whilst a doubt could 
exist as to the critical fact, to withdraw the co-ope- 
rating influence of the Federal measures. He par- 
ticularly and pathetically entreated Congress tc 
consider that it was in agitation, and probably 
would be determined by the Legislature of Massa- 
chusetts, not only to bring to due punishment the 
more active and leading offenders, but to disarm 
and disfranchize, for a limited time, the great body 
of them; that for the policy of this measure he 
would not undertake to vouch, being sensible that 
there were great and illustrious examples against it ; 
that his confidence, however, in the prudence of that 
Government, would not permit him to call their 
determinations into question; that what the effect 
of these rigors might be it was impossible to foresee. 
He dwelt much on the sympathy which they pro- 
bably would excite in behalf of the stigmatized 
party ; scarce a man was without a father, a brother, 
a friend, in the mass of the people ; adding that, as 
a precaution against contingencies, it was the pur- 
pose of the State to raise and station a small mili- 
tary force in the most suspected districts, and that 
forty thousand pounds, to be drawn from their 
impost on trade, had been appropriated accordingly; 



1787.] DEBATES. 583 

that under these circumstances a new crisis more 
solemn than the late one might be brought on, and 
therefore to stop the Federal enlistments, and thereby 
withdraw the aid which had been held out, would 
give the greatest alarm imaginable to the Govern- 
ment and its friends, as it would look like a disap- 
probation and desertion of them ; and, if viewed in 
that light by the disaffected, might rekindle the 
insurrection. He took notice of the possibility, to 
which every State in the Union was exposed, of 
being visited with similar calamities ; in which event 
they would all be suing for support in the same 
strain now used by the Delegates from Massachu- 
setts ; that the indulgence now requested in behalf 
of that State might be granted without the least 
inconvenience to the United States, as their enlist- 
ments, without any countermanding orders, would 
not go on whilst those of the State were in compe- 
tition ; it being natural for men to prefer the latter 
service, in which they would stay at home, and be 
sure of their pay, to the former, in which they might, 
with little prospect of it, be sent to the Ohio to fight 
the Indians. He concluded with the most earnest 
entreaties, and the fullest confidence, that Congress 
would not, at so critical a moment, and without any 
necessity whatever, agree to the motion, assuring 
them that in three or four weeks, possibly in less 
time, he might himself be a friend to it, and would 
promote it. 

Mr. Pinckney, in reply, contended, that if the 
measures pursuing by Massachusetts were such as 
had been stated, he did not think the United States 
bound to give them countenance. He thought them 



584 DEBATES. [1787. 

impolitic, and not to be reconciled with the genius 
of free governments ; and if fresh commotions should 
spring from them, that the State of Massachusetts 
alone should be at the charge, and abide by the 
consequences of their own misconduct. 

Mr. Madison would not examine whether the 
original views of Congress, in the enlargement of 
their military force, were proper or not ; nor whether 
it were so, to mask their views with an ostensible 
preparation against the Indians. He admitted, 
indeed, that it appeared rather difficult to reconcile 
an interference of Congress in the internal contro- 
versies of a State with the tenor of the Confedera- 
tion, which does not authorize it expressly, and 
leaves to the States all powers not expressly dele- 
gated; — or with the principles of republican govern- 
ments, which, as they rest on the sense of the 
majority, necessarily suppose power and right al- 
ways to be on the same side. He observed, how- 
ever, that in one point of our view military precau- 
tions on the part of Congress might have a different 
aspect. Whenever danger was apprehended from 
any foreign quarter, which, of necessity, extended 
itself to the Federal concerns, Congress were bound 
to guard against it, and although there might be no 
particular evidence in this case of such a meditated 
interference, yet there was sufficient ground for a 
general suspicion of readiness in Great Britain to 
take advantage of events in this country, to warrant 
precautions against her. But waving the question 
as to the original propriety of the measure adopted, 
and attending merely to the question whether at 
this moment the measure ought, from a change of 



1787.] DEBATES. 585 

circumstances, to be rescinded, he was inclined to 
think it would be more advisable to suspend than to 
go instantly into the recision. The considerations 
which led to this opinion were — 

First. That though it appeared pretty certain 
that the main body of the insurgents had been dis- 
persed, it was by no means certain that the spirit of 
insurrection was subdued. The leaders, too, of the 
insurgents had not been apprehended, and parties of 
them were still in arms in disaffected places. 

Secondly. That great respect is due on such occa- 
sions to the wishes and representations of the suffer- 
ing member of the Federal body, both of which 
must be judged of by what comes from her repre- 
sentatives on the floor. These tell us that the mea- 
sures taken by Congress have given great satisfaction 
and spirits to their constituents, and have co-operated 
much in baffling the views of their internal enemies ; 
that they are pursuing very critical precautions at 
this moment for their future safety and tranquillity ; 
and that the construction which will be put on the 
proposed resolution, if agreed to by Congress, cannot 
fail to make very unhappy impressions, and may 
have very serious consequences. The propriety of 
these precautions depends on so many circumstances 
better known to the Government of Massachusetts 
than to Congress, that it would be premature in 
Congress to be governed by a disapprobation. 

Thirdly. That every State ought to bear in mind 
the consequences of popular commotions, if not 
thoroughly subdued, on the tranquillity of the 
Union, and the possibility of being itself the scene 
of them. Every State ought, therefore, to submit 

Vol. I.— 37 * 



586 DEBATES. [1787. 

with cheerfulness to such indulgences to others as 
itself may, in a little time, be in need of. He had 
been a witness of the temper of his own State 
(Virginia) on this occasion. It was understood by 
the Legislature that the real object of the military 
preparations on foot was the disturbances in Massa- 
chusetts, and that very consideration inspired the 
ardor which voted, towards their quota, a tax on 
tobacco, which would not have been granted for 
scarce any other purpose whatever, being a tax 
operating very partially, in the opinion of the people 
of that State who cultivate that article ; yet this 
class of the Legislature were almost unanimous in 
making the sacrifice, because the fund was con- 
sidered as the most certain that could be provided. 

Fourthly. That it was probable the enlistments, 
for the reasons given, would be suspended without 
an order from Congress ; in which case the incon- 
venience suggested would be saved to the United 
States, and the wishes of Massachusetts satisfied at 
the same time. 

Fifthly. That as no bounty was given for the 
troops, and they could be dismissed at any time, the 
objections drawn from the consideration of expense 
would have but little force. 

Sixthly. That it was contended for a continuance 
of the apparent aid of Congress, for only three or 
four weeks, the members from Massachusetts them- 
selves considering that as a sufficient time. 

After the rejection of the motion, as stated on the 
Journal, a dispute arose whether the vote should be 
entered among the secret or public proceedings. Mr. 
Pinckney insisted that, in the former case, his view, 



1787.] DEBATES. 587 

which was to justify himself to his constituents, 
would be frustrated. Most of those who voted with 
him were opposed to an immediate publication. 
The expedient of a temporary concealment was 
proposed as answering all purposes. 127 



Tuesday, February 20th. 
Nothing of consequence was done. 



Wednesday, February 21st. 

The Report of the Convention at Annapolis, in Sep- 
tember, 1786, had been long under the consideration 
of a committee of Congress for the last year, and 
was referred over to a grand committee of the pre- 
sent year. The latter committee, after considerable 
difficulty and discussion, agreed on a report, by a 
majority of one only, (see the Journal,) I28 which was 
made a few days ago to Congress, and set down as 
the order for this day. The Report coincided with 
the opinion held at Annapolis, that the Confedera- 
tion needed amendments, and that the proposed 
Convention was the most eligible means of effecting 
them. The objections which seemed to prevail 
against the recommendation of the Convention by 
Congress, were, with some, that it tended to weaken 
the Federal authority by lending its sanction to an 
extra-constitutional mode of proceeding ; with others, 
that the interposition of Congress would be consi- 
dered by the jealous as betraying an ambitious wish 
to get power into their hands by any plan whatever 



588 DEBATES. [1787. 

that might present itself. Subsequent to the Re- 
port, the Delegates from New York received instruc- 
tions from its Legislature to move in Congress for a 
recommendation of a convention; and those from 
Massachusetts had, it appeared, received information 
which led them to suppose it was becoming the dis- 
position of the Legislature of that State to send 
deputies to the proposed Convention, in case Con- 
gress should give their sanction to it. There was 
reason to believe, however, from the language of the 
instruction from New York, that her object was to 
obtain a new convention, under the sanction of Con- 
gress, rather than to accede to the one on foot ; or 
perhaps, by dividing the plans of the States in their 
appointments, to frustrate all of them. The latter 
suspicion is in some degree countenanced by their 
refusal of the impost a few days before the instruc- 
tion passed, and by their other marks of an unfederal 
disposition. The Delegates from New York, in 
consequence of their instructions, made the motion 
on the Journal to postpone the Report of the Com- 
mittee, in order to substitute their own proposition. 
Those who voted against it considered it as liable to 
the objection above mentioned. Some who voted 
for it, particularly Mr. Madison, considered it sus- 
ceptible of amendment when brought before Con- 
gress ; and that if Congress interposed in the matter 
at all, it would be well for them to do it at the in- 
stance of a State, rather than spontaneously. This 
motion being lost, Mr. Dane, from Massachusetts, 
who was at bottom unfriendly to the plan of a con- 
vention, and had dissuaded his State from coming 
into it, brought forward a proposition, in a different 



1787.] DEBATES. 589 

form, but liable to the same objection with that from 
New York. After some little discussion, it was 
agreed on all sides, except by Connecticut, who 
opposed the measure in every form, that the resolu- 
tion should pass as it stands on the Journal, sanction- 
ing the proceedings and appointments already made 
by the States, as well as recommending further ap- 
pointments from other States, but in such terms as 
do not point directly to the former appointments. 

It appeared from the debates, and still more from 
the conversation among the members, that many of 
them considered this Resolution as a deadly blow to 
the existing Confederation. Doctor Johnson, who 
voted against it, particularly declared himself to that 
effect. Others viewed it in the same light, but were 
pleased with it as the harbinger of a better confede- 
ration. 

The reserve of many of the members made it dif- 
ficult to decide their real wishes and expectations 
from the present crisis of our affairs. All agreed 
and owned that the Federal Government, in its 
existing shape, was inefficient and could not last 
long. The members from the Southern and Middle 
States seemed generally anxious for some republican 
organization of the system which would preserve 
the Union, and give due energy to the government 
of it. Mr. Bingham alone avowed his wishes that 
the Confederacy might be divided into several dis- 
tinct confederacies, its great extent and various 
interests being incompatible with a single govern- 
ment. The Eastern members were suspected by 
some of leaning towards some anti-republican esta- 
blishment, (the effect of their late confusions,) or of 



590 DEBATES. [1787. 

being less desirous or hopeful of preserving the unity 
of the empire. For the first time the idea of separate 
confederacies had got into the newspapers. It ap- 
peared to-day under the Boston head. Whatever the 
views of the leading men in the Eastern States may 
be, it would seem that the great body of the people, 
particularly in Connecticut, are equally indisposed 
either to dissolve or divide the Confederacy, or to 
submit to any anti-republican innovations. 129 



Nothing noted till i 

Tuesday, March 13th. 

Col. Grayson and Mr. Clark having lately moved 
to have the military stores at Springfield, in Massa- 
chusetts, removed to some place of greater security, 
the motion was referred to the Secretary at War; 
who this day reported against the same, as his report 
will show. No opposition was made to the Report, 
and it seemed to be the general sense of Congress 
that his reasons were satisfactory. The movers of 
the proposition, however, might suppose the thinness 
of Congress (eight States only being present) to bar 
any hope of successful opposition. 

Memorandum. — Called with Mr. Bingham to-day 
on Mr. Guardoqui, and had a long conversation 
touching the Western country, the navigation of the 
Mississippi, and commerce ; as these objects relate to 
Spain and the United States. Mr. Bingham opened 
the conversation with intimating that there was 
reason to believe the Western people were exceed- 
ingly alarmed at the idea of the projected treaty 



1787.] DEBATES. 591 

which was to shut up the Mississippi, and were 
forming committees of correspondence, &c, for 
uniting their councils and interests. Mr. Guardoqui, 
with some perturbation, replied, that, as a friend to 
the United States, he was sorry for it, for they mis- 
took their interest; but that as the Minister of Spain 
he had no reason to be so. The result of what fell 
in the course of the conversation from Mr. Madison 
and Mr. Bingham was, that it was the interest of the 
two nations to live in harmony; that if Congress 
were disposed to treat with Spain on the ground of 
a cession of the Mississippi, it would be out of their 
power to enforce the treaty ; that an attempt would 
be the means of populating the western country with 
additional rapidity ; that the British had their eye 
upon that field, would countenance the separation of 
the western from the eastern part of North America, 
promote the settlement of it, and hereafter be able to 
turn the force springing up in that quarter against 
Spanish America, in co-operation with their naval 
armaments ; that Spain offered nothing in fact to the 
United States in the commercial scale which she did 
not grant to all the other nations from motives of 
interest. 

Mr. Guardoqui would not listen to the idea of a 
right to the navigation of the Mississippi by the 
United States, contending that the possession of the 
two banks at the mouth shut the door against any 
such pretension. Spain never would give up this 
point. He lamented that he had been here so long 
without effecting any thing; and foresaw that the 
consequences would be very disagreeable 

What would those consequences be 1 — He evaded 



592 DEBATES. [1787. 

an answer by repeating general expressions. Spain 
could make her own terms, he said, with Great 
Britain. He considered the commercial connection 
proposed as entirely in favor of the United States, 
and that in a little time the ports of Spain would be 
shut against fish. He was asked, whether against 
all fish, or only against fish from the United States ? 
From all places not in treaty, he said, with Spain. 
Spain would act according to her own ideas. She 
would not be governed by other people's ideas of 
her interest. 

He was very sorry for the instructions passed by 
Virginia ; he foresaw bad consequences from them. 
He had written to soften the matter as well as he 
could, but that troops and stores would certainly 
reinforce New Orleans in consequence of the Reso- 
lutions. 

He had not conferred at all with the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs since October, and did not expect to 
confer again. He did not expect to remain much 
longer in America. He wished he might not be a 
true prophet; but it would be found that we mistook 
our interest, and that Spain would make us feel the 
vulnerable side of our commerce by abridging it in 
her ports. 

With an air of ostensible jocoseness, he hinted that 
the people of Kentucky would make good Spanish 
subjects, and that they w r ould become such for the 
sake of the privilege annexed to that character. 

He seemed to be disposed to make us believe that 
Spain and Britain understood one another ; that he 
knew the views of Great Britain in holding the 
Western posts ; and that Spain had it in her power 



1787.] DEBATES. 593 

to make Great Britain bend to her views. He 
affected a mysterious air on this point, which only 
proved that he was at a loss what to say to the 
probability and tendency of a connection between 
Great Britain and the Western settlements, in case 
the Mississippi should be given up by Congress, 

He intimated that Spain could not grant any inlet 
of the American trade by treaty, but that, in case 
of a treaty, trade through the Mississippi, as well as 
other channels, would be winked at. 

In speaking of the Mississippi and the right of 
Spain, he alluded to the case of the Tagus, which 
Spain had never pretended to a right of navigating 
through Portugal. It was observed to him, that, in 
estimating the rights of nations in such cases, regard 
must be had to their respective proportions of terri- 
tory on the river. Suppose Spain held only five acres 
on each side at the mouth of the Mississippi, would 
she pretend to an exclusive right in such case ? He 
said that was not the case ; Spain had a great propor- 
tion. How much? After some confusion and hesitation, 
he said, she claimed at least — as far as the Ohio. We 
smiled, and asked how far eastwardly from the Missis- 
sippi ? He became still more at a loss for an answer, 
and turned it off by insinuating that he had conversed 
on that matter with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. 

He was reminded of the doctrine maintained by 
Spain in 1608, as to the Scheldt. He seemed not 
to have known the fact, and resolved it into some 
political consideration of the times. 

He was asked, whether the partition of the British 
Empire could deprive this part of it of the rights 
Vol. I.— 38 



594 DEBATES. [1787. 

appertaining to the King of Great Britain as King 
of this country ; and even whether the rupture of 
Great Britain and Spain could deprive, in justice, 
the United States of rights which they held under 
the Treaty of 1763, whilst they remained a part of 
the British Empire ? Whether, in case no such 
rupture had happened, the Treaty between Spain 
and that part of the Empire would have been dis- 
solved by the Revolution? &c, &c. He did not 
seem well to understand the principles into which 
such questions resolved themselves, and gave them 
the go-by, referring the claim of Spain principally to 
her conquests of the British possessions in North 
America. 

He betrayed strongly the anxiety of Spain to 
retard the population of the Western country ; ob- 
serving that whenever sufficient force should arise 
therein, it would be impossible for it to be controlled ; 
that any conciliating measures that might be taken 
now, would have little effect on their temper and 
views fifty or an hundred years hence, when they 
should be in force. 

When we rose to take leave, he begged us to 
remember what he had said as to the inflexibility 
of Spain on the point of the Mississippi, and the 
consequences to America of her adherence to her 
present pretensions. 130 



1787.] DEBATES. 595 

Nothing noted till 

Tuesday, March 20th. 

Mr. Jay's report on the Treaty of Peace taken up. 

Mr. Yates objected to the first resolution, which 
declares the Treaty to be a law of the land. He 
said the States, or at least his State, did not admit 
it to be such until clothed with legal sanction. At 
his request he was furnished with a copy of the 
resolution, for the purpose of consulting such as he 
might choose. 



Wednesday, March 21st. 

The subject of yesterday resumed. 

Mr. Yates was now satisfied with the resolutions 
as they stood. The words " constitutionally made," 
as applied to the Treaty, seemed to him, on con- 
sideration, to qualify sufficiently the doctrine on 
which the resolution was founded. 

The second and third resolutions, urging on the 
States a repeal of all laws contravening the Treaty, 
(first, that they might not continue to operate as 
violations of it; secondly, that questions might be 
avoided touching their validity,) underwent some 
criticisms and discussions. 

Mr. Varnum and Mr. Mitchell thought they did 
not consist with the first, which declared such laws 



596 DEBATES. [1787. 

to be void, in which case they could not operate as 
violations. 

Mr. Madison observed, that a repeal of those con- 
travening laws was expedient, and even necessary, 
to free the courts from the bias of their oaths, which 
bound the judges more strongly to the State than to 
the Federal authority. A distinction too, he said, 
might be started possibly between laws prior and 
laws subsequent to the Treaty; a repealing effect 
of the Treaty on the former not necessarily implying 
the nullity of the latter. Supposing the Treaty to 
have the validity of a law only, it would repeal all- 
antecedent laws. To render succeeding laws void, 
it must have more than the mere authority of a laic. 
In case these succeeding laws, contrary to the Treaty, 
should come into discussion before the courts, it 
would be necessary to examine the foundation of the 
Federal authority, and to determine whether it had 
the validity of a Constitution, paramount to the legis- 
lative authority in each State. This was a delicate 
question, and studiously to be avoided, as it was no- 
torious that, although in some of the States the Con- 
federation was incorporated with, and had the sanc- 
tion of, their respective constitutions, yet in others it 
received a legislative ratification only, and rested on 
no other basis. He admitted, however, that the 
word " operate rr might be changed for the better, 
and proposed, in its place, the words u be regarded, n 
as violations of the Treaty, — which was agreed to 
without opposition. 

Mr. King, in the course of the business, observed, 
that a question had been raised in New York, 
whether stipulations, as they might affect citizens- 



1787.] DEBATES. 597 

only, and not foreigners, could restrain the States 
from legislating with respect to the former; and 
supposed that such stipulations could not. 

The resolutions passed unanimously. 131 

Nothing till 

Friday, March 23rd. 

The Report for reducing salaries agreed to, as 
amended, unanimously. The proposition for reduc- 
ing the salary of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
to three thousand dollars was opposed by Mr. King 
and Mr. Madison, who entered into the peculiar 
duties and qualifications required in that office, and 
its peculiar importance. Mr. Mitchell and Mr, 
Varnum contended, that it stood on a level with the 
Secretaryship to Congress. The yeas and nays were 
called on the question, and it was lost. A motion 
was then made to reduce the salary of four thou- 
sand, to three thousand five hundred. Mr. Clark, 
who had been an opponent to any reduction, acceded 
to this compromise. Mr. King suffered his colleague 
to vote in the affirmative. There being six States 
for reducing to three thousand five hundred, and Mr. 
Carrington being on the same side, in opposition to 
Mr. Grayson, Mr. Madison gave up his opinion to 
so great a majority, and the resolution for three 
thousand five hundred passed. The preceding yeas 
and nays on the motions for reducing to three thou- 
sand was then withdrawn, and no entry made of it. 
It seemed to be the general opinion that the salary 
of the Secretary at War was disproportionately low, 
and ought to be raised. The Committee would have 



598 DEBATES. [1787. 

reported an augmentation, but conceived themselves 
restrained by their commission, which was to reduce, 
not to revise, the Civil List. 
Nothing of consequence till 

Wednesday, March 28th. 

Mr. King reminded Congress of the motion on the 
nineteenth day of February for discontinuing the 
enlistments, and intimated that the state of things 
in Massachusetts was at present such that no oppo- 
sition would now be made by the Delegation of 
that State. A committee was appointed, in general, 
to consider the military establishment, and parti- 
cularly to report a proper resolution for stopping the 
enlistments. 

The Virginia Delegates laid before Congress sun- 
dry papers from the Executive of that State relating 
to the seizure of Spanish property by General Clark, 
and the incendiary efforts on foot in the western 
country against the Spaniards, &c. No comment 
was made on them, nor any vote taken. 



Thursday, March 29th. 

The committee appointed to confer with the Trea- 
sury Board on the great business of a fiscal settle- 
ment of the accounts of the United States, reported 
that they be discharged, and the Board instructed to 
report an ordinance. Mr. King, in explanation, said, 
that it was the sense of the Committee and of the 
Treasury Board both, that commissioners should be 
appointed with full and final powers to decide on 



m 

1787.] DEBATES. 599 

the claims of the States against the Union, &c. The 
Report was agreed to nem. con. 

Sundry papers from the Illinois, complaining of the 
grievances of that country, which had arrived by a 
special express, were laid before Congress by the 
President, and committed. 

Mr. Mitchell, from Connecticut, observed that 
the papers from Virginia communicated yesterday 
were of a very serious nature ; and showed that we 
were in danger of being precipitated into disputes 
with Spain, which ought to be avoided if possible ; 
and moved that these papers might be referred to 
the Committee on the Illinois papers, which was 
done without opposition ; Mr. King only observing, 
that they contained mere information, and did not in 
his view need any step to be taken on them. 

The Virginia Delegates communicated to Mr. 
Guardoqui the proceedings of the Executive relative 
to Clark's seizure of Spanish property, at which he 
expressed much regret as a friend to the United 
States, though as a Spanish Minister he had little 
reason to dread the tendency of such outrages. The 
communication was followed by a free conversation 
on the Western territory and the Mississippi. The 
observations of the Delegates tended to impress 
him, — first, with the unfriendly temper which would 
be produced in the Western people, both against 
Spain and the United States, by a concerted occlu- 
sion of that river ; secondly, with the probability of 
throwing them into the arms of Great Britain; 
thirdly, of accelerating the population of that coun- 
try, after the example of Vermont; fourthly, the 
danger of such numbers under British influence, as 



600 DEBATES. [1787. 

well to Spanish America as to the Atlantic States ; 
fifthly, the universal opinion of right in the United 
States to the free use of the river ; sixthly, the dis- 
appointment of the people of America at an attempt 
in Spain to make their condition worse, as citizens 
of an independent State, in amity and lately engaged 
in a common cause, than as subjects of a formidable 
and unfriendly power ; seventhly, the inefficiency of 
an attempt in Congress to fulfil a treaty for shutting 
the Mississippi, and the folly of their entering into 
such a stipulation ; eighthly, that it would be wise in 
Spain to foresee and provide for events that could not 
be controlled, rather than, to make fruitless efforts to 
prevent or procrastinate them. 

Mr. Guardoqui reiterated his assertion that Spain 
would never accede to the claim of the United States 
to navigate the river ; secondly, urged that the result 
of what was said was, that Congress could enter into 
no treaty at all; thirdly, that the trade of Spain was 
of great importance, and would certainly be shut 
against the United States, — affecting to disregard 
the remark that, if Spain continued to use fish, flour, 
&c, her interest would restrain her from shutting her 
ports against the American competition : fourthly, he 
signified that he had observed the weakness of the 
Union, and foreseen its probable breach ; that he 
lamented the danger of it, as he wished to see it 
preserved and strengthened, which was more than 
France* or any other nation in Europe did. No 
reply was made to this remark. The sincerity of 
his declaration as to his own wishes was not free 

* From this it may be inferred that he does not regard France as favorable to 
the claims of Spain touching the Mississippi. 



1787.] DEBATES. 601 

from suspicion. Fifthly, he laid much stress on the 
service Spain had rendered the United States during 
the struggle for their independence, considering it as 
laying them under great obligations. The reality 
of the service was not denied, but he was reminded 
of the interest Spain had in dividing a power which 
had given the law to the House of Bourbon, and com- 
pelled Spain to relinquish, as he said, the exclusive 
use of the Mississippi. Sixthly, in answer to the 
remark, that Spain was for putting the United 
States on a worse footing than they stood on as 
British subjects, he not only mentioned the neces- 
sity which had dictated the Treaty of 1763, but 
contended that the recovery of West Florida made 
a distinction in the case. It was observed to him 
that, as the navigable channel of the Mississippi ran 
between the Island and the western shore, Spain 
had the same pretext for holding both shores when 
Florida was a British Colony, as since. He would 
neither accede to the inference nor deny the fact. 
Seventhly, he intimated, with a jocular air, the 
possibility of the Western people becoming Spanish 
subjects ; and, with a serious one, that such an idea 
had been brought forward to the King of Spain by 
some person connected with the Western country, 
but that His Majesty's dignity and character could 
never countenance it. It was replied, that that con- 
sideration was no doubt a sufficient obstacle, but it 
was presumed, that such subjects would not be very 
convenient to Spain. It would be much more for 
the interest of Spain that they should be friendly 
neighbors than refractory subjects. It did not ap- 
pear that he viewed the matter in a different light. 
Vol. I.— 38* 



602 DEBATES. [1787. 

Eighthly, he disclaimed his having ever assented to, 
or approved of, any limited occlusion of the Missis- 
sippi, though in a manner that did not speak a real in- 
flexibility on that point. Ninthly, it appeared clearly 
that the check to the Western settlements was a 
favorite object, and that the occlusion of the Missis- 
sippi was considered as having that tendency. 
Tenthly, the futility of many of his arguments and 
answers satisfied the Delegates that they could not 
appear convincing to himself, and that he was of 
course pursuing rather the ideas of his Court than 
his own. 132 



Friday, March 30th. 

Mr. Jay's report in favor of the admission of 
Phineas Bond as British Consul for the Middle 
States, was called for by Mr. Cadwalader. Mr. 
Madison said, he was far from being satisfied of the 
propriety of the measure ; he was a friend in general 
to a liberal policy, and admitted that the United 
States were more in the wrong in the violation of 
the Treaty of Peace than Great Britain ; but still 
the latter was not blameless. He thought, however, 
the question turned on different considerations : first, 
the facility of the United States in granting privi- 
leges to Great Britain without a treaty of commerce, 
instead of begetting a disposition to conclude such a 
treaty, had been found, on trial, to be made a reason 
against it ; secondly, the indignity of Great Britain 
in neglecting to send a public Minister to the United 
States, notwithstanding the lapse of time since Mr. 



1787.] DEBATES. 603 

Adams's arrival there, gave them no title to favors 
in that line ; and self-respect seemed to require that 
the United States should at least proceed with dis- 
trust and reserve. 

Mr. Grayson thought, as the Secretary had done, 
that it would be good policy to admit Mr. Bond, and 
that it could not be decently, and without offence, 
refused after the admission of Mr. Temple. 

Mr. Clark said, he was at first puzzled how to 
vote, as he did not like the admission proposed, on 
one hand; and, on the other, thought it not decent to 
refuse it after the admission of Mr. Temple. On 
reflecting, however, that Mr. Temple was admitted 
at a time when hopes were entertained of a commer- 
cial treaty, which had since vanished, and that the 
question might be postponed generally without being 
negatived, he should accede to the idea of doing 
nothing on the subject. 

Mr. Varnum animadverted on the obnoxious cha- 
racter of Mr. Bond, and conceived that alone a suf- 
ficient reason for not admitting him. The postpone- 
ment was agreed to without any overt dissent except 
that of Mr. Grayson. 

The Delegates from North Carolina communicated 
to Congress sundry papers conspiring with the other 
proofs of discontent in the Western country at the 
supposed surrender of the Mississippi, and of hostile 
machinations against the Spaniards. 

It was ordered that they should be referred to the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs for his information. It 
was then moved that the papers relative to the same 
subjects from Virginia, yesterday referred to a com- 
mittee, should, after discharging the Committee, be 



604 DEBATES- [1787. 

referred to the Office of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Clark 
proposed to add " to report." This was objected to 
by Mr. King, and brought on some general observa- 
tions on the proceedings of Congress in the affair of 
the Mississippi. It was at length agreed that the 
reference be made without an instruction to report. 
Mr. Pierce then observed that it had been hinted by 
Mr. Madison, as proper to instruct the Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs to lay before Congress the state of 
his negotiation with Mr. Guardoqui, and made a 
motion to that effect, which was seconded by several 
at once. 

Mr. King hoped Congress would not be hurried 
into a decision on that point, observing that it was 
a very delicate one. But he did not altogether like 
it; and yet it was of such a nature that it might 
appear strange to negative it. He desired that it 
might at least lie over till Monday. 

Mr. Madison concurred in wishing the same, being 
persuaded that the propriety of the motion was so 
clear that nothing could produce dissent, unless it 
were forcing members into an unwilling decision. 

The motion was withdrawn, with notice that it 
would be renewed on Monday next. 133 



Monday, April 2nd, 



Mr. Pierce renewed his motion instructing the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to lay before Congress 
the state of his negotiation with Mr. Guardoqui, 
which was agreed to without observation or dissent. 



1787.] DEBATES. 605 

See Journals till 

Tuesday, April 11th. 

Mr. Kearney moved that Congress adjourn on the 

last Friday in April, to meet on the day of May 5 

in Philadelphia. Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, 
Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Rhode 
Island, were for it. The merits of the proposition 
were not discussed. The friends to it seemed sensi- 
ble that objections lay against the particular moment 
at which it was proposed ; but considering the 
greater centrality of Philadelphia, as rendering a 
removal proper in itself, and the uncertainty of 
finding seven States present and in the humor 
again, they waived the objections. The opinion of 
Mr. Madison was, that the meeting of the ensuing 
Congress in Philadelphia ought to be fixed, leaving 
the existing Congress to remain throughout the 
Federal year in New York. This arrangement 
would have been less irritating, and would have 
had less the aspect of precipitancy or passion, and 
would have repelled insinuations of personal con- 
siderations with the members. The question was 
agreed to lie over till to-morrow. 



Wednesday, April 12th. 



Mr. Varnum moved that the motion for removing 
to Philadelphia should be postponed generally. As 
the assent of Rhode Island was necessary to make 
seven States, no one chose to press a decision : the 
postponement was therefore agreed to nem. con., and 



606 DEBATES. [1787. 

the proceedings of yesterday involved the Yeas and 
Nays on some immaterial points struck from the 
Journal. 



See the Journal till 

Wednesday, April 18th. 



It having appeared by the Report of Mr. Jay on 
the instruction agreed to on Monday, the 2nd in- 
stant, and on information referred to him concern- 
ing the discontents of the Western people, that he 
had considered the act of seven States as authorizing 
him to suspend the use of the Mississippi, and that he 
had accordingly adjusted with Mr. Guardoqui an 
article to that effect, that he was also much embar- 
rassed by the ferment excited in the Western country 
by the rumored intention to cede the Mississippi, by 
which such cession was rendered inexpedient on one 
side ; and, on the other side, by the disinclination in 
another part of the Union to support the use of the 
river by arms, if necessary. It was proposed by Mr. 
Madison, as an expedient which, if it should answer 
no other purpose, would at least gain time, that it 
should be resolved, " That the present state of the ne- 
gotiations with Spain, [meaning the step taken under 
the spurious authority of seven States,] and of the 
affairs of the United States, [meaning the temper and 
proceedings in the Western country,] renders it 
expedient that the Minister Plenipotentiary at the 
Court of France should proceed under a special com- 
mission to the Court of Madrid? there to make such 



1787.] DEBATES. 607 

representations, and to urge such negotiations, as 
will be most likely to satisfy the said Court of the 
friendly disposition of the United States, and to 
induce it to make such concessions relative to the 
Southern limit of the said States, and their right to 
navigate the river Mississippi, and to enter into such 
commercial stipulations with them, as may most 
effectually guard against a rupture of the subsisting 
harmony, and promote the mutual interest of the 
two nations; and that the Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs prepare and report the instructions proper to 
be given to the said Minister, with a proper commis- 
sion and letters of credence ; and that he also report 
the communications and explanations which it may 
be advisable to make to Mr. Guardoqui relative to 
this change in the mode of conducting the negotia- 
tion with his Court." 

Mr. King said that he did not know that he should 
be opposed to the proposition, as it seemed to be a 
plausible expedient, and as something seemed neces- 
sary to be done ; but that he thought it proper that 
Congress should, before they agreed to it, give the 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs an opportunity of 
stating his opinions on it, and accordingly moved 
that it should be referred to him. 

Mr. Clark and Mr. Varnum opposed the reference, 
it being improper for Congress to submit a principle, 
for deciding which no further information was 
wanted, to the opinion of their minister. The refer- 
ence being, however, at length acceded to by the 
other friends of the proposition, on the principle of 
accommodation, it had a vote of seven States. 134 



608 DEBATES. [1787. 

Thursday, April 19th. 

The instructions of Virginia against relinquishing 
the Mississippi were laid before Congress by the 
Delegates of that State, with a motion that they 
should be referred to the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, by way of information. 

The reference was opposed by Mr. King and Mr. 
Benson, as unnecessary for that purpose, the instruc- 
tions having been printed in the newspapers. 

In answer to this, it was observed, that the memo- 
rial accompanying the instructions had never been 
printed; that if it had, no just objection could be 
thence drawn against an official communication ; 
that if Congress would submit a measure, as they 
had done yesterday, to the opinion of their Minister, 
they ought at least to supply him with every fact, in 
the most authentic manner, which could assist his 
judgment; and that they had actually referred to 
the same Minister communications relative to the 
Western views, less interesting and authentic, and 
which he had made the basis of a Report to Con- 
gress. 

The motion was lost, Massachusetts and New 
York being against it, and Connecticut divided. 
Mr. Mitchell, from the latter State, was displeased 
at the negatives, as indicating a want of candor and 
moderation on the subject. 






1787.] DEBATES. 609 

Monday, April 23rd. 

Mr. Jay's report, stating objections against the 
motion of Mr. Madison for sending Mr. Jefferson to 
Madrid, was taken into consideration. 

Mr. Madison observed, that Mr. Jay had not taken 
up the proposition in the point of view in which it 
had been penned ; and explained what that was, to 
wit, that it was expedient to retract the step taken 
for ceding the Mississippi, and to do it in a manner 
as respectful and conciliating as possible to Spain, 
and which, at the same time, would procrastinate 
the dilemma stated by Mr. Jay. He said he was 
not attached to the expedient he had brought for- 
ward, and was open to any other that might be less 
exceptionable. 

Mr. Gorham avowed his opinion that the shut- 
ting the Mississippi would be advantageous to the 
Atlantic States, and wished to see it shut. 

Mr. Madison animadverted on the illiberality of 
his doctrine, and contrasted it with the principles 
of the Revolution, and the language of American 
patriots. 

Nothing was done in the case. 



Wednesday, April 25th. 

Mr. Madison, observing to Congress that he found 
a settled disinclination in some of the Delegations to 
concur in any conciliatory expedient for defending 
the Mississippi against the operation of the vote of 
seven States, and that it was hence become necessary 

Vol. I.— 39 



610 DEBATES. [1787. 

to attack directly the validity of that measure, to the 
end that the adversaries to it, and particularly the 
instructed Delegations, might at least discharge 
their duty in the case, made the following motion : 

Whereas it appears by the Report of the Secre- 
tary for the Department of Foreign Affairs, made on 
the 11th instant, that in consequence of a vote 
entered into by seven States on the 29th day of August 
last, he has proceeded to adjust with Mr. Guardoqui 
an article for suspending the right of the United 
States to the common use of the river Mississippi 
below their southern boundary : And whereas it is 
considered that the said vote of seven States, having 
passed in a case in which the assent of nine States 
is required by the Articles of Confederation, is not 
valid for the purpose intended by it ; and that any 
further negotiations in pursuance of the same may 
eventually expose the United States to great embar- 
rassments with Spain, as well as excite great discon- 
tents and difficulties among themselves : Resolved, 
therefore, that the Secretary for the said Department 
be informed that it is the opinion of Congress, that 
the said vote of seven States ought not to be re- 
garded as authorizing any suspension of the use of 
the river Mississippi by the United States, and that 
any expectations thereof, which may have been con- 
ceived on the part of Spain, ought to be repressed. 

Mr. King reminded Congress that this motion was 
barred by the rule that no question should be re- 
vived, which had been set aside by the previous 
question, unless the same States, or an equal number, 
be present, as were present at the time of such pre- 
vious question. This rule had been entered into in 



1787.] DEBATES. 611 

consequence of a similar motion made shortly after 
the vote of seven States had passed. Mr. King con- 
tended, that this rule was a prudent one, and recom- 
mended by the practice of all deliberative assem- 
blies, who never suffered questions once agitated and 
decided, to be repeated at the pleasure of the unsuc- 
cessful party. 

Mr. Madison admitted that the rule, if insisted on, 
was a bar to his motion ; but that he had not ex- 
pected that it would be called up, being so evidently 
improper in itself, and the offspring of the intempe- 
rance which characterized the epoch of its birth. 
As it was called up, however, it was become neces- 
sary that a preliminary motion for its repeal should 
be made, and which he accordingly made. His ob- 
jections against the rule were— 

First, that it was an attempt in one Congress to 
bind their successors, which was not only impracti- 
cable in itself, but highly unreasonable in the very 
instance which gave birth to the rule. Twelve 
States were on the floor at the time ; seven were for 
the previous question, five against it. The casting 
number, therefore, was but two. Was it not unrea- 
sonable that eleven States, unanimously of a con- 
trary opinion, should be controlled by this small 
majority when twelve were present; and yet such 
would be the operation of the rule, if eleven States 
only should at any time happen to be present, 
although they should be unanimous in the case. 

Secondly, the operation of the vote in another 
respect was still more reprehensible. In the former 
case the eleven States, or even seven, could extri- 
cate themselves by a repeal of the rule. In case a 



612 DEBATES. [1787. 

number less than seven should wish to justify them- 
selves by any particular motion, they might be pre- 
cluded by such a rule. Six States, instructed by 
their constituents to make a particular proposition, 
or to enter a particular protest, might be thus fet- 
tered by a stratagem of seven States. In the case 
actually depending, three States were instructed, 
and two, if not three, more ready to vote with them. 

Thirdly, the practice of other assemblies did not 
reach this case, and if it did the reason of it would 
be inapplicable. The restriction in other assemblies 
related to the same assembly, and even to the same 
session. Here the restriction is perpetual. In legis- 
lative assemblies, no great inconvenience would hap- 
pen from a suspension of a law for a limited time. 
In Executive councils, which are involved in the 
constitution of Congress, and particularly in military 
operations and negotiations, the vicissitude of events 
would often govern, and a measure improper on one 
day might become necessary the next. 

Mr. Clark and Mr. Varnum contended that the 
rules of the Congress for the last year were not in 
force during the present, and supposed that a repeal 
was unnecessary. 

In the course of this discussion, the question as 
to the validity of the vote of seven States, and the 
merits of the proposition of Mr. Madison, barred by 
the rule, incidentally came into view. The advocates 
of the latter did not maintain the validity, or rather 
studiously avoided giving an opinion on it. They 
urged only the impropriety of any exposition by 
Congress of their own powers, and of the validity 
of their own acts. They were answered, that the 



1787.] DEBATES. 613 

exposition must be somewhere, and more properly 
with Congress than with one of their Ministerial offi- 
cers ; that it was absurd to say that Congress, with 
information on their table that a treaty with a for- 
eign nation was going on without a constitutional 
sanction, should forbear, out of such scruple, to assert 
it, and prevent the dilemma which would ensue, of 
either recognizing an unconstitutional proceeding, or 
of quarrelling with the King of Spain ; that Congress 
had frequently asserted and expounded their own 
powers, and must frequently be obliged to do so. 
What was the late address to the States on the 
subject of the Treaty of Peace, but an exposition 
and vindication of their constitutional powers ? That, 
in the vote itself, the entry, " so it was resolved in 
the affirmative," asserted it to be valid and constitu- 
tional; the vote of seven States when nine were 
required being otherwise to be entered, like a vote of 
six States, in the negative. 

It appearing to be the inflexible predetermination 
of the advocates for the Spanish Treaty to hold fast 
every advantage they had got, the debate was 
shortened, and an adjournment took place without 
any question. 

Note. — Mr. King, in conversation repeatedly, 
though not in public debate, maintained that the 
entry,-" so it was resolved in the affirmative," decided 
nothing as to the validity of the vote of seven States 
for yielding the Mississippi ; and that they amounted 
to no more than a simple affirmation, or summary 
repetition, of the fact that the said seven States 
voted in the manner stated ! ! ! 



614 DEBATES. [1787. 

Thursday, April 26th. 

The question on the motion to repeal the rule 
was called for after some little conversation. Mr. 
Clark moved that it might be postponed, which was 
agreed to. 

Nothing further was done in this business till 
Wednesday, May the second, when Mr. Madison left 
New York for the Convention to be held in Phila- 
delphia. 

It was considered, on the whole, that the project 
for shutting the Mississippi was at an end — a point 
deemed of great importance in reference to the 
approaching Convention for introducing a change in 
the Federal Government, and to the objection to an 
increase of its powers, foreseen from the jealousy 
which had been excited by that project. 136 



LETTERS 



OF 



JAMES MADISON, 



SUBSEQUENT TO THE DEBATES OF 1787. 



1787.] 615 

LETTERS 

TO NOVEMBER 2, 1788, 

SUBSEQUENT TO THE DEBATES OF 1787. 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, February 15, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

Having but recently got here, I had not time to 
add a few private lines as I wished, to our public 
letter. We have as yet no definitive information 
from Massachusetts touching the operations of Gen- 
eral Lincoln. Little doubt, however, is entertained 
that the insurrection will be effectually quelled. 
The Legislature of that State seem to have taken 
great spirit from the prospect. They have come at 
length to the resolution of declaring the existence 
of a rebellion, and, it is said, mean to disarm and dis- 
franchise all who have been engaged in it. We 
have no information from any other quarter, and I 
have not been here long enough to collect any just 
idea of the general politics. 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, February 18, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

Congress have received no late intelligence either 
from Mr. Jefferson or Mr. Adams. Nor have any 
interesting measures yet taken place since they have 
been assembled in force. Those in expectation re- 



616 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

late to, — first, the Mississippi. On this subject I 
have no information to give, not a word having pass- 
ed concerning it since my arrival. Secondly, the 
treaty of peace. This subject is now depending in 
the form of a Report from Mr. Jay. I find what I 
was not before apprized of, that infractions on the 
part of the United States preceded even the viola- 
tion on the other side, in the instance of the negroes. 
If Congress should be able to agree on any measures 
for carrying the treaty into execution, it seems prob- 
able that the fundamental one will be a summons of 
the States to remove all legal impediments which 
stand at present in the way. There seems to be no 
reason to believe that Great Britain will comply on 
any other conditions than those signified in the com- 
munication of Lord Carmarthen to Mr. Adams. 
Thirdly, the proposed Convention in May. A great 
disagreement of opinion exists as to the expediency 
of a recommendation from Congress to the back- 
ward States in favor of the meeting. In would seem 
as if some of the States disliked it because it is an 
extra-constitutional measure, and that their dislike 
would be removed or lessened by a sanction from 
Congress to it. On the other hand it is suggested, 
that some would dislike it the more if Congress 
should appear to interest themselves in it. I observe 
in a late newspaper, that instructions are to be 
brought forward in the Legislature here to the 
Delegates in Congress, to propose and urge their 
interposition in favor of the Convention. What 
the sense of the State is on the merit of the pro- 
ject, is not perfectly clear. A refusal a few days 
ago, by a large majority, to grant the impost, does 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 617 

not augur well. Hopes, however, are entertain- 
ed. The four States north of it are also still to 
declare their sentiments. Massachusetts, it is now 
expected, will appoint deputies to the Convention, 
and her example will be much respected by the 
three others. The intermediate States from New 
York to South Carolina, Maryland excepted, have 
made appointments ; and Maryland has determined 
to do so, though she has not yet agreed on the indi- 
viduals. South Carolina and Georgia are supposed 
by their Delegates here to be well disposed to back 
the plan. Fourthly, the troops raising under the 
authority of Congress in Massachusetts. The pros- 
pect of a close to the turbulent scenes in that quar- 
ter has produced a motion for stopping the enlist- 
ments. The Delegates from the New England 
States generally, and from Massachusetts in partic- 
ular, are anxious that the motion should be suspend- 
ed for a few weeks, that the influence of the military 
preparations of the United States may be continued 
in favor of their State measures, some of which are 
likely to be pretty vigorous, and to try the strength 
of their Government. It appears, besides, that the 
ringleader of the insurrection has not yet been ap- 
prehended, and, according to report, still harbours 
mischief. We begin to experience already the in- 
con veniency of the clause in our treaties stipulating 
the privileges of the most favored nation. Mr. Van 
Berkel has got hold of the late act of our Assembly 
in favor of French wines and brandies brought in 
French bottoms, and contends that it violates the 
Dutch treaty. He has been told that these privi- 
leges are a requital for equal ones granted on the 
Vol. I.— 39* 



618 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

side of France ; and that Holland must pay the price 
before she can claim the concession. His answer is, 
that nothing is said about compensation in the trea- 
ty ; that it is expressly stated that the Dutch shall 
pay no higher duties than the most favored nation 
is, or shall be, obliged to pay. We tell him, the 
compensation is necessarily implied; and that a con- 
trary interpretation would render the treaty too in- 
convenient to both the parties to be supposed the 
true one. He persists in alleging that it is the true 
one, that the treaty pursues the carrying policy 
marked by a like stipulation in every treaty where 
it could be introduced, and that the clause relative 
to compensation was intentionally omitted. He 
means to bring the matter before Congress, and to 
direct the Dutch Consul to protest against the duties 
in case of their being exacted. He professes and 
appears, notwithstanding, to be anxious for an ami- 
cable adjustment, and would have forborne to apply 
to Congress if we could have authorized a hope that 
the law would not be actually put in execution 
against Dutch cargoes. As it is, he means to put a 
copy of the note to Congress in our hands, that it 
may be communicated to the State. I have not yet 
thoroughly investigated the question. The letter of 
the treaty is on his side, the equity of it on ours. If 
his construction be admitted, the United States could 
not purchase the West India trade of Great Britain 
or France, without letting in Holland to the privi- 
leges granted on our part, although she should keep 
her ports in that quarter shut against us, — a consid- 
eration not only unjust towards us, but creating ob- 
jections on the part of Great Britain or France. A 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 619 

very dismal account of Clark's proceedings in the 
Western country has been informally laid before 
Congress, and will be forwarded to your depart- 
ment. If the information be well founded, you will 
probably receive a confirmation through other chan- 
nels. 137 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, February 25, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

The Secretary's despatch will have communica- 
ted to you the Resolution of Congress giving their 
sanction to the proposed meeting in May next. At 
the date of my last, a great division of opinion pre- 
vailed on the subject, it being supposed by some of 
the States that the interposition of Congress was 
necessary to give regularity to the proceeding, and 
by others that a neutrality on their part was a ne- 
cessary antidote for the jealousy entertained of their 
wishes to enlarge the powers within their own ad- 
ministration. The circumstance which conduced 
much to decide the point, was an instruction from 
New York to its Delegates, to move in Congress for 
some recommendation of a Convention. The style 
of the instruction makes it probable that it was the 
wish of this State to have a new Convention institu- 
ted, rather than the one on foot recognized. Massachu- 
setts seemed also skittish on this point. Connecti- 
cut opposed the interposition of Congress altogether. 
The act of Congress is so expressed as to cover the 
proceedings of the States, which have already pro- 



620 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

vided for the Convention, without any pointed recog- 
nition of them. 

Our situation is becoming every day more and 
more critical. No money comes into the Federal 
Treasury ; no respect is paid to the Federal author- 
ity ; and people of reflection unanimously agree that 
the existing Confederacy is tottering to its foun- 
dation. Many individuals of weight, particularly in 
the Eastern district, are suspected of leaning toward 
monarchy. Other individuals predict a partition of 
the Stajtes into two or more confederacies. It is 
pretty certain that, if some radical amendment of 
the single one cannot be devised and introduced, one 
or other of these revolutions, the latter no doubt, 
will take place. I hope you are bending your 
thoughts seriously to the great work of guarding 
against both. 138 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New Yoik, March 11, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

The Governor of this State is just returned from 
his trip to the upper parts of it. He found every 
thing quiet in the place to which suspicions and re- 
ports carried him. He says also, as I am told, that 
Lincoln has restored a calm in that part of Mas- 
sachusetts which borders on New York, as he had 
before done in the other disaffected parts. Notwith- 
standing these favorable accounts, there is reason 
to apprehend that every thing is not yet right in 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 621 

Massachusetts, and that the discontents are rather 
silenced than subdued. The measures taken by the 
Legislature of that State prove that such is their 
view of the matter. They have disfranchized a con- 
siderable proportion of the disaffected voters ; have 
voted a military force for the purpose of maintain- 
ing the tranquillity of the commonwealth ; and their 
Delegates, in pursuance of instructions, have within 
a few days past, put on the Journals of Congress a 
representation including an assertion of right to Fed- 
eral support in case of necessity. 

The appointments for the Convention are still go- 
ing on. Georgia has appointed her Delegates to 
Congress, her Representatives in that body also. 
The gentleman from that State here at present are 
Colonel Few, and Major Pierce, formerly Aid to 
General Green. I am told just now, that South 
Carolina has appointed the two Rutl edges and Ma- 
jor Butler. Colonel Hamilton, with a Mr. Yates 
and a Mr. Lansing are appointed by New York. 
The two latter are supposed to lean too much to- 
wards State considerations to be good members of 
an assembly which will only be useful in proportion 
to its superiority to partial views and interests. 
Massachusetts has also appointed. Messrs. Gorham, 
Dana, King, Gerry and Strong compose her deputa- 
tion. The resolution under which they are appoint- 
ed restrains them from acceding to any departure 
from the principle of the fifth Article of Confed- 
eration. It is conjectured that this fetter, which ori- 
ginated with their Senate, will be knocked off. Its 
being introduced at all, denotes a very different 
spirit in that quarter from what some had been led 



622 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

to expect. Connecticut, it is now generally believed, 
will come into the measure. 

Nothing has been yet done in the principal busi- 
ness before Congress ; and I fear the number of 
States will not increase so far as to be competent to 
it. The negotiations with Spain are carried on, if 
they go on at all, entirely behind the curtain. The 
business has been put into such a form that it rests 
wholly with Jay how far he will proceed with 
Guardoqui, and how far he will communicate with 
Congress. The instructed States are hence under 
some embarrassment. They cannot demand inform- 
ation, of right ; they are unwilling, by asking it of 
favor, to risk a refusal ; and they cannot resort to 
the present thin Congress with any hope of success. 
Should Congress become pretty full, and Pennsyl- 
vania follow North Carolina, Virginia, and New Jer- 
sey, in giving instructions, the case may be altered. 139 



TO THOMAS JEFFERSON. 

New York, March 19, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

Congress have continued so thin as to be incom- 
petent to the dispatch of the more important busi- 
ness before them. We have at present nine States, 
and it is not improbable that something may now 
be done. The report of Mr. Jay on the mutual vio- 
lations of the treaty of peace will be among the first 
subjects of deliberation. He favors the British claim 
of interest, but refers the question to the court. The 
amount of the report, which is an able one, is, that 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 623 

the treaty should be put in force as a law 7 and the 
exposition of it left, like that of other laws, to the 
ordinary tribunals. 

The Spanish project sleeps. A perusal of the 
attempt of seven States to make a new treaty, by 
repealing an essential condition of the old, satisfied 
me that Mr. Jay's caution would revolt at so irregu- 
lar a sanction. A late accidental conversation with 
Guardoqui proved to me that the negotiation is ar- 
rested. It may appear strange that a member of 
Congress should be indebted to a foreign Minister 
for such information, yet such is the footing on which 
the intemperance of party has put the matter, that 
it rests wholly with Mr. Jay how far he will com- 
municate with Congress, as well as how far he will 
negotiate with Guardoqui. But although it appears 
that the intended sacrifice of the Mississippi will not 
be made, the consequences of the intention and the 
attempt are likely to be very serious. I have al- 
ready made known to you the light in which the 
subject was taken up by Virginia. Mr. Henry's dis- 
gust exceeds all measure, and I am not singular in 
ascribing his refusal to attend the Convention to the 
policy of keeping himself free to combat or espouse 
the result of it according to the result of the Missis- 
sippi business, among other circumstances. North 
Carolina also has given pointed instructions to her 
Delegates ; so has New Jersey. A proposition for 
the like purpose was a few days ago made in the 
Legislature of Pennsylvania, but went off without a 
decision on its merits. Her Delegates in Congress 
are equally divided on the subject. The tendency 
of this project to foment distrust among the Atlantic 



624 CORRESPONDENCE. [ 1787. 

States, at a crisis when harmony and confidence 
ought to have been studiously cherished, has not 
been more verified than its predicted effect on the 
ultramontane settlements. I have credible informa- 
tion that the people living on the Western waters 
are already in great agitation, and are taking meas- 
ures for uniting their consultations. The ambition 
of individuals will quickly mix itself with the ori- 
ginal motives of resentment and interest. Commu- 
nication will gradually take place with their British 
neighbours. They will be led to set up for them- 
selves, to seize on the vacant lands, to entice emi- 
grants by bounties and an exemption from Federal 
burthens, and in all respects play the part of Ver- 
mont on a large theatre. It is hinted to me that 
British partizans are already feeling the pulse of 
some of the Western settlements. Should these ap- 
prehensions not be imaginary, Spain may have equal 
reason with the United States to rue the unnatural 
attempt to shut the Mississippi. Guardoqui has been 
admonished of the danger, and, I believe, is not in- 
sensible to it, though he affects to be otherwise, and 
talks as if the dependence of Britain on the commer- 
cial favors of his Court would induce her to play 
into the hands of Spain. The eye of France also 
cannot fail to watch over the western prospects. I 
learn from those who confer here with Otto and De 
la Forest, that they favor the opening of the Missis- 
sippi, disclaiming at the same time any authority to 
speak the sentiments of their Court. I find that the 
Virginia Delegates, during the Mississippi discus- 
sions last fall, entered into very confidential inter- 
views with these gentlemen. In one of them the 



1787. ] CORRESPONDENCE. 625 

idea was communicated to Otto of opening the Mis- 
sissippi for exports but not for imports, and of giv- 
ing to France and Spain some exclusive privileges 
in the trade. He promised to transmit it to Vergen- 
nes, to obtain his sentiments on the whole matter, 
and to communicate them to the Delegates. Not 
long since Grayson called on him, and revived the 
subject. He assured Grayson that he had received 
no answer from France, and signified his wish that 
you might pump the Count de Vergennes, observing 
that he would deny to you his having received any in- 
formation from America. I discover, through sev- 
eral channels, that it would be very grateful to the 
French politicians here to see our negotiations with 
Spain shifted into your hands, and carried on under 
the mediating auspices of their Court. 

Van Berkel has remonstrated against the late acts 
of Virginia, giving privileges to French wines and 
brandies in French bottoms, contending that the 
Dutch are entitled by their treaty to equal exemp- 
tions with the most favored nation, without being 
subject to a compensation for them. Mr. Jay has 
reported against this construction, but considers the 
act of Virginia as violating the treaty ; — first, as it ap- 
pears to be gratuitous, not compensatory, on the face 
of it ; secondly, because the States have no right to 
form tacit compacts with foreign nations. No de- 
cision of Congress has yet taken place on the sub- 
ject. 

The expedition of General Lincoln against the in- 
surgents has effectually succeeded in dispersing 
them. Whether the calm which he has restored 
will be durable or not, is uncertain. From the pre- 

Vol. I.— 40 



626 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

cautions taking by the Government of Massachu- 
setts, it would seem as if their apprehensions were 
not extinguished. Besides disarming and disfran- 
chising, for a limited time, those who have been in 
arms, as a condition of their pardon, a military corps 
is to be raised to the amount of one thousand or fif- 
teen hundred men, and to be stationed in the most 
suspected districts. It is said that, notwithstanding 
these specimens of the temper of the Government, a 
great proportion of the offenders choose rather to 
risk the consequences of their treason, than submit 
to the conditions annexed to the amnesty ; that they 
not only appear openly on public occasions, but dis- 
tinguish themselves by badges of their character ; 
and that this insolence is in many instances coun- 
tenanced by no less decisive marks of popular favor 
than elections to local offices of trust and authority. 

A proposition is before the Legislature of this 
State, now sitting, for renouncing its pretensions to 
Vermont, and urging the admission of it into the 
Confederacy. The different parties are not agreed 
as to the form in which the renunciation should be 
made, but are likely to agree as to the substance. 
Should the offer be made, and should Vermont not 
reject it altogether, I think they will insist on two 
stipulations at least; — first, that their becoming par- 
ties to the Confederation shall not subject their 
boundaries, or the rights of their citizens, to be ques- 
tioned under the ninth Article ; secondly, that they 
shall not be subject to any part of the public debts 
already contracted. 

The Geographer and his assistants have returned 
surveys on the Federal lands to the amount of about 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 627 

eight hundred thousand acres, which it is supposed 
would sell pretty readily for public securities, and 
some of it, lying on the Ohio, even for specie. It 
will be difficult, however, to get proper steps taken 
by Congress, so many of the States having lands of 
their own at market. It is supposed that this con- 
sideration had some share in the zeal for shutting 
the Mississippi. New Jersey, and some others hav- 
ing no Western lands, which favored this measure, 
begin now to penerate the secret. 

A letter from the Governor of Virginia informs 
me, that the project of paper-money is beginning to 
recover from the blow given it at the last session of 
the Legislature. If Mr. Henry espouses it, of which 
there is little doubt, I think an emission will take 
place. 140 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, March 25, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

I have had the pleasure of your two favors of the 
first and seventh instant. The refusal of Mr. Henry 
to join in the task of revising the Confederation is 
ominous ; and the more so, I fear, if he means to be 
governed by the event which you conjecture. There 
seems to be little hope, at present, of being able to 
quash the proceedings relative to the affair which 
is so obnoxious to him ;* though on the other hand, 
there is reason to believe that they will never reach 
the object at which they aimed. 

* Jay's project for shutting the Mississippi for twenty-five years. 



628 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

Congress have not changed the day for meeting 
at Philadelphia, as you imagine. The act of Vir- 
ginia, I find, has done so in substituting the second 
day for the second Monday in May, the time recom- 
mended from Annapolis. 

I cannot suppose that Mr. Otto has equivocated 
in his explanation to the public touching the Flori- 
das. Nothing of that subject has been mentioned 
here, as far as I know. Supposing the exchange in 
question to have really been intended, I do not see 
the inference to be unfavorable to France. Her 
views, as they occur to me, would most probably be 
to conciliate the Western people, in common with 
the Atlantic States, and to extend her commerce, by 
reversing the Spanish policy. I have always wished 
to see the Mississippi in the hands of France, or of 
any nation which would be more liberally disposed 
than the present holders of it. 

Mr. Jay's report on the treaty of peace has at 
length been decided on. It resolves and declares, 
that the treaty, having been constitutionally formed, 
is the law of the land, and urges a repeal of all laws 
contravening it, as well to stop the complaints of 
their existing as legal impediments, as to avoid need- 
less questions touching their validity. Mr. Jay is 
preparing a circular address to accompany the Res- 
olutions, and the latter will not be forwarded till the 
former is ready. 141 



1 787. ] CORRESPONDENCE. 629 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, April 2, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

I have your favor of the fifteenth ultimo. All of 
preceding date have already been acknowledged. 
The information which you wished to go to Mr. 
Guardoqui has been communicated. The real im- 
pression made by it cannot easily be seen through 
the political veil. If he views the state of Western 
affairs in the true light, his representations to Spain 
must convince her that she has no option but be- 
tween concession and hostilities. It is to be lament- 
ed that so many circumstances have concurred to 
enlist her pride on the side of the latter alterna- 
tive. 

The papers accompanying the advice of the Coun- 
cil as to Clark, have been laid before Congress. 
Similar communications have also been made from 
North Carolina. The impression they have made 
is not unfriendly, I conjecture, to the rights of the 
Western people, and it is probable that a rediscus- 
sion of these may be produced by the occasion. Our 
strength, however, is unequal to any effectual vote. 
A reinforcement from either Maryland or South 
Carolina would, I believe, supply the defect, Penn- 
sylvania having lately appointed Armstrong in the 
place of Pettit, which throws that State into the 
right scale. We have some hopes also of Rhode Is- 
land. She begins to see the policy of some States 
in her neighborhood, in excluding the Federal terri- 
tory from the market at which they offer their own. 



630 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

New Jersey has fully entered into this view of the 
matter, and feels no small indignation at it. 

Rhode Island has negatived a motion for appoint- 
ing deputies to the Convention, by a majority of 
twenty-two votes. Nothing can exceed the wicked- 
ness and folly which continue to reign there. All 
sense of character as well as of right is obliterated. 
Paper-money is still their idol, though it is debased 
to eight for one. 142 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, April 8, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

Your tw^o favors of the twenty-second and twenty- 
seventh of March, have been received since my last. 
In a preceding one you ask, what tribunal is to take 
cognizance of Clark's offence ? If our own laws 
will not reach it, I see no possibility of punishing it. 
But will it not come within the act of the last ses- 
sion concerning treasons and other offences committed 
without the commonwealth ? I have had no oppor- 
tunity yet of consulting Mr. Otto on the allegation 
of Oster touching the marriage of French subjects 
in America. What is the conspicuous prosecution 
which you suspect will shortly display a notable 
instance of perjury ? 

I am glad to find that you are turning your 
thoughts towards the business of May next. My 
despair of your finding the necessary leisure, as sig- 
nified in one of your letters, with the probability that 
some leading propositions at least would be expect- 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 631 

ed from Virginia, had engaged me in a closer atten- 
tion to the subject than I should otherwise have 
given. I will just hint the ideas that have occurred, 
leaving explanations for our interview. 

I think with you, that it will be well to retain as 
much as possible of the old Confederation, though I 
doubt whether it may not be best to work the valu- 
able articles into the new system, instead of engraft- 
ing the latter on the former. I am also perfectly 
of your opinion, that, in framing a system, no mate- 
rial sacrifices ought to be made to local or tempora- 
ry prejudices. An explanatory address must of ne- 
cessity accompany the result of the Convention on 
the main object. I am not sure that it will be prac- 
ticable to present the several parts of the reform in so 
detached a manner to the States, as that a partial 
adoption will be binding. Particular States may 
view different articles as conditions of each other, 
and would only ratify them as such. Others might 
ratify them as independent propositions. The con- 
sequence would be that the ratifications of both 
would go for nothing. I have not, however, exam- 
ined this point thoroughly. In truth, my ideas of a 
reform strike so deeply at the old Confederation, 
and lead to such a systematic change, that they 
scarcely admit of the expedient. 

I hold it for a fundamental point, that an individ- 
ual independence of the States is utterly irreconci- 
lable with the idea of an aggregate sovereignty, I 
think, at the same time, that a consolidation of the 
States into one simple republic is not less unattain- 
able than it would be inexpedient. Let it be tried, 
then, whether any middle ground can be taken, 



632 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

which will at once support a due supremacy of the 
national authority, and leave in force the local au- 
thorities so far as they can be subordinately useful. 

The first step to be taken is, I think, a change in 
the principle of representation. According to the 
present form of the Union, an equality of suffrage, 
if not just towards the larger members of it, is at 
least safe to them, as the liberty they exercise of 
rejecting or executing the acts of Congress, is un- 
controllable by the nominal sovereignty of Congress. 
Under a system which would operate without the 
intervention of the States, the case would be mate- 
rially altered. A vote from Delaware would have 
the same effect as one from Massachusetts or Vir- 
ginia. 

Let the national Government be armed with a 
positive and complete authority in all cases where 
uniform measures are necessary, as in trade, &c, 
&c. Let it also retain the powers which it now 
possesses. 

Let it have a negative, in all cases whatsoever, 
on the Legislative acts of the States, as the King of 
Great Britain heretofore had. This I conceive to 
be essential and the least possible abridgement of 
the State sovereignties. Without such a defensive 
power, every positive power that can be given on 
paper will be unavailing. It will also give internal 
stability to the States. There has been no moment 
since the peace at which the Federal assent would 
have been given to paper-money, &c, &c. 

Let this national supremacy be extended also to 
the Judiciary department. If the Judges in the last 
resort depend on the States, and are bound by their 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 633 

oaths to them and not to the Union, the intention of 
the law and the interests of the nation may be defeat- 
ed by the obsequiousness of the tribunals to the pol- 
licy or prejudices of the States. It seems at least 
essential that an appeal should lie to some national 
tribunals in all cases which concern foreigners, or 
inhabitants of other States. The admiralty juris- 
diction may be fully submitted to the National Gov- 
ernment. 

A Government formed of such extensive powers 
ought to be well organized. The Legislative de- 
partment may be divided into two branches. One 
of them to be chosen every years by the Legis- 
latures or the people at large ; the other to consist 
of a more select number, holding their appointments 
for a longer term, and going out in rotation. Per- 
haps the negative on the State laws may be most 
conveniently lodged in this branch. A Council of 
Revision may be superadded, including the great 
ministerial officers. 

A national Executive will also be necessary. I 
have scarcely ventured to form my own opinion yet, 
either of the manner in which it ought to be consti- 
tuted, or of the authorities with which it ought to be 
clothed. 

An article ought to be inserted expressly guaran- 
teeing the tranquillity of the States against internal 
as well as external dangers. 

To give the new system its proper energy, it will 
be desirable to have it ratified by the authority of 
the people, and not merely by that of the Legis- 
latures. 

I am afraid you will think this project, if not ex- 

Vol. I.— 40* 



634 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

travagant, absolutely unattainable and unworthy of 
being attempted. Conceiving it myself to go no fur- 
ther than is essential, the objections drawn from this 
source are to be laid aside. I flatter myself, how- 
ever, that they may be less formidable on trial than 
in contemplation. The change in the principle of 
representation will be relished by a majority of the 
States, and those too of most influence. The north- 
ern States will be reconciled to it by the actual su- 
periority of their populousness ; the Southern by their 
expected superiority on this point. This principle 
established, the repugnance of the large States to 
part with power will in a great degree subside, and 
the smaller States must ultimately yield to the pre- 
dominant will. It is also already seen by many, 
and must by degrees be seen by all, that, unless the 
Union be organized efficiently on republican princi- 
ples, innovations of a much more objectionable form 
may be obtruded, or, in the most favorable event, 
the partition of the Empire, into rival and hostile 
confederacies will ensue. 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, April 15, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

Your favor of the fourth of April has been receiv- 
ed since my last. The probability of General Wash- 
ington's coming to Philadelphia is, in one point of 
view, flattering. Would it not, however, be well for 
him to postpone his actual attendance, until some 
judgment can be formed of the result of the meeting? 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 635 

It ought not to be wished by any of his friends that 
he should participate in any abortive undertaking. 
It may occur, perhaps, that the delay would de- 
prive the Convention of his presiding auspices, and 
subject him, on his arrival, to a less conspicuous 
point of view than he ought on all occasions to 
stand in. Against this difficulty must be weighed 
the consideration above mentioned, to which may be 
added the opportunity which Pennsylvania, by the 
appointment of Doctor Franklin, has afforded of put- 
ting sufficient dignity into the Chair. 

The effect of the interposition of Congress in favor 
of the treaty at this crisis, was foreseen by us. I 
would myself have preferred a little procrastination 
on the subject. But the manifest and undeniable 
propriety of the thing itself, with the chance that 
the Legislature here, which will adjourn in a little 
time until next winter, and which is one of the prin- 
cipal transgressors, may set an immediate example 
of reformation, overruled the argument for delay. 
The difficulties which, as you suggest, may be left 
behind by a mere repeal of all existing impediments, 
will be probably found of a very serious nature to 
British creditors. If no other advantage should be 
taken of them by the State, than the making the 
assent of the creditors to the plan of instalments, a 
condition of such further provisions as may not come 
within the treaty, I do not know that the existence 
of these difficulties ought to be matter of regret. In 
every view Congress seem to have taken the most 
proper course for maintaining the national charac- 
ter ; and if any deviations in particular States should 
be required by peculiar circumstances, it will be 



636 CORRESPONDENCE. [ 1787. 

better that they should be chargeable on such States 
than on the United States. 

The Maryland Assembly met on the second in- 
stant, being convened by proclamation. The ex- 
pected delay, therefore, in her appointments for the 
Convention, cannot be admitted among the consid- 
erations which are to decide the time of your setting 
out. I am sorry that punctuality on your part will 
oblige you to travel without the company of Mrs. 
Randolph. But the sacrifice seems to be the more 
necessary, as Virginia ought not only to be on the 
ground in due time, but to be prepared with some 
materials for the work of the Convention. In this 
view, I could wish that you might be able to reach 
Philadelphia some days before the second Monday 
in May. 

This city has been thrown into no small agitation 
by a motion, made a few days ago, for a short ad- 
journment of Congress, and the appointment of Phil- 
adelphia as the place of its reassembling. No final 
question was taken, but some preliminary questions 
shewed that six States were in favor of it ; Rhode 
Island, the seventh State, was at first in the affirma- 
tive, but one of its Delegates was overcome by the 
exertions made to convert him. As neither Mary- 
land nor South Carolina was present, the vote is 
strong evidence of the precarious tenure by which 
New York enjoys her metropolitan advantages. The 
motives which led to this attempt were probably 
with some of a local nature. With others they 
were certainly of a general nature. 

Mr. Jay was a few days ago instructed to com- 
municate to Congress the State of the Spanish nego- 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 637 

tiation. An unwilling but silent assent was given 
by Massachusetts and Connecticut. The Report 
shews that Jay viewed the act of seven States as 
valid, and has even adjusted with Guardoqui an 
article for suspending our use of the Mississippi 
during the term of the treaty. A subsequent report, 
on a reference of Western information from Virginia 
and North Carolina, denotes little confidence in the 
event of the negotiation, and considerable perplexity 
as to the steps proper to be taken by Congress. 
Wednesday is fixed for the consideration of these 
reports. We mean to propose that Jefferson be 
sent, under a special commission, to plead the cause 
of the Mississippi at Madrid. 143 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, April 22, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

I have the pleasure of yours of the eleventh in- 
stant, acknowledging mine of the second. In some 
of your letters I observe you do not say whether 
any have been received from me or not. I have not 
omitted to write, in a single instance, since our cor- 
respondence commenced. 

The time approaches so nearly when I shall have 
an opportunity of making verbal communications on 
confidential points, that I forbear to commit them to 
paper. 

Congress are deliberating on the plan most 
eligible for disposing of the Western territory not 
yet surveyed. Some alteration will probably be 



638 CORRESPONDENCE. [ 1787. 

made in the ordinance on that subject, in which the 
idea of townships will not be altogether abandoned, 
but rendered less expensive. An act passed yester- 
day providing for the sale of the surveyed lands, 
under the direction of the Treasury board. The 
price to be one dollar at the lowest ; the sale is to 
be duly advertised in all the States, but the office is 
to be opened and held ivhere Congress shall sit. 
The original plan of distributing the sale through all 
the States was certainly objectionable. To confine 
it to one place, and that so remote as New York is, 
both from the centre of the Union and the premises 
in question, cannot be less so. 

The inhabitants of the Illinois complain of the 
land-jobbers, particularly Pentecost and Clarke, 
who are purchasing titles among them. Those of 
St. Vincent's complain of the defect of criminal and 
civil justice among them, as well as of military pro- 
tection. These matters are before Congress, and 
are found to be infinitely embarrassing. 

A copper coinage was agreed on yesterday to the 
amount of two hundred and odd thousand dollars. 
It is to be executed under a contract between the 
Treasury Board and the Coiner, and under the in- 
spection of a person to be appointed on the part of 
the United States, — fifteen per cent, to be drawn 
from this operation into the Federal Treasury. 

A great revolution is taking place in the adminis- 
tration in Massachusetts. Bowdoin is displaced in 
favour of Hancock. A great proportion of the 
Senate is already changed, and a greater is expect- 
ed in the other branch of the Assembly. A paper 
emission there also is much feared by the friends of 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 639 

justice. I find that the fetter originally put on the 
Deputies from that State to the Convention was 
taken off in consequence of the recommendatory act 
of Congress, and that the commission was adjusted 
to that act. 

Connecticut has not yet been in Assembly, and, of 
course, has not decided on the Convention. I am 
told the changes which are taking place in her elec- 
tions are far from strengthening the probability of 
her concurrence. 144 



TO THOMAS JEFFERSON. 

New York, April 23, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

Congress have agreed to Mr. Jay's report on the 
treaty of peace, and to an address which accompa- 
nies it. Copies of both will no doubt be sent you 
from his Department. The Legislature of this 
State, which was sitting at the time, and on whose 
account the acts of Congress were hurried through, 
has adjourned till January next, without deciding 
on them. This is an ominous example to the other 
States, and must weaken much the claim on Great 
Britain of an execution of the treaty on her part, as 
promised in case of proper steps being taken on 
ours. Virginia, we foresee, will be among the fore- 
most in seizing pretexts for evading the injunctions 
of Congress. South Carolina is not less infected 
with the same spirit. The present deliberations of 
Congress turn on, first, the sale of the Western 
lands ; secondly, the government of the Western 



640 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

settlements within the Federal domain ; thirdly, the 
final settlement of the accounts between the Union 
and its members ; fourthly, the treaty with Spain. 

1. Between six and seven hundred thousand 
acres have been surveyed in townships, under the 
land ordinance, and are to be sold forthwith. The 
place where Congress sit is fixed for the sale. Its 
eccentricity, and remoteness from the premises, will, 
I apprehend, give disgust. On the most eligible 
plan of selling the unsurveyed residue, Congress are 
much divided ; the Eastern States being strongly 
attached to that of townships, notwithstanding the 
expense incident to it ; the Southern being equally 
biassed in favor of indiscriminate locations, notwith- 
standing the many objections against that mode. 
The dispute will probably terminate in some kind 
of compromise, if one can be hit upon. 

2. The government of the settlements on the 
Illinois and Wabash is a subject very perplexing in 
itself, and rendered more so by our ignorance of 
many circumstances on which a right judgment de- 
pends. The inhabitants at those places claim pro- 
tection against the savages, and some provision for 
both criminal and civil justice. It appears also that 
land-jobbers are among them, who are likely to 
multiply litigations among individuals, and, by col- 
lusive purchases of spurious titles, to defraud the 
United States. 

3. The settlement of the public accounts has long 
been pursued in varied shapes, and with little pros- 
pect of success. The idea which has long been 
urged by some of us, seems now to be seriously em- 
braced, of establishing a plenipotentiary tribunal for 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 641 

the final adjustment of the mutual claims, on the 
great and simple principle of equity. An ordinance 
for this purpose has been reported by the Treasury 
Board, and has made some progress through Con- 
gress. It is likely to be much retarded by the thin- 
ness of Congress, as indeed is almost every other 
matter of importance. 

4. The Spanish negotiation is in a very ticklish 
situation. You have been already apprized of the 
vote of seven States last fall for ceding the Missis- 
sippi for a term of years. From sundry circum- 
stances it was inferred that Jay was proceeding 
under this usurped authority. A late instruction to 
him to lay the state of the negotiation before Con- 
gress has discovered that he has adjusted with 
Guardoqui an article for suspending the use of the 
Mississippi by the citizens of the United States. 
The report, however, leaves it somewhat doubtful 
how far the United States are committed by this 
step, and a subsequent report of the Secretary on 
the seizure of Spanish property in the Western 
country, and on information of discontents touching 
the occlusion of the Mississippi, shews that the 
probable consequences of the measure perplex him 
extremely. It was nevertheless conceived by the 
instructed delegations to be their duty to press a 
revocation of the step taken, in some form which 
would least offend Spain, and least irritate the pa- 
trons of the vote of seven States. Accordingly a 
motion was made to the following effect — that the 
present state of the negotiation with Spain, and of 
the affairs of the United States, rendered it expedi- 
ent that you should proceed, under a special com- 

Vol. I.— 41 



642 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

mission, to Madrid, for the purpose of making such 
representations as might at once impress on that 
Court our friendly disposition and induce it to relax 
on the contested points ; and that the proper com- 
munications and explanations should be made to 
Guardoqui relative to this change in the mode of 
conducting the negotiation. This motion was re- 
ferred to Mr. Jay, whose report disapproves of it. 
In this state the matter lies. Eight States only 
being present, no effective vote is to be expected. It 
may, notwithstanding, be incumbent on us to try 
some question which will at least mark the paucity 
of States who abet the obnoxious project. Massa- 
chusetts and New York alone, of the present States, 
are under that description ; and Connecticut and 
New Hampshire alone of the absent. Maryland 
and South Carolina have hitherto been on the right 
side. Their future conduct is somewhat problemat- 
ical. The opinion of New Hampshire is only con- 
jectured. The conversion of Rhode Island counte- 
nances a hope that she too may, in this instance, 
desert the New England standard. 

The prospect of a full and respectable Convention 
grows stronger every day. Rhode Island alone has 
refused to send Deputies. Maryland has probably 
appointed by this time. Of Connecticut alone doubts 
are entertained. The anti-federal party in that State 
is numerous and persevering. It is said that the 
elections which are now going on are rather dis- 
couraging to the advocates of the Convention. 
Pennsylvania has added Dr. Franklin to her depu- 
tation. There is some ground to calculate on the 
attendance of General Washington. Our Governor, 






1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 643 

Mr. Wythe, Mr. Blair, and Col. Mason will pretty 
certainly attend. The last, I am informed, is re- 
nouncing his errors on the subject of the Confedera- 
tion, and means to take an active part in the amend- 
ment of it. Mr. Henry pretty soon resigned the 
undertaking. General Nelson was put into his 
place, who has also declined. He was succeeded 
by Mr. R. H. Lee, who followed his example. Doc- 
tor M'Clurg has been since appointed, and as he 
was on the spot must have been previously con- 
sulted. 145 



TO GENERAL WASHINGTON. 

New York, September 30, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

I found, on my arrival here, that certain ideas, un- 
favorable to the act of the Convention which had 
created difficulties in that body, had made their way 
into Congress. They were patronized chiefly by 
Mr. R. H. Lee, and Mr. Dane, of Massachusetts. It 
was first urged, that, as the new Constitution was 
more than an alteration of the Articles of Confedera- 
tion, under which Congress acted, and even sub- 
verted those Articles altogether, there was a consti- 
tutional impropriety in their taking any positive 
agency in the work. The answer given was, that 
the Resolution of Congress in February had recom- 
mended the Convention as the best means of ob- 
taining a firm National Government; that, as the 
powers of the Convention were defined, by their 
commissions, in nearly the same terms with the 



644 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787 

powers of Congress given by the Confederation on 
the subject of alterations, Congress were not more 
restrained from acceding to the new plan, than the 
Convention were from proposing it. If the plan was 
within the powers of the Convention, it was within 
those of Congress ; if beyond those powers, the same 
necessity which justified the Convention would 
justify Congress ; and a failure of Congress to concur 
in what was done would imply, either that the Con- 
vention had done wrong in exceeding their powers, 
or that the government proposed was in itself liable 
to insuperable objections; that such an inference 
would be the more natural, as Congress had never 
scrupled to recommend measures foreign to their 
constitutional functions, whenever the public good 
seemed to require it ; and had in several instances, 
particularly in the establishment of the new Western 
Governments, exercised assumed powers of a very 
high and delicate nature, under motives infinitely 
less urgent than the present state of our affairs, if 
any faith were due to the representations made by 
Congress themselves, echoed by twelve States in 
the Union, and confirmed by the general voice of 
the people. An attempt was made in the next place 
by R. H. L., to amend the act of the Convention be- 
fore it should go forth from Congress. He proposed 
a Bill of Rights, provision for juries in civil cases, 
and several other things corresponding with the 
ideas of Colonel Mason. He was supported by Mr. 
Melancthon Smith of this state. It was contended, 
that Congress had an undoubted right to insert 
amendments, and that it was their duty to make use 
of it in a case where the essential guards of liberty 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 645 

had been omitted. On the other side, the right of 
Congress was not denied, but the inexpediency of 
exerting it was urged on the following grounds ; — 
first, that every circumstance indicated that the 
introduction of Congress as a party to the reform 
was intended by the States merely as a matter of 
form and respect; secondly, that it was evident, 
from the contradictory objections which had been 
expressed by the different members who had anim- 
adverted on the plan, that a discussion of its merits 
would consume much time, without producing 
agreement even among its adversaries ; thirdly, that 
it was clearly the intention of the States that the 
plan to be proposed should be the act of the Con- 
vention, with the assent of Congress, which could 
not be the case, if alterations were made, the Con- 
vention being no longer in existence to adopt them ; 
fourthly, that as the act of the Convention, when 
altered, would instantly become the mere act of 
Congress, and must be proposed by them as such, 
and of course be addressed to the Legislatures, not 
Conventions of the States, and require the ratifica- 
tion of thirteen instead of nine States, and as the 
unaltered act would go forth to the States directly 
from the Convention under the auspices of that body, 
some States might ratify the one and some the other 
of the plans, and confusion and disappointment be 
the least evils that would ensue. These difficulties, 
which at one time threatened a serious division in 
Congress, and popular alterations, with the Yeas 
and Nays on the Journals, were at length fortunate- 
ly terminated by the following Resolution : " Con- 
gress having received the Report of the Convention 



646 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

lately assembled in Philadelphia, Resolved unani- 
mously that the said Report, with the Resolutions and 
letter accompanying the same, be transmitted to the 
several Legislatures, in order to be submitted to a 
Convention of Delegates chosen in each State by 
the people thereof, in conformity to the Resolves of 
the Convention made and provided in that case." 
Eleven States were present, the absent ones, Rhode 
Island and Maryland. A more direct approbation 
would have been of advantage in this and some 
other States, where stress will be laid on the agency 
of Congress in the matter, and a handle be taken 
by adversaries of any ambiguity on the subject. 
With regard to Virginia and some other States, 
reserve on the part of Congress will do no injury. 
The circumstance of unanimity must be favorable 
every where. 

The general voice of this City seems to espouse 
the new Constitution. It is supposed nevertheless 
that the party in power is strongly opposed to it. 
The country must finally decide, the sense of w T hich 
is as yet wholly unknown. As far as Boston and 
Connecticut have been heard from, the first im- 
pression seems to be auspicious. I am waiting with 
anxiety for the echo from Virginia, but with very 
faint hopes of its corresponding with my wishes. 

P. S. A small packet of the size of two volumes 
octavo addressed to you lately came to my hands 
with books of my own from France. General 
Pinkney has been so good as to take charge Oi 
them. He set out yesterday for South Carolina, 
and means to call at Mount Vernon. 143 



[1787. CORRESPONDENCE. 647 

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, October Y, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

Congress are at present deliberating on the requi- 
sition. The Treasury Board has reported one in 
specie alone, alleging the mischiefs produced by 
" Indents." It is proposed by a Committee that in- 
dents be received from the States, but that the con- 
ditions tying down the States to a particular mode 
of procuring them, be abolished ; and that the in- 
dents for one year be receivable in the quotas of 
any year. 

St. Clair is appointed Governor of the Western 
country, and Major Sarjent, of Massachusetts, the 
Secretary of that establishment. A treaty with the 
Indians is on the anvil, as a supplemental provision 
for the Western country. It is not certain, how- 
ever, that any thing will be done, as it involves 
money, and we shall have on the floor nine States 
one more day only. 

We hear nothing decisive as yet concerning the 
general reception given to the act of the Conven- 
tion. The advocates for it come forward more 
promptly than the adversaries. The sea coast 
seems every where fond of it. The party in Boston 
which was thought most likely to make opposition, 
are warm in espousing it. It is said that Mr. S. 
Adams objects to one point only, viz. the prohibition 
of a religious test. Mr. Bowdoin's objections are 
said to be against the great number of members 
composing the Legislature, and the intricate elec- 
tion of the President. You will no doubt have 



648 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

heard of the fermentation in the Assembly of Penn- 
sylvania. 147 

Mr. Adams is permitted to return home after 
February next, with thanks for the zeal and fidelity 
of his services. As the commission of Smith ex- 
pires at that time, and no provision is made for 
continuing him, or appointing a successor, the rep- 
resentation of the United States at the Court of 
London will cease at that period. 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, October 21, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

We hear that opinions are various in Virginia on 
the plan of the Convention. I have received, within 
a few days, a letter from the Chancellor, by which 
I find that he gives it his approbation ; and another 
from the President of William and Mary, which, 
though it does not absolutely reject the Constitution, 
criticises it pretty freely. The newspapers in the 
Northern and Middle States begin to teem with 
controversial publications. The attacks seem to be 
principally levelled against the organization of the 
Government, and the omission of the provisions con- 
tended for in favor of the press, and juries, &c. A 
new combatant, however, with considerable address 
and plausibility, strikes at the foundation. He rep- 
resents the situation of the United States to be such 
as to render any government improper and imprac- 
ticable which forms the States into one nation, and 
is to operate directly on the people. Judging from 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 649 

the newspapers, one would suppose that the adver- 
saries were the most numerous and the most ear- 
nest. But there is no other evidence that it is the 
fact. On the contrary, we learn that the Assembly 
of New Hampshire, which received the Constitution 
on the point of their adjournment, were extremely 
pleased with it. All the information from Massa- 
chusetts denotes a favorable impression there. The 
Legislature of Connecticut have unanimously recom- 
mended the choice of a Convention in that State, 
and Mr. Baldwin, who is just from the spot, informs 
me, that, from present appearances, the opposition 
will be inconsiderable ; that the Assembly, if it de- 
pended on them, would adopt the system almost 
unanimously ; and that the clergy and all the literary 
men are exerting themselves in its favor. Rhode 
Island is divided ; the majority being violently 
against it. The temper of this State cannot yet be 
fully discerned. A strong party is in favor of it. 
But they will probably be outnumbered, if those 
whose numbers are not yet known should take the 
opposite side. New Jersey appears to be zealous. 
Meetings of the people in different counties are 
declaring their approbation, and instructing their 
representatives. There will probably be a strong 
opposition in Pennsylvania. The other side, how- 
ever, continue to be sanguine. Doctor Carroll, who 
came hither lately from Maryland, tells me, that the 
public voice there appears at present to be decidedly 
in favor of the Constitution. Notwithstanding all 
these circumstances, I am far from considering the 
public mind as fully known, or finally settled on the 
subject. They amount only to a strong presump- 
Vol. I.— 41 * 



650 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

tion that the general sentiment in the Eastern and 
Middle States is friendly to the proposed system at 
this time. 



TO THOMAS JEFFERSON. 

New York, October 24, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

When the plan of the Constitution proposed by 
the Convention came before Congress for their 
sanction, a very serious effort was made by R. H. 
Lee and Mr. Dane, from Massachusetts, to embar- 
rass it. It was first contended, that Congress could 
not properly give any positive countenance to a 
measure which had for its object the subversion of 
the Constitution under which they acted. This 
ground of attack failing, the former gentleman urged 
the expediency of sending out the plan with amend- 
ments, and proposed a number of them correspond- 
ing with the objections of Col. Mason. This ex- 
periment had still less effect. In order, however, to 
obtain unanimity, it was necessary to couch the 
resolution in very moderate terms. 

Mr. Adams has received permission to return, 
with thanks for his services. No provision is made 
for supplying his place, or keeping up any repre- 
sentation there. Your reappointment for three 
years will be notified from the office of foreign 
affairs. It was made without a negative, eight 
States being present. Connecticut, notwithstand- 
ing, put in a blank ticket, the sense of that State 
having been declared against embassies. Massa- 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 651 

chusetts betrayed some scruple on like ground. 
Every personal consideration was avowed, and I 
believe with sincerity, to have militated against 
these scruples. It seems to be understood that 
letters to and from the foreign ministers of the 
United States are not free of postage ; but that the 
charge is to be allowed in their accounts. 

The exchange of our French for Dutch creditors 
has not been countenanced either by Congress or 
the Treasury Board. The paragraph in your last 
letter to Mr. Jay, on the subject of applying a loan 
in Holland to the discharge of the pay due to the 
foreign officers, has been referred to the Board since 
my arrival here. No report has yet been made. 
But I have little idea that the proposition will be 
adopted. Such is the state and prospect of our 
fiscal department, that any new loan, however 
small, that should now be made, would probably 
subject us to the reproach of premeditated decep- 
tion. The balance of Mr. Adams's last loan will 
be wanted for the interest due in Holland, and, with 
all the income here, will, it is feared, not save our 
credit in Europe from farther wounds. It may well 
be doubted whether the present Government can be 
kept alive during the ensuing year, or until the new 
one may take its place. 

Upwards of one hundred thousand acres of the 
lands of the United States have been disposed of in 
open market. Five millions of unsurveyed have 
been sold by private contract to a New England 
eompany, at two-thirds of a dollar per acre, pay- 
ment to be made in the principal of the public secu- 
rities. A negotiation is nearly closed with a New 



652 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

Jersey company for two millions more on like terms, 
and another commenced with a company of this 
city for four millions. 148 



TO GENERAL WASHINGTON. 

New York, Oct. 28, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

The mail of yesterday brought me your favor of 
the twenty-second instant. The communications 
from Richmond give me as much pleasure as they 
exceed my expectations. As I find by a letter from 
a member of the Assembly, however, that Col. Ma- 
son has not got down, and it appears that Mr. Henry 
is not at bottom a friend, I am not without fears that 
the combined influence and management may yet 
create difficulties. There is one consideration which 
I think ought to have some weight in the case, over 
and above the intrinsic inducements to embrace the 
Constitution, and which I have suggested to some 
of my correspondents. There is at present a very 
strong probability that nine States at least will 
pretty speedily concur in establishing it. What 
will become of the tardy remainder ? They must 
be either left, as outcasts from the society, to shift 
for themselves, or be compelled to come in, or must 
come in of themselves when they will be allowed 
no credit for it. Can either of these situations be 
as eligible as a prompt and manly determination to 
support the Union, and share its common fortunes ? 

My last stated pretty fully the information which 
had arrived here from different quarters, concerning 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 653 

the proposed Constitution. I recollect nothing that 
is now to be added, farther than that the Assembly 
of Massachusetts, now sitting, certainly gives it a 
friendly reception. I enclose a Boston paper, by 
which it appears that Governor Hancock has ushered 
it to them in as propitious a manner as could have 
been required. 

Mr. Charles Pinckney's character is, as you ob- 
serve, well marked by the publications which I en- 
closed. His printing the secret paper at this time 
could have no motive but the appetite for expected 
praise ; for the subject to which it relates has been 
dormant a considerable time, and seems likely to 
remain so. 

A foreign gentleman of merit, and who, besides 
this general title, brings me a letter which gives 
him a particular claim to my civilities, is very 
anxious to obtain a sketch of the Potomac and the 
route from the highest navigable part of it to the 
western waters which are to be connected with the 
Potomac by the portage, together with a sketch of 
the works going on, and a memorandum of the pro- 
gress made in them. Knowing of no other channel 
through which I could enable myself to gratify this 
gentleman, I am seduced into the liberty of resorting 
to your kindness ; and of requesting, that, if you 
have such a draught by you, your amanuensis may 
be permitted to take a very rough copy of it for me. 
In making this request I beseech you, Sir, to under- 
stand that I do it with not more confidence in your 
goodness than with the sincerest desire that it may 
be disregarded if it cannot be fulfilled with the most 
perfect convenience. 149 



654 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, November 18, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

I have not since my arrival collected any ad- 
ditional information concerning the progress of the 
Federal Constitution. I discovered no evidence on 
my journey through New Jersey, that any opposition 
whatever would be made in that State. The Con- 
vention of Pennsylvania is to meet on Tuesday 
next. The members returned, I was told by several 
persons, reduced the adoption of the plan in that 
State to absolute certainty, and by a greater ma- 
jority than the most sanguine advocates had calcu- 
lated. One of the counties which had been set 
down by all on the list of opposition, had elected 
deputies of known attachment to the Constitution. 

I do not find that a single State is represented 
except Virginia, and if seems very uncertain when 
a Congress will be made. There are individual 
members present from several States ; and the at- 
tendance of this and the neighbouring States may, 
I suppose, be obtained when it will produce a 
quorum. 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, December 2, 1787. 



Dear Sir, 

Our public letter gave you the latest authentic 
information from Europe. A general war seems not 
impossible; a war between the Russians and the 
Turks has actually commenced. The enterprizing 






1787. ] CORRESPONDENCE. 655 

movements of the Prussian troops have disconcerted 
the patriotic party and their supporters, and it seems 
as if the Stadtholder would gain a complete triumph. 
What effect this may have on the Government of 
that country, I cannot undertake to foretell. I have 
never been inclined to think that complete success 
to the views of either party would be favorable to 
the people. If the Stadtholdership were abolished, 
the government, unless further changes occurred, 
would be a simple aristocracy. Should the patriots, 
as they call themselves, be excluded from the govern- 
ment, the Stadtholder would be an absolute mon- 
arch. Whilst both continue, they check each other ; 
which is absolutely necessary, as the people have 
no check on either. The consequence of the people 
arises from the competitions of the two for their 
favor. In general the lower orders have been parti- 
zans of the Stadtholder. They are so, it is said, 
in the present contest. 

We have not more than two or three States as 
yet attending. It is altogether conjectural when 
the deficiency of a quorum will be made up. 

No recent indications of the views of the States 
as to the Constitution have come to my knowledge. 
The elections in Connecticut are over, and, as far as 
the returns are known, a large majority are friendly 
to it. Doctor Johnson says, it will be pretty cer- 
tainly adopted ; but there will be opposition. The 
power of taxing any thing but imports appears to 
be the most popular topic among the adversaries. 
The Convention of Pennsylvania is sitting. The 
result there will not reach you first through my 
hands. The divisions on preparatory questions, as 



656 CORRESPONDENCE. [ 1787. 

they are published in the newspapers, shew that 
the party in favor of the Constitution have forty-four 
or forty-five vs. twenty-two or twenty-four, or there- 
abouts. 

The enclosed paper contains two numbers of the 
Federalist. This paper was begun about three 
weeks ago, and proposes to go through the subject. 
I have not been able to collect all the numbers, since 
my return from Philadelphia, or I would have sent 
them to you. I have been the less anxious, as I 
understand the printer means to make a pamphlet of 
them, when I can give them to you in a more 
convenient form. You will probably discover marks 
of different pens. I am not at liberty to give you 
any other key than that I am in myself for a few 
numbers, and that one besides myself was a mem- 
ber of the Convention. 150 



TO THOMAS JEFFERSON. 

New York, December 20, 1787. 

Dear Sir, 

Mr. De la Forest, the Consul here, called on me 
a few days ago, and told me he had information, 
that the Farmers General and Mr. Morris, having 
found their contract mutually advantageous, are 
evading the resolutions of the Committee by tacit ar- 
rangements for its continuance. He observed, that 
the object of the Farmers was singly profit, that of 
the Government two fold, revenue and commerce. 
It was consequently the wish of the latter to render 
the monopoly as little hurtful to the trade with 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 657 

America as possible. He suggested as an expedient, 
that the Farmers should be required to divide the 
contracts among six or seven houses, French and 
American, who should be required to ship annually 
to America a reasonable proportion of goods. This, 
he supposed, would produce some competition in the 
purchases here, and would introduce a competition 
also with British goods here. The latter condition, 
he said, could not be w T ell required of, or executed 
by, a single contractor, and the Government could 
not abolish the farm. These ideas were meant for 
you. 

Since the date of my other letter, the Convention 
of Delaware have unanimously adopted the new 
Constitution. That of Pennsylvania has adopted it 
by a majority of 46 against 23. That of New Jer- 
sey is sitting and will adopt pretty unanimously. 
These are all the Conventions that have met. I 
hear from North Carolina that the Assembly there 
is well disposed. Mr. Henry, Mr. Mason, R. H. Lee, 
and the Governor, continue by their influence to 
strengthen the opposition in Virginia. The Assem- 
bly there is engaged in several mad freaks. Among 
others a bill has been agreed to in the House of 
Delegates, prohibiting the importation of rum, brandy ', 
and all other spirits not distilled from some Ameri- 
can production. All brewed liquors under the same 
description, with beef, tallow candles, cheese, &c, 
are included in the prohibition. In order to enforce 
this despotic measure, the most despotic means are 
resorted to. If any person be found, after the com- 
mencement of the act, in the use or possession of any 
of the prohibited articles, though acquired previously 

Vol. I.— 42 



658 CORRESPONDENCE. [ 1787. 

to the law, he is to lose them, and pay a heavy fine. 
This is the form in which the bill was agreed to by 
a large majority in the House of Delegates. It is a 
child of Mr. Henry, and said to be a favorite one. 
They first voted, by a majority of thirty, that all 
legal obstructions to the treaty of peace, should 
cease in Virginia as soon as laws complying with it 
should have passed in all the other States. This 
was the result of four days' debate, with the most 
violent opposition from Mr. Henry. A few days 
afterward he renewed his efforts, and got a vote, by 
a majority of fifty, that Virginia would not comply 
until Great Britain shall have complied. 

The States seem to be either wholly omitting to 
provide for the Federal Treasury ; or to be with- 
drawing the scanty appropriations made to it. The 
latter course has been taken by Massachusetts, Vir- 
ginia, and Delaware. The Treasury Board seems 
to be in despair of maintaining the shadow of gov- 
ernment much longer. Without money, the offices 
must be shut up, and the handful of troops on the 
frontier disbanded, which will probably bring on an 
Indian war, and make an impression to our disad- 
vantage on the British garrisons within our limits. 151 



TO GENERAL WASHINGTON. 

New York, December 20, 1787. 



Dear Sir, 

I was favored on Saturday with your letter of the 
seventh instant, along with which was covered the 
printed letter of Colonel R. H. Lee to the Governor. 



1787.] CORRESPONDENCE. 659 

It does not appear to me to be a very formidable 
attack on the new Constitution; unless it should 
derive an influence from the names of the correspond- 
ents, which its intrinsic merits do not entitle it to. 
He is certainly not perfectly accurate in the state- 
ment of all his facts ; and I should infer from the 
tenor of the objections in Virginia that his plan of 
an Executive would hardly be viewed as an amend- 
ment of that of the Convention. It is a little singu- 
lar that three of the most distinguished advocates 
for amendments ; and who expect to unite the thir- 
teen States in their project, appear to be pointedly 
at variance with each other on one of the capital 
articles of the system. Colonel Lee proposes, that 
the President should choose a Council of eleven, and 
with their advice have the appointment of all offi- 
cers. Colonel Mason's proposition is, that a Coun- 
cil of six should be appointed by the Congress. 
What degree of power he would confide to it, I do 
not know. The idea of the Governor is, that there 
should be a plurality of co-equal heads, distinguished 
probably by other peculiarities in the organization. 
It is pretty certain that some others who make a 
common cause with them in the general attempt to 
bring about alterations, differ still more from them 
than they do from each other ; and that they them- 
selves differ as much on some other great points, as 
on the constitution of the Executive. 

You did not judge amiss of Mr. Jay. The para- 
graph affirming a change in his opinion of the plan 
of the Convention, was an arrant forgery. He has 
contradicted it in a letter to Mr. J. Vaughan which 
has been printed in the Philadelphia gazettes. 



660 CORRESPONDENCE. [1787. 

Tricks of this sort are not uncommon with the ene- 
mies of the new Constitution. Colonel Mason's ob- 
jections were, as I am told, published in Boston, mu- 
tilated of that which pointed at the regulation of 
commerce. Doctor Franklin's concluding speech, 
which you will meet with in one of the papers here- 
with enclosed, is both mutilated and adulterated, so 
as to change both the form and spirit of it. 

I am extremely obliged by the notice you take of 
my request concerning the Potomac. I must insist 
that you will not consider it as an object of any fur- 
ther attention. 

The Philadelphia papers will have informed you 
of the result of the Convention of that State. New 
Jersey is now in Convention, and has probably by 
this time adopted the Constitution. General Irvine, 
of the Pennsylvania Delegation, who is just arrived 
here, and who conversed with some of the members 
at Trenton, tells me that great unanimity reigns in 
the Convention. 

Connecticut, it is pretty certain, will decide also 
in the affirmative by a large majority. So, it is pre- 
sumed, will New Hampshire ; though her Conven- 
tion will be a little later than could be wished. 
There are not enough of the returns in Massachu- 
setts known for a final judgment of the probable 
event in that State. As far as the returns are 
known, they are extremely favorable : but as they 
are chiefly from the maritime parts of the State, they 
are a precarious index of the public sentiment. I 
have good reason to believe that if you are in corres- 
pondence with any gentleman in that quarter, and 
a proper occasion should offer for an explicit com- 



1788.] CORRESPONDENCE. 661 

munication of your good wishes for the plan, so as 
barely to warrant an explicit assertion of the fact, 
that it would be attended with valuable effects. 
I barely drop the idea. The circumstances on 
which the propriety of it depends are best known to 
you, as they will be best judged of by yourself. 
The information from North Carolina gave me great 
pleasure. We have nothing from the States south 
of it. 152 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, January 10, 1788. 

Dear Sir, 

I received two days ago your favor of December 
twenty seventh, enclosing a copy of your letter to 
the Assembly. I have read it with attention, and 
I can add with pleasure, because the spirit of it does 
as much honor to your candor, as the general reason- 
ing does to your abilities. Nor can I believe that 
in this quarter the opponents of the Constitution 
will find encouragement in it. You are already 
aware that your objections are not viewed in the same 
decisive light by me that they are by you. I must own 
that I differ still more from your opinion, that a 
prosecution of the experiment of a second Conven- 
tion will be favorable, even in Virginia, to the ob- 
ject which I am sure you have at heart. It is to 
me apparent that, had your duty led you to throw 
your influence into the opposite scale, it would have 
given it a decided and unalterable preponderance ; 
and that Mr. Henry would either have suppressed 



662 CORRESPONDENCE. [ 1788. 

his enmity, or been baffled in the policy which it has 
dictated. It appears also that the grounds taken 
by the opponents in different quarters forbid any 
hope of concord among them. Nothing can be 
further from your views than the principles of 
different sets of men who have carried on their op- 
position under the respectability of your name. In 
this State the party adverse to the Constitution 
notoriously meditate either a dissolution of the 
Union, or protracting it by patching up the Articles 
of Confederation. In Connecticut and Massa- 
chusetts, the opposition proceeds from that part of 
the people who have a repugnance in general to 
good government, or to any substantial abridgement 
of State powers, and a part of whom in Massa- 
chusetts are known to aim at confusion, and are 
suspected of wishing a reversal of the Revolution. 
The minority in Pennsylvania, as far as they are 
governed by any other views than an habitual op- 
position to their rivals, are manifestly averse to 
some essential ingredients in a National Govern- 
ment. You are better acquainted with Mr. Henry's 
politics than I can be, but I have for some time con- 
sidered him as no further concurring in the plan of 
amendments than as he hopes to render it subser- 
vient to his real designs. Viewing the matter in 
this light, the inference with me is unavoidable that 
were a second trial to be made, the friends of a good 
constitution for the Union would not only find them- 
selves not a little differing from each other as to the 
proper amendments; but perplexed and frustrated 
by men who had objects totally different. A second 
Convention would, of course, be formed under the 



1788. ] CORRESPONDENCE. 663 

influence, and composed in a great measure of the 
members of the opposition in the several States. 
But were the first difficulties overcome, and the 
Constitution re-edited with amendments, the event 
would still be infinitely precarious. Whatever re- 
spect may be due to the rights of private judgment, 
and no man feels more of it than I do, there can be 
no doubt that there are subjects to which the 
capacities of the bulk of mankind are unequal, and 
on which they must and will be governed by those 
with whom they happen to have acquaintance and 
confidence. The proposed Constitution is of this 
description. The great body of those who are both 
for and against it must follow the judgment of others, 
not their own. Had the Constitution been framed 
and recommended by an obscure individual, instead 
of a body possessing public respect and confidence, 
there cannot be a doubt, that although it would 
have stood in the identical words, it would have 
commanded little attention from most of those who 
now admire its wisdom. Had yourself, Colonel 
Mason, Colonel R. H. Lee, Mr. Henry, and a few 
others, seen the Constitution in the same light with 
those who subscribed it, I have no doubt that Vir- 
ginia would have been as zealous and unanimous, as 
she is now divided, on the subject. I infer from 
these considerations, that, if a government be ever 
adopted in America, it must result from a fortunate 
coincidence of leading opinions, and a general con- 
fidence of the people in those who may recommend 
it. The very attempt at a second Convention 
strikes at the confidence in the first ; and the ex- 
istence of a second, by opposing influence to influ- 



664 CORRESPONDENCE. [1788. 

ence would in a manner destroy an effectual con- 
fidence in either, and give a loose rein to human 
opinions; which must be as various and irrecon- 
cileable concerning theories of government, as doc- 
trines of religion ; and give opportunities to designing 
men which it might be impossible to counteract. 

The Connecticut Convention has probably come 
to a decision before this ; but the event is not known 
here. It is understood that a great majority will 
adopt the Constitution. The accounts from Massa- 
chusetts vary extremely according to the channels 
through which they come. It is said that S. Adams, 
who has hitherto been reserved, begins to make 
open declaration of his hostile views. His influence 
is not great, but this step argues an opinion that he 
can calculate on a considerable party. It is said 
here, and I believe on good ground, that North 
Carolina has postponed her Convention till July, in 
order to ha ye the previous example of Virginia. 
Should North Carolina fall into Mr. Henry's politics, 
which does not appear to me improbable, it will 
endanger the Union more than any other circum- 
stance that could happen. My apprehensions of 
this danger increase every day. The multiplied in- 
ducements at this moment to the local sacrifices 
necessary to keep the States together, can never be 
expected to coincide again, and they are counter- 
acted by so many unpropitious circumstances, that 
their, efficacy can with difficulty be confided in. I 
have no information from South Carolina or 
Georgia, on which any certain opinion can be form- 
ed of the temper of those States. The prevailing 
idea has been, that both of them would speedily and 



1788.] CORRESPONDENCE. 665 

generally embrace the Constitution. It is impos- 
sible, however, that the example of Virginia and 
North Carolina should not have an influence on their 
politics. I consider every thing therefore proble- 
matical from Maryland southward. 

We have no Congress yet. The number of 
States on the spot does not exceed five. It is prob- 
able that a quorum will now be soon made. A 
delegate from New Hampshire is expected, which 
will make up a representation from that State. The 
termination of the Connecticut Convention will set 
her Delegates at liberty, and the meeting of the 
Assembly of this State, will fill the vacancy which 
bas some time existed in her Delegation. 153 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, January 20, 1788. 

Dear Sir, 

The Count de Moustier arrived a few days ago as 
successor to the Chevalier de la Luzerne. He had 
so long a passage that I do not know whether the 
dispatches brought by him contain much that is 
new. It seems that, although the affairs of Holland 
are put into a pacific train, those of the Russians 
and Turks may yet produce a general broil in 
Europe. The Prussian troops are to be with- 
drawn, and the fate of the Dutch regulated by ne- 
gotiation. 

The intelligence from Massachusetts begins to be 
rather ominous to the Constitution. The interest 

Vol. I.— 42* 



666 CORRESPONDENCE. [1788. 

opposed to it is reinforced by all connected with the 
late insurrection ; and by the province of Maine 
which apprehends difficulties, under the new system, 
in obtaining a separate Government, greater than 
may be otherwise experienced. Judging from the 
present state of the intelligence, as I have it, the 
probability is, that the voice of the State will 
be in the negative. The Legislature of this State 
is much divided at present. The House of Assem- 
bly are said to be friendly to the merits of the Con- 
stitution. The Senate, at least a majority of those 
actually assembled, are opposed even to the calling 
a Convention. The decision of Massachusetts, in 
either w T ay, will decide the voice of this State. The 
minority of Pennsylvania are extremely restless 
under their defeat ; will endeavour at all events, if 
they can get an Assembly to their wish, to under- 
mine what has been done there ; and will, it is pre- 
sumed, be emboldened by a negative from Massa- 
chusetts to give a more direct and violent form to 
their attack. So they are also from South Carolina, 
as far as they extend. 

If I am not misinformed as to the arrival of some 
members of Congress in town, a quorum is at length 
made up. 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, January 27, 1788. 



Dear Sir, 

A Congress was made for the first time on Mon- 
day last, and our friend C. Griffin placed in the 



1788.] CORRESPONDENCE. 667 

Chair. There was no competition in the case, which 
you will wonder at, as Virginia has so lately sup- 
plied a President. New Jersey did not like it, I 
believe, very well, but acquiesced. 

I postponed writing by the last mail, in hopes of 
being able by this to acquaint you with the proba- 
ble result of the Convention of Massachusetts. It 
appears, however, that the prospect continues too 
equivocal to justify a conjecture on the subject. 
The representations vary somewhat, but they all 
tend to excite, rather than diminish, anxiety. Mr. 
Gerry had been introduced to a seat for the purpose 
of stating facts. On the arrival of the discussion at 
the Article concerning the Senate, he signified, with- 
out being called on, that he had important informa- 
tion to communicate on that subject. Mr. Dana 
and several others remarked on the impropriety of 
Mr. Gerry's conduct. Gerry rose to justify. Others 
opposed it as irregular. A warm conversation 
arose, and continued till the adjournment ; after 
which a still warmer one took place between Gerry 
and Dana. The members gathered around them, 
took sides as they were for or against the Constitu- 
tion, and strong symptoms of confusion appeared. 
At length, however, they separated. It was ex- 
pected that the subject would be renewed in the 
Convention the next morning. This was the state 
of things when the post came off. 

In one of the papers enclosed you will find your 
letter to the Assembly reviewed by some critic of 
this place. I can form no guess who he is. I have 
seen another attack grounded on a comparative 
view of your objections, Col. Mason's, and Mr. Ger- 



668 CORRESPONDENCE. [1788 

ry's. This was from Philadelphia. I have not the 
paper, or I would add it. 15J 



TO GENERAL WASHINGTON. 

New York, February 3, 1788. 

Dear Sir, 

Another mail has arrived from Boston without 
terminating the conflict between our hopes and 
fears. I have a letter from Mr. King, of the twenty- 
seventh, which, after dilating somewhat on the ideas 
in his former letters, concludes with the following 
paragraph : " We have avoided every question 
which would have shewn the division of the House. 
Of consequence we are not positive of the numbers 
on each side. By the last calculation we made on 
our side, we were doubtful whether we exceeded 
them, or they us, in numbers. They, however, say 
that they have a majority of eight or twelve against 
us. We by no means despair." Another letter of 
the same date, from another member, gives the fol- 
lowing picture : " Never was there an Assembly in 
this State in possession of greater ability and infor- 
mation than the present Convention ; yet I am in 
doubt whether they will approve the Constitution. 
There are unhappily three parties opposed to it — 
first, all men who are in favor of paper-money and 
tender laws, — these are more or less in every part of 
the State ; secondly, all the late insurgents and their 
abettors, — in the three great western counties they 



1788.] CORRESPONDENCE. 669 

are very numerous ; we have in the Convention eigh- 
teen or twenty who were actually in Shays' army; — 
thirdly, a great majority of the members from the pro- 
vince of Maine. Many of them and their constituents 
are only squatters on other people's land, and they are 
afraid of being brought to account ; they also think, 
though erroneously, that their favorite plan, of being 
a separate State, will be defeated. Add to these 
the honest doubting people, and they make a pow- 
erful host. The leaders of this party are — Mr. 
Widgery, Mr. Thomson, and Mr. Nasson, from the 
province of Maine ; Doctor Taylor, from the county 
of Worcester, and Mr. Bishop, from the neighbour- 
hood of Rhode Island. To manage the cause against 
them, are the present and late Governors, three 
Judges of the Supreme Court, fifteen members of the 
Senate, twenty from among the most respectable of 
the clergy, ten or twelve of the first characters at 
the bar, Judges of probate, High sheriffs of counties, 
and many other respectable people, merchants, &c, 
Generals Heath, Lincoln, Brooks, and others of the 
late army. With all this ability in support of the 
cause, I am pretty well satisfied we shall lose the 
question, unless we can take off some of the Opposi- 
tion by amendments. I do not mean such as are to 
be made conditions of the ratification, but recom- 
mendations only. Upon this plan I flatter myself 
we may possibly get a majority of twelve or fifteen, 
if not more." 

The Legislature of this State has voted a Con- 
vention on the seventeenth of June. 155 



670 CORRESPONDENCE. [_ 1788. 

TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, March 3, 1788. 

Dear Sir, 

The Convention of New Hampshire have disap- 
pointed the general expectation. They have not 
rejected the Constitution, but they have adjourned 
without adopting it. It was found that, on a final 
question, there would be a majority of three or four 
in the negative ; but in this number were included 
some who, with instructions from their towns 
against the Constitution, had been proselyted by 
the discussions. These concurring with the Fede- 
ralists in the adjournment, carried it by fifty-seven 
against forty-seven, if I am rightly informed as to 
the numbers. The second meeting is not to be till 
the last week in June. I have inquired of the gen- 
tlemen from that quarter, what particularly recom- 
mended so late a day, supposing it might refer to 
the times fixed by New York and Virginia. They 
tell me it was governed by the intermediate annual 
elections and courts. If the Opposition in that State 
be such as they are described, it is not probable that 
they pursue any sort of plan, more than that of 
Massachusetts. This event, whatever cause may 
have produced it, or whatever consequences it may 
have in New Hampshire, is no small check to the 
progress of the business. The Opposition here, 
which are unquestionably hostile to every thing be- 
yond the federal principle, will take new spirits. 
The event in Massachusetts had almost extinguished 
their hopes. That in Pennsylvania will probably 
be equally encouraged. 156 



1788.] CORRESPONDENCE. 671 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, July 2, 1788. 

Dear Sir, 

There are public letters just arrived from Jeffer- 
son. The contents are not yet known. His private 
letters to me and others refer to his public for 
political news. I find that he is becoming more and 
more a friend to the new Constitution, his objections 
being gradually dispelled by his oiun further reflections 
on the subject. He particularly renounces his opinion 
concerning the expediency of a ratification by nine, 
and a repeal by four, States, considering the mode 
pursued by Massachusetts as the only rational one, 
but disapproving some of the alterations recommended 
by that State. He will see still more room for dis- 
approbation in the recommendation of other States. 
The defects of the Constitution which he continues 
to criticise are, the omission of a Bill of Rights, and 
of the principle of rotation, at least in the Executive 
department. 

Congress have been some days on the question 
where the first meeting of the new Congress shall 
be placed. Philadelphia failed by a single vote 
from Delaware, which ultimately aimed at that 
place, but wished to bring Wilmington into view. 
In that vote New Hampshire and Connecticut both 
concurred. New York is now in nomination, and 
if those States accede which I think probable, and 
Rhode Island which has yet refused to sit in the 
question can be prevailed on to vote, which I also 
think probable, the point will be carried. In this 



672 CORRESPONDENCE. [ 1788. 

event a great handle, I fear, will be given to those 
who have opposed the new Government on account 
of the Eastern preponderance in the Federal 
system. 157 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, July 16, 1788. 

Dear Sir, 

The enclosed papers will give you the latest 
intelligence from Poughkeepsie. It seems by no 
means certain what the result there will be. Some 
of the most sanguine calculate on a ratification. 
The best informed apprehend some clog that will 
amount to a condition. The question is made pe- 
culiarly interesting in this place, by its connexion 
with the question relative to the place to be recom- 
mended for the meeting of the first Congress under 
the new Government. 

Thirteen States are at present represented. A 
plan for setting this new machine in motion has 
been reported some days, but will not be hurried to 
a conclusion. Having been but a little time here, I 
am not yet fully in the politics of Congress. 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, July 22, 1788. 



Dear Sir, 

The enclosed papers will give you a view of the 
business in the Convention at Poughkeepsie. It is 



1788.] CORRESPONDENCE. 673 

not as yet certain that the ratification will take any 
final shape than can make New York immediately 
a member of the new Union. The opponents can- 
not come to that point without yielding a complete 
victory to the Federalists, which must be a severe 
sacrifice of their pride. It is supposed too, that some 
of them would not be displeased at seeing a bar to 
the pretensions of this city to the first meeting of the 
new Government. On the other side, the zeal for 
an unconditional ratification is not a little increased 
by contrary wishes. 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York August 11,1788. 

Dear Sir, 

The length of the interval since my last has pro- 
ceeded from a daily expectation of being able to 
communicate the arrangements for introducing the 
new Government. The times necessary to be fixed 
by Congress have been many days agreed on. The 
place of meeting, has undergone many vicissitudes, 
and is still as uncertain as ever. Philadelphia was 
first named by a member from Connecticut, and was 
negatived by the voice of one from Delaware, who 
wished to make an experiment for Wilmington. 
New York came next into view. Lancaster was 
opposed to it, and failed. Baltimore was next tried, 
and, to the surprize of every one, had seven votes, 
South Carolina joining the Southern States and 
Pennsylvania in the question. It was not difficult 

Vol. I.— 43 



674 CORRESPONDENCE. [1788. 

to foresee that such a vote could not stand. Ac- 
cordingly the next day, New York carried it on a 
second trial and at present fills the blank. Its 
success, however, was owing to Rhode Island, whose 
Delegates have refused to vote on the final question, 
and have actually gone home. There are not at 
present seven States for any place, and the result 
must depend (unless Rhode Island should return 
with instructions, as is given out) on the com- 
parative flexibility of the Northern and Southern 
delegations. 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, August 22, 1788. 

Dear Sir, 

I have your favor of the thirteenth. The effect 
of Clinton's circular letter in Virginia does not sur- 
prize me. It is a signal of concord and hope to 
the enemies of the Constitution every where, and 
w T ill, I fear, prove extremely dangerous. Notwith- 
standing your own remarks on the subject, I can- 
not but think that an early Convention will be an 
unadvised measure. It will evidently be the off- 
spring of party and passion, and will probably for 
that reason alone be the parent of error and public 
injury. It is pretty clear that a majority of the 
people of the Union are in favor of the Constitu- 
tion as it stands, or at least are not dissatisfied with 
it in that form ; or if this be not the case, it is at 
least clear that a greater proportion unite in that 
system than are likely to unite in any other theory. 



1788.] CORRESPONDENCE. 675 

Should radical alterations take place, therefore, 
they will not result from the deliberate sense of the 
people, but will be obtained by management, or ex- 
torted by menaces, and will be a real sacrifice of 
the public will, as well as of the public good, to the 
views of individuals, and perhaps the ambition of 
State Legislatures. 

Congress have come to no final decision as to the 
place for commencing the new Government. 158 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, September 14, 1788. 

Dear Sir, 

Your favor of the third instant would have been 
acknowledged two days ago, but for the approach- 
ing completion of the arrangement for the new 
Government, which I wished to give you the earli- 
est notice of. This subject has long employed Con- 
gress, and has, in its progress, assumed a variety of 
shapes, some of them not a little perplexing. The 
times, as finally settled, are, January for the choice 
of Electors, February for the choice of a President, 
and March for the meeting of Congress. The place, 
the present seat of the Federal Government. The 
last point was carried by the yielding of the smaller, 
to the inflexibility of the greater, number. I have 
myself been ready for bringing it to this issue for 
some time, perceiving that further delay could only 
discredit Congress, and injure the object in view. 
Those who had opposed New York along with me 
could not overcome their repugnance so soon. Ma- 



676 CORRESPONDENCE. [1788. 

ryland went away before the question was decided, 
in a temper which, I believe, would never have 
yielded. Delaware was equally inflexible. Pre- 
viously to our final assent, a motion was made 
which tendered a blank for any place the majority 
would choose between the North river and the Po- 
tomac. This being rejected, the alternative remain- 
ing was, to agree to New York, or to strangle the 
Government in its birth. The former as the lesser 
evil was of course preferred, and must now be made 
the best of. 159 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New Yoik, September 24, 1788. 

Dear Sir, 

I have been favored with yours of the twelfth 
instant. The picture it gives of the state of our 
country is the more distressing as it seems to exceed 
all the known resources for immediate relief. No- 
thing, in my opinion, can give the desired facility to 
the discharge of debts, but a re-establishment of that 
confidence which will at once make the creditor 
more patient and open to the solvent debtor other 
means than bringing his property to market. How 
far the new Government will produce these effects, 
cannot yet be decided. But the utmost success that 
can be hoped from it will leave in full force the 
causes of intermediate embarrassment. The addi- 
tional pressure apprehended from British debts, is 
an evil also for which I perceive at present no cer- 
tain remedy. As far, however, as the favorable 



1788.] CORRESPONDENCE. 677 

influence of the new Government may extend, that 
may be one source of alleviation. It may be ex- 
pected also that the British creditors will feel seve- 
ral motives to indulgence. And I will not suppress 
a hope that the new Government will be both able 
and willing to effect something by negotiation. 
Perhaps it might not be amiss for the Assembly to 
prepare the way by some act or other, for drawing 
the attention of the first session of the Congress to 
this subject. The possession of the posts by Great 
Britain, after the removal of the grounds of her 
complaint by the provision in the new Constitution 
with regard to the Treaty, will justify a renewal of 
our demands, and an interference in favor of Ameri- 
can citizens on whom the performance of the Treaty 
on our side depends. 

Congress have agreed to some resolutions in favor 
of the Mississippi which are well calculated to 
appease the discontents of our Western brethren. 
You shall soon have a copy of them. They are 
grounded on a remonstrance from North Carolina 
on that subject. By the way, how has it happened 
that the last resolutions of Virginia were never for- 
warded to the Delegation ? 



TO GENERAL WASHINGTON. 

New York, September 26, 1788. 



Dear Sir, 

I subjoin two resolutions lately taken by Congress 
in relation to the Mississippi, which I hope may 



678 CORRESPONDENCE. [1788. 

have a critical and salutary effect on the temper of 
our Western brethren. 



In Congress, September 16th. 

On report of the Committee, consisting of Mr. 
Hamilton, Mr. Madison, Mr. Williamson, Mr. Dane, 
and Mr. Edwards, to whom was referred the Re- 
port of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs on a 
motion of the Delegates of North Carolina stating 
the uneasiness produced by a report £ that Congress 
are disposed to treat with Spain for the surrender of 
their claim to the navigation of the river Missis- 
sippi,' and proposing a Resolution intended to re- 
move such apprehensions, 

Resolved, that the said report not being founded 
in fact, the Delegates be at liberty to communicate 
all such circumstances as may be necessary to 
contradict the same, and to remove misconcep- 
tions. 

Resolved^ that the free navigation of the river 
Mississippi, is a clear and essential right of the 
United States, and that the same ought to be con- 
sidered and supported as such. 

In addition to these resolutions, which are not of 
a secret nature, another has passed arresting all 
negotiations with Spain, and handing over the sub- 
ject, thus freed from bias from any former proceed- 
ings, to the ensuing Government. This last reso- 
lution is entered on the Secret Journal, but a tacit 
permission is given to the members to make a confi- 
dential use of it. 160 



1788.] CORRESPONDENCE. 679 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, October 17, 1788. 

Dear Sir, 

I have a letter from Mr. Jefferson, but it contains 
nothing of much consequence. His public letters to 
which it refers have not yet been communicated 
from the office of Foreign Affairs. Through other 
authentic channels I learn that the States General 
will pretty certainly be convened in May next. 
The efficacy of that cure for the public maladies 
will depend materially on the mode in which the 
deputies may be selected, which appears to be not 
yet settled. There is good reason also to presume, 
that, as the spirit which at present agitates the 
nation has been in a great measure caught from the 
American Revolution, so the result of the struggle 
there will be not a little affected by the character 
which liberty may receive from the experiment now 
on foot here. The tranquil and successful estab- 
lishment of a great reform by the reason of the com- 
munity, must give as much force to the doctrines 
urged on one side as a contrary event would do to 
the policy maintained on the other. 

As Col. Carrington will be with you before this 
gets to hand, I leave it with him to detail all matters 
of a date previous to his departure. Of a subse- 
quent date I recollect nothing worth adding. I 
requested him also to confer with you in full confi- 
dence on the appointments to the Senate and House 
of Representatives, so far as my friends may con- 
sider me in relation to either. He is fully possessed 



680 CORRESPONDENCE. [1788. 

of my real sentiments, and will explain them more 
conveniently than can be done on paper. I mean 
not to decline an agency in launching the new 
Government if such should be assigned me in one of 
the Houses, and I prefer the House of Representa- 
tives, chiefly because, if I can render any service 
there, it can only be to the public, and, not even in 
imputation, to myself. At the same time my pre- 
ference, I own, is somewhat founded on the sup- 
position that the arrangements for the popular 
elections may secure me against any competition 
which would require on my part any step that would 
speak a solicitude which I do not feel, or have the 
appearance of a spirit of electioneering which I 
despise. 



TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. 

New York, November 2, 1788. 

Dear Sir, 

I received yesterday your favor of the twenty- 
third ultimo. The first countenance of the Assem- 
bly corresponds with the picture which my imagina- 
tion had formed of it. The views of the greater 
part of the opposition to the Federal Government 
have, ever since the Convention, been regarded by 
me as permanently hostile, and likely to produce 
every effort that might endanger or embarrass it. 

My last letter, with Colonel Carrington's communi- 
cations to which it referred, will have sufficiently 
explained my sentiments with regard to the legis- 
lative service under the new Constitution. My 



1788.] CORRESPONDENCE. 681 

first wish is to see the Government put into quiet 
and successful operation; and to afford any service 
that may be acceptable from me for that purpose. 
My second wish, if that were to be consulted, would 
prefer, for reasons formerly hinted, an opportunity 
of contributing that service in the House of Represen- 
tatives, rather than in the Senate; provided the 
opportunity be attainable from the spontaneous suf- 
frage of the Constituents. Should the real friends 
of the Constitution think this preference inconsistent 
with any primary object, as Colonel Carrington 
tells me is the case with some who are entitled to 
peculiar respect, and view my renouncing it as of 
any material consequence, I shall not hesitate to 
comply. You will not infer from the freedom with 
which these observations are made, that I am in the 
least unaware of the probability that, whatever 
my inclinations or those of my friends may be, they 
are likely to be of little avail in the present case. I 
take it for certain that a clear majority of the As- 
sembly are enemies to the Government, and I have 
no reason to suppose that I can be less obnoxious 
than others on the opposite side. An election into 
the Senate, therefore, can hardly come into question. 
I know also that a good deal will depend on the 
arrangements for the election of the other branch ; 
and that much may depend, moreover, on the steps 
to be taken by the candidates, which will not be 
taken by me. Here again, therefore, there must be 
great uncertainty, if not improbability, of my 
election. With these circumstances in view, it is 
impossible that I can be the dupe of false calcula- 
tions, even if I were in other cases disposed to in- 
Vol. I.— 43? 



682 CORRESPONDENCE. [ 1788. 

dulge them. I trust it is equally impossible for the 
result, whatever it may be, to rob me of any re- 
flections which enter into the internal fund of com- 
fort and happiness. Popular favor or disfavor is no 
criterion of the character maintained with those 
whose esteem an honorable ambition must court. 
Much less can it be a criterion of that maintained 
with one's self. And when the spirit of party directs 
the public voice, it must be a little mind, indeed, 
that can suffer in its own estimation, or apprehend 
danger of suffering in that of others. 161 






DEBATES 



FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. 

BY JAMES MADISON, 



A MEMBER. 



INTRODUCTION 



Note. — The following paper is copied from a rough draught in the hand- 
writing of Mr. Madison. The particular place it was intended to occupy in his 
works is not designated ; but as it traces the causes and steps which led to the 
meeting of the Convention of 1787, it seems properly to preface the acts of 
that body. The paper bears evidence, in the paragraph preceding its conclusion, 
that it was written at a late period of the life of its author, when the pressure of 
ill health, combined with his great age, in preventing a final revision of it. 



As the weakness and wants of man naturally lead 
to an association of individuals under a common au- 
thority, whereby each may have the protection of 
the whole against danger from without, and enjoy 
in safety within the advantages of social intercourse, 
and an exchange of the necessaries and comforts of 
life ; in like manner feeble communities, independent 
of each other, have resorted to a union, less intimate, 
but with common councils, for the common safety 
against powerful neighbours, and for the preservation 
of justice and peace among themselves. Ancient 
history furnishes examples of these confederate asso- 
ciations, though with a very imperfect account of 
their structure, and of the attributes and functions 
of the presiding authority. There are examples of 



6S6 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

modern date also, some of them still existing, the 
modifications and transactions of which are suffi- 
ciently known. 

It remained for the British Colonies, now United 
States of North America, to add to those examples, 
one of a more interesting character than any of 
them ; which led to a system without an example 
ancient or modern. A system founded on popular 
rights, and so combining a federal form with the 
forms of individual republics, as may enable each to 
supply the defects of the other and obtain that ad- 
vantage of both. 

Whilst the Colonies enjoyed the protection of the 
parent country, as it was called, against foreign dan- 
ger, and were secured by its superintending control 
against conflicts among themselves, they continued 
independent of each other, under a common, though 
limited, dependence on the parental authority. When, 
however, the growth of the offspring in strength and 
in wealth awakened the jealousy, and tempted the 
avidity of the parent, into schemes of usurpation 
and exaction, the obligation was felt by the former 
of uniting their counsels and efforts, to avert the 
impending calamity. 

As early as the year 1754, indications having been 
given of a design in the British government to levy 
contributions on the Colonies without their consent, 
a meeting of Colonial deputies took place at Al- 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 687 

bany, which attempted to introduce a comprom- 
ising substitute, that might at once satisfy the British 
requisitions, and save their own rights from violation. 
The attempt had no other effect, than, by bringing 
these rights into a more conspicuous view, to invig- 
orate the attachment to them, on the one side ; and 
to nourish the haughty and encroaching spirit on the 
other. 162 

In 1774, the progress made by Great Britain in 
the open assertion of her pretensions, and the appre- 
hended purpose of otherwise maintaining them by 
legislative enactments and declarations, had been 
such that the Colonies did not hesitate to assemble, 
by their deputies, in a formal Congress, authorized 
to oppose to the British innovations whatever meas- 
ures might be found best adapted to the occasion ; 
without, however, losing sight of an eventual recon- 
ciliation. 163 

The dissuasive measures of that Congress being 
without effect, another Congress was held in 1775, 
whose pacific efforts to bring about a change in the 
views of the other party being equally unavailing, 
and the commencement of actual hostilities having 
at length put an end to all hope of reconciliation, 
the Congress, finding, moreover, that the popular 
voice began to call for an entire and perpetual disso- 
lution of the political ties which had connected them 
with Great Britain, proceeded on the memorable 



688 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

Fourth of July, 1776, to declare the thirteen Colo- 
nies Independent States. 

During the discussions of this solemn act, a Com- 
mittee, consisting of a member from each Colony, 
had been appointed, to prepare and digest a form of 
Confederation for the future management of the 
common interests, which had hitherto been left to 
the discretion of Congress, guided by the exigencies 
of the contest, and by the known intentions or occa- 
sional instructions of the Colonial Legislatures. 

It appears that as early as the twenty-first of July, 
1775, a plan, entitled " Articles of Confederation and 
perpetual union of the Colonies," had been sketched 
by Doctor Franklin, the plan being on that day 
submitted by him to Congress; and though not 
copied into their Journals, remaining on their files in 
his handwriting. But notwithstanding the term 
" perpetual" observed in the title, the Articles pro- 
vided expressly for the event of a return of the Col- 
onies to a connection with Great Britain. 164 

This sketch became a basis for the plan reported 
by the Committee on the twelfth of July, now also 
remaining on the files of Congress in the hand-wri- 
ting of Mr. Dickinson. The plan, though dated after 
the Declaration of Independence, was probably drawn 
up before that event ; since the name of Colonies, not 
States, is used throughout the draught! 65 The plan 
reported was debated and amended from time to 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 689 

time, till the seventeenth of November, 1777, when 
it was agreed to by Congress, and proposed to the 
Legislatures of the States, with an explanatory and 
recommendatory letter. 166 The ratifications of these, 
by their delegates in Congress, duly authorized, took 
place at successive dates ; but were not completed till 
the first of March, 1781, when Maryland, who had 
made it a prerequisite that the vacant lands acquired 
from the British Crown should be a common fund, 
yielded to the persuasion that a final and formal es- 
tablishment of the Federal Union and Government 
would make a favorable impression, not only on other 
foreign nations, but on Great Britain herself. 

The great difficulty experienced in so framing the 
Federal system, as to obtain the unanimity required 
for its due sanction, may be inferred from the long 
interval, and recurring discussions, between the com- 
mencement and completion of the work ; from the 
changes made during its progress ; from the language 
of Congress when proposing it to the States, which 
dwelt on the impracticability of devising a system 
acceptable to all of them ; from the reluctant assent 
given by some ; and the various alterations proposed 
by others ; and by a tardiness in others again, which 
produced a special address to them from Congress, 
enforcing the duty of sacrificing local considerations 
and favorite opinions to the public safety, and the 
necessary harmony : nor was the assent of some of 
44 * . i 



690 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

the States finally yielded without strong protests 
against particular Articles, and a reliance on future 
amendments removing their objections. It is to be 
recollected, no doubt, that these delays might be 
occasioned in some degree by an occupation of the 
public councils, both general and local, with the de- 
liberations and measures essential to a revolutionary 
struggle; but there must have been a balance for 
these causes in the obvious motives to hasten the 
establishment of a regular and efficient government ; 
and in the tendency of the crisis to repress opinions 
and pretensions which might be inflexible in another 
state of things. 

The principal difficulties which embarrassed the 
progress, and retarded the completion, of the plan 
of Confederation, may be traced to — first, the natural 
repugnance of the parties to a relinquishment of 
power; secondly, a natural jealousy of its abuse in 
other hands than their own; thirdly, the rule of 
suffrage among parties whose inequality in size did 
not correspond with that of their wealth, or of their 
military or free population ; fourthly, the selection and 
definition of the powers, at once necessary to the 
federal head, and safe to the several members. 

To these sources of difficulty, incident to the 
formation of all such confederacies, were added two 
others, one of a temporary, the other of a permanent 
nature. The first was the case of the Crown lands, 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 691 

so called because they had been held by the British 
Crown, and being ungranted to individuals when 
its authority ceased, were considered by the States 
within whose charters or asserted limits they lay, 
as devolving on them ; whilst it was contended by 
the others, that, being wrested from the dethroned 
authority by the equal exertions of all, they resulted 
of right and in equity to the benefit of all. The 
lands being of vast extent, and of growing value, 
were the occasion of much discussion and heart- 
burning ; and proved the most obstinate of the im- 
pediments to an earlier consummation of the plan of 
federal government. The State of Maryland, the 
last that acceded to it, held out as already noticed, 
till the first of March, 1781 ; and then yielded only 
to the hope that, by giving a stable and authoritative 
character to the Confederation, a successful termina- 
tion of the contest might be accelerated. The dis- 
pute was happily compromised by successive sur- 
renders of portions of the territory by the States 
having exclusive claims to it, and acceptances of 
them by Congress. 

The other source of dissatisfaction was the pe- 
culiar situation of some of the States, which, having 
no convenient ports for foreign commerce, were 
subject to be taxed by their neighbours, through 
whose ports their commerce was carried on. New 
Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New 



692 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

York, was likened to a cask tapped at both ends ; 
and North Carolina, between Virginia and South 
Carolina, to a patient bleeding at both arms. The 
Articles of Confederation provided no remedy for 
the complaint ; which produced a strong protest on 
the part of New Jersey, and never ceased to be a 
source of dissatisfaction and discord, until the new 
Constitution superseded the old. 

But the radical infirmity of the " Articles of Con- 
federation" was the dependence of Congress on the 
voluntary and simultaneous compliance with its 
requisitions by so many independent communities, 
each consulting more or less its particular interests 
and convenience, and distrusting the compliance of 
the others. Whilst the paper emissions of Congress 
continued to circulate, they were employed as a 
sinew of war, like gold and silver. When that 
ceased to be the case, and the fatal defect of the 
political system was felt in its alarming force, the 
war was merely kept alive, and brought to a suc- 
cessful conclusion, by such foreign aids and tem- 
porary expedients as could be applied ; a hope pre- 
vailing with many, and a wish with all, that a state 
of peace, and the sources of prosperity opened by it, 
would give to the Confederacy, in practice, the 
efficiency which had been inferred from its theory. 

The close of the war, however, brought no cure 
for the public embarrassments. The States, re- 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 693 

lieved from the pressure of foreign danger, and 
flushed with the enjoyment of independent and 
sovereign power, instead of a diminished disposition 
to part with it, persevered in omissions and in 
measures incompatible with their relations to the 
Federal Government, and with those among them- 
selves. 

Having served as a member of Congress through 
the period between March, 1780, and the arrival of 
peace, in 1783, I had become intimately acquainted 
with the public distresses and the causes of them. 
I had observed the successful opposition to every 
attempt to procure a remedy by new grants of 
power to Congress. I had found, moreover, that 
despair of success hung over the compromising 
principle of April, 1783, for the public necessities, 
which had been so elaborately planned and so im- 
pressively recommended to the States. Sympa- 
thizing, under this aspect of affairs, in the alarm of 
the friends of free government at the threatened 
danger of an abortive result to the great, and per- 
haps last, experiment in its favor, I could not be in- 
sensible to the obligation to aid as far as I could in 
averting the calamity. With this view I acceded to 
the desire of my fellow citizens of the County, that 
I should be one of its representatives in the Legisla- 
ture, hoping that I might there best contribute to 
inculcate the critical posture to which the Revolu- 



694 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

tionary cause was reduced, and the merit of a lead- 
ing agency of the State in bringing about a rescue 
of the Union, and the blessings of liberty staked on 
it, from an impending catastrophe. 

It required but little time after taking my seat in 
the House of Delegates in May, 1784, to discover, 
that, however favorable the general disposition of 
the State might be towards the Confederacy, the 
Legislature retained the aversion of its predecessors 
to transfers of power from the State to the Govern- 
ment of the Union ; notwithstanding the urgent de- 
mands of the Federal Treasury, the glaring inade- 
quacy of the authorized mode of supplying it, the 
rapid growth of anarchy in the Federal system, and 
the animosity kindled among the States by their 
conflicting regulations. 

The temper of the Legislature, and the wayward 
course of its proceedings, may be gathered from 
the Journals of its sessions in the years 1784 and 
1785. 163 

The failure, however, of the varied propositions in 
the Legislature, for enlarging the powers of Con- 
gress ; the continued failure of the efforts of Con- 
gress to obtain from them the means of providing 
for the debts of the Revolution, and of countervailing 
the commercial laws of Great Britain, a source of 
much irritation, and against which the separate 
efforts of the States were found worse than abortive; 



DEEATES IN THE CONVENTION. 695 

these considerations, with the lights thrown on the 
whole subject by the free and full discussion it had 
undergone, led to a general acquiescence in the 
Resolution passed on the twenty-first of January, 
1786, which proposed and invited a meeting of 
Deputies from all the States, as follows : 

" Resolved, that Edmund Randolph, James Madi- 
son, Jr., Walter Jones, St. George Tucker, and 
Meriwether Smith, Esquires, be appointed Commis- 
sioners, who, or any three of whom, shall meet such 
Commissioners as may be appointed in the other 
States of the Union, at a time and place to be 
agreed on, to take into consideration the trade of 
the United States ; to examine the relative situa- 
tions and trade of said States ; to consider how far 
a uniform system in their commercial regulations 
may be necessary to their common interest and their 
permanent harmony; and to report to the several 
States such an act, relative to this great object, as, 
when unanimously ratified by them, will enable the 
United States in Congress, effectually to provide for 
the same." 

The Resolution had been brought forward some 
weeks before, on the failure of a proposed grant of 
power to Congress to collect a revenue from com- 
merce, which had been abandoned by its friends in 
consequence of material alterations made in the 
grant by a Committee of the Whole. The Resolu- 



696 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

tion, though introduced by Mr. Tyler, an influential 
member, — who, having never served in Congress, 
had more the ear of the House than those whose 
services there exposed them to an imputable bias, — 
was so little acceptable, that it was not then per- 
sisted in. Being now revived by him, on the last 
day of the session, and being the alternative of 
adjourning without any effort for the crisis in the 
affairs of the Union, it obtained a general vote ; less, 
however, with some of its friends, from a confidence 
in the success of the experiment, than from a hope 
that it might prove a step to a more comprehensive 
and adequate provision for the wants of the Con- 
federacy. 169 

It happened also, that Commissioners, appointed 
by Virginia and Maryland to settle the jurisdiction 
on waters dividing the two States, had, apart from 
their official reports, recommended a uniformity in 
the regulations of the two States on several subjects, 
and particularly on those having relation to foreign 
trade. It appeared at the same time, that Mary- 
land had deemed a concurrence of her neighbours, 
Delaware and Pennsylvania, indispensable in such 
a case ; who, for like reasons, would require that of 
their neighbours. So apt and forcible an illustration 
of the necessity of an uniformity throughout all the 
States could not but favor the passage of a resolu- 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 697 

tion which proposed a Convention having that for 
its object. 

The Commissioners appointed by the Legislature, 
and who attended the Convention, were Edmund 
Randolph, the Attorney of the State, St. George 
Tucker and James Madison. The designation of 
the time and place to be proposed for its meeting, 
and communicated to the States, having been left to 
the Commissioners, they named, for the time the first 
Monday in September, and for the place the city of 
Annapolis, avoiding the residence of Congress, and 
large commercial cities, as liable to suspicions of an 
extraneous influence. 

Although the invited meeting appeared to be 
generally favored, five States only assembled ; some 
failing to make appointments, and some of the indi- 
viduals appointed not hastening their attendance; 
the result in both cases being ascribed mainly to a 
belief that the time had not arrived for such a po- 
litical reform as might be expected from a further 
experience of its necessity. 

But in the interval between the proposal of the 
Convention and the time of its meeting, such had 
been the advance of public opinion in the desired 
direction, stimulated as it had been by the effect of 
the contemplated object of the meeting, in turning 
the general attention to the critical state of things, 
and in calling forth the sentiments and exertions of 
44* 



698 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

the most enlightened and influential patriots, that 
the Convention, thin as it was, did not scruple to 
decline the limited task assigned to it, and to recom- 
mend to the States a Convention with powers ade- 
quate to the occasion. Nor had it been unnoticed 
that the commission of the New Jersey deputation 
had extended its object to a general provision for 
the exigencies of the Union. A recommendation for 
this enlarged purpose was accordingly reported by 
a committee to whom the subject had been referred. 
It was drafted by Col. Hamilton, and finally agreed 
to in the following form : 

" To the Honorable, the Legislatures of Virginia, 
Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New 
York, the Commissioners from the said States, re- 
spectively, assembled at Annapolis, humbly beg 
leave to report : 

"That, pursuant to their several appointments, 
they met at Annapolis, in the State of Maryland, 
on the eleventh day of September instant ; and 
having proceeded to a communication of their 
powers, they found that the States of New York, 
Pennsylvania and Virginia, had, in substance, and 
nearly in the same terms, authorized their respec- 
tive Commissioners ' to meet such commissioners as 
were, or might be, appointed by the other States of 
the Union, at such time and place as should be 
agreed upon by the said Commissioners, to take 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 699 

into consideration the trade and commerce of the 
United States ; to consider how far an uniform sys- 
tem in their commercial intercourse and regulations 
might be necessary to their common interest and 
permanent harmony; and to report to the several 
States such an act, relative to this great object, as, 
when unanimously ratified by them, would enable 
the United States in Congress assembled effectually 
to provide for the same. J 

" That the State of Delaware had given similar 
powers to their Commissioners, with this difference 
only, that the act to be framed in virtue of these 
powers is required to be reported 'to the United 
States in Congress assembled, to be agreed to by 
them, and confirmed by the Legislature of every 
State.' 

" That the State of New Jersey had enlarged the 
object of their appointment, empowering their com- 
missioners, ' to consider how far an uniform system 
in their commercial regulations, and other important 
matters, might be necessary to the common interest 
and permanent harmony of the several States ;' and 
to report such an act on the subject, as, when rati- 
fied by them, ' would enable the United States in 
Congress assembled effectually to provide for the 
exigencies of the Union.' 

" That appointments of Commissioners ..have also 
been made by the States of New Hampshire, Mas- 



700 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

sachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina, none 
of whom, however, have attended ; but that no in- 
formation has been received by your Commissioners 
of any appointment having been made by the States 
of Maryland, Connecticut, South Carolina or Georgia. 

" That the express terms of the powers to your 
Commissioners supposing a deputation from all the 
States, and having for object the trade and com- 
merce of the United States, your Commissioners did 
not conceive it advisable to proceed on the business 
of their mission under the circumstances of so partial 
and defective a representation. 

" Deeply impressed, however, with the magnitude 
and importance of the object confided to them on 
this occasion, your Commissioners cannot forbear to 
indulge an expression of their earnest and unani- 
mous wish, that speedy measures may be taken to 
effect a general meeting of the States in a future 
Convention, for the same and such other purposes, 
as the situation of public affairs may be found to 
require. 

" If, in expressing this wish, or in intimating any 
other sentiment, your Commissioners should seem to 
exceed the strict bounds of their appointment, they 
entertain a full confidence, that a conduct dictated 
by an anxiety for the welfare of the United States 
will not fail to receive an indulgent construction. 

" In this persuasion, your Commissioners submit an 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 701 

opinion, that the idea of extending the powers of 
their Deputies to other objects than those of com- 
merce, which has been adopted by the State of New 
Jersey, was an improvement on the original plan, 
and will deserve to be incorporated into that of a 
future Convention. They are the more naturally 
led to this conclusion, as, in the course of their reflec- 
tions on the subject, they have been induced to think 
that the power of regulating trade is of such com- 
prehensive extent, and will enter so far into the 
general system of the Federal Government, that to 
give it efficacy, and to obviate questions and doubts 
concerning its precise nature and limits, may require 
a correspondent adjustment of other parts of the 
Federal system. 

" That there are important defects in the system of 
the Federal Government, is acknowledged by the 
acts of all those States which have concurred in the 
present meeting. That the defects, upon a closer ex- 
amination, may be found greater and more numerous 
than even these acts imply, is at least so far probable, 
from the embarrassments which characterize the 
present state of our national affairs, foreign and do- 
mestic, as may reasonably be supposed to merit a 
deliberate and candid discussion, in some mode which 
will unite the sentiments and councils of all the 
States. In the choice of the mode, your Commis- 
sioners are of opinion, that a Convention of deputies 



702 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

from the different States, for the special and sole 
purpose of entering into this investigation, and di- 
gesting a plan for supplying such defects as may be 
discovered to exist, will be entitled to a preference, 
from considerations which will occur without being 
particularized. 

" Your Commissioners decline an enumeration of 
those national circumstances on which their opinion, 
respecting the propriety of a future Convention with 
more enlarged powers, is founded ; as it would be an 
useless intrusion of facts and observations, most of 
which have been frequently the subject of public 
discussion, and none of which can have escaped the 
penetration of those to whom they would in this 
instance be addressed. They are, however, of a 
nature so serious, as, in the view of your Commis- 
sioners, to render the situation of the United States 
delicate and critical, calling for an exertion of the 
united virtue and wisdom of all the members of the 
Confederacy. 

" Under this impression, your Commissioners, with 
the most respectful deference, beg leave to suggest 
their unanimous conviction, that it may essentially 
tend to advance the interests of the Union, if the 
States by whom they have been respectively dele- 
gated would themselves concur, and use their en- 
deavors to procure the concurrence of the other 
States, in the appointment of Commissioners, to meet 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 703 

at Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next, 
to take into consideration the situation of the United 
States; to devise such further provisions as shall 
appear to them necessary to render the constitution 
of the Federal Government adequate to the exigen- 
cies of the Union ; and to report such an act for that 
purpose, to the United States in Congress assembled, 
as, when agreed to by them, and afterwards con- 
firmed by the Legislatures of every State, will effect- 
ually provide for the same. 

" Though your Commissioners could not with pro- 
priety address these observations and sentiments to 
any but the States they have the honor to represent, 
they have nevertheless concluded, from motives of 
respect, to transmit copies of this Report to the 
United States in Congress assembled, and to the 
Executives of the other States." 170 

The recommendation was well received by the 
Legislature of Virginia, which happened to be the 
first that acted on it ; and the example of her com- 
pliance was made as conciliatory and impressive as 
possible. The Legislature were unanimous, or very 
nearly so, on the occasion. As a proof of the mag- 
nitude and solemnity attached to it, they placed 
General Washington at the head of the deputation 
from the State ; and as a proof of the deep interest 
he felt in the case, he overstepped the obstacles to 
his acceptance of the appointment. 



704 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

The law complying with the recommendation 
from Annapolis was in the terms following : 

" Whereas, the Commissioners who assembled at 
Annapolis, on the fourteenth day of September last, 
for the purpose of devising and reporting the means 
of enabling Congress to provide effectually for the 
commercial interests of the United States, have re- 
presented the necessity of extending the revision of 
the Federal system to all its defects; and have 
recommended that deputies for that purpose be 
appointed by the several Legislatures, to meet in 
Convention in the City of Philadelphia, on the 
second Monday of May next, — a provision which 
seems preferable to a discussion of the subject in 
Congress, where it might be too much interrupted 
by the ordinary business before them, and where it 
would, besides, be deprived of the valuable counsels 
of sundry individuals who are disqualified by the 
constitutions or laws of particular States, or re- 
strained by peculiar circumstances, from a seat in 
that Assembly : 

"And whereas, the General Assembly of this 
Commonwealth, taking into view the actual situa- 
tion of the Confederacy, as well as reflecting on the 
alarming representations made from time to time, 
by the United States in Congress, particularly in 
their act of the fifteenth day of February last, can 
no longer doubt that the crisis is arrived at which 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 705 

the good people of America are to decide the solemn 
question, whether they will, by wise and magnan- 
imous efforts, reap the just fruits of that independence 
which they have so gloriously acquired, and of that 
union which they have cemented with so much of 
their common blood ; or whether, by giving way to 
unmanly jealousies and prejudices, or to partial and 
transitory interests, they will renounce the auspicious 
blessings prepared for them by the Revolution, and 
furnish to its enemies an eventual triumph over 
those, by whose virtue and valour, it has been ac- 
complished: 

"And whereas, the same noble and extended 
policy, and the same fraternal and affectionate 
sentiments, which originally determined the citizens 
of this Commonwealth to unite with their brethren 
of the other States, in establishing a federal govern- 
ment, cannot but be felt with equal force now, as 
motives to lay aside every inferior consideration, 
and to concur in such farther concessions and pro- 
visions, as may be necessary to secure the great ob- 
jects for which that government was instituted, and 
to render the United States as happy in peace, as 
they have been glorious in war. 

"Be it, therefore, enacted, by the General Assembly 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia, That seven Com- 
missioners be appointed by joint ballot of both 
Houses of Assembly, who, or any three of them, are 
45 



706 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

hereby authorized as Deputies from this Common- 
wealth, to meet such Deputies as may be appointed 
and authorized by other States, to assemble in Con- 
vention at Philadelphia, as above recommended, and 
to join with them in devising and discussing all such 
alterations and farther provisions, as may be neces- 
sary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to 
the exigencies of the Union ; and in reporting such an 
act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress, 
as when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the 
several States, will effectually provide for the same. 

" And be it further enacted, That in case of the death 
of any of the said deputies, or of their declining their 
appointments, the Executive are hereby authorized 
to supply such vacancies ; and the Governor is re- 
quested to transmit forthwith a copy of this act to 
the United States in Congress, and to the Executives 
of each of the States in the Union."* m 

A resort to a General Convention, to re-model the 
Confederacy, was not a new idea. It had entered 
at an early date into the conversations and specula- 
tions of the most reflecting and foreseeing observers 
of the inadequacy of the powers allowed to Congress. 
In a pamphlet published in May, 1781, at the seat of 
Congress, Pelatiah Webster, an able though not con- 
spicuous citizen, after discussing the fiscal system of 

* Drawn by J. Madison, passed the House of Delegates November 9th, the 
Senate November 23d — and Deputies appointed December 4th, 1786. 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 707 

the United States, and suggesting, among other re- 
medial provisions, one including a national bank, re- 
marks, that " the authority of Congress at present is 
very inadequate to the performance of their duties ; 
and this indicates the necessity of their calling a 
Continental Convention for the express purpose of 
ascertaining, defining, enlarging and limiting, the 
duties and powers of their Constitution." m 

On the first day of April, 1783, Colonel Hamilton, 
in a debate in Congress, observed, " that he wished, 
instead of them (partial Conventions), to see a gen- 
eral Convention take place; and that he should 
soon, in pursuance of instructions from his constitu- 
ents, propose to Congress a plan for that purpose, 
the object of which would be to strengthen the 
Federal Constitution." He alluded, probably, to the 
resolutions introduced by General Schuyler in the 
Senate, and passed unanimously by the Legislature, 
of New York in the summer of 1782, declaring, that 
the Confederation was defective, in not giving Con- 
gress power to provide a revenue for itself, or in not 
investing them with funds from established and pro- 
ductive sources ; and that it would be advisable for 
Congress to recommend to the States to call a gene- 
ral Convention to revise and amend the Confedera- 
tion." It does not appear, however, that his expect- 
ation had been fulfilled. 173 

In a letter to James Madison from R. H. Lee, then 



708 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

President of Congress, dated the twenty-sixth of 
November, 1784, he says : "It is by many here sug- 
gested as a very necessary step for Congress to take, 
the calling on the States to form a Convention for 
the sole purpose of revising the Confederation, so 
far as to enable Congress to execute with more en- 
ergy, effect and vigor the powers assigned to it, than 
it appears by experience that they can do under the 
present state of things." The answer of Mr. Madison 
remarks : " I hold it for a maxim, that the union of 
the States is essential to their safety against foreign 
danger and internal contention ; and that the perpe- 
tuity and efficacy of the present system cannot be 
confided in. The question, therefore, is, in what 
mode, and at what moment, the experiment for sup- 
plying the defects ought to be made." 

In the winter of 1784-5, Noah Webster, whose 
political and other valuable writings had made him 
known to the public, proposed, in one of his publica- 
tions, "anew system of government which should 
act, not on the States, but directly on individuals, 
and vest in Congress full power to carry its laws 
into effect." 174 

The proposed and expected Convention at Anna- 
polis, the first of a general character that appears to 
have been realized, and the state of the public mind 
awakened by it, had attracted the particular atten- 
tion of Congress, and favored the idea there of a 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 709 

Convention with fuller powers for amending the 
Confederacy.* 

It does not appear that in any of these cases the 
reformed system was to be otherwise sanctioned 
than by the Legislative authority of the States ; nor 
whether, nor how far, a change was to be made in 
the structure of the depository of Federal powers. 

The act of Virginia providing for the Convention 
at Philadelphia was succeeded by appointments from 
the other States as their Legislatures were assem- 
bled, the appointments being selections from the most 
experienced and highest standing citizens. Rhode 
Island was the only exception to a compliance with 
the recommendation from Annapolis, well known to 
have been swayed by an obdurate adherence to an 
advantage which her position gave her, of taxing her 
neighbours through their consumption of imported 
supplies, an advantage which it was foreseen would 
be taken from her by a revisal of the Articles of 
Confederation. 

As the public mind had been ripened for a salu- 
tary reform of the political system, in the interval 
between the proposal and the meeting of the Com- 
missioners at Annapolis, the interval between the 
last event and the meeting of deputies at Philadel- 



* The letters of Win. Grayson, March 22, 1786, and of James Monroe, of 
April 28th, 1786, both then members, to Mr. Madison, state that a proposition 
for such a Convention had been made. 



710 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

phia had continued to develope more and more the 
necessity and the extent of a systematic provision 
for the preservation and government of the Union. 
Among the ripening incidents was the insurrection 
of Shays, in Massachusetts, against her government ; 
which was with difficulty suppressed, notwithstand- 
ing the influence on the insurgents of an appre- 
hended interposition of the Federal troops. 

At the date of the Convention, the aspect and 
retrospect of the political condition of the United 
States could not but fill the public mind with a 
gloom which was relieved only by a hope that so 
select a body would devise an adequate remedy for 
the existing and prospective evils so impressively 
demanding it. 

It was seen that the public debt, rendered so 
sacred by the cause in which it had been incurred, 
remained without any provision for its payment. 
The reiterated and elaborate efforts of Congress to 
procure from the States a more adequate power to 
raise the means of payment, had failed. The effect 
of the ordinary requisitions of Congress had only dis- 
played the inefficiency of the authority making them, 
none of the States having duly complied with them, 
some having failed altogether, or nearly so ; while 
in one instance, that of New Jersey,* a compliance 



* A letter of Mr. Grayson to Mr. Madison of March 22, 1786, relating the 
conduct of New Jersey, states this fact. 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 711 

was expressly refused ; nor was more yielded to the 
expostulations of members of Congress deputed to 
her Legislature, than a mere repeal of the law, 
without a compliance. The want of authority in 
Congress to regulate commerce had produced in for- 
eign nations, particularly Great Britain, a monopo- 
lizing policy, injurious to the trade of the United 
States, and destructive to their navigation ; the im- 
becility, and anticipated dissolution, of the Confed- 
eracy extinguishing all apprehensions of a counter- 
vailing policy on the part of the United States. 
The same want of a general power over commerce 
led to an exercise of the power, separately, by the 
States, which not only proved abortive, but engen- 
dered rival, conflicting and angry regulations. Be- 
sides the vain attempts to supply their respective 
treasuries by imposts, which turned their commerce 
into the neighbouring ports, and to coerce a relax- 
ation of the British monopoly of the West India 
navigation, which was attempted by Virginia,* the 
States having ports for foreign commerce, taxed and 
irritated the adjoining States, trading through them, 
as New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South 
Carolina. Some of the States, as Connecticut, taxed 
imports from others, as from Massachusetts, which 
complained in a letter to the Executive of Virginia, 

* See the Journal ef her Legislature. 



712 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

and doubtless to those of other States. In sundry- 
instances, as of New York, New Jersey, Pennsyl- 
vania and Maryland, the navigation laws treated 
the citizens of other States as aliens. In certain 
cases the authority of the Confederacy was disre- 
garded, as in violation, not only of the Treaty of 
Peace, but of treaties with France and Holland ; 
which were complained of to Congress. In other 
cases the Federal authority was violated by treaties 
and wars with Indians, as by Georgia ; by troops 
raised and kept up without the consent of Congress, 
as by Massachusetts ; by compacts without the con- 
sent of Congress, as between Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey, and between Virginia and Maryland. From 
the Legislative Journals of Virginia it appears, that 
a vote refusing to apply for a sanction of Congress 
was followed by a vote against the communication 
of the compact to Congress. In the internal admin- 
istration of the States, a violation of contracts had 
become familiar, in the form of depreciated paper 
made a legal tender, of property substituted for 
money, of instalment laws, and of the occlusions of 
the courts of justice, although evident that all such 
interferences affected the rights of other States, 
relatively creditors, as well as citizens creditors 
within the State. Among the defects which had 
been severely felt was wantof an uniformity in cases 
requiring it, as laws of naturalization and bank- 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 713 

ruptcy, a coercive authority operating on individ- 
uals, and a guarantee of the internal tranquillity of 
the States. 

As a natural consequence of this distracted and 
disheartening condition of the Union, the Federal 
authority had ceased to be respected abroad, and 
dispositions were shown there, particularly in 
Great Britain, to take advantage of its imbecility, 
and to speculate on its approaching downfall. At 
home it had lost all confidence and credit ; the un- 
stable and unjust career of the States had also for- 
feited the respect and confidence essential to order 
and good government, involving a general decay of 
confidence and credit between man and man. It 
was found, moreover, that those least partial to 
popular government, or most distrustful of its effi- 
cacy, were yielding to anticipations, that from an 
increase of the confusion a government might result 
more congenial with their taste or their opinions ; 
whilst those most devoted to the principles and 
forms of Republics were alarmed for the cause of 
liberty itself, at stake in the American experiment, 
and anxious for a system that would avoid the in- 
efficacy of a mere confederacy, without passing into 
the opposite extreme of a consolidated government. 
It was known that there were individuals who had 
betrayed a bias towards monarchy, and there had 
always been some not unfavorable to a partition of 
45* 



714 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

the Union into several confederacies ; either from a 
better chance of figuring on a sectional theatre, or 
that the sections would require stronger govern- 
ments, or by their hostile conflicts lead to a mon- 
archical consolidation. The idea of dismemberment 
had recently made its appearance in the newspapers. 

Such were the defects, the deformities, the dis- 
eases and the ominous prospects, for which the Con- 
vention were to provide a remedy, and which ought 
never to be overlooked in expounding and appre- 
ciating the constitutional charter, the remedy that 
was provided. 175 

As a sketch on paper, the earliest, perhaps, of a 
Constitutional Government for the Union (organized 
into the regular departments, with physical means 
operating on individuals) to be sanctioned by the 
people of the States, acting in their original and 
sovereign character, was contained in the letters of 
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson of the nine- 
teenth of March; to Governor Randolph of the 
eighth of April ; and to General Washington of the 
sixteenth of April, 1787, for which see their respec- 
tive dates. 176 

' The feature, in these letters which vested in the 
general authority a negative on the laws of the 
States, was suggested by the negative in the head 
of the British Empire, which prevented collisions 
between the parts and the whole, and between the 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 715 

parts themselves. It was supposed that the substi- 
tution of an elective and responsible authority, for 
an hereditary and irresponsible one, would avoid the 
appearance even of a departure from Republican- 
ism. But although the subject was so viewed in the 
Convention, and the votes on it were more than once 
equally divided, it was finally and justly abandoned, 
as, apart from other objections, it was not practi- 
cable among so many States, increasing in number, 
and enacting, each of them, so many laws. Instead 
of the proposed negative, the objects of it were left 
as finally provided for in the Constitution. 177 

On the arrival of the Virginia Deputies at Phila- 
delphia, it occurred to them, that, from the early 
and prominent part taken by that State in bringing 
about the Convention, some initiative step might be 
expected from them. The Resolutions introduced 
by Governor Randolph were the result of a con- 
sultation on the subject, with an understanding that 
they left all the Deputies entirely open to the lights 
of discussion, and free to concur in any alterations 
or modifications which their reflections and judg- 
ments might approve. The Resolutions, as the 
Journals show, became the basis on which the pro- 
ceedings of the Convention commenced, and to the 
developements, variations and modifications of which 
the plan of government proposed by the Convention 
may be traced. 178 



716 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

The curiosity I had felt during my researches into 
the history of the most distinguished confederacies, 
particularly those of antiquity, and the deficiency I 
found in the means of satisfying it, more especially 
in what related to the process, the principles, the 
reasons, and the anticipations, which prevailed in 
the formation of them, determined me to preserve, as 
far as I could, an exact account of what might pass 
in the Convention whilst executing its trust ; with 
the magnitude of which I was duly impressed, as I 
was by the gratification promised to future curiosity 
by an authentic exhibition of the objects, the 
opinions, and the reasonings, from which the new 
system of government was to receive its peculiar 
structure and organization. Nor was I unaware of 
the value of such a contribution to the fund of 
materials for the history of a Constitution on which 
would be staked the happiness of a people great 
even in its infancy, and possibly the cause of liberty 
throughout the world. 

In pursuance of the task I had assumed, I chose a 
seat in front of the presiding member, with the other 
members on my right and left hands. In this 
favorable position for hearing all that passed, I 
noted, in terms legible and in abbreviations and 
marks intelligible to myself, what was read from 
the Chair or spoken by the members ; and losing not 
a moment unnecessarily between the adjournment 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 717 

and reassembling of the Convention, I was enabled 
to write out my daily notes during the session, or 
within a few finishing days after its close, in the ex- 
tent and form preserved in my own hand on my 
files. 

In the labor and correctness of this I was not a 
little aided by practice, and by a familiarity with the 
style and the train of observation and reasoning 
which characterized the principal speakers. It 
happened, also, that I was not absent a single day, 
nor more than a casual fraction of an hour in any 
day, so that I could not have lost a single speech, 
unless a very short one. 

It may be proper to remark, that, with a very 
few exceptions, the speeches were neither furnished, 
nor revised, nor sanctioned, by the speakers, but 
written out from my notes, aided by the freshness of 
my recollections. A further remark maybe proper, 
that views of the subject might occasionally be 
presented, in the speeches and proceedings, with a 
latent reference to a compromise on some middle 
ground, by mutual concessions. The exceptions 
alluded to were, — first, the sketch furnished by 
Mr. Randolph of his speech on the introduction of 
his propositions, on the twenty-ninth day of May ; 
secondly, the speech of Mr. Hamilton, who happened 
to call on me when putting the last hand to it, 
and who acknowledged its fidelity, without sug- 



718 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

gesting more than a very few verbal alterations 
which were made ; thirdly, the speech of Gouverneur 
Morris on the second day of May, which was com- 
municated to him on a like occasion, and who acqui- 
esced in it without even a verbal change. The 
correctness of his language and the distinctness of 
his enunciation were particularly favorable to a 
reporter. The speeches of Doctor Franklin, ex- 
cepting a few brief ones, were copied from the writ- 
ten ones read to the Convention by his colleague, 
Mr. Wilson, it being inconvenient to the Doctor 
to remain long on his feet. 

Of the ability and intelligence of those who com- 
posed the Convention the debates and proceedings 
may be a test ; as the character of the work which 
was the offspring of their deliberations must be 
tested by the experience of the future, added to that 
of nearly half a century which has passed. 

But whatever may be the judgment pronounced 
on the competency of the architects of the Constitu- 
tion, or whatever may be the destiny of the edifice 
prepared by them, I feel it a duty to express my 
profound and solemn conviction, derived from my 
intimate opportunity of observing and appreciating 
the views of the Convention, collectively and indi- 
vidually, that there never was an assembly of men, 
charged with a great and arduous trust, who were 
more pure in their motives, or more exclusively or 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 719 

anxiously devoted to the object committed to them, 
than were the members of the Federal Convention 
of 1787, to the object of devising and proposing a 
constitutional system which should best supply the 
defects of that which it was to replace, and best 
secure the permanent liberty and happiness of their 
country. 



DEBATES 



FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1781 



Monday, May 14th, 1787, 

Was the day fixed for the meeting of the Deputies 
in Convention, for revising the federal system of 
government. On that day a small number only had 
assembled. Seven States were not convened till, 



Friday, May 25th. 

When the following members appeared : 

From 

Massachusetts, Rufus King. 

New York, Robert Yates, and 

Alexander Hamilton. 

New Jersey, David Brearly, 

William Churchill Houston, and 
William Patterson. 

Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, 

Thomas Fitzsimons, 
James Wilson, and 
Gouverneur Morris. 

Delaware, George Read, 

Richard Basset, and 
Jacob Broom. 

Vol. I.-46 



722 



DEBATES IN THE 



[1787. 



Virginia, George Washington, 

Edmund Randolph, 
John Blair, 
James Madison, 
George Mason, 
George Wythe, and 
James McClurg. 
North Carolina, Alexander Martin, 

William Richardson Davie, 
Richard Dobbs Spaight, and 
Hugh Williamson, 
South Carolina, John Rutledge, 

Charles Cotes worth Pinckney, 
Charles Pinckney, and 
Pierce Butler. 
Georgia, William Few. 

Mr. Robert Morris informed the members assem- 
bled, that, by the instruction and in behalf of the 
deputation of Pennsylvania, he proposed George 
Washington, Esquire, late Commander-in-Chief, for 
President of the Convention.* Mr. John Rutledge 
seconded the motion, expressing his confidence that 
the choice would be unanimous; and observing, 
that the presence of General Washington forbade 
any observations on the occasion which might 
otherwise be proper. 

General Washington was accordingly unanimous- 
ly elected by ballot, and conducted to the Chair by 



* The nomination came with particular grace from Pennsylvania, as Doctor 
Franklin alone could have been thought of as a competitor. The Doctor was 
himself to have made the nomination of General Washington, but the state of 
the weather and of his health confined him to his house. 



ItS?.] Federal convention. 723 

Mr, R. Morris and Mr. Rutledge ; from which, in a 
very emphatic manner, he thanked the Convention 
for the honor they had conferred on him ; reminded 
them of the novelty of the scene of business in which 
he was to act, lamented his want of better qualifica- 
tions, and claimed the indulgence of the House 
towards the involuntary errors which his inexperi- 
ence might occasion, 

Mr. Wilson moved that a Secretary be appointed, 
and nominated Mr. Temple Franklin. 

Colonel Hamilton nominated Major Jackson. On 
the ballot Major Jackson had five votes, and Mr. 
Franklin two votes. 

On reading the credentials of the Deputies, it was 
noticed that those from Delaware were prohibited 
from changing the Article in the Confederation 
establishing an equality of votes among the States. 179 

The appointment of a Committee, on the motion 
of Mr. C. Pinckney, consisting of Messrs. Wythe, 
Hamilton, and C. Pinckney, to prepare standing 
rules and orders, was the only remaining step taken 
on this day. 



Monday, May 28th. 

In Convention; — From Massachusetts, Nathaniel 
Gorham and Caleb Strong ; from Connecticut, 
Oliver Ellsworth ; from Delaware, Gunning Bed- 
ford ; from Maryland, James McHenry ; from Penn- 
sylvania, Benjamin Franklin, George Clymer, 
Thomas Mifflin, and Jared Ingersoll, — took their 
seats. 



724 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Wythe, from the Committee for preparing 
rules, made a report, which employed the delibera- 
tions of this day. 

Mr. King objected to one of the rules in the re- 
port authorizing any member to call for the Yeas 
and Nays and have them entered on the minutes. 
He urged, that as the acts of the Convention were 
not to bind the constituents, it was unnecessary to 
exhibit this evidence of the votes ; and improper, as 
changes of opinion would be frequent in the course 
of the business, and would fill the minutes with con- 
tradictions. 

Colonel Mason seconded the objection, adding, 
that such a record of the opinions of members would 
be an obstacle to a change of them on conviction ; 
and in case of its being hereafter promulged, must 
furnish handles to the adversaries of the result of 
the meeting. 

The proposed rule was rejected, nem. con. The 
standing rules agreed to were as follows : 

RULES. 

" A House to do business shall consist of the Depu- 
ties of not less than seven States ; and all questions 
shall be decided by the greater number of these 
which shall be fully represented. But a less num- 
ber than seven may adjourn from day to day. 

" Immediately after the President shall have taken 
the Chair, and the members their seats, the minutes 
of the preceding day shall be read by the Secretary. 

" Every member, rising to speak, shall address the 
President ; and, whilst he shall be speaking, none 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 725 

shall pass between them, or hold discourse with 
another, or read a book, pamphlet, or paper, printed 
or manuscript. And of two members rising to speak 
at the same time, the President shall name him who 
shall be first heard. 

" A member shall not speak oftener than twice, 
without special leave, upon the same question ; and 
not the second time, before every other who had 
been silent shall have been heard, if he choose to 
speak upon the subject. 

"A motion, made and seconded, shall be repeated, 
and, if written, as it shall be when any member 
shall so require, read aloud, by the Secretary, be- 
fore it shall be debated ; and may be withdrawn at 
any time before the vote upon it shall have been 
declared. 

" Orders of the day shall be read next after the 
minutes ; and either discussed or postponed, before 
any other business shall be introduced. 

" When a debate shall arise upon a question, no 
motion, other than to amend the question, to com- 
mit it, or to postpone the debate, shall be received. 

" A question which is complicated shall, at the 
request of any member, be divided, and put separ- 
ately upon the propositions of which it is com- 
pounded. 

" The determination of a question, although fully 
debated, shall be postponed, if the Deputies of any 
State desire it, until the next day. 

" A writing which contains any matter brought on 
to be considered shall be read once throughout, for 
information ; then by paragraphs, to be debated ; 
and again, with the amendments, if any, made on 



726 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the second reading ; and afterwards the question 
shall be put upon the whole, amended, or approved 
in its original form, as the case shall be. 

" Committees shall be appointed by ballot ; and 
the members who have the greatest number of 
ballots, although not a majority of the votes pre- 
sent, shall be the Committee. When two or more 
members have an equal number of votes, the mem- 
ber standing first on the list, in the order of taking 
down the ballots, shall be preferred. 

" A member may be called to order by any other 
member, as well as by the President ; and may be 
allowed to explain his conduct, or expressions, sup- 
posed to be reprehensible. And all questions of 
order shall be decided by the President, without ap- 
peal or debate. 

" Upon a question to adjourn, for the day, which 
may be made at any time, if it be seconded, the 
question shall be put without a debate. 

" When the House shall adjourn, every member 
shall stand in his place until the President pass 
him."* 

* Previous to the arrival of a majority of the States, the rule by which they 
ought to vote in the Convention had been made a subject of conversation 
among the members present. It was pressed by Gouverneur Morris, and 
favored by Robert Morris and others from Pennsylvania, that the large States 
should unite in firmly refusing to the small States an equal vote, as unreason- 
able, and as enabling the small States to negative every good system of gov- 
ernment, which must, in the nature of things, be founded on a violation of that 
equality. The members from Virginia, conceiving that such an attempt 
might beget fatal altercations between the large and small States ; and that it 
would be easier to prevail on the latter, in the course of the deliberations, to 
give up their equality for the sake of an effective government, than, on taking 
the field of discussion, to disarm themselves of the right, and thereby throw 
themselves on the mercy of the larger States, discountenanced and stifled the 
project. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 727 

A letter from sundry persons of the State of 
Rhode Island, addressed to the Chairman of the 
General Convention, was presented to the Chair by 
Mr. Gouverneur Morris ; and, being read, was 
ordered to lie on the table for further considera- 
tion.* 

Mr. Butler moved that the House provide against 
interruption of business by absence of members, 
and against licentious publications of their proceed- 
ings. To which was added, by Mr. Spaight, a 
motion to provide, that, on the one hand, the House 
might not be precluded by a vote upon any question 
from revising the subject matter of it, when they see 
cause, nor, on the other hand, be led too hastily to 
rescind a decision which was the result of mature 
discussion. Whereupon it was ordered, that these 
motions be referred for the consideration of the 
Committee appointed to draw up the standing rules, 
and that the Committee make report thereon. 

Adjourned till to-morrow, at ten o'clock. 



Tuesday, May 29th. 

In Convention, — John Dickinson, and Elbridge 
Gerry, the former from Delaware, the latter from 
Massachusetts, took their seats. The following 



* For the letter, see Appendix, No. 1. 



728 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

rules were added, on the Report of Mr. Wythe, from 
the Committee — 

" That no member be absent from the House, so 
as to interrupt the representation of the State, with- 
out leave. 

" That Committees do not sit whilst the House 
shall be, or ought to be, sitting. 

"That no copy be taken of any entry on the 
Journal during the sitting of the House, without 
leave of the House. 

" That members only be permitted to inspect the 
Journal. 

" That nothing spoken in the House be printed, 
or otherwise published, or communicated without 
leave. 

" That a motion to reconsider a matter which 
has been determined by a majority, may be made, 
with leave, unanimously given, on the same day on 
which the vote passed ; but otherwise, not without 
one day's previous notice ; in which last case, if the 
House agree to the reconsideration, some future day 
shall be assigned for that purpose." 

Mr. C. Pinckney moved, that a Committee be ap- 
pointed to superintend the minutes. 

Mr. G. Morris objected to it. The entry of the 
proceedings of the Convention belonged to the 
Secretary as their impartial officer. A Committee 
might have an interest and bias in moulding the 
the entry, according to their opinions and wishes. 

The motion was negatived, five Noes, four Ayes. 

Mr. Randolph then opened the main business : — 

He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, 
rather than those who w^ere of longer standing in 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 729 

life and political experience, to open the great sub- 
ject of their mission. But as • the Convention had 
originated from Virginia, and his colleagues sup- 
posed that some proposition was expected from 
them, they had imposed this task on him. 

He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, 
and the necessity of preventing the fulfilment of the 
prophecies of the American downfall. 

He observed, that, in revising the federal system 
we ought to inquire, first, into the properties which 
such a government ought to possess ; secondly, the 
defects of the Confederation ; thirdly the danger of 
our situation; and fourthly, the remedy. 

1. The character of such a government ought to 
secure, first, against foreign invasion; secondly, 
against dissensions between members of the Union, 
or seditions in particular States ; thirdly, to procure 
to the several States various blessings of which 
an isolated situation was incapable ; fourthly, it 
should be able to defend itself against encroachment ; 
and fifthly, to be paramount to the State Constitu- 
tions. 

2. In speaking of the defects of the Confederation, 
he professed a high respect for its authors, and con- 
sidered them as having done all that patriots could 
do, in the then infancy of the science of constitu- 
tions, and of confederacies ; when the inefficiency of 
requisitions was unknown — no commercial discord 
had arisen among any States — no rebellion had ap- 
peared, as in Massachusetts — foreign debts had not 
become urgent — the havoc of paper-money had not 
been foreseen — treaties had not been violated— and 
perhaps nothing better could be obtained, from the 

Vol. I.— 46* 



730 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

jealousy of the Stales with regard to their sover- 
eignty. 

He then proceeded to enumerate the defects: — 
First, that the Confederation produced no security 
against foreign invasion ; Congress not being per- 
mitted to prevent a war, nor to support it by their 
own authority. Of this he cited many examples ; 
most of which tended to shew, that they could not 
cause infractions of treaties, or of the law of nations, 
to be punished ; that particular States might by 
their conduct provoke war without control ; and 
that, neither militia nor drafts being fit for de- 
fence on such occasions, enlistments only could be 
successful, and these could not be executed without 
money. 

Secondly, that the Federal Government could not 
check the quarrel between States, nor a rebellion in 
any, not having constitutional power nor means to 
interpose according to the exigency. 

Thirdly, that there were many advantages which 
the United States might acquire, which were not 
attainable under the Confederation — such as a pro- 
ductive impost — counteraction of the commercial 
regulations of other nations — pushing of commerce 
ad libitum, &c. &c. 

Fourthly, that the Federal Government could 
not defend itself against encroachments from the 
States. 

Fifthly, that it was not even paramount to the 
State Constitutions, ratified as it was in many of the 
States. 

3. He next reviewed the danger of our situation ; 
and appealed to the sense of the best friends of the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 731 

United States — to the prospect of anarchy from the 
laxity of government every where — and to other 
considerations. 

4. He then proceeded to the remedy ; the basis of 
which he said must be the republican principle. 

He proposed, as conformable to his ideas, the 
following resolutions, which he explained one by 
one. 

1. " Resolved, that the Articles of Confederation 
ought to be so corrected and enlarged as to accom- ^/ 
plish the objects proposed by their institution ; 
namely, " common defence, security of liberty, and 
general welfare." 

2. " Resolved, therefore, that the rights of suffrage 
in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned 
to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of 
free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may 
seem best in different cases. 

3. " Resolved, that the National Legislature ought 
to consist of two branches. 

4. " Resolved, that the members of the first branch 
of the National Legislature ought to be elected by 

the people of the several States every for 

the term of ; to be of the age of years 

at least ; to receive liberal stipends by which they 
may be compensated for the devotion of their time 
to the public service ; to be ineligible to any office 
established by a particular State, or under the 
authority of the United States, except those pecu- 
liarly belong to the functions of the first branch, 
during the term of service, and for the space of 
after its expiration; to be incapable of re- 
election for the space of • after the expiration 



732 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

of their term of service, and to be subject to re- 
call. 

5. " Resolved, that the members of the second 
branch of the National Legislature ought to be 
elected by those of the first, out of a proper number 
of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, 

to be of the age of years at least; to hold their 

offices for a term sufficient to ensure their indepen- 
dency; to receive liberal stipends, by which they 
may be compensated for the devotion of their time 
to the public service ; and to be ineligible to any 
office established by a particular State, or under the 
authority of the United States, except those pecu- 
liarly belonging to the functions of the second 
branch, during the term of service ; and for the 
space of after the expiration thereof. 

6. " Resolved, that each branch ought to possess 
the right of originating acts ; that the National 
Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the 
legislative rights vested in Congress by the Con- 
federation, and moreover to legislate in all cases to 
which the separate States are incompetent, or in 
which the harmony of the United States may be in- 
terrupted by the exercise of individual legislation ; 
to negative all laws passed by the several States 
contravening, in the opinion of the National Legis- 
lature, the Articles of Union, or any treaty subsist- 
ing under the authority of the Union ; and to call 
forth the force of the Union against any member of 
the Union failing to fulfil its duty under the Articles 
thereof. 

7. " Resolved, that a National Executive be insti- 
tuted ; to be chosen by the National Legislature for 



1T87.J FEDERAL CONVENTION. 733 

the term of ; to receive punctually, at stated 

times, a fixed compensation for the services ren- 
dered, in which no increase nor diminution shall be 
made, so as to affect the magistracy existing at the 
time of increase or diminution ; and to be ineligible 
a second time ; and that, besides a general authority 
to execute the national laws, it ought to enjoy the 
executive rights vested in Congress by the Confed- 
eration. 

8. " Resolved, that the Executive, and a conve- 
nient number of the national Judiciary, ought to 
compose a Council of Revision, with authority to 
examine every act of the National Legislature, be- 
fore it shall operate, and every act of a particular 
Legislature before a negative thereon shall be final ; 
and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount 
to a rejection, unless the act of the National Legis- 
lature be again passed, or that of a particular Legis- 
lature be again negatived by of the members 

of each branch. 

9. " Resolved, that a National Judiciary be estab- 
ished ; to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, 

and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National 
Legislature ; to hold their offices during good behav- 
iour, and to receive punctually, at stated times, fixed 
compensation for their services, in which no increase 
or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons 
actually in office at the time of such increase or dimi- 
nution. That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals 
shall be to hear and determine, in the first instance, 
and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine, 
in the dernier resort, all piracies and felonies on the 
high seas ; captures from an enemy ; cases in which 



734 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

foreigners, or citizens of other States, applying to 
such jurisdictions, may be interested ; or which re- 
spect the collection of the national revenue ; im- 
peachments of any national officers, and questions 
which may involve the national peace and har- 
j mony. 

10. " Resolved, that provision ought to be made 
for the admission of States lawfully arising within 
the limits of the United States, whether from a 
voluntary junction of government and territory, or 
otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices 
in the National Legislature less than the whole. 

11. " Resolved, that a republican government, and 
the territory of each State, except in the instance of 
a voluntary junction of government and territory, 
ought to be guaranteed by the United States to 
each State. 

12. " Resolved, that provision ought to be made 
for the continuance of Congress and their authorities 
and privileges, until a given day after the reform of 
the Articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the 
completion of all their engagements. 

13. " Resolved, that provision ought to be made 
for the amendment of the Articles of Union, when- 
soever it shall seem necessary ; and that the assent 
of the National Legislature ought not to be required 
thereto. 

" 14. Resolved, that the legislative, executive, 
and judiciary powers, within the several States 
ought to be bound by oath to support the Articles 
of Union. 

" 15. Resolved, that the amendments which shall 
be offered to the Confederation, by the Convention, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 735 

ought, at a proper time or times, after the approba- 
tion of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly 
or assemblies of representatives, recommended by 
the several Legislatures, to be expressly chosen by 
the people to consider and decide thereon." 

He concluded with an exhortation, not to suffer 
the present opportunity of establishing general 
peace, harmony, happiness and liberty in the United 
States to pass away unimproved.* 

It was then resolved, that the House will to- 
morrow resolve itself into a Committee of the 
Whole House, to consider of the state of the Ameri- 
can Union ; and that the propositions moved by Mr. 
Randolph be referred to the said Committee. 

Mr. Charles Pinckney laid before the House the 
draft of a federal government which he had pre- 
pared, to be agreed upon between the free and inde- 
pendent States of America : 

plan of a federal constitution.? 

We, the people of the States of New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Providence Plant- 
ations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, 
declare, and establish the following Constitution, for 
the government of ourselves and posterity. 



* This abstract of the speech was furnished to James Madison by Mr. 
Randolph, and is in his hand- writing. 

t See Appendix, No. 2., for notes on Mr. Pinckney's plan. 



736 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Article I. 

" The style of this government shall be, The 
United States of America, and the government shall 
consist of supreme legislative, executive and judicial 
powers. 

Article II. 

" The legislative power shall be vested in a Con- 
gress, to consist of two separate Houses ; one to be 
called the House of Delegates ; and the other the 

Senate, who shall meet on the ■ day of 

in every year. 

Article III. 

" The members of the House of Delegates shall 

be chosen every year by the people of the 

several States ; and the qualification of the electors 
shall be the same as those of the electors in the 
several States for their Legislatures. Each member 
shall have been a citizen of the United States for 

■ years ; and shall be of years 

of age, and a resident in the State he is chosen for. 
Until a census of the people shall be taken in the 
manner hereinafter mentioned, the House of Dele- 
gates shall consist of , to 

be chosen from the different States in the following 

proportions : for New Hampshire, ; for 

Massachusetts, ; for Rhode Island, 

for Connecticut, ; for New York, 

for New Jersey, ; for Pennsylvania, 

for Delaware, ; for Maryland, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 737 

for Virginia, — ■ — ; for North Carolina, : 



for South Carolina, — ; for Georgia, ; 

and the Legislature shall hereinafter regulate the 
number of Delegates by the number of inhabitants, 
according to the provisions hereinafter made, at the 

rate of one for every — thousand. All money 

bills of every kind shall originate in the House of 
Delegates, and shall not be altered by the Senate. 
The House of Delegates shall exclusively possess 
the power of impeachment, and shall choose its own 
officers ; and vacancies therein shall be supplied by 
the executive authority of the State in the repre- 
sentation from which they shall happen. 

Article IV. 

u The Senate shall be elected and chosen by the 
House of Delegates; which House, immediately 

after their meeting, shall choose by ballot 

Senators from among the citizens and residents of 

New Hampshire ; from among those of 

Massachusetts; from among those of Rhode 

Island ; from among those of Connecticut ; 

from among those of New York ; 

from among those of New Jersey ; from 

among those of Pennsylvania ; from among 

those of Delaware ; — from among those of 

Maryland ; from among those of Virginia ; 

from among those of North Carolina ; 

from among those of South Carolina ; and 

from among those of Georgia. The Sen- 
ators chosen from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut, shall form one class ; 

Vol. I.— 47 



738 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

those from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
and Delaware, one class ; and those from Mary- 
land, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Georgia, one class. The House of Delegates shall 
number these classes one, two, and three ; and fix 
the times of their service by lot. The first class 

shall serve for years ; the second for — • 

years ; and the third for years. As their 

times of service expire, the House of Delegates shall 

fill them up by elections for — years ; and 

they shall fill all vacancies that arise from death or 
resignation, for the time of service remaining of the 
members so dying or resigning. Each Senator shall 

be years of age at least ; and shall have 

been a citizen of the United States for four years 
before his election ; and shall be a resident of the 
State he is chosen from. The Senate shall choose 
its own officers. 

Article V. 

" Each State shall prescribe the time and manner 
of holding elections by the people for the House of 
Delegates ; and the House of Delegates shall be the 
judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of 
their members. 

" In each House a majority shall constitute a 
quorum to do business. Freedom of speech and 
debate in the Legislature shall not be impeached, or 
questioned, in any place out of it; and the members 
of both Houses shall in all cases, except for treason, 
felony, or breach of the peace, be free from arrest 
during their attendance on Congress, and in going 
to and returning from it. Both Houses shall keep 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 739 

Journals of their proceedings, and publish them, ex- 
cept on secret occasions ; and the Yeas and Nays 

may be entered thereon at the desire of one 

of the members present. Neither House, without 
the consent of the other, shall adjourn for more than 

days, nor to any place but where they are 

sitting. 

" The members of each House shall not be eligible 
to, or capable of holding, any office under the Union, 
during the time for which they have been re- 
spectively elected ; nor the members of the Senate 
for one year after. The members of each House 
shall be paid for their services by the States which 
they represent. Every bill which shall have passed 
the Legislature shall be presented to the President 
of the United States for his revision ; if he approves 
it, he shall sign it ; but if he does not approve it, he 
shall return it, with his objections, to the House it 
originated in; which House, if two-thirds of the 
members present, notwithstanding the President's 
objections, agree to pass it, shall send it to the other 
House, with the President's objections; where if 
two-thirds of the members present also agree to 
pass it, the same shall become a law; and all bills 
sent to the President, and not returned by him 
within — days, shall be laws, unless the Legis- 
lature, by their adjournment, prevent their return; 
in which case they shall not be laws. 

Article VI. 

" The Legislature of the United States shall have 
the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, 
and excises ; 



740 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

To regulate commerce with all nations, and 
among the several States ; 

To borrow money and emit bills of credit ; 

To establish post-offices ; 

To raise armies ; 

To build and equip fleets ; 

To pass laws for arming, organizing, and dis- 
ciplining the militia of the United States. 

To subdue a rebellion in any State, on application 
of its Legislature ; 

To coin money, and regulate the value of all 
coins, and fix the standard of weights and meas- 
ures; 

To provide such dockyards and arsenals, and 
erect such fortifications as may be necessary for the 
United States, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction 
therein ; 

To appoint a Treasurer, by ballot ; 

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme 
Court ; 

To establish post and military roads ; 

To establish and provide for a national university 
at the seat of government of the United States ; 

To establish uniform rules of naturalization ; 

To provide for the establishment of a seat of gov- 
ernment for the United States, not exceeding 

miles square, in which they shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction ; 

To make rules concerning captures from an en- 
emy; 

To declare the law and punishment of piracies 
and felonies at sea, and of counterfeiting coin, and 
of all offences against the laws of nations ; 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 741 

To call forth the aid of the militia to execute the 
laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insur- 
rections, and repel invasions ; 

And to make all laws for carrying the foregoing 
powers into execution. 

" The Legislature of the United States shall have 
the power to declare the punishment of treason, 
which shall consist only in levying war against the 
United States, or any of them, or in adhering to their 
enemies. No person shall be convicted of treason 
but by the testimony of two witnesses. 

a The proportion of direct taxation shall be regu- 
lated by the whole number of inhabitants of every 

description ; which number shall, within years 

after the first meeting of the Legislature, and within 

the term of every year after, be taken in the 

manner to be prescribed by the Legislature. 

" No tax shall be laid on articles exported from 
the States ; nor capitation tax, but in proportion to 
the census before directed. 

" All laws regulating commerce shall require the 
assent of two-thirds of the members present in each 
House. The United States shall not grant any title 
of nobility. The Legislature of the United States 
shall pass no law on the subject of religion ; nor 
touching or abridging the liberty of the press ; nor 
shall the privilege of the writ of Habeus Corpus 
ever be suspended, except in case of rebellion or 
invasion. 

" All acts made by the Legislature of the United 
States, pursuant to this Constitution, and all trea- 
ties made under the authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme law of the land ; and all judges 



742 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

shall be bound to consider them as such in their de- 
cisions. 

Article VII. 

" The Senate shall have the sole and exclusive 
power to declare war ; and to make treaties ; and 
to appoint ambassadors and other ministers to for- 
eign nations, and judges of the Supreme Court. 

" They shall have the exclusive power to regulate 
the manner of deciding all disputes and controver- 
sies now existing, or which may arise, between the 
States, respecting jurisdiction or territory. 

Article VIII. 

" The executive power of the United States shall 
be vested in a President of the United States of 
America, which shall be his style; and his title 
shall be His Excellency. He shall be elected for 
years ; and shall be re-eligible. 

" He shall from time to time give information to 
the Legislature, of the state of the Union, and rec- 
ommend to their consideration the measures he may 
think necessary. He shall take care that the laws 
of the United States be duly executed. He shall 
commission all the officers of the United States; 
and, except as to ambassadors, other ministers, and 
judges of the Supreme Court, he shall nominate, 
and, with the consent of the Senate, appoint, all 
other officers of the United States. He shall receive 
public ministers from foreign nations; and may cor- 
respond with the Executives of the different States. 



1787. ] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 743 

He shall have power to grant pardons and reprieves, 
except in impeachments. He shall be Commander- 
in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States, 
and of the militia of the several States ; and shall 
receive a compensation which shall not be in- 
creased or diminished during his continuance in 
office. At entering on the duties of his office, he 
shall take an oath faithfully to execute the duties of 
a President of the United States. He shall be re- 
moved from his office on impeachment by the House 
of Delegates, and conviction in the Supreme Court, 
of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case of his 
removal, death, resignation, or disability, the Presi- 
dent of the Senate shall exercise the duties of his 
office until another President be chosen. And in 
case of the death of the President of the Senate, the 
Speaker of the House of Delegates shall do so. 

Article IX. 

" The Legislature of the United States shall have 
the power, and it shall be their duty, to establish 
such courts of law, equity, and admiralty, as shall 
be necessary. 

u The judges of the courts shall hold their offices 
during good behaviour ; and receive a compensa- 
tion, which shall not be increased or diminished 
during their continuance in office. One of these 
courts shall be termed the Supreme Court ; whose 
jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under 
the laws of the United States, or affecting ambassa- 
dors, other public ministers and consuls ; to the trial 
of impeachment of officers of the United States ; to 



744 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In 
cases of impeachment affecting ambassadors, and 
other public ministers, this jurisdiction shall be ori- 
ginal ; and in all other cases appellate. 

" All criminal offences, except in cases of im- 
peachment, shall be tried in the State where they 
shall be committed. The trials shall be open and 
public, and shall be by jury. 

Article X. 

" Immediately after the first census of the people 
of the United States, the House of Delegates shall 
apportion the Senate by electing for each State, out 
of the citizens resident therein, one Senator for ev- 
ery members each State shall have in the 

House of Delegates. Each State shall be entitled 
to have at least one member in the Senate. 

Article XI. 

" No State shall grant letters of marque and 
reprisal, or enter into treaty, or alliance, or con- 
federation ; nor grant any title of nobility ; nor, 
without the consent of the Legislature of the United 
States, lay any impost on imports ; nor keep troops 
or ships of war in time of peace ; nor enter into 
compacts with other States or foreign powers ; nor 
emit bills of credit ; nor make any thing but gold, 
silver, or copper, a tender in payment of debts ; nor 
engage in war, except for self-defence when actually 
invaded, or the danger of invasion be so great as not 
to admit of a delay until the Government of the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 745 

United States can be informed thereof. And to 
render these prohibitions effectual, the Legislature 
of the United States shall have the power to revise 
the laws of the several States that may be supposed 
to infringe the powers exclusively delegated by this 
Constitution to Congress, and to negative and annul 
such as do. 

Article XII, 

" The citizens of each State shall be entitled to 
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the sev- 
eral States. Any person, charged with crimes in 
any State, fleeing from justice to another, shall, on 
demand of the Executive of the State from which 
he fled, be delivered up, and removed to the State 
having jurisdiction of the offence. 

Article XIII. 

" Full faith shall be given, in each State, to the 
acts of the Legislature, and to the records and judi- 
cial proceedings of the courts and magistrates, of 
every State. 

Article XIV. 

" The Legislature shall have power to admit new 
States into the Union, on the same terms with the 
original States ; provided two-thirds of the members 
present in both Houses agree. 

Article XV. 

" On the application of the Legislature of a State, 
Vol. I.— 44* 



746 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the United States shall protect it against domestic 
insurrection. 

Article XVI. 



" If two-thirds of the Legislatures of the States 
apply for the same, the Legislature of the United 
States shall call a convention for the purpose of 
amending the Constitution ; or, should Congress, 
with the consent of two-thirds of each House, pro- 
pose to the States amendments to the same, the 
agreement of two-thirds of the Legislatures of the 
States shall be sufficient to make the said amend- 
ments parts of the Constitution. 

" The ratification of the conventions of 

States shall be sufficient for organizing this 

Constitution." 

Ordered, that the said draft be referred to the Com- 
mittee of the Whole appointed to consider the state 
of the American Union. 

Adjourned. 



Wednesday, May 30th. 

Roger Sherman, from Connecticut, took his seat, 
The House went into Committee of the Whole on 

the state of the Union. Mr. Gorham was elected 

to the Chair by ballot. 

The propositions of Mr. Randolph which had been 

referred to the Committee being taken up, he moved, 

on the suggestion of Mr. G. Morris, that the first of his 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 747 

propositions, — to wit : " Resolved, that the Articles of 
Confederation ought to be so corrected and enlarged, 
as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institu- 
tion ; namely, common defence, security of liberty, and 
general welfare," — should mutually be postponed, in 
order to consider the three following: 

" 1. That a union of the States merely federal 
will not accomplish the objects proposed by the 
Articles of Confederation, namely, common defence, 
security of liberty, and general welfare. 

" 2. That no treaty or treaties among the whole 
or part of the States, as individual sovereignties, 
would be sufficient. 

" 3. That a national government ought to be es- 
tablished, consisting of a supreme Legislative, Exec- 
utive and Judiciary." 

The motion for postponing was seconded by Mr. 
G. Morris, and unanimously agreed to. 

Some verbal criticisms were raised against the 
first proposition, and it was agreed, on motion of 
Mr. Butler, seconded by Mr. Randolph, to pass on* 
to the third, which underwent a discussion, less, 
however, on its general merits than on the force 
and extent of the particular terms national and 
supreme. 

Mr. Charles Pinckney wished to know of Mr. 
Randolph, whether he meant to abolish the State 
governments altogether. Mr. Randolph replied, that 
he meant by these general propositions merely to 
introduce the particular ones which explained the 
outlines of the system he had in view. 

Mr. Butler said, he had not made up his mind on 
the subject, and was open to the light which discus- 



748 DEBATES IN THE [1787 

sion might throw on it. After some general obser- 
vations, he concluded with saying, that he had 
opposed the grant of powers to Congress heretofore, 
because the whole power was vested in one body. 
The proposed distribution of the powers with differ- 
ent bodies changed the case, and would induce him 
to go great lengths. 

General Pinckney expressed a doubt whether the 
act of Congress recommending the Convention, or 
the commissions of the Deputies to it, would au- 
thorize a discussion of a system founded on different 
principles from the Federal Constitution. 

Mr. Gerry seemed to entertain the same doubt. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris explained the distinction 
between a federal and a national, supreme govern- 
ment ; the former being a mere compact resting on 
the good faith of the parties ; the latter having a 
complete and compulsive operation. He contended, 
that in all communities there must be one supreme 
power, and one only. 

t Mr. Mason observed, not only that the present 
Confederation was deficient in not providing for 
coercion and punishment against delinquent States ; 
but argued very cogently, that punishment could 
not in the nature of things be executed on the States 
collectively, and therefore that such a government 
was necessary as could directly operate on indi- 
viduals, and would punish those only whose guilt 
required it. 

Mr. Sherman admitted that the Confederation had 
not given sufficient power to Congress, and that 
additional powers were necessary ; particularly that 
of raising money, which he said would involve many 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 749 

other powers. He admitted also, that the general and 
particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be con- 
current. He seemed, however, not to be disposed to 
make too great inroads on the existing system; 
intimating, as one reason, that it would be wrong to 
lose every amendment by inserting such as would 
not be agreed to by the States. 

It was moved by Mr. Read, and seconded by Mr. 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, to postpone the 
third proposition last offered by Mr. Randolph, viz. 
" that a national government ought to be established, 
consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive, and 
Judiciary,' 7 in order to take up the following, viz. 
" Resolved, that, in order to carry into execution 
the design of the States in forming this Convention, 
and to accomplish the objects proposed by the 
Confederation, a more effective government, con- 
sisting of a Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, 
ought to be established." The motion to postpone 
for this purpose was lost: 

Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, South 
Carolina, aye — 4; New York, Pennsylvania, Vir- 
ginia, North Carolina, no — 4. 

On the question, as moved by Mr. Butler, on the 
third proposition, it was resolved, in Committee of 
Whole, "that a national government ought to be 
established, consisting of a supreme Legislative, 
Executive, and Judiciary," — Massachusetts, Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, aye — 6 ; Connecticut, no — 1 ; New 
York divided 180 ( Colonel Hamilton, aye, Mr. Yates, 
no). 

The following Resolution, being the second of 



750 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

those proposed by Mr. Randolph, was taken up, viz. 
" that the rights of suffrage in the National Legis- 
lature ought to be 'proportioned to the (juotas of con- 
tribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as 
the one or the other rule may seem best in different 
cases" 

Mr. Madison, observing that the words, " or to the 
number of free inhabitants" might occasion debates 
which would divert the Committee from the general 
question whether the principle of representation 
should be changed, moved that they might be struck 
out. 

Mr. King observed, that the quotas of contribu- 
tion, which would alone remain as the measure of 
representation, would not answer ; because, waiving 
every other view of the matter, the revenue might 
hereafter be so collected by the General Govern- 
ment that the sums respectively drawn from the 
States would' not appear, and would besides be 
continually varying. 

Mr. Madison admitted the propriety of the ob- 
servation, and that some better rule ought to be 
found. 

Colonel Hamilton moved to alter the resolution 
so as to read, " that the rights of suffrage in the 
National Legislature ought to be proportioned to 
the number of free inhabitants." Mr. Spaight 
seconded the motion. 

It was then moved that the resolution be post- 
poned ; which was agreed to. 

Mr. Randolph and Mr. Madison then moved the 
following resolution : " that the rights of suffrage in 
the National Legislature ought to be proportioned." 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 751 

It was moved and seconded to amend it by 
adding, " and not according to the present system ;" 
which was agreed to. 

It was then moved and seconded to alter the 
resolution so as to read, "that the rights of suffrage 
in the National Legislature ought not to be ac- 
cording to the present system." 

It was then moved and seconded to postpone the 
resolution moved by Mr. Randolph and Mr. Madison; 
which being agreed to,- — 

Mr. Madison moved, in order to get over the 
difficulties, the following resolution: "that the 
equality of suffrage established by the Articles of 
Confederation ought not to prevail in the National 
Legislature ; and that an equitable ratio of repre- 
sentation ought to be substituted." This was sec- 
onded by Mr. Gouverneur Morris, and, being gen- 
erally relished, would have been agreed to ; when — 

Mr. Read moved, that the whole clause relating 
to the point of representation be postponed ; re- 
minding the Committee that the Deputies from 
Delaware were restrained by their commission from 
assenting to any change of the rule of suffrage, and 
in case such a change should be fixed on, it might 
become their duty to retire from the Convention. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris observed, that the valu- 
able assistance of those members could not be lost 
without real concern; and that so early a proof of 
discord in the Convention, as the secession of a 
State, would add much to the regret; that the 
change proposed was, however, so fundamental an 
article in a national government, that it could not 
be dispensed with. 



752 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Madison observed, that, whatever reason 
might have existed for the equality of suffrage when 
the Union was a federal one among sovereign States, 
it must cease when a national government should 
be put into the place. In the former case, the acts 
of Congress depended so much for their efficacy on 
the co-operation of the States, that these had a 
weight, both within and without Congress, nearly 
in proportion to their extent and importance. In 
the latter case, as the acts of the General Govern- 
ment would take effect without the intervention 
of the State Legislatures, a vote from a small State 
would have the same efficacy and importance as 
a vote from a large one, and there was the same 
reason for different numbers of representatives from 
different States, as from counties of different extents 
within particular States. He suggested as an ex- 
pedient for at once taking the sense of the members 
on this point, and saving the Delaware Deputies 
from embarrassment, that the question should be 
taken in Committee, and the clause, on report to the 
House, be postponed without a question there. 
This, however, did not appear to satisfy Mr. Read. 

By several it was observed, that no just construc- 
tion of the act of Delaware could require or justify 
a secession of her Deputies, even if the resolution 
were to be carried through the House as well as 
the Committee. It was finally agreed, however, 
that the clause should be postponed ; it being under- 
stood that, in the event, the proposed change of 
representation would certainly be agreed to, no ob- 
jection or difficulty being started from any other 
quarter than from Delaware. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 753 

The motion of Mr. Read to postpone being agreed 
to, — 

The Committee then rose; the Chairman re- 
ported progress ; and the House, having resolved to 
resume the subject in Committee to-morrow, — 

Adjourned to ten o'clock. 



Thursday, May 31 st. 



William Pierce, from Georgia, took his seat. 181 

In the Committee of the Whole on Mr. Randolph's 
Resolutions, — The third Resolution, "that the Na- 
tional Legislature ought to consist of two branches" 
was agreed to without debate, or dissent, except 
that of Pennsylvania, — given probably from com-^ 
plaisaace to Doctor Franklin, who was understood I 
to be partial to a single house of legislation. ^yS 

The fourth Resolution, first clause, " that the 
members of the first branch of the National Legisla- 
ture ought to be elected by the people of the several 
States" being taken up : 

Mr. Sherman opposed the election by the people, 
insisting that it ought to be by the State Legisla- 
tures. The people, he said, immediately, should 
have as little to do as may be about the govern- 
ment. They want information, and are constantly 
liable to be misled. 

Mr. Gerry, « The evils we experience flow from 
the excess of democracy. The people do not want 
virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots.* In 
Massachusetts it had been fully confirmed by ex- 
perience, that they are daily misled into the most 

Vol. I.--48 



754 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

baneful measures and opinions, by the false reports 
circulated by designing men, and which no one on 
the spot can refute. One principal evil arises from 
the want of due provision for those employed in the 
administration of government. It would seem to be 
a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants. 
He mentioned the popular clamor in Massachusetts 
for the reduction of salaries, and the attack made on 
that of the Governor, though secured by the spirit 
of the Constitution itself. He had, he said, been too 
republican heretofore: he was still, however, re- 
publican; but had been taught by experience the 
danger of the levelling spirit. 

Mr. Mason argued strongly for an election of the 
larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand 
depository of the democratic principle of the govern- 
ment. It was, so to speak, to be our House of 
Commons. It ought to know and sympathize with 
every part of the community; and ought therefore 
to be taken, not only from different parts of the 
whole republic, but also from different districts of 
the larger members of it; which had in several 
instances, particularly in Virginia, different interests 
and views arising from difference of produce, of 
habits, &c. &c. He admitted that we had been too 
democratic, but was afraid we should incautiously 
run into the opposite extreme. We ought to attend 
to the rights of every class of the people. He had 
often wondered at the indifference oi the superior 
classes of society to this dictate of humanity and 
policy ; considering, that, however affluent their cir- 
cumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, 
the course of a few years not only might, but cer- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 755 

t a inly would, distribute their posterity throughout 
the lowest classes of society. Every selfish motive, 
therefore, every family attachment, ought to recom- 
mend such a system of policy as would provide no 
less carefully for the rights and happiness of the 
lowest, than of the highest, order of citizens. 

Mr. Wilson contended strenuously for drawing 
the most numerous branch of the Legislature im- 
mediately from the people. He was for raising the 
federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for 
that reason wished to give it as broad a basis as 
possible. No government could long subsist with- 
out the confidence of the people. In a republican 
government, this confidence was peculiarly essential. 
He also thought it wrong to increase the weight 
of the State Legislatures by making them the 
electors of the National Legislature. All interfer- 
ence between the general and local governments 
should be obviated as much as possible. On ex- 
amination it would be found that the opposition of ! 
States to Federal measures had proceeded much 
more from the officers of the States than from the 
people at large. 

Mr. Madison considered the popular election of 
one branch of the National Legislature as essential 
to every plan of free government. He observed, that 
in some of the States one branch of the Legislature 
was composed of men already removed from the 
people by an intervening body of electors. That 
if the first branch of the General Legislature should 
be elected by the State Legislatures, the second, 
branch elected by the first, the Executive by the 
second together with the first, and other appoint- 



756 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ments again made for subordinate purposes by the 
Executive, the people would be lost sight of alto- 
gether ; and the necessary sympathy between them 
and their rulers and officers too little felt. He was 
an advocate for the policy of refining the popular 
appointments by successive nitrations, but thought it 
might be pushed too far. He wished the expedient 
to be resorted to only in the appointment of the 
second branch of the Legislature, and in the Execu- 
tive and Judiciary branches of the government. He 
thought, too, that the great fabric to be raised would 
be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the 
solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it 
should stand merely on the pillars of the Legisla- 
tures. 

Mr. Gerry did not like the election by the people 
The maxims taken from the British constitution 
were often fallacious when applied to our situation, 
which was extremely different. Experience, he 
said, had shown that the State Legislatures, drawn 
immediately from the people, did not always possess 
their confidence. He had no objection, however, to 
an election by the people, if it were so qualified that 
men of honor and character might not be unwilling 
to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to 
think the people might nominate a certain number, 
out of which the State Legislatures should be bound 
to choose. 

Mr. Butler thought an election by the people an 
impracticable mode. 

^ On the question for an election of the first branch 
of the National Legislature, by the people, Massa- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 757 

chusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5; New Jersey, South 
Carolina, no — 2; Connecticut, Delaware, divided. # 

The remaining clauses of the fourth Resolution, 
relating to the qualifications of members of the Na- 
tional Legislature, being postponed, nem. con., as 
entering too much into detail for general proposi- 
tions,— 

The Committee proceeded to the fifth Resolu- 
tion, that the second [or senatorial] branch of the 
National Legislature ought to be chosen by the first 
branch, out of persons nominated by the State Legis- 
latures. 

Mr. Spaight contended, that the second branch 
ought to be chosen by the State Legislatures, and 
moved an amendment to that effect. 

Mr. Butler apprehended that the taking so many 
powers out of the hands of the States as was pro- 
posed, tended to destroy all that balance and secu- 
rity of interests among the States which it was 
necessary to preserve ; and called on Mr. Randolph, 
the mover of the propositions, to explain the extent 
of his ideas, and particularly the number of mem- 
bers he meant to assign to this second branch. 

Mr. Randolph observed, that he had, at the time 
of offering his propositions, stated his ideas as far as 
the nature of general propositions required ; that 
details made no part of the plan, and could not per- 
haps with propriety have been introduced. If he 
was to give an opinion as to the number of the sec- 
ond branch, he should say that it ought to be much 
smaller than that of the first ; so small as to be 
exempt from the passionate proceedings to which 



758 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

numerous assemblies are liable. He observed, thai 
the general object was to provide a cure for the 
^viJs under which the United States labored ; that 
in tracing these evils to their origin, every man had 
found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy ; 
that some check therefore was to be sought for, 
against this tendency of our governments ; and that 
a good Senate seemed most likely to' answer the 
purpose. 

Mr. King reminded the Committee that the choice 
of the second brauch as proposed, (by Mr. Spaight) 
viz., by the State Legislatures, would be impracti- 
cable, unless it was to be very numerous, or the idea 
of proportion among the States was to be disre- 
garded. According to this idea, there must be 
eighty or a hundred members to entitle Delaware 
to the choice of one of them. 

Mr. Spaight withdrew his motion. 

Mr. Wilson opposed both a nomination by the 
State Legislatures, and an election by the first 
branch of the National Legislature, because the 
second branch of the latter ought to be indepen- 
dent of both. He thought both branches of the 
National Legislature ought to be chosen by the 
people, but was not prepared with a specific propo- 
sition. He suggested the mode of choosing the 
Senate of New York, to wit, of uniting several elec- 
tion districts for one branch, in choosing members 
for the other branch, as a good model. 

Mr. Madison observed, that such a mode would 
destroy the influence of the smaller States asso- 
ciated with larger ones in the same district ; as the 
latter would choose from within themselves, al- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 759 

though better men might be found in the former. 
The election of Senators in Virginia, where large 
and small counties were often formed into one dis- 
trict for the purpose, had illustrated this conse- 
quence. Local partiality would often prefer a resi- 
dent within the county or State, to a candidate of 
superior merit residing out of it. Less merit also in 
a resident would be more known throughout his 
own State. 

Mr. Sherman favored an election of one member 
by each of the State Legislatures. 

Mr. Pinckney moved to strike out the " nomina- 
tion by the State Legislatures ;" on this question — 

* Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jer- 
sey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 9; Delaware, divided. 

On the whole question for electing by the first 
branch out of nominations by the State Legisla- 
tures — Massachusetts, Virginia, South Carolina, aye 
— 3 ; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsyl- 
vania, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 7. 

So the clause was disagreed to, and a chasm left 
in this part of the plan. 183 

The sixth Resolution, stating the cases in which the 
National Legislature ought to legislate, was next 
taken into discussion. On the question whether each 
branch should originate laws, there was an unani- 
mous affirmative, without debate. On the question 
for transferring all the legislative powers of the ex- 
isting Congress to this assembly, there was also an 
unanimous affirmative, without debate. 

* This question is omitted in the printed Journal, and the votes applied to 
the succeeding one, instead of the votes as here stated. 



760 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

On the proposition for giving legislative power in 
in all cases to which the State Legislatures were indi- 
vidually incompetent, — Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Rut- 
ledge objected to the vagueness of the term "incom- 
petent" and said they could not well decide how to 
vote until they should see an exact enumeration of 
the powers comprehended by this definition. 

Mr. Butler repeated his fears that we were run- 
ning into an extreme, in taking away the powers of 
the States ; and called on Mr. Randolph for the ex- 
tent of his meaning. 

Mr. Randolph disclaimed any intention to give 
indefinite powers to the National Legislature, de- 
claring that he was entirely opposed to such an 
inroad on the State jurisdictions ; and that he did 
not think any considerations whatever could ever 
change his determination. His opinion was fixed on 
this point. 

Mr. Madison said, that he had brought with him 
into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an 
enumeration and definition of the powers necessary 
to be exercised by the National Legislature; but 
had also brought doubts concerning its practica- 
bility. His wishes remained unaltered ; but his 
doubts had become stronger. What his opinion 
might ultimately be, he could not yet tell. But he 
should shrink from nothing which should be found 
essential to such a form of government as would 
provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the 
community. This being the end of all our delibera- 
tions, all the necessary means for attaining it must, 
however reluctantly, be submitted to. 

On the question for giving powers, in cases to 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 761 

which the States are not competent — Massachu- 
setts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela- 
ware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, aye — 9; Connecticut, divided, (Sherman, 
no, Ellsworth, aye.) 

The other clauses, giving powers necessamj to pre- 
serve harmony among the States, to negative all State 
laws contravening, in the opinion of the National 
Legislature, the Articles of Union, down to the last 
clause, (the words, " or any treaties subsisting under 
the authority of the Union," being added after the 
words " contravening, &c. the Articles of the Union," 
on motion of Doctor Franklin) were agreed to with- 
out debate or dissent. 

The last clause of the sixth Resolution, author- 
izing an exertion of the force of the whole against a 
delinquent Slate, came next into consideration. 

Mr. Madison observed, that the more he reflected 
on the use of force, the more he doubted the practi- 
cability, the justice and the efficacy of it, when ap- 
plied to people collectively, and not individually. 
An union of the States containing such an ingredient 
seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use 
of force against a State would look more like a de- 
claration of war than an infliction of punishment; 
and would probably be considered by the party at- 
tacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by 
which it might be bound. He hoped that such a 
system would be framed as might render this re- 
source unnecessary, and moved that the clause be 
postponed. This motion was agreed to, nem. con. 

The Committee then rose, and the House ad- 
journed. 

Vol. I.— 48* 



762 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Friday, June 1st. 

William Houstoun, from Georgia, took his seat. 

The Committee of the Whole proceeded to the 
seventh Resolution, that a National Executive be in- 
stituted, to be chosen by the National Legislature for 
the term of years, cfc, to be ineligible there- 
after, to possess the Executive poivers of Congress, <^c. 

Mr. Pinckney was for a vigorous Executive, but 
was afraid the executive powers of the existing 
Congress might extend to peace and war, &c. ; 
which would render the Executive a monarchy of 
the worst kind, to wit, an elective one. 

Mr. Wilson moved that the Executive consist of 
a single person. Mr. C. Pinckney seconded the mo- 
tion, so as to read " that a National Executive, to 
consist of a single person, be instituted." 

A considerable pause ensuing, and the Chairman 
asking if he should put the question, Doctor Frank- 
lin observed that it was a point of great importance, 
and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their 
sentiments on it before the question was put. 

Mr. Rutledge animadverted on the shyness of 
gentlemen on this and other subjects. He said it 
looked as if they supposed themselves precluded, by 
having frankly disclosed their opinions, from after- 
wards changing them, which he did not take to be 
at all the case. He said he was for vesting the 
executive power in a single person, though he was 
not for giving him the power of war and peace. A 
single man would feel the greatest responsibility, 
and administer the public affairs best. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 763 

Mr. Sherman said, he considered the executive 
magistracy as nothing more than an institution for 
carrying the will of the legislature into effect ; that 
the person or persons ought to be appointed by and 
accountable ta the legislature only, which was the 
depository of the supreme will of the society. As 
they were the best judges of the business which 
ought to be done by the executive department, and 
consequently of the number necessary from time to 
time for doing it, he wished the number might not 
be fixed, but that the legislature should be at liberty 
to appoint one or niore as experience might dictate. 

Mr. Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giv- 
ing most energy, dispatch and responsibility to the 
office. He did not consider the prerogatives of the 
British monarch as a proper guide in defining the 
executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were 
of a legislative nature ; among others, that of war 
and peace, &c. The only powers he considered 
strictly executive were those of executing the laws, 
and appointing officers, not appertaining to, and ap- 
pointed by, the legislature. 

Mr. Gerry favored the policy of annexing a coun- 
cil to the Executive, in order to give weight and 
inspire confidence. 

Mr. Randolph strenuously opposed an unity in the 
executive magistracy. He regarded it as the fcetus 
of monarchy. We had, he said, no motive to be 
governed by the British government as our proto- 
type. He did not mean, however, to throw censure 
on that excellent fabric. If we were in a situation 
to copy it, he did not know that he should be op- 
posed to it ; but the fixed genius of the people of 



764 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

America required a different form of government. 
He could not see why the great requisites for the 
executive department, vigor, dispatch, and responsi- 
bility, could not be found in three men, as well as in 
one man. The Executive ought to be independent. 
It ought, therefore, in order to support its indepen- 
dence, to consist of more than one. 

Mr. Wilson said, that unity in the Executive, in- 
stead of being the foetus of monarchy, would be the 
best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated, that 
he was not governed by the British model, which 
was inapplicable to the situation of this country; the 
extent of which was so great, and the manners so 
republican, that nothing but a great confederated 
republic would do for it. 

Mr. Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was 
postponed by common consent, the Committee seem- 
ing unprepared for any decision on it ; and the first 
part of the clause agreed to, viz. " that a national 
Executive be instituted." 184 

Mr. Madison thought it would be proper, before a 
choice should be made between a unity and a plu- 
rality in the Executive, to fix the extent of the ex- 
ecutive authority; that as certain powers were in 
their nature executive, and must be given to that 
department, whether administered by one or more 
persons, a definition of their extent would assist the 
judgment in determining how far they might be 
safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly 
moved that so much of the clause before the Com- 
mittee as related to the powers of the Executive 
should be struck out, and that after the words "that 
a national Executive ought to be instituted," there 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 765 

be inserted the words following, viz. " with power 
to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to 
offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to 
execute such other powers, f not legislative nor judi- 
ciary in their nature,' as may from time to time be 
delegated by the national Legislature." The words 
" not legislative nor judiciary in their nature," were 
added to the proposed amendment, in consequence 
of a suggestion, by General Pinckney, that improper 
powers might otherwise be delegated. 

Mr. Wilson seconded this motion. 

Mr. Pinckney moved to amend the amendment 
by striking out the last member of it, viz. " and to 
execute such x)ther powers, not legislative nor 
judiciary in their nature, as may from time to time 
be delegated." He said they were unnecessary, the 
object of them being included in the "power to 
carry into effect the national laws." 

Mr. Randolph seconded the motion. 

Mr. Madison did not know that the words were 
absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words, 
" to appoint to offices, &c," the whole being, per- 
haps, included in the first member of the proposition. 
He did not, however, see any inconvenience in 
retaining them ; and cases might happen in which 
they might serve to prevent doubts and miscon- 
structions. 

In consequence of the motion of Mr. Pinckney, 
the question on Mr. Madison's motion was divided ; 
and the words objected to by Mr. Pinckney struck 
out, by the votes of Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, 
and Georgia — 7, against Massachusetts, Virginia, 



766 DERATES IN THE [1787. 

and South Carolina — 3; the preceding part of the 
motion being first agreed to, — Connecticut, divided ; 
all the other States in the affirmative. 

The next clause in the seventh Resolution, re- 
lating to the mode of appointing, and the duration 
of, the Executive, being under consideration, — 

Mr. Wilson said, he was almost unwilling to de- 
clare the mode which he wished to take place, being 
apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He 
would say, however, at least, that in theory he was 
for an election by the people. Experience, particu- 
larly in New York and Massachusetts, showed that 
an election of the first magistrate by the people 
at large was both a convenient and successful mode. 
The objects of choice in such cases must be persons 
whose merits have general notoriety. 

Mr. Sherman was for the appointment by the 
Legislature, and for making him absolutely de- 
pendent on that body, as it was the will of that 
which was to be executed. An independence of 
the Executive on the supreme Legislature, was, in 
his opinion, the very essence of tyranny, if there 
was any such thing. 

Mr. Wilson moved, that the blank for the term 
of duration should be filled with three years, ob- 
serving, at the same time, that he preferred this 
short period on the supposition that a re-eligibility 
would be provided for. 

Mr. Pinckney moved, for seven years. 

Mr. Sherman was for three years, and against the 
doctrine of rotation, as throwing out of office the 
men best qualified to execute its duties. 

Mr. Mason was for seven years at least, and for 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 767 

prohibiting a re-eligibilty, as the best expedient, both 
for preventing the effect of a false complaisance on 
the side of the Legislature towards unfit characters ; 
and a temptation on the side of the Executive to 
intrigue with the Legislature for a re-appointment. 

Mr. Bedford was strongly opposed to so long a 
term as seven years. He begged the Committee to 
consider what the situation of the country would be, 
in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it 
for such a period, and it should be found on trial that 
he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him, 
or should lose them after his appointment. An im- 
peachment, he said, would be no cure for this evil, 
as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, 
not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, 
and for an ineligibility after a period of nine years. 

On the question, for seven years, — New York, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye 
— 5 ; Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carol- 
ina, Georgia, no 4 ; Massachusetts, divided. There 
being five ayes, four noes, and one divided, a ques- 
tion was asked, whether a majority had voted in 
the affirmative. The President decided that it was 
an affirmative vote. 185 

The mode of appointing the Executive was the 
next question. 

Mr. Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of 
an appointment by the people. He wished to derive 
not only both branches of the Legislature from the 
people without the intervention of the State Legis- 
latures, but the Executive also, in order to make 
them as independent as possible of each other, as 
well as of the States. 



768 DEBATES IN T HE [1787. 

Colonel Mason favors the idea, but thinks it im- 
practicable. He wishes, however, that Mr. Wilson 
might have time to digest it into his own form. 
The clause, u to be chosen by the National Legisla- 
ture," was accordingly postponed. 

Mr. Rutledge suggests an election of the Execu- 
tive by the second branch only of the National 
Legislature. 

The Committee then rose, and the House ad- 
journed. 



Saturday, June 2nd. 

William Samuel Johnson, from Connecticut, 
Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, from Maryland, and 
John Lansing, Jun., from New York, took their 
seats. 

In Committee of the Whole, — It was moved and 
seconded to postpone the Resolutions of Mr. Ran- 
dolph respecting the Executive, in order to take up 
the second branch of the Legislature ; which being- 
negatived, — by Massachusetts, Connecticut, Dela- 
ware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia — 7; against New York, Pennsylvania, Mary- 
land — 3 1 the mode of appointing the Executive was 
resumed. 

Mr. Wilson made the following motion, to be 
substituted for the mode proposed by Mr. Ran- 
dolph's Resolution, " that the executive magistracy 
shall be elected in the following manner : That the 
States be divided into districts and that the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 769 

persons qualified to vote in each district for mem- 
bers of the first branch of the National Legislature 

elect — members for their respective districts 

to be electors of the executive magistracy ; that the 
said electors of the executive magistracy meet at 

— — « , and they 5 or any of them, so 

met, shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of 
their own body, person- in whom the execu- 
tive authority of the National Government shall be 
vested." 

Mr. Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of 
an election without the intervention of the States. 
He supposed, too, that this mode would produce 
more confidence among the people in the first 
magistrate, than an election by the National Legis- 
lature. 

Mr. Gerry opposed the election by the National 
Legislature. There would be a constant intrigue 
kept up for the appointment. The Legislature and 
the candidates would bargain and play into one 
another's hands. Votes would be given by the 
former under promises or expectations from the 
latter, of recompensing them by services to members 
of the Legislature or their friends. He liked the 
principle of Mr. Wilson's motion, but fears it would 
alarm and give a handle to the State partizans, as 
tending to supersede altogether the State author- 
ities. He thought the community not yet ripe for 
stripping the States of their powers, even such as 
might not be requisite for local purposes. He 
was for waiting till the people should feel more 
the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking 
the suffrages of the States, instead of electors ; or 

Vol. I.— 49 



770 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

letting the Legislatures nominate, and the electors 
appoint. He was not clear that the people ought 
to act directly even in the choice of electors, being 
too little informed of personal characters in large 
districts, and liable to deceptions. 

Mr. Williamson could see no advantage in the 
introduction of electors chosen by the people, who 
would stand in the same relation to them as the 
State Legislatures ; whilst the expedient would be 
attended with great trouble and expense. 

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's 
substitute, it was negatived, — Pennsylvania, Mary- 
land, aye — 2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New 
York,* Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 8. 186 

On the question, for electing the Executive by 
the National Legislature, for the term of seven years, 
it was agreed to, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New 
York, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
no— 2. 

Doctor Franklin moved, that what related to the 
compensation for the services of the Executive be 
postponed, in order to substitute, " whose necessary 
expenses shall be defrayed, but who shall receive 
no salary, stipend, fee, or reward whatsoever for 
their services." He said, that, being very sensible 
of the effect of age on his memory, he had been 
unwilling to trust to that for the observations which 
seemed to support his motion, and had reduced 



New York, in the printed Journal, divided. 



1787.1 FEDERAL CONVENTION. 771 

them to writing, that he might, with the permission 
of the Committee, read, instead of speaking, them. 
Mr. Wilson made an offer to read the paper, which 
was accepted. The following is a literal copy of 
the paper : 

" Sir, it is with reluctance that I rise to express 
a disapprobation of any one article of the plan for 
which we are so much obliged to the honorable 
gentleman who laid it before us. From its first 
reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general 
wished it success. In this particular of salaries 
to the Executive branch, I happen to differ: and 
as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it 
is only from a persuasion that it is right, and from 
a sense of duty, that I hazard it. The Committee 
will judge of my reasons when they have heard 
them, and their judgment may possibly change mine. 
I think I see inconveniences in the appointment of 
salaries ; I see none in refusing them, but, on the 
contrary, great advantages. 

" Sir, there are two passions which have a power- 
ful influence on the affairs of men. There are am- 
bition and avarice ; the love of power, and the love 
of money. Separately, each of these has great force 
in prompting men to action; but when united in 
view of the same object, they have in many minds 
the most violent effects. Place before the eyes of 
such men a post of honor, that shall be at the same 
time a place of profit, and they will move heaven 
and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such 
places it is that renders the British government so 
tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true 
sources of all those factions, which are perpetually 



772 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

dividing tne nation, distracting its councils, hurrying 
sometimes into fruitless and mischievous wars, and 
often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms 
of peace. 

" And of what kind are the men that will strive 
for this profitable pre-eminence, through all the 
bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite 
mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of 
characters ? It will not be the wise and moderate, 
the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest 
for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, 
the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity 
in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust them- 
selves into your government, and be your rulers. 
And these, too, will be mistaken in the expected 
happiness of their situation: for their vanquished 
competitors, of the same spirit, and from the same 
motives, will perpetually be endeavouring to distress 
their administration, thwart their measures, and 
render them odious to the people. 

/" Besides these evils, Sir, though we may set out 
in the beginning with moderate salaries, we shall 
find that such will not be of long continuance. 
Reasons will never be wanting for proposed aug- 
mentations. And there will always be a party for 
giving more to the rulers, that the rulers may be 
able in return to give more to them. Hence, as all 
history informs us, there has been in every state 
and kingdom a constant kind of warfare between 
the governing and governed, the one striving to ob- 
.1 tain more for its support, and the other to pay less. 
1 And this has alone occasioned great convulsions, 
; actual civil wars, ending either in dethroning of the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 773 

princes, or enslaving of the people. Generally, in- 
deed, the ruling power carries its point, the revenues 
of princes constantly increasing ; and we see that 
they are never satisfied, but always in want of more. 
The more the people are discontented with the op- 
pression of taxes, the greater need the prince has of 
money to distribute among his partizans, and pay 
the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and 
enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce 
a king in an hundred, who would not, if he could, 
follow the example of Pharaoh, get first all the 
people's money, then all their lands, and then make 
them and their children servants for ever. It will 
be said, that we don't propose to establish kings. I 
know it : but there is a natural inclination in man- 
kind to kingly government. It sometimes relieves 
them from aristocratic domination. They had 
rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives 
more of the appearance of equality among citizens, 
and that they like. I am apprehensive, therefore^ 
perhaps too apprehensive, that the government of 
these States may in future times end in a monarchy. 
But this catastrophe I think may be long delayed, 
if in our proposed system we do not sow the seeds 
of contention, faction, and tumult, by making our 
posts of honor, places of profit. If w T e do, I fear 
that, though we do employ at first a number, and 
not a single person, the number will in time be set 
aside ; it will only nourish the foetus of a king, as 
the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly 
expressed it, and a king will the sooner be set over us. 
" It may be imagined by some that this is an Uto- 
pian idea, and that we can never find men to serve 



774 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

us in the Executive department without paying 
them well for their services. I conceive this to be 
a mistake. Some existing facts present themselves 
to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The 
high-sheriff of a county in England is an honorable 
office, but it is not a profitable one. It is rather ex- 
pensive and therefore not sought for. But yet, it is 
executed and well executed, and usually by some of 
the principal gentlemen of the county. In France, 
the office of Counsellor, or member of their judiciary 
parliament, is more honorable. It is therefore pur- 
chased at a high price : there are indeed fees on the 
law proceedings, which are divided among them, 
but these fees do not amount to more than three per 
cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore, as 
legal interest is there at five per cent, they in fact 
pay two per cent for being allowed to do the judiciary 
business of the nation, which is at the same time 
entirely exempt from the burden of paying them any 
salaries for their services. I do not, however, mean 
to recommend this as an eligible mode for our Ju- 
diciary department. I only bring the instance to 
show, that the pleasure of doing good and serving 
their country, and the respect such conduct entitles 
them to, are sufficient motives with some minds to 
give up a great portion of their time to the public, 
without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfac- 
tion. 

" Another instance is that of a respectable society 
who have made the experiment, and practised it 
with success more than one hundred years. I mean 
the Quakers. It is an established rule with them, 
that they are not to go to law ; but in their contro- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 775 

versies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly, 
and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with 
patience to hear the parties, and spend much time 
in composing their differences. In doing this, they 
are supported by a sense of duty, and the respect 
paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employ- 
ed, but it is never made profitable by salaries, fees 
or perquisites. And, indeed, in all cases of public 
service, the less the profit the greater the honor. 

" To bring the matter nearer home, have we not 
seen the great and most important of our offices, that 
of General of our armies, executed for eight years 
together without the smallest salary, by a patriot 
whom I will not now offend by any other praise ; 
and this, through fatigues and distresses, in common 
with the other brave men, his military friends and 
companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to 
his station ? And shall we doubt finding three or 
four men in all the United States, with public spirit 
enough to bear sitting in peaceful council for per- 
haps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil 
concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed? 
Sir, I have a better opinion of our country. I think 
we shall never be without a sufficient number of 
wise and good men to undertake and execute well 
and faithfully the office in question. 

" Sir, the saving of the salaries that may at first be 
proposed is not an object with me. The subsequent 
mischiefs of proposing them are what I apprehend. 
And therefore it is, that I move the amendment. If 
it is not seconded or accepted, I must be contented 
with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion 
frankly and done my duty." 



776 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton, with 
the view, he said, merely of bringing so respectable 
a proposition before the Committee, and which was 
besides enforced by arguments that had a certain 
degree of weight. No debate ensued, and the pro- 
position was postponed for the consideration of the 
members. It was treated with great respect, but 
rather for the author of it, than from any apparent 
conviction of its expediency or practicability. 187 

Mr. Dickinson moved, " that the Executive be 
made removable by the National Legislature, on 
the request of a majority of the Legislatures of in- 
dividual States." It was necessary, he said, to place 
the power of removing somewhere. He did not like 
the plan of impeaching the great officers of state. 
He did not know how provision could be made for 
removal of them in a better mode than that which 
he had proposed. He had no idea of abolishing the 
State governments, as some gentlemen seemed in- 
clined to do. The happiness of this country, in his 
opinion, required considerable powers to be left in 
the hands of the States. 

Mr. Bedford seconded the motion. 
Mr. Sherman contended, that the National Legis- 
lature should have power to remove the Executive 
at pleasure. 

Mr. Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit 
magistrate is rendered indispensable by the falli- 
bility of those who choose, as well as by the corrup- 
tibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly 
the making the Executive the mere creature of the 
Legislature, as a violation of the fundamental princi- 
ple of good government. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 777 

r Mr. Madison and Mr. Wilson observed, that it 
would leave an equality of agency in the small with 
the great States ; that it would enable a minority of 
the people to prevent the removal of an officer who 
had rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of 
a majority ; that it would open a door for intrigues 
against him in States where his administration, 
though just, might be unpopular ; and might tempt 
him to pay court to particular States whose leading 
partizans he might fear, or wish to engage as his 
partizans. They both thought it bad policy to in- 
troduce such a mixture of the State authorities, 
where their agency could be otherwise supplied. 

Mr. Dickinson considered the business as so im- 
portant that no man ought to be silent or reserved. 
He went into a discourse of some length, the sum of 
which was, that the Legislative, Executive and Ju- 
diciary departments ought to be made as indepen- 
dent as possible ; but that such an Executive as 
some seemed to have in contemplation was not con- 
sistent with a republic ; that a firm Executive could 
only exist in a limited monarchy. In the British 
government itself the weight of the Executive arises 
from the attachments which the Crown draws to 
itself, and not merely from the force of its preroga- 
tives. In place of these attachments we must look 
out for something else. One source of stability is 
the double branch of the Legislature. The di- 
vision of the country into distinct States formed the 
other principal source of stability. This division 
ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable 
powers to be left with the States. This was the 
ground of his consolation for the future fate of his 



"78 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

country. Without this, and in case of a consolida- 
tion of the States into one great republic, we might 
read its fate in the history of smaller ones. A lim- 
ited monarchy he considered as one of the best gov- 
ernments in the world. It was not certain that the 
same blessings were derivable from any other form. 
It was certain that equal blessings had never yet 
1 een derived from any of the republican forms. A 
limited monarchy, however, was out of the question. 
The spirit of the times, the state of our affairs for- 
bade the experiment, if it were desirable. Was it 
possible, moreover, in the nature of things, to intro- 
duce it even if these obstacles were less insuperable? 
A house of nobles was essential to such a govern- 
ment, — could these be created by a breath, or by a 
stroke of the pen ? No. They were the growth of 
ages, and could only arise under a complication of 
circumstances none of which existed in this country. 
But though a form the most perfect, perhaps, in it- 
self, be unattainable, we must not despair. If an- 
cient republics have been found to flourish for a mo- 
ment only, and then vanish forever, it only proves 
that they were badly constituted ; and that we ought 
to seek for every remedy for their diseases. One of 
these remedies he conceived to be the accidental 
lucky division of this country into distinct States ; a 
division which some seemed desirous to abolish alto- 
gether. 

As to the point of representation in the National 
Legislature, as it might affect States of different 
sizes, he said it must probably end in mutual con- 
cession. He hoped that each State would retain an 
equal voice at least in one branch of the National 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 779 

Legislature, and supposed the sums paid within each 
State would form a better ratio for the other branch 
than either the number of inhabitants or the quan- 
tum of property. 

A motion being made to strike out, " on request 
by a majority of the Legislatures of the individual 
States," and rejected — (Connecticut, South Caro- 
lina and Georgia, being aye ; the rest, no,) the ques- 
tion was taken on Mr. Dickinson's motion, "for 
making the Executive removable by the National 
Legislature at the request of a majority of State 
Legislatures," which was also rejected, — all the 
States being in the negative, except Delaware, 
which gave an affirmative vote. 188 

The question for making the Executive ineligible 
after seven years, was next taken and agreed to, — 
Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Vir- 
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 7; Con- 
necticut, Georgia, * no — 2; Pennsylvania, divided. 

Mr. Williamson, seconded by Mr. Davie, moved 
to add to the last clause the words, " and to be re- 
movable on impeachment and conviction of mal- 
practice or neglect of duty ;" which was agreed to. 

Mr. RuTLEDGEandMr.C.PiNCKNEY moved, that the 
blank for the number of persons in the Executive be 
filled with the words, "one person." He supposed 
the reasons to be so obvious and conclusive in favor 
of one, that no member would oppose the motion. 

Mr. Randolph opposed it with great earnestness, 
declaring that he should not do justice to the country 
which sent him, if he were silently to suffer the 

* In the printed Journal, Georgia, aye. 



780 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

establishment of a unity in the Executive depart- 
ment. He felt an opposition to it which he believed 
he should continue to feel as long as he lived. He 
urged — first, that the permanent temper of the 
people was adverse to the very semblance of mon- 
archy ; secondly, that a unity was unnecessary, a 
plurality being equally competent to all the objects 
of the department; thirdly, that the necessary con- 
fidence would never be reposed in a single magis- 
trate; fourthly, that the appointments would gen- 
erally be in favor of some inhabitant near the centre 
of the community, and consequently the remote parts 
would not be on an equal footing. He was in favor 
of three members of the Executive, to be drawn 
from different portions of the country. 

Mr. Butler contended strongly for a single magis- 
trate, as most likely to answer the purpose of the 
remote parts. If one man should be appointed, he 
would be responsible to the whole, and would be 
impartial to its interests. If three or more should 
be taken from as many districts, there would be a 
constant struggle for local advantages. In military 
matters this would be particularly mischievous. 
He said, his opinion on this point had been formed 
under the opportunity he had had of seeing the 
manner in which a plurality of military heads dis- 
tracted Holland, when threatened with invasion by 
the imperial troops. One man was for directing the 
force to the defence of this part, another to that part 
of the country, just as he happened to be swayed by 
prejudice or interest. 

The motion was then postponed ; the Committee 
rose ; and the House adjourned. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 781 



Monday, June 4th. 

In Committee of the Whole. — The question was 
resumed, on motion of Mr. Pinckney, seconded by 
Mr. Wilson, ' shall the blank for the number of the 
Executive be filled with a single person ?' 

Mr. Wilson was in favor of the motion. It had 
been opposed by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Randolph) ; but the arguments used had not con- 
vinced him. He observed, that the objections of Mr. 
Randolph were levelled not so much against the 
measure itself, as against its unpopularity. If he 
could suppose that it would occasion a rejection of 
the plan of which it should form a part, though the 
part were an important one, yet he would give it up 
rather than lose the whole. On examination, he 
could see no evidence of the alleged antipathy of 
the people. On the contrary, he was persuaded 
that it does not exist. All know that a single 
magistrate is not a king. One fact has great weight 
with him. All the thirteen States, though agreeing 
in scarce any other instance, agree in placing a 
single magistrate at the head of the government. 
The idea of three heads has taken place in none. 
The degree of power is, indeed, different ; but there 
are no co-ordinate heads. In addition to his former 
reasons for preferring a unity, he would mention 
another. The tranquillity, not less than the vigor, 
of the government, he thought, would be favored 
by it. Among three equal members, he foresaw 
nothing but uncontrolled, continued, and violent 
animosities; which would not only interrupt the 



782 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

public administration, but diffuse their poison through 
the other branches of government, through the 
states, and at length through the people at large. 
If the members were to be unequal in power, the 
principle of opposition to the unity was given up. 
If equal, the making them an odd number would 
not be a remedy. In courts of justice there are two 
sides only to a question. In the legislative and ex- 
ecutive departments, questions have commonly many 
sides. Each member, therefore, might espouse a 
separate one, and no two agree. 

Mr. Sherman. This matter is of great importance, 
and ought to be well considered before it is deter- 
mined. Mr. Wilson, he said, had observed that in 
each State a single magistrate was placed at the 
head of the government. It was so, he admitted, 
and properly so ; and he wished the same policy to 
prevail in the Federal Government. But then it 
should be also remarked, that in all the States there 
was a council of advice, without which the first 
magistrate could not act. A council he thought 
necessary to make the establishment acceptable to 
the people. Even in Great Britain, the King has 
a council ; and though he appoints it himself, its 
advice has its weight with him, and attracts the 
confidence of the people. 

Mr. Williamson asks Mr. Wilson, whether he 
means to annex a Council. 

Mr. Wilson means to have no Council, which 
oftener serves to cover, than prevent malpractices. 

Mr. Gerry was at a loss to discover the policy of 
three members for the Executive. It would be ex- 
tremely inconvenient in many instances, particularly 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 783 

in military matters, whether relating to the militia, 
an army, or a navy. It would be a general with 
three heads. 

On the question for a single Executive, it was 
agreed to, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylva- 
nia, Virginia, (Mr. Randolph and Mr. Blair, no; 
Doctor McClurg, Mr. Madison, and General Wash- 
ington, aye ; Colonel Mason being no, but not in the 
House, Mr. Wythe, aye, but gone home), North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7; New 
York, Delaware, Maryland, no — 3. 189 

The first clause of the eighth Resolution, relating 
to a council of revision, was next taken into consider- 
ation. 

^Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought 
to form a part of it, as they will have a sufficient 
check against encroachments on their own depart- 
ment by their exposition of the laws, which involved 
a power of deciding on their constitutionality. In 
some States the judges had actually set aside laws, 
as being against the Constitution. This was done, 
too, with general approbation. It was quite foreign 
from the nature of their office to make them judges 
of the policy of public measures. He moves to post- 
pone the clause, in order to propose, " that the 
National Executive shall have a right to negative 
any legislative act, which shall not be afterwards 

passed by parts of each branch of the 

National Legislature." % 

Mr. King seconded the motion, observing that the 
judges ought to be able to expound the law, as it 
should come before them, free from the bias of having 
participated in its formation. 



784 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Wilson thinks neither the original proposition 
nor the amendment goes far enough. If the Legisla- 
tive, Executive, and Judiciary ought to be distinct 
and independent, the Executive ought to have an 
absolute negative. Without such a self-defence, the 
Legislature can at any moment sink it into non- 
existence. He was for varying the proposition, in 
such a manner as to give the Executive and Judici- 
ary jointly an absolute negative. 

On the question to postpone, in order to take 
Mr. Gerry's proposition into consideration, it was 
agreed to, — Massachusetts, New York, Pennsyl- 
vania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
aye — 6 ; Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
no — 4. # 

Mr. Gerry's proposition being now before the 
Committee, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hamilton move, 
that the last part of it (viz. "which shall not be after- 
wards passed by parts of each branch of the 

National Legislature"), be struck out, so as to give 
the Executive an absolute negative on the laws. 
There was no danger, they thought, of such a power 
being too much exercised. It was mentioned by 
Colonel Hamilton that the King of Great Britain 
had not exerted his negative since the Revolution. 

Mr. Gerry sees no necessity for so great a control 
over the Legislature, as the best men in the com- 
munity would be comprised in the two branches of it. 

Doctor Franklin said he^as sorry to differ from 
his colleague, for whom he had a very great respect, 
on any occasion, but he could not help it on this. 
He had had some experience of this check in the 
Executive on the Legislature, under the proprietary 



1787. "I FEDERAL CONVENTION. 785 

government of Pennsylvania. The negative of the 
Governor was constantly made use of to extort 
money. No good law whatever could be passed 
without a private bargain with him. An increase 
of his salary, or some donation, was always made a 
condition; till at last it became the regular practice, 
to have orders in his favor on the Treasury, pre- 
sented along with the bills to be signed, so that he 
might actually receive the former before he should 
sign the latter. When the Indians were scalping 
the western people, and notice of it arrived, the 
concurrence of the Governor in the means of self- 
defence could not be got, till it was agreed that his 
estate should be exempted from taxation: so that 
the people were to fight for the security of his 
property, whilst he was to bear no share of the 
burden. This was a mischievous sort of check. If 
the Executive was to have a Council, such a power 
would be less objectionable. It was true, the King 
of Great Britain had not, as was said, exerted his 
negative since the Revolution ; but that matter was 
easily explained. The bribes and emoluments now 
given to the members of parliament rendered it 
unnecessary, every thing being done according to 
the will of the ministers. He was afraid, if a nega- 
tive should be given as proposed, that more power 
and money would be demanded, till at last enough 
would be got to influence and bribe the Legisla- 
ture into a complete subjection to the will of the 
Executive. 

Mr. Sherman was against enabling any one man 
to stop the will of the whole. No one man could 
be found so far above all the rest in wisdom. He 

Vol. I— 50 



786 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

thought we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom 
iin revising the laws, but not permit him to overrule 
the decided and cool opinions of the Legislature. 

Mr. Madison supposed, that, if a proper proportion 
of each branch should be required to overrule the 
objections of the Executive, it would answer the 
same purpose as an absolute negative. It would 
rarely, if ever, happen that the Executive, consti- 
tuted as ours is proposed to be, would have firmness 
enough to resist the Legislature, unless backed by a 
certain part of the body itself. The King of Great 
Britain, with all his splendid attributes, would not 
be able to withstand the unanimous and eager wish- 
es of both Houses of Parliament. To give such a 
prerogative would certainly be obnoxious to the 
temper of this country, — its present temper at least. 

Mr. Wilson believed, as others did, that this pow T - 
er would seldom be used. The Legislature would 
know that such a power existed, and would refrain 
from such laws as it would be sure to defeat. Its 
silent operation would therefore preserve harmony 
and prevent mischief. The case of Pennsylvania 
formerly was very different from its present case. 
The Executive was not then, as now to be, appoint- 
ed by the people. It will not in this case, as in the 
one cited, be supported by the head of a great em- 
pire, actuated by a different and sometimes opposite 
interest. The salary, too, is now proposed to be 
fixed by the Constitution, or, if Doctor Franklin's 
idea should be adopted, all salary whatever inter- 
dicted. The requiring a large proportion of each 
House to overrule the Executive check, might do in 
peaceable times ; but there might be tempestuous 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 787 

moments in which animosities may run high be- 
tween the Executive and Legislative branches, and 
in which the former ought to be able to defend 
itself. 

Mr. Butler had been in favor of a single execu- 
tive magistrate ; but could he have entertained an 
idea that a complete negative on the laws was to be 
given him, he certainly should have acted very dif- 
ferently. It had been observed, that in all coun- 
tries the executive power is in a constant course of 
increase. This was certainly the case in Great 
Britain. Gentlemen seemed to think that we had 
nothing to apprehend from an abuse of the executive 
power. But why might not a Cataline or a Crom- 
well arise in this country as well as in others ? 

Mr. Bedford was opposed to every check on the 
Legislature, even the council of revision first pro- 
posed. He thought it would be sufficient to mark 
out in the constitution the boundaries to the legisla- 
tive authority, which would give all the requisite 
security to the rights of the other departments. The 
representatives of the people were the best judges of 
what was for their interest, and ought to be under 
no external control whatever. The two branches 
would produce a sufficient control within the Legis- 
lature itself. 

Col. Mason observed that a vote had already 
passed, he found — he was out at the time — for vest- 
ing the executive powers in a single person. Among 
these powers was that of appointing to offices in 
certain cases. The probable abuses of a negative 
had been well explained by Doctor Franklin, as 
proved by experience, the best of all tests. Will 



788 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

not the same door be opened here ? The Executive 
may refuse its assent to necessary measures, till new 
appointments shall be referred to him ; and, having by 
degrees engrossed all these into his own hands, the 
American Executive, like the British, will, by bribe- 
ry and influence, save himself the trouble and odium 
of exerting his negative afterwards. We are, Mr. 
Chairman, going very far in this business. We are 
not indeed constituting a British government, but a 
more dangerous monarchy, an elective one. We are 
introducing a new principle into our system, and not 
necessary, as in the British government, where the 
Executive has greater rights to defend. Do gentle- 
men mean to pave the way to hereditary monarchy ? 
Do they natter themselves that the people will ever 
consent to such an innovation ? If they do, I ven- 
ture to tell them, they are mistaken. The people 
never will consent. And do gentlemen consider the 
danger of delay, and the still greater danger of a 
rejection, not for a moment, but forever, of the plan 
which shall be proposed to them ? Notwithstanding 
the oppression and injustice experienced among us 
from democracy, the genius of the people is in favor 
of it; and the genius of the people must be con- 
sulted. He could not but consider the Federal sys- 
tem as in effect dissolved by the appointment of this 
Convention to devise a better one. And do gentle- 
men look forward to the dangerous interval between 
extinction of an old, and the establishment of a new, 
government ; and to the scenes of confusion which 
may ensue ? He hoped that nothing like a monar- 
chy would ever be attempted in this country. A 
hatred to its oppressions had carried the people 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 789 

through the late Revolution. Will it not be enough 
to enable the Executive to suspend offensive laws, 
till they shall be coolly revised, and the objections 
to them overruled by a greater majority than was 
required in the first instance ? He never could agree 
to give up all the rights of the people to a single 
magistrate. If more than one had been fixed on, 
greater powers might have been entrusted to the 
Executive. He hoped this attempt to give such 
powers would have its weight hereafter, as an argu- 
ment for increasing the number of the Executive. 

Doctor Franklin. A gentleman from South Car- 
olina, (Mr. Butler) a day or two ago called our at- 
tention to the case of the United Netherlands. He 
wished the gentleman had been a little fuller, and 
had gone back to the original of that government. 
The people being under great obligations to the 
P>;ince of Orange, whose wisdom and bravery had 
saved them, chose him for the Stadtholder. He did 
very well. Inconveniences, however, were felt from 
his powers ; which growing more and more oppres- 
sive, they were at length set aside. Still, however, 
there was a party for the Prince of Orange, which 
descended to his son ; who excited insurrections, 
spilled a great deal of blood, murdered the De 
Witts, and got the powers re-vested in the Stadt- 
holder. Afterwards another prince had power to 
excite insurrections, and make the Stadtholdership 
hereditary. And the present Stadtholder is ready 
to wade through a bloody civil war to the establish- 
ment of a monarchy. Col. Mason had mentioned 
the circumstance of appointing officers. He knew 
how that point would be managed. No new ap- 



790 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

pointment would be suffered, as heretofore in Penn- 
sylvania, unless it be referred to the Executive ; so 
that all profitable offices will be at his disposal. 
The first man put at the helm will be a good one. 
Nobody knows what sort may come afterwards. 
The Executive will be always increasing here, as 
elsewhere, till it ends in a monarchy. 

On the question for striking out, so as to give the 
Executive an absolute negative, — Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 10. 190 

Mr. Butler moved that the Resolution be altered 
so as to read, " Resolved, that the national Execu- 
tive have a power to suspend any legislative act for 
the term of ." 

Doctor Franklin seconded the motion. 

Mr. Gerry observed, that the power of suspend- 
ing might do all the mischief dreaded from the nega- 
tive of useful laws, without answering the salutary 
purpose of checking unjust or unwise ones. 

On the question for giving this suspending power, 
all the States, to wit, Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
were, no. 

On a question for enabling tico-thirds of each 
branch of the Legislature to overrule the pro vision- 
ary check, it passed in the affirmative, sub silentio ; 
and was inserted in the blank of Mr. Gerry's mo- 
tion. 

On the question on Mr. Gerry's motion, which 
gave the Executive alone, without the Judiciary, 



1787. "I FEDERAL CONVENTION. 791 

the revisionary control on the laws, unless overruled 
by two-thirds of each branch, — Massachusetts, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Car- 
olina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Connecti- 
cut, Maryland, no — 2. 

It was moved by Mr. Wilson, seconded by Mr. 
Madison, that the following amendment be made to 
the last Resolution : after the words u national Ex- 
ecutive," to add a and a convenient number of the 
national Judiciary." 

An objection of order being taken by Mr. Hamil- 
ton to the introduction of the last amendment at 
this time, notice was given by Mr. Wilson and Mr. 
Madison, that the same would be moved to-morrow ; 
whereupon Wednesday w 7 as assigned to reconsider 
the amendment of Mr. Gerry. 

It was then moved and seconded to proceed to the 
consideration of the ninth Resolution submitted by 
Mr. Randolph ; when, on motion to agree to the first 
clause, namely, " Resolved, that a national Judiciary 
be established" it passed in the affirmative, nem. 
con. 

It was then moved and seconded, to add these 
words to the first clause of the ninth Resolution, 
namely, " to consist of one supreme tribunal, and of 
one or more inferior tribunals ;" which passed in the 
affirmative. 191 

The Committee then rose, and the House ad- 
journed. 



792 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Tuesday, June 5th. 

Governor Livingston, of New Jersey, took his seat. 

In Committee of the Whole. — The words " one or 
more" were struck out before "inferior tribunals," 
as an amendment to the last clause of the ninth Res- 
olution. The clause, " that the national Judiciary 
be chosen by the National Legislature," being under 
consideration. 

Mr. Wilson opposed the appointment of Judges 
by the National Legislature. Experience showed 
the impropriety of such appointments by numerous 
bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were 
the necessary consequences. A principal reason for 
unity in the Executive was, that officers might be 
appointed by a single, responsible person. 

Mr. Rutledge was by no means disposed to grant 
so great a power to any single person. The people 
will think we are leaning too much towards monar- 
chy. He was against establishing any national tri- 
bunal, except a single supreme one. The State tri- 
bunals are most proper to decide in all cases in the 
first instance. 

Doctor Franklin observed, that two modes of 
choosing the Judges had been mentioned, to wit, by 
the Legislature, and by the Executive. He wished 
such other modes to be suggested as might occur to 
other gentlemen ; it being a point of great moment. 
He would mention one which he had understood was 
practised in Scotland. He then, in a brief and en- 
tertaining manner, related a Scotch mode, in which 
the nomination proceeded from the lawyers, who 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 793 

always selected the ablest of the profession, in order 
to get rid of him, and share his practice among 
themselves. It was here, he said, the interest of the 
electors to make the best choice, which should al- 
ways be made the case if possible. 

Mr. Madison disliked the election of the Judges by 
the Legislature, or any numerous body. Besides the 
danger of intrigue and partiality, many of the mem- 
bers were not judges of the requisite qualifications. 
The legislative talents, which were very different 
from those of a Judge, commonly recommended men 
to the favor of legislative assemblies. It was known, 
too, that the accidental circumstances of presence 
and absence, of being a member or not a member, 
had a very undue influence on the appointment. On 
the other hand, he was not satisfied with referring 
the appointment to the Executive. He rather in- 
clined to give it to the Senatorial branch, as nume- 
rous enough to be confided in ; as not so numerous 
as to be governed by the motives of the other branch; 
and as being sufficiently stable and independent to 
follow their deliberate judgments. He hinted tins 
only, and moved that the appointment by the Legis- 
lature might be struck out, and a blank left, to be 
hereafter filled on maturer reflection. Mr. Wilson 
seconds it. On the question for striking out, — Mas- 
sachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
Georgia, aye — 9 ; Connecticut, South Carolina, no 

Mr. Wilson gave notice that he should at a future 
day move for a reconsideration of that clause which 
respects inferior tribunals." 

Vol. I.— 50* 



794 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Pinckney gave notice, that when the clause 
respecting the appointment of the Judiciary should 
again come before the Committee, he should move 
to restore the " appointment by the National Legis- 
lature." 

The following clauses of the ninth Resolution 
were agreed to, viz., " to hold their offices during 
good behaviour, and to receive punctually, at stated 
times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which 
no increase nor diminution shall be made so as to affect 
the persons actually in office at the time of such increase 
or diminution.'" 

The remaining clause of the ninth Resolution 
was postponed. 

The tenth Resolution was agreed to, viz., " that 
provision ought to be made for the admission of States , 
lawfully arising within tlie limits of the United States, 
whether from a voluntary junction of government 
and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a num- 
ber of voices in the national legislature less than the 
whole." 

The eleventh Resolution for guaranteeing to States 
republican government and territory, <fe. : being 
read, — 

Mr. Patterson wished the point of representation 
could be decided before this clause should be con- 
sidered, and moved to postpone it ; which was not 
opposed, and agreed to, — Connecticut and South 
Carolina only voting against it. 

The twelfth Resolution, for continuing Congress 
till a given day, and for fulfilling their engagements, 
produced no debate. 

On the question, Massachusetts, New York, 



1787. ] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 795 

New Jersey,* Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; 
Connecticut, Delaware, no — 2. 

The thirteenth Resolution, to the effect that 
provision ought to be made for hereafter amending the 
system now to be established, without requiring the 
assent of the National Legislature, being taken up, — 

Mr. Pinckney doubted the propriety or necessity 
of it. 

Mr. Gerry favored it. The novelty and diffi- 
culty of the experiment requires periodical revision. 
The prospect of such a revision would also give 
intermediate stability to the government. Nothing 
had yet happened in the States where this provision 
existed to prove its impropriety. — The proposition 
was postponed for further consideration ; the votes 
being, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, 
aye — 7 ; Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 3. 

The fourteenth Resolution, requiring oath from 
the State officers to support the National Government, 
—was postponed, after a short, uninteresting con- 
versation; the votes, — Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye 
— 6; New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North 
Carolina, no — 4; Massachusetts, divided. 

The fifteenth Resolution, for recommending con- 
ventions under appointment of the people to ratify 
the new Constitution, <fcc., being taken up, — 



New Jersey omitted in the printed Journal. 



796 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Sherman thought such a popular ratification 
unnecessary ; the Articles of Confederation providing 
for changes and alterations, with the assent of Con- 
gress, and ratification of State Legislatures. 

Mr. Madison thought this provision essential. 
The Articles of Confederation themselves were de- 
fective in this respect, resting, in many of the States, 
on the legislative sanction only. Hence, in conflicts 
between acts of the States and of Congress, espe- 
cially where the former are of posterior date, and 
the decision is to be made by State tribunals, an 
uncertainty must necessarily prevail ; or rather per- 
haps a certain decision in favor of the State author- 
ity. He suggested also, that, as far as the Articles 
of Union were to be considered as a treaty only, of 
a particular sort, among the governments of inde- 
pendent states, the doctrine might be set up that a 
breach of any one Article, by any of the parties, ab- 
solved the other parties from the whole obligation. 
For these reasons, as well as others, he thought it 
indispensable that the new Constitution should be 
ratified in the most unexceptionable form, and by 
the supreme authority of the people themselves. 

Mr. Gerry observed, that in the Eastern States 
the Confederation had been sanctioned by the 
people themselves. He seemed afraid of referring 
the new system to them. The people in that 
quarter have at this time the wildest ideas of gov- 
ernment in the world. They were for abolishing 
the Senate in Massachusetts, and giving all the 
other powers of government to the other branch of 
the Legislature. 

Mr. King supposed, that the last Article of the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 797 

Confederation rendered the Legislature competent 
to the ratification. The people of the Southern 
States, where the Federal Articles had been ratified 
by the Legislatures ouly, had since, impliedly, given 
their sanction to it. He thought, notwithstanding, 
that there might be policy in varying the mode. 
A convention being a single house, the adoption 
may more easily be carried through it, than through 
the Legislatures, where there are several branches. 
The Legislatures also, being to lose power, will be 
most likely to raise objections. The people having 
already parted with the necessary powers, it is im- 
material to them, by which government they are 
possessed, provided they be well employed. 

Mr. Wilson took this occasion to lead the Com- 
mittee, by a train of observations, to the idea of not 
suffering a disposition in the plurality of States, to 
confederate anew on better principles, to be defeated 
by the inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few 
States. He hoped the provision for ratifying would 
be put on such a footing as to admit of such a partial 
union, with a door open for the accession of the 
rest.* 

Mr. Pinckney hoped, that, in case the experiment 
should not unanimously take place, nine States 
might be authorized to unite under the same govern- 
ment. 

The fifteenth Resolution was postponed, nem. can. 

Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Rutledge moved, that 



* This hint was probably meant in terrorem to the smaller States of New 
Jersey and Delaware. Nothing was said in reply to it. 



798 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

to-morrow be assigned to reconsider that clause of 
the fourth Resolution which respects the election of 
the first branch of the National Legislature ; which 
passed in the affirmative, — Connecticut, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye — 
6; Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 5. 

Mr. Rutledge having obtained a rule for recon- 
sideration of the clause for establishing inferior tri- 
bunals under the national authority, now moved 
that that part of the clause in the ninth Resolution 
should be expunged; arguing, that the State tri- 
bunals might and ought to be left in all cases to de- 
cide in the first instance, the right of appeal to the 
supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure 
the national rights and uniformity of judgments; 
that it was making an unnecessary encroachment 
on the jurisdiction of the States, and creating unne- 
cessary obstacles to their adoption of the new 
system. 

Mr. Sherman seconded the motion. 

Mr. Madison observed, that unless inferior tri- 
bunals were dispersed throughout the Republic with 
final jurisdiction in many cases, appeals would be 
multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that, be- 
sides, an appeal would not in many cases be a re- 
medy. What was to be done after improper ver- 
dicts, in State tribunals, obtained under the biassed 
directions of a dependent judge, or the local pre- 
judices of an undirected jury 1 To remand the 
cause for a new trial would answer no purpose. To 
order a new trial at the supreme bar, would oblige 
the parties to bring up their witnesses, though ever 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 799 

so distant from the seat of the court. An effective 
Judiciary establishment commensurate to the Legis- 
lative authority, was essential. A government, with- 
out a proper Executive and Judiciary, would be the 
mere trunk of a body, without arms or legs to act or 
move. 

Mr. Wilson opposed the motion on like 
grounds. He said the admiralty jurisdiction ought 
to be given wholly to the National Government, as 
it related to cases not within the jurisdiction of 
particular States, and to a scene in which contro- 
versies with foreigners would be most likely to hap- 
pen. 

Mr. Sherman was in favor of the motion. He 
dwelt chiefly on the supposed expensiveness of 
having a new set of courts, when the existing State 
courts would answer the same purpose. 

Mr. Dickinson contended strongly, that if there 
was to be a National Legislature, there ought to be 
a National Judiciary, and that the former ought 
to have authority to institute the latter. 

On the question for Mr. Rutledge's motion to 
strike out " inferior tribunals," it passed in the 
affirmative, — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6; 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no — 4; 
Massachusetts, divided. 

Mr. Wilson and Mr. Madison then moved, in pur- 
suance of the idea expressed above by Mr. Dickin- 
son, to add to the ninth Resolution the words follow- 
ing : " that the National Legislature be empowered 
to institute inferior tribunals." They observed, that 
there was a distinction between establishing such 



800 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the 
Legislature to establish or not to establish them. 
They repeated the necessity of some such provision. 

Mr. Butler. The people will not bear such in- 
novations. The States will revolt at such encroach- 
ments. Supposing such an establishment to be use- 
ful, we must not venture on it. We must follow the 
example of Solon, who gave the Athenians not the 
best government he could devise, but the best they 
would receive. 

Mr. King remarked, as to the comparative ex- 
pense, that the establishment of inferior tribunals 
would cost infinitely less than the appeals that would 
be prevented by them. 

On this question, as moved by Mr. Wilson and 
Mr. Madison, — Massachusetts, New Jersey,* Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Car- 
olina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Connecticut, South Carolina, 
no _2; New York, divided. 194 

The Committee then rose, and the House ad- 
journed. 



Wednesday, June 6th. 

In Committee of the Whole. — Mr. Pinckney, ac- 
cording to previous notice, and rule obtained, moved, 
" that the first branch of the National Legislature 
be elected by the State Legislatures, and not by the 
people;" contending that the people were less fit 

* In the printed Journal, New Jersey, no. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 801 

judges in such a case, and that the Legislatures 
would be less likely to promote the adoption of the 
new government if they were to be excluded from 
all share in it. 

Mr. Rutledge seconded the motion. 

Mr. Gerry. Much depends on the mode of elec- 
tion. In England the people will probably lose 
their liberty from the smallness of the proportion 
having a right of suffrage. Our danger arises from 
the opposite extreme. Hence in Massachusetts the 
worst men get into the Legislature. Several mem- 
bers of that body had lately been convicted of in- 
famous crimes. Men of indigence, ignorance, and 
baseness, spare no pains, however dirty, to carry 
their point against men who are superior to the arti- 
fices practised. He was not disposed to run into 
extremes. He was as much principled as ever 
against aristocracy and monarchy. It was neces- 
sary, on the one hand, that the people should appoint 
one branch of the government, in order to inspire 
them with the necessary confidence ; but he wished 
the election, on the other, to be so modified as to 
secure more effectually a just preference of merit. 
His idea was, that the people should nominate cer- 
tain persons, in certain districts, out of whom the 
State Legislatures should make the appointment. 

Mr. Wilson. He wished for vigor in the govern- 
ment, but he wished that vigorous authority to flow 
immediately from the legitimate source of all au- 
thority. The government ought to possess, not only, 
first, the force, but second, the mind or sense, of the 
people at large. The Legislature ought to be the 
most exact transcript of the whole society. Repre- 

Vol. I.— 51 



802 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

sentation is made necessary only because it is im- 
possible for the people to act collectively. The 
opposition was to be expected, he said, from the 
governments^ not from the citizens of the States. 
The latter had parted, as was observed by Mr. 
King, until all the necessary poicers ; and it was im- 
material to them by whom they were exercised, if 
well exercised. The State officers were to be the 
losers of power. The people, he supposed, would be 
rather more attached to the National Government 
than to the State Governments, as being more impor- 
tant in itself, and more flattering to their pride. There 
is no danger of improper elections, if made by large 
districts. Bad elections proceed from the smallness 
of the districts, which give an opportunity to bad 
men to intrigue themselves into office. 

Mr. Sherman. If it were in view to abolish the 
State Governments, the elections ought to be by the 
people. If the State Governments are to be con- 
tinued, it is necessary, in order to preserve harmony 
between the National and State Governments, that 
the elections to the former should be made by the 
latter. The right of participating in the National 
Government would be sufficiently secured to the 
people by their election of the State Legislatures. 
The objects of the Union, he thought were few, — 
first, defence against foreign danger ; secondly, 
against internal disputes, and a resort to force; 
thirdly, treaties with foreign nations ; fourthly, regu- 
lating foreign commerce, and drawing revenue from 
it. These, and perhaps a few lesser objects, alone 
rendered a confederation of the States necessary. 
All other matters, civil and criminal, would be much 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 803 

better in the hands of the States. The people are 
more happy in small than in large States. States 
may. indeed, be too small, as Rhode Island, and 
thereby be too subject to faction. Some others 
were, perhaps, too large, the powers of government 
not being able to pervade them. He was for giving 
the General Government power to legislate and ex- 
ecute within a denned province. 

Col. Mason. Under the existing Confederacy, 
Congress represent the States, and not the people of 
the States ; their acts operate on the States, not on 
the individuals. The case will be changed in the 
new plan of government. The people will be re- 
presented ; they ought therefore to choose the Re- 
presentatives. The requisites in actual representa- 
tion are, that the representatives should sympathize 
with their constituents ; should think as they think, 
and feel as they feel ; and that for these purposes 
they should be residents among them. Much, he 
said, had been alleged against democratic elections. 
He admitted that much might be said ; but it was 
to be considered that no government was free from 
imperfections and evils ; and that improper elections 
in many instances were inseparable from republican 
governments. But compare these with the advan- 
tage of this form, in favor of the rights of the people, 
in favor of human nature ! He was persuaded there 
was a better chance for proper elections by the peo- 
ple, if divided into large districts, than by the State 
Legislatures. Paper-money had been issued by the 
latter, when the former were against it. Was it to 
be supposed, that the State Legislatures, then, would 



804 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

not send to the National Legislature patrons of such 
projects, if the choice depended on them ? 

Mr. Madison considered an election of one branch, 
at least, of the Legislature by the people immedi- 
ately, as a clear principle of free government ; and 
that this mode, under proper regulations, had the 
additional advantage of securing better representa- 
tives, as well as of avoiding too great an agency of 
the State Governments in the general one. He dif- 
fered from the member from Connecticut, (Mr, Sher- 
man,) in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the 
principal ones that required a national government. 
Those were certainly important and necessary ob- 
jects ; but he combined with them the necessity of 
providing more effectually for the security of private 
rights, and the steady dispensation of justice. In- 
terferences with these were evils which had, more 
perhaps than any thing else, produced this Conven- 
tion. Was it to be supposed, that republican liberty 
could long exist under the abuses of it practised in 
some of the States ? The gentleman (Mr. Sher- 
man) had admitted, that in a very small State fac- 
tion and oppression would prevail. It was to be 
inferred, then, that wherever these prevailed the 
State was too small. Had they not prevailed in the 
largest as well as the smallest, though less than in 
the smallest 1 And were we not thence admonished 
to enlarge the sphere as far as the nature of the 
government would admit ? This was the only de- 
fence against the inconveniences of democracy, con- 
sistent with the democratic form of government. 
All civilized societies would be divided into different 
sects, factions, and interests, as they happened to 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 805 

consist of rich and poor, debtors and creditors, the 
landed, the manufacturing, the commercial interests, 
the inhabitants of this district or that district, the 
followers of this political leader or that political 
leader, the disciples of this religious sect or that 
religious sect. In all cases where a majority are 
united by a common interest or passion, the rights 
of the minority are in danger. What motives are to 
restrain them ? A prudent regard to the maxim, 
that honesty is the best policy, is found by experi- 
ence to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by 
individuals. Respect for character is always dimi- 
nished in proportion to the number among whom the 
blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience, the 
only remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in in- 
dividuals ; in large numbers, little is to be expected 
from it. Besides, religion itself may become a mo- 
tive to persecution and oppression. These observa- 
tions are verified by the histories of every country, 
ancient and modern. In Greece and Rome the rich 
and poor, the creditors and debtors, as well as the 
patricians and plebeians, alternately oppressed each 
other with equal unmercifulness. What a source of 
oppression was the relation between the parent 
cities of Rome, Athens, and Carthage, and their re- 
spective provinces ; the former possessing the power, 
and the latter being sufficiently distinguished to be 
separate objects of it? Why was America so justly 
apprehensive of parliamentary injustice? Because 
Great Britain had a separate interest, real or sup- 
posed, and, if her authority had been admitted, could 
have pursued that interest at our expense. •• We 
have seen the mere distinction of color made, in 



806 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the 
most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man 
over man.f What has been the source of those un- 
just laws complained of among ourselves ? Has it 
not been the real or supposed interest of the major 
number ? Debtors have defrauded their creditors. 
The landed interest has borne hard on the mercan- 
tile interest. The holders of one species of property 
have thrown a disproportion of taxes on the holders 
of another species. The lesson we are to draw from 
the whole is, that where a majority are united by a 
common sentiment, and have an opportunity, the 
rights of the minor party become insecure. In a 
republican government, the majority, if united, have 
always an opportunity. The only remedy is, to en- 
large the sphere, and thereby divide the community 
into so great a number of interests and parties, that, 
in the first place, a majority will not be likely, at 
the same moment, to have a common interest sepa- 
rate from that of the whole, or of the minority ; and 
in the second place, that in case they should have 
such an interest, they may not be so apt to unite in 
the pursuit of it. It was incumbent on us, then, to 
try this remedy, and, with that view, to frame a re- 
publican system on such a scale, and in such a form, 
as will control all the evils which have been experi- 
enced. 

Mr. Dickinson considered it essential, that one 
branch of the Legislature should be drawn immedi- 
ately from the people ; and expedient, that the other 
should be chosen by the Legislatures of the States. 
Thisi combination of the State Governments with 
the National Government was as politic as it was 



1787.] FEDERAL CONV ENTION. 807 

unavoidable. In the formation of the Senate, we 
ought to carry it through such a refining process as 
will assimilate it, as nearly as may be, to the House 
of Lords in England. He repeated his warm eulo- 
giunis on the British Constitution. He was for a 
strong National Government; but for leaving the 
States a considerable agency in the system. The 
objection against making the former dependent on 
the latter might be obviated by giving to the Senate 
an authority permanent, and irrevocable for three, 
five or seven years. Being thus independent, they 
will check and decide with uncommon freedom. 

Mr. Read. Too much attachment is betrayed to 
the State Governments. We must look beyond 
their continuance. A National Government must 
soon of necessity swallow them all up. They will 
soon be reduced to the mere office of electing the 
National Senate. He was against patching up the 
old Federal system : he hoped the idea would be 
dismissed. It would be like putting new cloth on 
an old garment. The confederation was founded on 
temporary principles. It cannot last: it cannot be 
amended. If we do not establish a good govern- 
ment on new principles, we must either go to ruin, 
or have the work to do over again. The people at 
large are wrongly suspected of being averse to a 
General Government. The aversion lies among 
interested men who possess their confidence. 

Mr. Pierce was for an election by the people as 
to the first branch, and by the States as to the 
second branch ; by which means the citizens of the 
States would be represented both individually and 
collectively. 



808 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

General Pinckney wished to have a good Na- 
tional Government, and at the same time to leave a 
considerable share of power in the States. An 
election of either branch by the people, scattered as 
they are in many States, particularly in South 
Carolina, was totally impracticable. He differed 
from gentlemen who thought that a choice by the 
people would be a better guard against bad mea- 
sures, than by the Legislatures. A majority of the 
people in South Carolina were notoriously for 
paper-money, as a legal tender ; the Legislature had 
refused to make it a legal tender. The reason was, 
that the latter had some sense of character, and were 
restrained by that consideration. The State Legis- 
latures, also, he said, would be more jealous, and 
more ready to thwart the National Government, if 
excluded from a participation in it. The idea of 
abolishing these Legislatures would never go down. 

Mr. Wilson would not have spoken again, but for 
what had fallen from Mr. Read ; namely that the 
idea of preserving the State Governments ought to 
be abandoned. He saw no incompatibility between 
the National and State Governments, provided the 
latter were restrained to certain local purposes ; 
nor any probability of their being devoured by the 
former. In all confederated systems, ancient and 
modern, the reverse had happened ; the generality 
being destroyed gradually by the usurpations of the 
parts composing it. 

On the question for electing the first branch by 
the State Legislatures as moved by Mr. Pincknev t , 
it was negatived, — Connecticut, New Jersey, South 
Carolina, aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, New York, Penn- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 809 

sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 8. 195 

Mr. Wilson moved to reconsider the vote exclu- 
ding the Judiciary from a share in the revision of the 
laws, and to add, after " national Executive," the 
words, " with a convenient number of the national 
Judiciary ;" remarking the expediency of reinforcing 
the Executive with the influence of that depart- 
ment. 

Mr. Madison seconded the motion. He observed, 
that the great difficulty in rendering the Executive 
competent to its own defence arose from the nature 
of republican government, which could not give to 
an individual citizen that settled pre-eminence in 
the eyes of the rest, that weight of property, that 
personal interest against betraying the national 
interest, which appertain to an hereditary magis- 
trate. In a republic personal merit alone could be 
the ground of political exaltation; but it would 
rarely happen that this merit would be so pre- 
eminent as to produce universal acquiescence. The 
executive magistrate would be envied and assailed 
by disappointed competitors : his firmness therefore 
would need support. He would not possess those 
great emoluments from his station, nor that per- 
manent stake in the public interest, which would 
place him out of the reach of foreign corruption. 
He would stand in need therefore of being controlled 
as well as supported. An association of the judges 
in his revisionary function would both double the 
advantage, and diminish the danger. It would also 
enable the Judiciary department the better to defend 
51* 



810 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

itself against legislative encroachments. Two ob- 
jections had been made, — first, that the judges 
ought not to be .subject to the bias which a parti- 
cipation in the making of laws might give in the 
exposition of them ; secondly, that the Judiciary 
department ought to be separate and distinct from 
the other great departments. The first objection 
had some weight ; but it was much diminished by 
reflecting, that a small proportion of the laws 
coming in question before a judge would be such 
wherein he had been consulted ; that a small part 
of this proportion would be so ambiguous as to 
leave room for his prepossessions ; and that but a 
few cases would probably arise in the life of a 
judge, under such ambiguous passages. How much 
good, on the other hand, would proceed from the 
perspicuity, the conciseness, and the systematic 
character which the code of laws would receive 
from the Judiciary talents. As to the second ob- 
jection, it either had no weight, or it applied with 
equal weight to the Executive, and to the Judiciary 
revision of the laws. The maxim on which the ob- 
jection was founded, required a separation of the 
Executive, as well as the Judiciary, from the Legis- 
lature and from each other. There would, in truth, 
however, be no improper mixture of these distinct 
powers in the present case. In England, whence 
the maxim itself had been drawn, the Executive 
had an absolute negative on the laws; and the 
supreme tribunal of justice (the House of Lords), 
formed one of the other branches of the Legislature. 
In short, whether the object of the revisionary 
power was to restrain the Legislature from en- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 811 

croaching on the other co-ordinate departments, or 
on the rights of the people at large ; or from passing 
laws unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their 
form; the utility of annexing the wisdom and 
weight of the Judiciary to the Executive seemed 
incontestable. 

Mr. Gerry thought the Executive whilst standing 
alone would be more impartial than when he could 
be covered by the sanction and seduced by the so- 
phistry of the Judges. 

Mr. King. If the unity of the Executive was 
preferred for the sake of responsibility, the policy of 
it is as applicable to the revisionary, as to the exec- 
utive, power. 

Mr. Pinckney had been at first in favor of joining 
the heads of the principal departments, the Secre- 
tary at War, of Foreign Affairs, &c. in the Council 
of Revision. He had, however, relinquished the 
idea, from a consideration that these could be called 
on by the executive magistrate, whenever he pleased 
to consult them. He was opposed to the introduc- 
tion of the judges into the business. 

Colonel Mason was for giving all possible weight 
to the revisionary institution. The executive power 
ought to be well secured against legislative usurpa- 
tions on it. The purse and the sword ought never 
to get into the same hands whether legislative or 
executive, 

Mr. Dickinson. Secrecy, vigor, and despatch are 
not the principal properties required in the Execu- 
tive. Important as these are, that of responsibility 
is more so, which can only be preserved by leaving 
it singly to discharge its functions. He thought, too, 



r 



812 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

a junction of the Judiciary to it involved an im- 
proper mixture of powers. 

Mr. Wilson remarked, that the responsibility re- 
quired belonged to his executive duties. The revi- 
sionary duty was an extraneous one, calculated for 
collateral purposes. 

Mr. Williamson was for substituting a clause re- 
quiring two- thirds for every effective act of the 
legislature, in place of the revisionary provision. 

On the question for joining the judges to the Ex- 
ecutive in the revisionary business, — Connecticut, 
New York, Virginia, aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 8. 

Mr. Pinckney gave notice, that to-morrow lie 
should move for the re-consideration of that clause 
in the sixth Resolution adopted by the Committee, 
which vests a negative in the National Legislature 
on the laws of the several States. 

The Committee rose, and the House adjourned. 



Thursday, June 7th. 

In Committee of the Whole — Mr. Pinckney, ac- 
cording to notice, moved to reconsider the clause 
respecting the negative on State laws, which was 
agreed to, and to-morrow fixed for the purpose. 

The clause providing for the appointment of the 
second branch of the National Legislature, having 
lain blank since the last vote on the mode of elect- 
ing it, to wit, by the first branch, Mr. Dickinson 
now moved, " that the members of the second branch 
ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures.'' 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 813 

Mr. Sherman seconded the motion ; observing, 
that the particular States would thus become inter- 
ested in supporting the National Govenment, and 
that a due harmony between the two governments 
would be maintained. He admitted that the two 
ought to have separate and distinct jurisdictions, but 
that they ought to have a mutual interest in sup- 
porting each other. 

Mr. Pinckney. If the small States should be 
allowed one Senator only, the number will be too 
great ; there will be eighty at least. 

Mr. Dickinson had two reasons for his motion — 
first, because the sense of the States would be better 
collected through their Governments, than immedi- 
ately from the people at large ; secondly, because 
he wished the Senate to consist of the most distin- 
guished characters, distinguished for their rank in 
life and their w T eight of property, and bearing as 
strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as 
possible ; and he thought such characters more likely 
to be selected by the State Legislatures, than in any 
other mode. The greatness of the number was no 
objection with him. He hoped there would be 
eighty, and twice eighty of them. If their number 
should be small, the popular branch could not be 
balanced by them. The Legislature of a numerous 
people ought to be a numerous body. 

Mr. Williamson preferred a small number of Sen- 
ators, but wished that each State should have at least 
one. He suggested twenty-five as a convenient num- 
ber. The different modes of representation in the 
different branches will serve as a mutual check. 



814 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Butler was anxious to know the ratio of rep- 
resentation before he gave any opinion. 

Mr. Wilson. If we are to establish a National 
Government, that government ought to flow from 
the people at large. If one branch of it should be 
chosen by the Legislatures, and the other by the 
people, the two branches will rest on different foun- 
dations, and dissensions will naturally arise between 
them. He wished the Senate to be elected by the 
people, as well as the other branch; the people 
might be divided into proper districts for the pur- 
pose ; and he moved to postpone the motion of Mr. 
Dickinson, in order to take up one of that import. 

Mr. Morris seconded him. 

Mr. Read proposed " that the Senate should be 
appointed by the Executive magistrate, out of a 
proper number of persons to be nominated by the 
individual Legislatures." He said, he thought it his 
duty to speak his mind frankly. Gentlemen he 
hoped would not be alarmed at the idea. Nothing 
short of this approach towards a proper model of 
government would answer the purpose, and he 
thought it best to come directly to the point at once. 
His proposition was not seconded nor supported. 

Mr. Madison. If the motion (of Mr. Dickinson) 
should be agreed to, we must either depart from the 
doctrine of proportional representation, or admit into 
the Senate a very large number of members. The 
first is inadmissible, being evidently unjust. The 
second is inexpedient. The use of the Senate is to 
consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with 
more system, and with more wisdom, than the pop- 
ular branch. Enlarge their number, and you com- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 815 

municate to them the vices which they are meant 
to- correct. He differed from Mr. Dickinson, who 
thought that the additional number would give ad- 
ditional weight to the body. On the contrary, it 
appeared to him that their weight would be in an 
inverse ratio to their numbers. The example of the 
Roman tribunes was applicable. They lost their 
influence and power, in proportion as their number 
was augmented. The reason seemed to be obvious : 
they were appointed to take care of the popular 
interests and pretensions at Rome ; because the peo- 
ple by reason of their numbers could not act in 
concert, and were liable to fall into factions among 
themselves, and to become a prey to their aristo- 
cratic adversaries. The more the representatives 
of the people, therefore, were multiplied, the more 
they partook of the infirmities of their constituents, 
the more liable they became to be divided among 
themselves, either from their own indiscretions or 
the artifices of the opposite faction, and of course the 
less capable of fulfilling their trust. When the 
weight of a set of men depends merely on their per- 
sonal characters, the greater the number, the greater 
the weight. When it depends on the degree of po- 
litical authority lodged in them, the smaller the 
number, the greater the weight. These considera- 
tions might perhaps be combined in the intended 
Senate ; but the latter was the material one. 

Mr. Gerry. Four modes of appointing the Senate 
have been mentioned. First, by the first branch of 
the National Legislature, — this would create a de- 
pendance contrary to the end proposed. Secondly, 
by the National Executive, — this is a stride towards 



816 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

monarchy that few will think of. Thirdly, by the 
people ; the people have two great interests, the 
landed interest, and the commercial, including the 
stockholders. To draw both branches from the peo- 
ple will leave no security to the latter interest ; the 
people being chiefly composed of the landed interest, 
and erroneously supposing that the other interests 
are adverse to it. Fourthly, by the individual Le- 
gislatures, — the elections being carried through this 
refinement, will be most like to provide some check 
in favor of the commercial interest against the land- 
ed; without which, oppression will take place ; and 
no free government can last long where that is the 
case. He was therefore in favor of this last. 

Mr. Dickinson.* The preservation of the States 
in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It 
will produce that collision between the different 
authorities which should be wished for in order to 
check each other. To attempt to abolish the States 
altogether, would degrade the councils of our coun- 
try, would be impracticable, would be ruinous. He 
compared the proposed national system to the solar 
system, in which the States were the planets, and 
ought to be left to move freely in their proper orbits. 
The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Wilson) 
wished, he said, to extinguish these planets. If 
the State Governments were excluded from all 
agency in the national one, and all power drawn 



* It will throw light on this discussion to remark that an election by the 
State Legislatures involved a surrender of the principle insisted on by the large 
States, and dreaded by the small ones, namely, that of a proportional repre 
sentation in the Senate. Such a rule would make the body too numerous, a 
the smallest State must elect one member at least. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 817 

from the people at large, the consequence would be 
that the National Government would move in the 
same direction as the State Governments now do, 
and would run into all the same mischiefs. The 
reform would only unite the thirteen small streams 
into one great current, pursuing the same course 
without any opposition whatever. He adhered to 
the opinion that the Senate ought to be composed of 
a large number ; and that their influence, from family 
weight and other causes, would be increased thereby. 
He did not admit that the Tribunes lost their weight 
in proportion as their number was augmented, and 
gave a historical sketch of this institution. If the 
reasoning (of Mr. Madison) was good, it would prove 
that the number of the Senate ought to be reduced 
below ten, the highest number of the Tribunitial 
corps. 

Mr. Wilson. The subject, it must be owned, is 
surrounded with doubts and difficulties. But we 
must surmount them. The British Government can- 
not be our model. We have no materials for a simi- 
lar one. Our manners, our laws, the abolition of 
entails and of primogeniture, the whole genius of the 
people, are opposed to it. He did not see the danger 
of the States being devoured by the National Gov- 
ernment On the contrary, he wished to keep them 
from devouring the National Government. He was 
not, however, for extinguishing these planets, as was 
supposed by Mr. Dickinson ; neither did he, on the 
other hand, believe that they would warm or en- 
lighten the sun. Within their proper orbits they 
must still be suffered to act for subordinate purposes, 
for which their existence is made essential by the 
52 



818 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

great extent of our country. He could not compre- 
hend in what manner the landed interest would he 
rendered less predominant in the Senate by an election 
through the medium of the Legislatures, than by the 
people themselves. If the Legislatures, as was now 
complained, sacrificed the commercial to the landed 
interest, what reason was there to expect such a 
choice from them as would defeat their own views ? 
He was for an election by the people, in large dis- 
tricts, which would be most likely to obtain men of 
intelligence and uprightness ; subdividing the dis- 
tricts only for the accommodation of voters. 

Mr. Madison could as little comprehend in what 
manner family weight, as desired by Mr. Dickinson, 
would be more certainly conveyed into the Senate 
through elections by the State Legislatures, than in 
some other modes. The true question was, in what 
mode the best choice would be made ? If an elec- 
tion by the people, or through any other channel 
than the State Legislatures, promised as uncorrupt 
and impartial a preference of merit, there could 
surely be no necessity for an appointment by those 
Legislatures. Nor was it apparent that a more use- 
ful check would be derived through that channel, 
than from the people through some other. The 
great evils complained of were, that the State Le- 
gislatures run into schemes of paper-money, &c, 
whenever solicited by the people, and sometimes 
without even the sanction of the people. Their in- 
fluence, then, instead of checking a like propensity 
in the National Legislature, may be expected to 
promote it. Nothing can be more contradictory 
than to say that the National Legislature, without a 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 819 

proper check, will follow the example of the State 
Legislatures ; and, in the same breath, that the State 
Legislatures are the only proper check. 

Mr. Sherman opposed elections by the people in 
districts, as not likely to produce such fit men as 
elections by the State Legislatures. 

Mr. Gerry insisted, that the commercial and 
monied interest would be more secure in the hands 
of the State Legislatures, than of the people at 
large. The former have more sense of character, 
and will be restrained by that from injustice. The 
people are for paper-money, when the Legislatures 
are against it. In Massachusetts the county con- 
ventions had declared a wish for a depreciating pa- 
per that would sink itself. Besides, in some States 
there are two branches in the Legislature, one of 
which is somewhat aristocratic. There would there- 
fore be so far a better chance of refinement in the 
choice. There seemed, he thought, to be three 
powerful objections against elections by districts. 
First, it is impracticable ; the people cannot be 
brought to one place for the purpose ; and, whether 
brought to the same place or not, numberless frauds ' 
would be unavoidable. Secondly, small States, 
forming part of the same district with a large one, 
or a large part of a large one, would have no chance 
of gaining an appointment for its citizens of merit. 
Thirdly, a new source of discord would be opened 
between different parts of the same district. 

Mr. Pinckney thought the second branch ought to 
be permanent and independent ; and that the mem- 
bers of it would be rendered more so by receiving 
their appointments from the State Legislatures. 



820 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

This mode would avoid the rivalships and discon- 
tents incident to the election by districts. He was 
for dividing the States in three classes, according to 
their respective sizes, and for allowing to the first 
class three members ; to the second, two ; and to the 
third, one. 

On the question for postponing Mr. Dickinson's mo- 
tion, referring the appointment of the Senate to the 
State Legislatures, in order to consider Mr. Wilson's 
for referring it to the people, Pennsylvania, aye — 1 ; 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Soutli 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 10. 

Col. Mason. Whatever power may be necessary 
for the National Government, a certain portion must 
necessarily be left with the States. It is impossible 
for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the 
United States, so as to carry equal justice to them. 
The State Legislatures also ought to have some means 
of defending themselves against encroachments of 
the National Government. In every other depart- 
ment we have studiously endeavoured to provide for 
its self-defence. Shall we leave the States alone 
unprovided with the means for this purpose ? And 
what better means can we provide, than the giving 
them some share in, or rather to make them a con- 
stituent part of, the national establishment ? There 
is danger on both sides, no doubt ; but we have only 
seen the evils arising on the side of the State Gov- 
ernments. Those on the other side remain to be 
displayed. The example of Congress does not ap- 
ply. Congress had no power to carry their acts 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 821 

into execution, as the National Government will 
have. 

On Mr. Dickinson's motion for an appointment of 
the Senate by the State Legislatures, — Massachu- 
setts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 10. 197 

Mr. Gerry gave notice, that he would to-morrow 
move for a reconsideration of the mode of appointing 
the National Executive, in order to substitute an 
appointment by the State Executives. 

The Committee rose, and the House adjourned. 




Friday, June 8th. 



In Committee of the Whole. — On a reconsideration 
of the clause giving the National Legislature a neg- 
ative on such laws of the States as might be con- 
trary to the Articles of Union, or treaties with for- 
eign nations ; 

Mr. Pinckney moved, " that the National Legisla- 
ture should have authority to negative all laws 
which they should judge to be improper." He urged 
that such a universality of the power was indis- 
pensably necessary to render it effectual ; that the 
States must be kept in due subordination to the 
nation ; that if the States were left to act of them- 
selves in any case, it would be impossible to defend 
the national prerogatives, however extensive they 
might be, on paper ; that the acts of Congress had 
been defeated by this means ; nor had foreign trea- 



822 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ties escaped repeated violations : that this universal 

negative was in fact the corner-stone of an efficient 

© 

national Government ; that under the British Gov- 
ernment the negative of the Crown had been found 
beneficial, and the States are more one nation now, 
than the colonies were then. 

Mr. Madison seconded the motion. He could not 
but regard an indefinite power to negative legisla- 
tive acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a 
perfect system. Experience had evinced a constant 
tendency in the States to encroach on the Federal 
authority ; to violate national treaties ; to infringe 
the rights and interests of each other; to oppress 
the weaker party within their respective jurisdic- 
tions. A negative was the mildest expedient that 
could be devised for preventing these mischiefs. 
The existence of such a check would prevent at- 
tempts to commit them. Should no such precaution 
be engrafted, the only remedy would be in an appeal 
to coercion. Was such a remedy eligible ? Was it 
practicable ? Could the national resources, if ex- 
erted to the utmost, enforce a national decree against 
Massachusetts, abetted, perhaps, by several of her 
neighbours? It would not be possible. A small 
proportion of the community, in a compact situation, 

acting: on the defensive, and at one of its extremi- 

© » 

ties, might at any time bid defiance to the national 
authority, Any government for the United States, 
formed on the supposed practicability of using force 
against the unconstitutional proceedings of the 
States, would prove as visionary and fallacious as 
the government of Congress. The negative would 
render the use of force unnecessary. The States 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 823 

could of themselves pass no operative act, any more 
than one branch of a legislature, where there are 
two branches, can proceed without the other. But 
in order to give the negative this efficacy, it must 
extend to all cases. A discrimination would only 
be a fresh source of contention between the two 
authorities. In a word, to recur to the illustrations 
borrowed from the planetary system, this prerog- 
ative of the General Government is the great per- 
vading principle that must control the centrifugal 
tendency of the States ; which, without it, will con- 
tinually fly out of their proper orbits, and destroy 
the order and harmony of the political system, 

Mr. Willix\mson was against giving a power that 
might restrain the States from regulating their in- 
ternal police. 

Mr. Gerry could not see the extent of such a 
power, and was against every power that was not 
necessary. He thought a remonstrance against un- 
reasonable acts of the States would restrain them. 
If it should not 7 force might be resorted to. He had 
no objection to authorize a negative to paper-money 
and similar measures. When the confederation was 
depending before Congress, Massachusetts was then 
for inserting the power of emitting paper-money 
among the exclusive powers of Congress. He ob- 
served, that the proposed negative would extend to 
the regulations of the militia, a matter on which the 
existence of the State might depend. The National 
Legislature, with such a power, may enslave the 
States. Such an idea as this will never be acceded 
to. It has never been suggested or conceived among 
the people. No speculative projector — and there 



824 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

are enough of that character among us, in politics as 
well as in other things — has, in any pamphlet or 
newspaper, thrown out the idea. The States, too, 
have different interests, and are ignorant of each 
other's interests. The negative, therefore, will be 
abused. New States, too, having separate views 
from the old States, will never come into the Union. 
They may even be under some foreign influence ; 
are they in such case to participate in the negative 
on the will of the other States ? 

Mr. Sherman thought the cases in which the 
negative ought to be exercised might be defined. 
He wished the point might not be decided till a trial 
at least should be made for that purpose. 

Mr. Wilson would not say what modifications of 
the proposed power might be practicable or ex- 
pedient. But, however novel it might appear, the 
principle of it, when viewed with a close and steady 
eye, is right. There is no instance in which the 
laws say that the individual should be bound in one 
case, and at liberty to judge whether he will obey 
or disobey in another. The cases are parallel. 
Abuses of the power over the individual persons 
may happen, as well as over the individual States. 
Federal liberty is to the States what civil liberty is 
to private individuals ; and States are not more un- 
willing to purchase it, by the necessary concession 
of their political sovereignty, than the savage is to 
purchase civil liberty by the surrender of the per- 
sonal sovereignty which he enjoys in a state of 
nature. A definition of the cases in which the neg- 
ative should be exercised is impracticable. A dis- 
cretion must be left on one side or the other, — will 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVEN riOK. 825 

it not be most safely lodged on the side of the Na- 
tional Government? Among the first sentiments 
expressed in the first Congress, one was, that Vir- 
ginia is no more, that Massachusetts is no more, that 
Pennsylvania is no more, &c. — we are now one 
nation of brethren; — we must bury all local interests 
and distinctions. This language continued for some 
time. The tables at length began to turn. No 
sooner were the State Governments formed than 
their jealousy and ambition began to display them- 
selves ; each endeavoured to cut a slice from the 
common loaf, to add to its own morsel, till at length 
the Confederation became frittered down to the 
impotent condition in which it now stands. Review 
the progress of the Articles of Confederation through 
Congress, and compare the first and last draught of 
it. To correct its vices is the business of this Con- 
vention. One of its vices is the want of an effectual 
control in the whole over its parts. What danger is 
there that the whole will unnecessarily sacrifice a 
part ? But reverse the case, and leave the whole 
at the mercy of each part, and will not the general 
interest be continually sacrificed to local interests ? 

Mr. Dickinson deemed it impossible to draw a 
line between the cases proper, and improper, for the 
exercise of the negative. We must take our choice 
of two things. We must either subject the States 
to the danger of being injured by the power of the 
National Government, or the latter to the danger of 
being injured by that of the States. He thought the 
danger greater from the States. To leave the power 
doubtful, would be opening another spring of discord, 
and he was for shutting as many of them as possible. 
52* 



826 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Bedford, in answer to his colleague's ques- 
tion, where would be the danger to the States from 
this power, would refer him to the smallness of his 
own State, which may be injured at pleasure with- 
out redress. It was meant, he found, to strip the 
small States of their equal right of suffrage. In this 
case Delaware would have about one-ninetieth for 
its share in the general councils ; whilst Pennsyl- 
vania and Virginia would possess one-third of the 
whole. Is there no difference of interests, no rival- 
ship of commerce, of manufactures ? Will not these 
large States crush the small ones, whenever they 
stand in the way of their ambitious or interested 
views? This shows the impossibility of adopting 
such a system as that on the table, or any other 
founded on a change in the principle of representa- 
tion. And after all, if a State does not obey the 
law of the new system, must not force be resorted 
to, as the only ultimate remedy in this as in any 
other system? It seems as if Pennsylvania and 
Virginia, by the conduct of their deputies, wished to 
provide a system in which they would have an 
enormous and monstrous influence. Besides, how 
can it be thought that the proposed negative can be 
exercised ? Are the laws of the States to be sus- 
pended in the most urgent cases, until they can be 
sent .seven or eight hundred miles, and undergo the 
deliberation of a body who may be incapable of 
judging of them ? Is the National Legislature, too, 
to sit continually in order to revise the laws of the 
States? 

Mr. Madison observed, that the difficulties which 
had been started were worthy of attention, and 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 827 

ought to be answered before the question was put. 
The case of laws of urgent necessity must be pro- 
vided for by some emanation of the power from the 
National Government into each State, so far as to 
give a temporary assent at least. This was the 
practice in the Royal Colonies before the Revolu- 
tion, and would not have been inconvenient if the 
supreme power of negativing had been faithful to 
the American interest, and had possessed the ne- 
cessary information. He supposed that the negative 
might be very properly lodged in the Senate alone, 
and that the more numerous and expensive branch 
therefore might not be obliged to sit constantly. 
He asked Mr. Bedford, what would be the conse- 
quence to the small States of a dissolution of the 
Union, which seemed likely to happen if no effectual 
substitute was made for the defective system ex- 
isting ? — and he did not conceive any effectual sys- 
tem could be substituted on any other basis than 
that of a proportional suffrage. If the large States 
possessed the avarice and ambition with which 
they were charged, would the small ones in their 
neighbourhood be more secure when all control of a 
General Government was withdrawn ? 

Mr. Butler was vehement against the negative 
in the proposed extent, as cutting off all hope of 
equal justice to the distant States. The people 
there would not, he was sure give it a hearing. 

On the question for extending the negative power 
to all cases, as proposed by Mr. Pinckney and Mr. 
Madison, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
(Mr. Randolph and Mr. Mason, no; Mr. Blair, 
Doctor McClurg and Mr. Madison, aye; General 



828 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Washington not consulted,) aye — 3; Connecticut, 
New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 7 ; Delaware, divided, 
(Mr. Read and Mr. Dickinson, aye ; Mr. Bedford 
and Mr. Basset, no). 198 

On motion of Mr. Gerry and Mr. King, to-morrow 
was assigned for reconsidering the mode of appoint- 
ing the national Executive; the reconsideration 
being voted for by all the States except Connecticut 
and North Carolina. 

Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Rutledge moved to add to 
the fourth Resolution, agreed to by the Committee, 
the following, viz. : " that the States be divided into 
three classes, the first class to have three members, 
the second two, and the third one member, each ; 
that an estimate be taken of the comparative im- 
portance of each State at fixed periods, so as to as- 
certain the number of members they may from time 
to time be entitled to." The Committee then rose, 
and the House adjourned. 



Saturday, June 9th. 

Mr. Luther Martin, from Maryland, took his seat. 

In Committee of the Whole, — Mr. Gerry, accord- 
ing to previous notice given by him, moved " that 
the national Executive should be elected by the 
Executives of the States, whose proportion of votes 
should be the same with that allowed to the States, 
in the election of the Senate." If the appointment 
should be made by the National Legislature, it 
would lessen that independence of the Executive, 
which ought to prevail ; would give birth to intrigue 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 829 

and corruption between the Executive and Legis- 
lature previous to the election, and to partiality in 
the Executive afterwards to the friends who pro- 
moted him. Some other mode, therefore, appeared 
to him necessary. He proposed that of appointing 
by the State Executives, as most analagous to the 
principle observed in electing the other branches of 
the National Government ; the first branch being 
chosen by the people of the States and the second 
by the Legislatures of the States, he did not see any 
objection against letting the Executive be appointed 
by the Executives of the States. He supposed the 
Executives would be most likely to select the fittest 
men, and that it would be their interest to support 
the man of their own choice. 

Mr. Randolph urged strongly the inexpediency 
of Mr. Gerry's mode of appointing the National 
Executive. The confidence of the people would 
not be secured by it to the National magistrate. 
The small States would lose all chance of an ap- 
pointment from within themselves. Bad appoint- 
ments would be made, the Executives of the States 
being little conversant with characters not within 
their own small spheres. The State Executives, 
too, notwithstanding their constitutional independ- 
ence, being in fact dependent on the State Legisla- 
tures, will generally be guided by the views of the 
latter, and prefer either favorites within the States, 
or such as it may be expected will be most partial 
to the interests of the State. A national Executive 
thus chosen will not be likely to defend with be- 
coming vigilance and firmness the national rights 
against State encroachments. Vacancies also must 



830 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

happen. How can these be filled ? He could not 
suppose, either, that the Executives would feel the 
interest in supporting the national Executive which 
had heen imagined. They will not cherish the great 
oak which is to reduce them to paltry shrubs. 

On the question for referring the appointment of 
the national Executive to the State Executives, as 
proposed by Mr. Gerrv, — Massachusetts, Connecti- 
cut New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Mary- 
land, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no; Dela- 
ware. divided. 199 

Mr. Patterson moved, that the Committee resume 
the clause relating to the rule of suffrage in the Na- 
tional Legislature. 

Mr. Brearly seconds him. He was sorry, he 
said, that any question on this point was brought 
into view. It had been much agitated in Congress 
at the time of forming the Confederation, and was 
then rightly settled by allowing to each sovereign 
State an equal vote. Otherwise, the smaller States 
must have been destroyed instead of being saved. 
The substitution of a ratio, he admitted, carried fair- 
ness on the face of it ; but on a deeper examination 
was unfair and unjust. Judging of the disparity of 
the States by the quota of Congress, Virginia would 
have sixteen votes, and Georgia but one. A like 
proportion to the others will make the whole num- 
ber ninety. There will be three large States, and 
ten small ones. The large States, by which he 
meant Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Virginia, 
will carry every thing before them. It had been 
admitted, and was known to him from facts within 
New Jersey, that where large and small counties 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 831 

were united into a district for electing representa- 
tives for the district, the large counties always car- 
ried their point, and consequently the large States 
would do so. Virginia with her sixteen votes will 
be a solid column indeed, a formidable phalanx. 
While Georgia with her solitary vote, and the other 
little States, will be obliged to throw themselves 
constantly into the scale of some large one, in order 
to have any weight at all. He had come to the 
Convention with a view of being as useful as he 
could, in giving energy and stability to the Federal 
Government. When the proposition for destroying 
the equality of votes came forward, he was aston- 
ished, he was alarmed. Is it fair, then, it will be 
asked, that Georgia should have an equal vote with 
Virginia ? He would not say it was. What remedy 
then ? One only, that a map of the United States 
be spread out, that all the existing boundaries be 
erased, and that a new partition of the whole be 
made into thirteen equal parts. 

Mr. Patterson considered the proposition for a 
proportional representation as striking at the ex- 
istence of the lesser States. He would premise, 
however, to an investigation of this question, some 
remarks on the nature, structure, and powers of the 
Convention. The Convention, he said, was formed 
in pursuance of an act of Congress ; that this act 
was recited in several of the commissions, particu- 
larly that of Massachusetts, which he required to be 
read ; that the amendment of the Confederacy was 
the object of all the laws and commissions on the 
subject ; that the Articles of the Confederation were 
therefore the proper basis of all the proceedings of 



832 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the Convention; that we ought to keep within its 
limits, or we should be charged by our constituents 
with usurpation ; that the people of America were 
sharp-sighted, and not to be deceived. But the 
commissions under which we acted were not only 
the measure of our power, they denoted also the 
sentiments of the States on the subject of our delib- 
eration. The idea of a National Government, as 
contradistinguished from a federal one, never en- 
tered into the mind of any of them ; and to the pub- 
lic mind we must accommodate ourselves. We have 
no power to go beyond the Federal scheme ; and if 
we had, the people are not ripe for any other. We 
must follow the people ; the people will not follow 
us. The proposition could not be maintained, 
whether considered in reference to us as a nation, or 
as a confederacy. A confederacy supposes sove- 
reignty in the members composing it, and sovereignty 
supposes equality. If we are to be considered as a 
nation, all State distinctions must be abolished, the 
whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when an 
equal division is made, then there may be fairly an 
equality of representation. He held up Virginia, 
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, as the three large 
States, and the other ten as small ones ; repeating 
the calculations of Mr. Brearly, as to the disparity 
of votes which would take place, and affirming that 
the small States would never agree to it. He said 
there was no more reason that a great individual 
State, contributing much, should have more votes 
than a small one, contributing little, than that a rich 
individual citizen should have more votes than an 
indigent one. If the rateable property of A was to 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 833 

that of B as forty to one, ought A for that reason to 
have forty times as many votes as B ■? Such a prin- 
ciple would never be admitted ; and if it were ad- 
mitted would put B entirely at the mercy of A. As 
A has more to be protected than B, so he ought to 
contribute more for the common protection. The 
same may be said of a large State, which has more 
to be protected than a small one. Give the large 
States an influence in proportion to their magnitude, 
and what will be the consequence ? Their ambition 
will be proportionally increased, and the small 
States will have every thing to fear. It was once 
proposed by Galloway, and some others, that Amer- 
ica should be represented in the British Parliament, 
and then be bound by its laws. America could not 
have been entitled to more than one-third of the 
representatives which would fall to the share of 
Great Britain, — would American rights and interests 
have been safe under an authority thus constituted ? 
It has been said, that if a national Government is 
to be formed, so as to operate on the people and not 
on the States, the Representatives ought to be drawn 
from the people. But why so? May not a Legis- 
lature, filled by the State Legislatures, operate on the 
people who choose the State Legislatures ? Or may 
not a practicable coercion be found ? He admitted 
that there was none such in the existing system. 
He was attached strongly to the plan of the existing 
Confederacy, in which the people choose their legis- 
lative representatives ; and the Legislatures their fed- 
eral representatives. No other amendments were 
wanting than to mark the orbits of the States with 
due precision, and provide for the use of coercion, 
53 



834 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

which was the great point. He alluded to the hint 
thrown out by Mr. Wilson, of the necessity to which 
the large States might be reduced, of confederating 
among themselves, by a refusal of the others to con- 
cur. Let them unite if they please, but let them re- 
member that they have no authority to compel the 
others to unite. New Jersey will never confederate 
on the plan before the Committee. She would be 
swallowed up. He had rather submit to a mon- 
arch, to a despot, than to such a fate. He would 
not only oppose the plan here, but on his return 
home do every thing in his power to defeat it there. 
Mr. Wilson hoped, if the Confederacy should be 
dissolved, that a majority, — nay,a minority o£ the States 
would unite for their safety. He entered elaborately 
into the defence of a proportional representation, 
stating for his first position, that, as all authority 
was derived from the people, equal numbers of peo- 
ple ought to have an equal number of representa- 
tives, and different numbers of people, different num- 
bers of representatives. This principle had been im- 
properly violated in the Confederation, owing to the 
urgent circumstances of the time. As to the case of 
A andB stated by Mr. Patterson, he observed, that, 
in districts as large as the States, the number of people 
was the best measure of their comparative wealth. 
Whether, therefore, wealth or numbers was to form 
the ratio it would be the same. Mr. Patterson 
admitted persons, not property, to be the measure of 
suffrage. Are not the citizens of Pennsylvania 
equal to those of New Jersey'? Does it require 
one hundred and fifty of the former to balance fifty 
of the latter ? Representatives of different districts 



1787."] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 835 

ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each 
other, as their respective constituents hold to each 
other. If the small States will not confederate on 
this plan, Pennsylvania, and he presumed some 
other States, would not confederate on any other. 
We have been told that each State being sovereign, 
all are equal. So each man is naturally a sovereign 
over himself, and all men are therefore naturally 
equal. Can he retain this equality when he be- 
comes a member of civil government ? He cannot. 
As little can a sovereign State, when it becomes a 
member of a federal government. If New Jersey 
will not part with her sovereignty, it is vain to talk 
of government. A new partition of the States is 
desirable, but evidently and totally impracticable. 

Mr. Williamson illustrated the cases by a com- 
parison of the different States to counties of different 
sizes within the same State; observing that pro- 
portional representation was admitted to be just in 
the latter case, and could not, therefore, be fairly 
contested in the former. 

The question being about to be put, Mr. Patter- 
son hoped that as so much depended on it, it might 
be thought best to postpone the decision till to- 
morrow ; which was done, nem. con. 

The Committee rose, and the House adjourned. 



Monday, June 11th. 

Mr. Abraham Baldwin, from Georgia, took his seat. 

In Committee of the Whole, — The clause concern- 
ing the rule of suffrage in the National Legislature, 
postponed on Saturday, was resumed. 



836 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Sherman proposed, that the proportion ol 
suffrage in the first branch should be according 
to the respective numbers of free inhabitants ; and 
that in the second branch, or Senate, each State 
should have one vote and no more. He said, as 
the States would remain possessed of certain in- 
dividual rights, each State ought to be able to pro- 
tect itself; otherwise, a few large States will rule 
the rest. The House of Lords in England, he ob- 
served, had certain particular rights under the Con- 
stitution, and hence they have an equal vote with 
the House of Commons, that they may be able to 
defend their rights. 

Mr. Rutledge proposed, that the proportion of 
suffrage in the first branch should be according 
to the quotas of contribution. The justice of this 
rule, he said, could not be contested. Mr. Butler 
urged the same idea ; adding, that money was 
power ; and that the States ought to have weight 
in the government in proportion to their wealth. 

Mr. King and Mr. Wilson,* in order to bring the 
question to a point, moved, " that the right of 
suffrage in the first branch of the National Legis- 
lature ought not to be according to the rule estab- 
lished in the Articles of Confederation, but accord- 
ing to some equitable ratio of representation." 
The clause, so far as it related to suffrage in the 
first branch, was postponed, in order to consider 
this motion. 

Mr. Dickinson contended for the actual contribu- 



* In the printed Journal Mr. Rutledge is named as the seconder of the 
motion. 



1787."] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 837 

tions of the States, as the rule of their represen- 
tation and suffrage in the first branch. By thus 
connecting the interests of the States with their 
duty, the latter would be sure to be performed. 

Mr. King remarked, that it was uncertain what 
mode might be used in levying a national revenue ; 
but that it was probable, imposts would be one 
source of it. If the actual contributions were to be 
the rule, the non-importing States, as Connecticut 
and New Jersey, would be in a bad situation, in- 
deed. It might so happen that they would have no 
representation. This situation of particular States 
had been always one powerful argument in favor 
of the five per cent, impost. 

The question being about to be put, Doctor 
Franklin said, he had thrown his ideas of the mat- 
ter on a paper, which Mr. Wilson read to the Com- 
mittee, in the words following : 

Mr. Chairman, — It has given me great pleasure 
to observe, that, till this point, the proportion of 
representation, came before us, our debates were 
carried on with great coolness and temper. If any 
thing of a contrary kind has on this occasion ap- 
peared, I hope it will not be repeated; for we are 
sent here to consult, not to contend, with each other ; 
and declarations of a fixed opinion, and of determin- 
ed resolution never to change it, neither enlighten 
nor convince us. Positiveness and warmth on one 
side naturally beget their like on the other, and 
tend to create and augment discord and division, in 
a great concern w T herein harmony and union are 
extremely necessary to give weight to our councils, 



838 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

and render them effectual in promoting and se- 
curing the common good. 

" I must own, that I was originally of opinion 
it would be better if every member of Congress, 
or our national Council, were to consider himself 
rather as a representative of the whole, than as 
an agent for the interests of a particular State; 
in which case the proportion of members for each 
State would be of less consequence, and it would 
not be very material whether they voted by 
States or individually. But as I find this is not 
to be expected, I now think the number of re- 
presentatives should bear some proportion to the 
number of the represented; and that the decisions 
should be by the majority of members, not by 
the majority of the States. This is objected to 
from an apprehension that the greater States 
would then swallow up the smaller. I do not at 
present clearly see what advantage the greater 
States could propose to themselves by swallowing 
up the smaller, and therefore do not apprehend 
they would attempt it. I recollect that, in the 
beginning of this century, when the union was 
proposed of the two kingdoms, England and Scot- 
land, the Scotch patriots were full of fears, that 
unless they had ; an equal number of representa- 
tives in Parliament, they should be ruined by the 
superiority of the English. They finally agreed, 
however, that the different proportions of impor- 
tance in the union of the two nations should be 
attended to, whereby they were to have only 
forty members in the House of Commons, and 
only sixteen in the House of Lords. A very great 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 839 

inferiority of numbers ! And yet to this day I do 
not recollect that any thing has been done in the 
Parliament of Great Britain to the prejudice of 
Scotland ; and whoever looks over the lists of public 
officers, civil and military, of that nation, will find, I 
believe, that the North Britons enjoy at least their 
full proportion of emolument. 

" But, sir, in the present mode of voting by States, 
it is equally in the power of the lesser States to 
swallow up the greater ; and this is mathematically 
demonstrable. Suppose, for example, that seven 
smaller States had each three members in the 
House, and the six larger to have, one with another 
six members ; and that, upon a question, two mem- 
bers of each smaller State should be in the affirma- 
tive, and one in the negative, they would make : — 
affirmatives, 14 ; negatives, 7 ; and that all the lar- 
ger States should be unanimously in the negative, 
they would make, negatives, 36 ; in all, affirmatives, 
14, negatives, 43. 

" It is, then, apparent, that the fourteen carry 
the question against the forty-three, and the mi- 
nority overpowers the majority, contrary to the 
common practice of assemblies in all countries and 
ages. 

" The greater States, sir, are naturally as unwil- 
ling to have their property left in the disposition of 
the smaller, as the smaller are to have theirs in the 
disposition of the greater. An honorable gentleman 
has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a proposition of 
equalizing the States. It appears to me an equita- 
ble one, and I should, for my own part, not be 
against such a measure, if it might be found practi- 



840 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

cable. Formerly, indeed, when almost every pro- 
vince had a different constitution, some with greater, 
others with fewer, privileges, it was of importance 
to the borderers, when their boundaries were con- 
tested, whether, by running the division lines, they 
were placed on one side or the other. At present, 
when such differences are done away, it is less ma- 
terial. The interest of a State is made up of the 
interests of its individual members. If they are not 
injured, the State is not injured. Small States are, 
more easily well and happily governed than large 
ones. If, therefore, in such an equal division, it 
should be found necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, 
I should not be averse to the giving a part of it to 
New Jersey, and another to Delaware. But as 
there would probably be considerable difficulties in 
adjusting such a division ; and, however equally 
made at first, it would be continually varying by 
the augmentation of inhabitants in some States, and 
their fixed proportion in others, and thence frequent- 
ly occasion new divisions I beg leave to propose, 
for the consideration of the Committee, another 
mode, which appears to me to be as equitable, more 
easily carried into practice, and more permanent in 
its nature. 

" Let the weakest State say what proportion of 
money or force it is able and willing to furnish for 
the general purposes of the Union : 

" Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish 
each an equal proportion : 

" The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely 
in the disposition of Congress : 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 841 

"The Congress in this case to be composed of an 
equal number of delegates from each State : 

" And their decisions to be by the majority of in- 
dividual members voting. 

" If these joint and equal supplies should, on par- 
ticular occasions, not be sufficient, let Congress make 
requisitions on the richer and more powerful States 
for further aids, to be voluntarily afforded, leaving 
to each State the right of considering the necessity 
and utility of the aid desired, and of giving more or 
less as it should be found proper. 

" This mode is not new. It was formerly prac- 
tised with success by the British government with 
respect to Ireland and the Colonies. We sometimes 
gave even more than they expected, or thought just 
to accept ; and in the last war, carried on while we 
were united, they gave us back in five years a mil- 
lion sterling. We should probably have continued 
such voluntary contributions, whenever the occa- 
sions appeared to require them for the common good 
of the Empire. It was not till they chose to force 
us, and to deprive us of the merit and pleasure of 
voluntary contributions, that we refused and resist- 
ed. These contributions, however, were to be dis- 
posed of at the pleasure of a government in which 
we had no representative. I am, therefore, per- 
suaded, that they will not be refused to one in which 
the representation shall be equal. 

"My learned colleague (Mr. Wilson) has already 
mentioned, that the present method of voting by 
States was submitted to originally by Congress un- 
der a conviction of its impropriety, inequality, and 
injustice. This appears in the words of their reso- 
53* 






842 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

lution. It is of the sixth of September, 1774. The 
words are : 

11 Resolved, that in determining questions in this 
" Congress each Colony or Province shall have one 
" vote ; the Congress not being possessed of, or at 
" present able to procure, materials for ascertaining 
" the importance of each Colony." 

On the question for agreeing to Mr. King's and 
Mr. Wilson's motion, it passed in the affirmative, — 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7; 
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no — 3 ; Mary- 
land, divided. 

It was then moved by Mr. Rutledge, seconded by 
Mr. Butler, to add to the words, " equitable ratio 
of representation," at the end of the motion just 
agreed to, the words " according to the quotas of 
contribution." On motion of Mr. Wilson, seconded 
by Mr. Pinckney, this was postponed ; in order to 
add, after the words, " equitable ratio of representa- 
tion," the words following: "in proportion to the 
whole number of white and other free citizens and 
inhabitants of every age, sex and condition, inclu- 
ding those bound to servitude for a term of years, 
and three-fifths of all other persons not comprehend- 
ed in the foregoing description, except Indians not 
paying taxes, in each State" — this being the rule in 
the act of Congress, agreed to by eleven States, for 
apportioning quotas of revenue on the States, and 
requiring a census only every five, seven, or ten 
years. 

Mr. Gerry thought property not the rule of re- 
presentation. Why, then, should the blacks, who 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 843 

were property in the South, be in the rule of repre- 
sentation more than the cattle and horses of the 
North 1 

On the question, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; New 
Jersey, Delaware, no — 2. 200 

Mr. Sherman moved, that a question be taken, 
whether each State shall have one vote in the second 
branch. Every thing, he said, depended on this. 
The smaller States would never agree to the plan 
on any other principle than an equality of suffrage 
in this branch. Mr. Ellsworth seconded the mo- 
tion. On the question for allowing each State one 
vote in the second branch, — Connecticut, New York, 
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye — 5 ; Massa- 
chusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6. 

Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hamilton moved, that the 
right of suffrage in the second branch ought to be 
according to the same rule as in the first branch. 

On this question for making the ratio of represen- 
tation, the same in the second as in the first branch, 
it passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, Penn- 
sylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, aye— 6\ Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
Delaware, Maryland, no — 5. 201 

The eleventh Resolution, for guaranteeing repub- 
lican government and territory to each State, being 
considered, the words " or partition," were, on mo- 
tion of Mr. Madison, added after the words " volun- 
tary junction," — Massachusetts, New York, Penn- 
sylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 



844 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Georgia, aye — 7; Connecticut, New Jersey, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, no — 4. 

Mr. Read disliked the idea of guaranteeing terri- 
tory. It abetted the idea of distinct States, which 
would be a perpetual source of discord. There can 
be no cure for this evil but in doing away States 
altogether, and uniting them all into one great 
society. 

Alterations having been made in the Resolution, 
making it read, " that a Republican constitution, and 
its existing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each 
State by the United States," the whole was agreed 
to, nem. con. 

The thirteenth Resolution, for amending the na- 
tional Constitution, hereafter, without consent of the 
national Legislature, being considered, several mem- 
bers did not see the necessity of the Resolution at 
all, nor the propriety of making the consent of the 
National Legislature unnecessary. 

Col. Mason urged the necessity of such a pro- 
vision. The plan now to be formed will certainly 
be defective, as the Confederation has been found on 
trial to be. Amendments, therefore, will be neces- 
sary ; and it will be better to provide for them in an 
easy, regular and constitutional way, than to trust 
to chance and violence. It would be improper to 
require the consent of the National Legislature, be- 
cause they may abuse their power, and refuse their 
assent on that very account. The opportunity for 
such an abuse may be the fault of the Constitution 
calling for amendment. 

Mr. Randolph enforced these arguments. 

The words, " without requiring the consent of the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 845 

National Legislature," were postponed. The other 
provision in the clause passed, mm. con. m 

The fourteenth resolution, requiring oaths from 
the members of the State Governments to observe 
the national Constitution and laws, being consid- 
ered, — 

Mr. Sherman opposed it, as unnecessarily intru- 
ding into the State jurisdictions. 

Mr. Randolph considered it necessary to prevent 
that competition between the national Constitution 
and laws, and those of the particular States, which 
had already been felt. The officers of the States 
are already under oath to the States. To preserve 
a due impartiality they ought to be equally bound 
to the National Government. The national author- 
ity needs every support we can give it. The Exec- 
utive and Judiciary of the States, notwithstanding 
their nominal independence on the State Legisla- 
tures, are in fact so dependent on them, that unless 
they be brought under some tie to the National Sys- 
tem, they will always lean too much to the State 
systems, whenever a contest arises between the 
two. 

Mr. Gerry did not like the clause. He thought 
there was as much reason for requiring an oath of 
fidelity to the States from national officers, as vice 
versa. 

Mr. Luther Martin moved to strike out the words 
requiring such an oath from the State officers, viz. : 
" within the several States," observing, that if the 
new oath should be contrary to that already taken 
by them, it would be improper ; if coincident, the 
oaths already taken will be sufficient. 



846 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

On the question for striking out as proposed by 
Mr. L. Martin, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, aye — 4 ; Massachusetts, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Car- 
olina, Georgia, no — 7. 

Question on the whole Resolution as proposed by- 
Mr. Randolph, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Vir- 
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
aye — 6 ; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Del- 
aware, Maryland, no — 5. 203 

The Committee rose, and the House adjourned. 



Tuesday, June 12th. 

In Committee of the Whole, — The question was 
taken on the fifteenth Resolution, to wit, referring 
the new system to the people of the United States 
for ratification. It passed in the affirmative, — Mas- 
sachusetts, Pennsylvania,* Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Connecticut, New 
York, New Jersey, no — 3; Delaware, Maryland, 
divided. 204 

Mr. Sherman and Mr. Ellsworth moved to fill 
the blank left in the fourth Resolution, for the pe- 
riods of electing the members of the first branch, 
with the words, " every year ;" Mr. Sherman observ- 
ing that he did it in order to bring on some question. 

Mr. Rutledge proposed " every two years." 

Mr. Jenifer proposed, " every three years ;" ob- 
serving that the too great frequency of elections ren- 

* Pennsylvania omitted in the printed Journal. The vote is -there entered 
as of June 11th. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 847 

dered the people indifferent to them, and made the 
best men unwilling to engage in so precarious a 
service. 

Mr. Madison seconded the motion for three years. 
Instability is one of the great vices of our republics 
to be remedied. Three years will be necessary, in 
a government so extensive, for members to form any 
knowledge of the various interests of the States to 
which they do not belong, and of which they can 
know but little from the situation and affairs of their 
own. One year will be almost consumed in pre- 
paring for, and travelling to and from the seat of 
national business. 

Mr. Gerry. The people of New England will 
never give up the point of annual elections. They 
know of the transition made in England from trien- 
nial to septennial elections, and will consider such 
an innovation here as the prelude to a like usurpa- 
tion. He considered annual elections as the only 
defence of the people against tyranny. He was as 
much against a triennial House, as against a hered- 
itary Executive. 

Mr. Madison observed, that if the opinions of the 
people were to be our guide, it would be difficult to 
say what course we ought to take. No member of 
the Convention could say what the opinions of his 
constituents were at this time; much less could he 
say what they would think, if possessed of the 
information and lights possessed by the members 
here; and still less, what would be their way of 
thinking six or twelve months hence. We ought to 
consider what was right and necessary in itself for 
the attainment of a proper government. A plan 



848 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

adjusted to this idea will recommend itself. The 
respectability of this Convention will give weight to 
their recommendation of it. Experience will be con- 
stantly urging the adoption of it ; and all the most 
enlightened and respectable citizens will be its ad- 
vocates. Should we fall short of the necessary and 
proper point, this influential class of citizens will 
be turned against the plan, and little support in op- 
position to them can be gained to it from the unre- 
flecting multitude. 

Mr. Gerry repeated his opinion, that it was ne- 
cessary to consider what the people would approve. 
This had been the policy of all legislators. If the 
reasoning (of Mr. Madison) were just, and we sup- 
posed a limited monarchy the best form in itself, we 
ought to recommend it, though the genius of the 
people was decidedly adverse to it, and, having no 
hereditary distinctions among us, we were destitute 
of the essential materials for such an innovation. 

On the question for the triennial election of the 
first branch, — New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva- 
nia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye — 
7; Massachusetts, (Mr. King, aye, Mr. Gorham, 
wavering) Connecticut, North Carolina, South Ca- 
rolina, no — 4. 205 

The words requiring members of the first branch 

to be of the age of years were struck out, 

— Maryland alone, no. 

The words " liberal compensation for members" 
being considered, Mr. Madison moved to insert the 
words, " and fixed." He observed that it would be 
improper to leave the members of the National 
Legislature to be provided for by the State Legisla- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 849 

tures, because it would create an improper depend- 
ence ; and to leave them to regulate their own 
wages was an indecent thing, and might in time 
prove a dangerous one. He thought wheat, or some 
other article of which the average price, throughout 
a reasonable period preceding, might be settled in 
some covenient mode, would form a proper stand- 
ard. 

Colonel Mason seconded the motion ; adding, that 
it would be improper, for other reasons, to leave the 
wages to be regulated by the States, — first, the 
different States would make different provision for 
their representatives, and an inequality would be 
felt among them, whereas he thought they ought to 
be in all respects equal ; secondly, the parsimony of 
the States might reduce the provision so low, that, as 
had already happened in choosing delegates to Con- 
gress, the question would be, not who were most fit 
to be chosen, but who were most willing to serve. 

On the question for inserting the words, " and 
fixed," — New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
Georgia, aye — 8 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, South 
Carolina, no — 3. 

Doctor Franklin said, he approved of the amend- 
ment just made for rendering the salaries as fixed as 
possible ; but disliked the word " liberal.''' He 
would prefer the word " moderate," if it was neces- 
sary to substitute any other. He remarked the 
tendency of abuses, in every case, to grow of them- 
selves when once begun ; and related very pleasant- 
ly the progression in ecclesiastical benefices, from 
the first departure from the gratuitous provision for 
54 



850 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the apostles, to the establishment of the papal sys- 
tem. The word " liberal" was struck out, nem con. 

On the motion of Mr. Pierce, that the wages 
should be paid out of the National Treasury, Massa- 
chusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 
8 ; Connecticut, New York, South Carolina, no — 3. 

Question on the clause relating to term of service 
and compensation of the first branch, — Massachu- 
setts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- 
land, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; 
Connecticut, New York, South Carolina, no — 3. 

On a question for striking out the " ineligibility of 
members of the National Legislature to State offices" 
— Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, aye — 4 ; New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Virginia, Georgia, no — 5 ; Massachusetts, 
Maryland, divided. 

On the question for agreeing to the clause as 
amended, — Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye— 10; Con- 
necticut, no — 1. 

On a question for making members of the Na- 
tional Legislature ineligible to any office under the 
National Government for the term of three years 
after ceasing to be members, — Maryland, aye — 1 ; 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 10. 

On the question for such ineligibility for one 
year, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 851 

South Carolina, aye — 8 ; New York, Georgia, no — 
2 ; Maryland divided. 

On the question moved by Mr. Pinckney, for 
striking out " incapable of re-election into the first 

branch of the National Legislature for years, 

and subject to recall," agreed to, nem. con.™ 

On the question for striking out from the fifth 
Resolution the words requiring members of the 

Senatorial branch to be of the age of years 

at least, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
aye— 3 ; Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Mary- 
land, Virginia, South Carolina, no — 6 ; North Caro- 
lina, Georgia, divided. 

On the question for filling the blank with " thirty 
years," as the qualification, it was agreed to, — 
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 7; 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, no 
—4. 

Mr. Spaight moved to fill the blank for the dura- 
tion of the appointments to the second branch of the 
national Legislature, with the words " seven years." 

Mr. Sherman thought seven years too long. He 
grounded his opposition, he said, on the principle, 
that if they did their duty well, they would be re- 
elected ; and if they acted amiss, an earlier oppor- 
tunity should be allowed for getting rid of them. 
He preferred five years, which would be between the 
terms of the first branch and of the Executive. 

Mr. Pierce proposed three years. Seven years 
would raise an alarm. Great mischiefs have arisen 
in England from their Septennial Act, which was 
reprobated by most of their patriotic statesmen. 



852 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Randolph was for the term of seven years. 
The democratic licentiousness of the State Legisla- 
tures proved the necessity of a firm Senate. The 
object of this second branch is, to control the demo- 
cratic branch of the National Legislature. If it be 
not a firm body, the other branch, being more 
numerous, and coming immediately from the people, 
will overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland, con- 
stituted on like principles, had been scarcely able to 
stem the popular torrent. No mischief can be ap- 
prehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, 
and in some measure of the Executive, will in all 
cases be necessary. A firmness and independence 
may be the more necessary, also, in this branch, as 
it ought to guard the Constitution against encroach- 
ments of the Executive, who will be apt to form 
combinations with the demagogues of the popular 
branch. 

Mr. Madison considered seven years as a term by 
no means too long. What we wished was, to give 
to the government that stability which was every 
where called for, and which the enemies of the 
republican form alleged to be inconsistent with its 
nature. He was not afraid of giving too much 
stability, by the term of seven years. His fear was, 
that the popular branch would still be too great an 
overmatch for it. It was to be much lamented that 
we had so little direct experience to guide us. 
The Constitution of Maryland was the only one 
that bore any analogy to this part of the plan. In 
no instance had the Senate of Maryland created 
just suspicions of danger from it. In some instances, 
perhaps, it may have erred by yielding to the House 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 853 

of Delegates. In every instance of their opposition 
to the measures of the House of Delegates, they had 
had with them the suffrages of the most enlightened 
and impartial people of the other States, as well as 
of their own. In the States, where the Senates 
were chosen in the same manner as the other 
branches of the Legislature, and held their seats for 
four years, the institution was found to be no check 
whatever against the instabilities of the other 
branches. He conceived it to be of great impor- 
tance that a stable and firm government, organized 
in the republican form, should be held out to the 
people. If this be not done, and the people be left 
to judge of this species of government by the ope- 
rations of the defective systems under which they 
now live, it is much to be feared, the time is not 
distant, when, in universal disgust, they will re- 
nounce the blessing which they have purchased at 
so dear a rate, and be ready for any change that 
may be proposed to them. 

On the question for " seven years," as the term for 
the second branch, — New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye, — 8; Connecticut, 
no — 1 ; Massachusetts, (Mr. Gorham and Mr. King, 
aye ; Mr. Gerry and Mr. Strong, no) New York, di- 
vided. 207 

Mr. Butler and Mr. Rutledge proposed that the 
members of the second branch should be entitled to 
no salary or compensation for their services. On 
the question * — Connecticut, Delaware, South Car- 

* It is probable the votes here turned chiefly on the idea that if the salaries 
were not here provided for, the members would be paid by their respective States. 



854 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

olina, aye — 3 ; New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva- 
nia, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, 
no — 7; Massachusetts, divided. 

It was then moved, and agreed, that the clauses 
respecting the stipends and ineligibility of the sec- 
ond branch be the same as of the first branch, — 
Connecticut disagreeing to the ineligibilty. It was 
moved and seconded, to alter the ninth Resolution, 
so as to read, " that the jurisdiction of the supreme 
tribunal shall be, to hear and determine, in the der- 
nier resort, all piracies, felonies, &c." 

It was moved and seconded, to strike out, " all 
piracies and felonies on the high seas," which was 
agreed to. 

It was moved, and agreed, to strike out, " all cap- 
tures from an enemy." 

It was moved, and agreed, to strike out, " other 
States," and insert "two distinct States of the 
Union." 

It was moved, and agreed, to postpone the con- 
sideration of the ninth Resolution, relating to the 
Judiciary. 

The Committee then rose, and the House ad- 
journed. 



Wednesday, June 13th. 

In Committee of the Whole, — The ninth Resolu- 
tion being resumed, — 

The latter part of the clause relating to the juris- 
diction of the national tribunals, was struck out, 
nem. con. ; in order to leave full room for their or- 
ganization. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 855 

Mr. Randolph and Mr. Madison then moved the 
following resolution respecting a national Judiciary, 
viz. : " that the jurisdiction of the National Judi- 
ciary shall extend to cases which respect the col- 
lection of the national revenue, impeachments of 
any national officers, and questions which involve the 
national peace and harmony." Agreed to. 208 

Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Sherman moved to insert, 
after the words, " one supreme tribunal," the words, 
u the judges of which to be appointed by the Na- 
tional Legislature." 

Mr. Madison objected to an appointment by the 
whole Legislature. Many of them are incompetent 
judges of the requisite qualifications. They were 
too much influenced by their partialities. The can- 
didate who was present, who had displayed a talent 
for business in the legislative field, who had, per- 
haps, assisted ignorant members in business of their 
own, or of their constitutents, or used other winning 
means, would, without any of the essential qualifi- 
cations for an expositor of the laws, prevail over a 
competitor not having these recommendations, but 
possessed of every necessary accomplishment. He 
proposed that the appointment should be made by 
the Senate; which, as a less numerous and more 
select body, would be more competent judges, and 
which was sufficiently numerous to justify such 
a confidence in them. 

Mr. Sherman and Mr. Pinckney withdrew their 
motion, and the appointment by the Senate was 
agreed to, nem. con. 

Mr. Gerry moved to restrain the Senatorial branch 
from originating money bills. The other branch was 



856 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

more immediately the representatives of the people, 
and it was a maxim, that the people ought to hold 
the purse-strings. If the Senate should be allowed 
to originate such bills, they would repeat the experi- 
ment, till chance should furnish a set of Represen- 
tatives in the other branch who will fall into their 
snares. 

Mr. Butler saw no reason for such a discrimina- 
tion. We were always following the British Con- 
stitution, when the reason of it did not apply. There 
was no analogy between the House of Lords and 
the body proposed to be established. If the Senate 
should be degraded by any such discriminations, the 
best men would be apt to decline serving in it, in 
favor of the other branch. And it will lead the latter 
into the practice of tacking other clauses to money 
bills. 

Mr. Madison observed, that the commentators on 
the British Constitution had not yet agreed on the 
reason of the restriction on the House of Lords, in 
money bills. Certain it was, there could be no simi- 
lar reason in the case before us. The Senate would 
be the representatives of the people, as well as the 
first branch. If they should have any dangerous 
influence over it, they would easily prevail on some 
member of the latter to originate the bill they wished 
to be passed. As the Senate w T ould be generally a 
more capable set of men, it would be wrong to disable 
them from any preparation of the business, especially 
of that which w^as most important, and, in our repub- 
lics, worse prepared than any other. The gentle- 
man, in pursuance of his principle, ought to carry 
the restraint to the amendment^ as well as the ori- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION., 857 

ginating of money bills ; since an addition of a given 
sum would be equivalent to a distinct proposition 
of it. 

Mr. King differed from Mr. Gerry, and concurred 
in the objections to the proposition. 

Mr. Read favored the proposition, but would not 
extend the restraint to the case of amendments. 

Mr. Pincknev thinks the question premature. If 
the Senate should be formed on the same proportional 
representation as it stands at present, they should 
have equal power ; otherwise, if a different principle 
should be introduced. 

Mr. Sherman. As both branches must concur, 
there can be no danger, whichever way the Senate 
may be formed. We establish two branches in or- 
der to get more wisdom, which is particularly needed 
in the finance business. The Senate bear their share 
of the taxes, and are also the representatives of the 
people. c What a man does by another, he does by 
himself,' is a maxim. In Connecticut both branches 
can originate, in all cases, and it has been found safe 
and convenient. Whatever might have been the 
reason of the rule as to the House of Lords, it is 
clear that no good arises from it now even there. 

General Pinckney. This distinction prevails in 
South Carolina, and has been a source of pernicious 
disputes between the two branches. The Consti- 
tution is now evaded by informal schedules of 
amendments, handed from the Senate to the other 
House. 

Mr. Williamson wishes for a question, chiefly to 
prevent re-discussion. The restriction will have 
one advantage ; it will oblige some member in the* 
54* 



858 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

lower branch to move, and people can then mark 
him. 

On the question for excepting money-bills, as pro- 
posed by Mr. Gerry, — New York, Delaware, Vir- 
ginia, aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jer- 
sey, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no— 7. 209 

The Committee rose, and Mr. Gorham made re- 
port, which w 7 as postponed till to-morrow T , to give an 
opportunity for other plans to be proposed — the 
Report was in the words following : 

1. Resolved, that it is the opinion of this Commit- 
tee, that a national Government ought to be estab- 
lished, consisting of a supreme Legislative, Execu- 
tive and Judiciary. 

2. Resolved, that the National Legislature ought 
to consist of two branches. 

3. Resolved, that the members of the first branch 
of the National Legislature ought to be elected by 
the people of the several States for the term of three 
years, to receive fixed stipends by which they may 
be compensated for the devotion of their time to the 
public service, to be paid out of the National Trea- 
sury : to be ineligible to any office established by a 
particular State, or under the authority of the Uni- 
ted States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the 
functions of the first branch,) during the term of ser- 
vice, and under the national Government for the 
space of one year after its expiration. 

4. Resolved, that the members of the second 
branch of the National Legislature ought to be 
chosen by the individual Legislatures ; to be of the 
age of thirty years at least ; to hold their offices for 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. # 859 

a term sufficient to ensure their independence, name- 
ly, seven years ; to receive fixed stipends by which 
they may be compensated for the devotion of their 
time to the public service, to be paid out of the Na- 
tional Treasury ; to be ineligible to any office estab- 
lished by a particular State, or under the authority 
of the United States, (except those peculiarly be- 
longing to the functions of the second branch,) dur- 
ing the term of service, and under the national Gov- 
ernment for the space of one year after its expira- 
tion. 

5. Resolved, that each branch ought to possess 
the right of originating acts. 

6. Resolved, that the National Legislature ought 
to be empowered to enjoy the legislative rights ves- 
ted in Congress by the Confederation ; and moreover 
to legislate in all cases to which the separate States 
are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the 
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of 
individual legislation ; to negative all laws passed 
by the several States contravening, in the opinion of 
the National Legislature, the Articles of Union, or 
any treaties subsisting under the authority of the 
Union. 

7. Resolved, that the rights of suffrage in the first 
branch of the National Legislature, ought not to be 
according to the rule established in the Articles of 
Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio 
of representation, namely, in proportion to the whole 
number of white and other free citizens and inhabi- 
tants, of every age, sex and condition, including those 
bound to servitude for a term of years, and three- 
fifths of all other persons, not comprehended in the 



860 DEBATES IN THE [ L787. 

foregoing description, except Indians not paying 
taxes, in each State. 

8. Resolved, that the right of suffrage in the sec- 
ond branch of the National Legislature, ought to be 
according to the rule established for the first. 

9. Resolved, that a National Executive be insti- 
tuted, to consist of a single person ; to be chosen by 
the National Legislature, for the term of seven years; 
with power to carry into execution the national 
laws ; to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise 
provided for ; to be ineligible a second time ; and to 
be removable on impeachment and conviction of 
malpractices or neglect of duty ; to receive a fixed 
stipend by which he may be compensated for the 
devotion of his time to the public service, to be paid 
out of the National Treasury. 

10. Resolved, that the national Executive shall 
have a right to negative any legislative act, which 
shall not be afterwards passed by two-thirds of each 
branch of the national Legislature. 

11. Resolved, that a national Judiciary be estab- 
lished, to consist of one supreme tribunal, the Judges 
of which shall be appointed by the second branch of 
the national Legislature, to hold their offices during 
good behaviour, and to receive punctually, at stated 
times, a fixed compensation for their services, in 
which no increase or diminution shall be made, so 
as to affect the persons actually in office at the time 
of such increase or diminution. 

12. Resolved, that the national Legislature be 
empowered to appoint inferior tribunals. 

13. Resolved, that the jurisdiction of the national 
Judiciary shall extend to all cases which respect 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 861 

the collection of the national revenue, impeach- 
ments of any national officers, and questions which 
involve the national peace and harmony. 

14. Resolved, that provision ought to be made for 
the admission of States lawfully arising within the 
limits of the United States, whether from a volun- 
tary junction of government and territory, or other- 
wise, with the consent of a number of voices in the 
national Legislature less than the whole. 

15. Resolved, that provision ought to be made for 
the continuance of Congress and their authorities 
and privileges, until a given day, after the reform of 
the Articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the 
completion of all their engagements. 

16. Resolved, that a republican constitution, and 
its existing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each 
State, by the United States. 

17. Resolved, that provision ought to be made for 
the amendment of the Articles of Union, whensoever 
it shall seem necessary. 

18. Resolved, that the Legislative, Executive and 
Judiciary powers within the several States, ought 
to be bound by oath to support the Articles of 
Union. 

19. Resolved, that the amendments which shall 
be offered to the Confederation by the Convention 
ought, at a proper time or times after the approba- 
tion of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly or 
assemblies recommended by the several Legisla- 
tures, to be expressly chosen by the people to con- 
sider and decide thereon. 210 



862 DEBATES IN THE f 1787. 

% 

Thursday, June 14th. 

Mr. Patterson observed to the Convention, that 
it was the wish of several Deputations, particularly 
that of New Jersey, that further time might be al- 
lowed them to contemplate the plan reported from 
the Committee of the Whole, and to digest one 
purely federal, and contradistinguished from the 
reported plan. He said, they hoped to have such 
an one ready by to-morrow to be laid before the 
Convention : and the Convention adjourned that 
leisure might be given for the purpose. 



Friday, June 15th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Patterson laid before the 
Convention the plan which he said several of the 
Deputations wished to be substituted in place of that 
proposed by Mr. Randolph. After some little dis- 
cussion of the most proper mode of giving it a fair 
deliberation, it was agreed, that it should be refer- 
red to a Committee of the Whole ; and that, in or- 
der to place the two plans in due comparison, the 
other should be recommitted. At the earnest re- 
quest of Mr. Lansing and some other gentlemen, it 
was also agreed that the Convention should not go 
into Committee of the Whole on the subject till 
to-morrow ; by which delay the friends of the plan 
proposed by Mr. Patterson would be better pre- 
pared to explain and support it, and all would have 
an opportunity of taking copies.* 

* This plan had been concerted among the Deputation, or members thereof, from 
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and perhaps Mr. Martin, from 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 863 

The propositions from New Jersey, moved by Mr. 
Patterson, were in the words following : 

1. Resolved, that the Articles of Confederation 
ought to be so revised, corrected, and enlarged, as to 
render the Federal Constitution adequate to the ex- 
igencies of government, and the preservation of the 
Union. 

2. Resolved, that, in addition to the powers vested 
in the United States in Congress, by the present ex- 
isting Articles of Confederation, they be authorized 
to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty 
or duties on all goods or merchandizes of foreign 
growth or manufacture, imported into any part of 
the United States ; by stamps on paper, vellum or 
parchment ; and by a postage on all letters or pack- 
ages passing through the general post-office ; to be 
applied to such Federal purposes as they shall deem 
proper and expedient ; to make rules and regulations 
for the collection thereof; and the same, from time 
co time, to alter and amend in such manner as they 
shall think proper ; to pass acts for the regulation of 
trade and commerce, as well with foreign nations as 

Maryland, who made with them a common cause, though on different principles. 
Connecticut and New York were against a departure from the principle of the 
Confederation, wishing rather to add a few new powers to Congress than to 
substitute a National Government. The States of New Jersey and Delaware 
were opposed to a National Government, because its patrons considered a propor- 
tional representation of the States as the basis of it. The eagerness displayed by 
the members opposed to a National Government, from these different motives, 
began now to produce serious anxiety for the result of the Convention. Mr. 
Dickinson said to Mr. Madison, "You see the consequence of pushing things 
too far. Some of the members from the small States wish for two branches in 
the General Legislature, and are friends to a good National Government ; but 
we would sooner submit to foreign power, than submit to be deprived, in both 
branches of the legislature, of an equality of suffrage, and thereby be thrown 
under the domination of the larger States." 



864 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

with each other; provided that all punishments, 
fines, forfeitures and penalties, to be incurred for con- 
travening such acts, rules and regulations, shall be 
adjudged by the common law Judiciaries of the 
State in which any offence contrary to the true in- 
tent and meaning of such acts, rules, and regula- 
tions, shall have been committed or perpetrated, 
with liberty of commencing in the first instance all 
suits and prosecutions for that purpose in the Supe- 
rior common law Judiciary in such State; subject, 
nevertheless, for the correction of all errors, both in 
law and fact, in rendering judgment, to an appeal to 
the Judiciary of the United States. 

3. Resolved, that whenever requisitions shall be 
necessary, instead of the rule for making requisitions 
mentioned in the Articles of Confederation, the Uni- 
ted States in Congress be authorized to make such 
requisitions in proportion to the whole number of 
white and other free citizens and inhabitants, of eve- 
ry age, sex, and condition, including those bound to 
servitude for a term of years, and three-fifths of all 
other persons not comprehended in the foregoing de- 
scription, except Indians not paying taxes ; that, if 
such requisitions be not complied with, in the time 
specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in 
the non-complying States ; and for that purpose to 
devise and pass acts directing and authorizing the 
same; provided, that none of the powers hereby 
vested in the United States in Congress, shall be ex- 
ercised without the consent of at least States ; 

and in that proportion, if the number of confedera- 
ted States should hereafter be increased or dimin- 
ished. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 865 

4. Resolved, that the United States in Congress 
be authorized to elect a Federal Executive, to con- 
sist of persons, to continue in office for the 

term of years ; to receive punctually, at 

stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, 
in which no increase nor diminution shall be made 
so as to affect the persons composing the Executive 
at the time of such increase or diminution; to be 
paid out of the Federal treasury ; to be incapable of 
holding any other office or appointment during their 

time of service, and for years thereafter: 

to be ineligible a second time, and removeable by 
Congress, on application by a majority of the Ex- 
ecutives of the several States ; that the Executive, 
besides their general authority to execute the Fed- 
eral acts, ought to appoint all Federal officers not 
otherwise provided for, and to direct all military 
operations ; provided, that none of the persons com- 
posing the Federal Executive shall, on any occasion, 
take command of any troops, so as personally to 
conduct any military enterprise, as General, or in 
any other capacity. 

5. Resolved, that a Federal Judiciary be estab- 
lished, to consist of a supreme tribunal, the Judges 
of which to be appointed by the Executive, and to 
hold their offices during good behaviour ; to receive 
punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for 
their services, in which no increase nor diminution 
shall be made so as to affect the persons actually 
in office at the time of such increase or diminution. 
That the Judiciary so established shall have author- 
ity to hear and determine, in the first instance, on 

55 



866 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

on all impeachments of Federal officers; and, by 
way of appeal, in the dernier resort, in all cases 
touching the rights of ambassadors ; in all cases of 
captures from an enemy ; in all cases of piracies 
and felonies on the high seas; in all cases in which \ 
foreigners may be interested ; in the construction of \ 
any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any 
of the acts for the regulation of trade, or the col- 
lection of the Federal revenue: that none of the 
Judiciary shall, during the time they remain in 
office, be capable of receiving or holding any other 
office or appointment during their term of service, or 
for thereafter. 

6. Resolved, that all acts of the United States in 
Congress, made by virtue and in pursuance of the 
powers hereby, and by the Articles of Confedera- 
tion, vested in them, and all treaties made and rati- 
fied under the authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme law of the respective States, so far 
forth as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said 
States or their citizens ; and that the Judiciary of 
the several States shall be bound thereby in their 
decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the 
individual States to the contrary notwithstanding : 
and that if any State, or any body of men in any 
State, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into ex- 
ecution such acts or treaties, the Federal Executive 
shall be authorized to call forth the power of the 
confederated States, or so much thereof as may be 
necessary, to enforce and compel an obedience to 
such acts, or an observance of such treaties. 

7. Resolved, that provision be made for the ad- 
mission of new States into the Union. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 867 

8. Resolved, that the rule for naturalization ought 
to be same in every State. 

9. Resolved, that a citizen of one State commit- 
ting an offence in another State of the Union, shall 
be deemed guilty of the same offence as if it had 
been committed by a citizen of the State in which 
the offence was committed.* 211 

Adjourned. 



Saturday, June 16th. 

In Committee of the Whole, on the Resolutions pro- 
posed by Mr. Patterson and Mr. Randolph, — Mr. 
Lansing called for the reading of the first Resolution 
of each plan, which he considered as involving prin- 
ciples directly in contrast. That of Mr. Patterson, 
says he, sustains the sovereignty of the respective 
States, that of Mr. Randolph destroys it. The latter 
requires a negative on all the laws of the particular 
States, the former only certain general power for the 
general good. The plan of Mr. Randolph in short 
absorbs all power, except what may be exercised in 
the little local matters of the States which are not ob- 



* This copy of Mr. Patterson's propositions varies in a few clauses from that 
in the printed Journal furnished from the papers of Mr. Brearly, a colleague of 
Mr. Patterson. A confidence is felt, notwithstanding, in its accuracy. That 
the copy in the Journal is not entirely correct, is shown by the ensuing speech 
of Mr. Wilson (June 16), in which he refers to the mode of removing the Ex- 
ecutive " by impeachment and conviction" as a feature in the Virginia plan 
forming one of its contrasts to that of Mr. Patterson, which proposed a removal 
" on application of a majority of the Executives of the States." In the copy 
printed in the Journal, the two modes are combined in the same clause ; 
whether through inadvertence, or as a contemplated amendment, does not 
appear. 



868 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

jects worthy of the supreme cognizance. He ground- 
ed his preference of Mr. Patterson's plan, chiefly, on 
two objections to that of Mr. Randolph, — first, want 
of power in the Convention to discuss and propose 
it : secondly, the improbability of its being adopted. 

1. He was decidedly of opinion that the power of 
the Convention was restrained to amendments of a 
Federal nature, and having for their basis the Con- 
federacy in being. The acts of Congress, the tenor 
of the acts of the States, the commissions produced 
by the several Deputations, all proved this. And 
this limitation of the power to an amendment of 
the Confederacy marked the opinion of the States, 
that it was unnecessary and improper to go further. 
He was sure that this was the case with his State. 
New York would never have concurred in sending 
Deputies to the Convention, if she had supposed the 
deliberations w 7 ere to turn on a consolidation of the 
States, and a National Government. 

2. Was it probable that the States would adopt 
and ratify a scheme, which they had never author- 
ized us to propose, and which so far exceeded what 
they regarded as sufficient 1 We see by their seve- 
ral acts, particularly in relation to the plan of reve- 
nue proposed by Congress in 1783, not authorized 
by the Articles of Confederation, what were the 
ideas they then entertained. Can so great a change 
be supposed to have already taken place ? To rely 
on any change which is hereafter to take place in 
the sentiments of the people, would be trusting to 
too great an uncertainty. We know only what 
their present sentiments are. And it is in vain to 
propose what will not accord with these. The 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 869 

States will never feel a sufficient confidence in a 
General Government, to give it a negative on their 
laws. The scheme is itself totally novel. There is 
no parallel to it to be found. The authority of Con- 
gress is familiar to the people, and an augmentation 
of the powers of Congress will be readily approved 
by them. 

Mr. Patterson said, as he had on a former occa- 
sion given his sentiments on the plan proposed by 
Mr. Randolph, he would now, avoiding repetition as 
much as possible, give his reasons in favor of that 
proposed by himself. He preferred it because it ac- 
corded, — first, with the powers of the Convention; 
secondly, with the sentiments of the people. If the 
Confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to 
our States, and obtain larger powers, not assume 
them ourselves. I came here not to speak my own 
sentiments, but the sentiments of those who sent me. 
Our object is not such a government as may be best 
in itself, but such a one as our constituents have au- 
thorized us to prepare, and as they will approve. 
If we argue the matter on the supposition that no 
confederacy at present exists, it cannot be denied 
that all the States stand on the footing of equal 
sovereignty. All, therefore, must concur before any 
can be bound. If a proportional representation be 
right, why do we not vote so here ? If we argue on 
the fact that a Federal compact actually exists, and 
consult the articles of it, we still find an equal sove- 
reignty to be the basis of it. He reads the fifth Ar- 
ticle of the Confederation, giving each State a vote ; 
and the thirteenth, declaring that no alteration shall 
be made without unanimous consent. This is the 



870 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

nature of all treaties. What is unanimously done, 
must be unanimously undone. It was observed (by 
Mr. Wilson) that the larger States gave up the 
point, not because it was right, but because the cir- 
cumstances of the moment urged the concession. 
Be it so. Are they for that reason at liberty to 
take it back ? Can the donor resume his gift with- 
out the consent of the donee 1 This doctrine may 
be convenient, but it is a doctrine that will sacrifice 
the lesser States. The larger States acceded readi- 
ly to the Confederacy. It was the small ones that 
came in reluctantly and slowly. New Jersey and 
Maryland were the two last ; the former objecting 
to the want of power in Congress over trade ; both 
of them to the want of power to appropriate the va- 
cant territory to the benefit of the whole. If the 
sovereignty of the States is to be maintained, the 
representatives must be drawn immediately from the 
States, not from the people ; and we have no power 
to vary the idea of equal sovereignty. The only 
expedient that will cure the difficulty is that of 
throwing the States into hotchpot. To say that 
this is impracticable, will not make it so. Let it be 
tried, and we shall see whether the citizens of Mas- 
sachusetts, Pennsylvania and Virginia accede to it. 
It will be objected, that coercion will be impracti- 
cable. But will it be more so in one plan than the 
other ? Its efficacy will depend on the quantum of 
power collected, not on its being drawn from the 
States, or from the individuals ; and according to his 
plan it may be exerted on individuals as well as ac- 
cording to that of Mr. Randolph. A distinct Ex- 
ecutive and Judiciary also were equally provided by 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 871 

his plan. It is urged, that two branches in the Le- 
gislature are necessary. Why ? For the purpose of 
a check. But the reason for the precaution is not 
applicable to this case. Within a particular State, 
where party heats prevail, such a check may be 
necessary. In such a body as Congress it is less 
necessary ; and, besides, the Delegations of the dif- 
ferent States are checks on each other. Do the 
people at large complain of Congress ? No. What 
they wish is, that Congress may have more power. 
If the power now proposed be not enough, the peo- 
ple hereafter will make additions to it. With pro- 
per powers Congress will act with more energy and 
wisdom than the proposed National Legislature; 
being fewer in number, and more secreted and 
refined by the mode of election. The plan of Mr. 
Randolph will also be enormously expensive. Al- 
lowing Georgia and Delaware two representatives 
each in the popular branch, the aggregate number 
of that branch will be one hundred and eighty. 
Add to it half as many for the other branch, and 
you have two hundred and seventy members, coming 
one at least a year, from the most distant as well as 
the most central parts of the Republic. In the pre- 
sent deranged state of our finances, can so expensive 
a system be seriously thought of ? By enlarging the 
powers of Congress, the greatest part of this ex- 
pense will be saved, and all purposes will be an- 
swered. At least a trial ought to be made. 

Mr. Wilson entered into a contrast of the princi- 
pal points of the two plans, so far, he said, as there 
had been time to examine the one last proposed. 
These points were : — 1. In the Virginia plan there 



872 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

are two, and in some degree three, branches in the 
Legislature ; in the plan from New Jersey there is 
to be a single Legislature only. 2. Representation 
of the people at large is the basis of one ; the State 
Legislatures the pillars of the other. 3. Propor- 
tional representation prevails in one, equality of 
suffrage in the other. 4. A single Executive Magis- 
trate is at the head of the one ; a plurality is held 
out in the other. 5. In the one, a majority of the 
people of the United States must prevail ; in the 
other, a minority may prevail. 6. The National 
Legislature is to make laws in all cases to which 
the separate States are incompetent, &c. ; in place 
of this, Congress are to have additional power in a 
few cases only. 7. A negative on the laws of the 
States ; in place of this, coercion to be substituted. 
8. The Executive to be removable on impeachment 
and conviction, in one plan ; in the other, to be re- 
movable at the instance of a majority of the Execu- 
tives of the States. 9. Revision of the laws provi- 
ded for, in one ; no such check in the other. 10. 
Inferior national tribunals, in one ; none such in the 
other. 11. In the one, jurisdiction of national tri- 
bunals to extend, &c. ; an appellate jurisdiction only 
allowed in the other. 12. Here, the jurisdiction is 
to extend to all cases affecting the national peace 
and harmony ; there, a few cases only are marked 
out. 13. Finally, the ratification is, in this, to be by 
the people themselves ; in that, by the legislative 
authorities, according to the thirteenth Article of 
the Confederation. 

With regard to the power of the Convention, he 
conceived himself authorized to conclude nothing, but 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 873 

to be at liberty to propose any thing. In this par- 
ticular, he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the 
two plans. 

With regard to the sentiments of the people, he con- 
ceived it difficult to know precisely what they are. 
Those of the particular circle in which one moved 
were commonly mistaken for the general voice. He 
could not persuade himself that the State Govern- 
ments and sovereignties were so much the idols of 
the people, nor a National Government so obnox- 
ious to them, as some supposed. Why should a 
National Government be unpopular? Has it less 
dignity ? Will each citizen enjoy under it less lib- 
erty or protection ? Will a citizen of Delaware be 
degraded by becoming a citizen of the United States? 
Where do the people look at present for relief from 
the evils of which they complain? Is it from 
an internal reform of their governments ? No, sir. 
It is from the national councils that relief is ex- 
pected. For these reasons, he did not fear that the 
people would not follow us into a National Gov- 
ernment ; and it will be a further recommendation 
of Mr. Randolph's plan, that it is to be submitted 
to them, and not to the Legislatures, for ratification. 

Proceeding now to the first point on which he 
had contrasted the two plans, he observed, that, 
anxious as he was for some augmentation of the 
Federal powers, it would be with extreme reluc- 
tance, indeed, that he could ever consent to give 
powers to Congress. He had two reasons, either 
of which was sufficient, — first, Congress, as a legis- 
lative body, does not stand on the people ; secondly, 
it is a single body. 
55* 



874 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

1. He would not repeat the remarks he had for- 
merly made on the principles of representation. He 
would only say, that an inequality in it has ever 
been a poison contaminating every branch of gov- 
ernment. In Great Britain, where this poison has 
had a full operation, the security of private rights is 
owing entirely to the purity of her tribunals of jus- 
tice, the judges of which are neither appointed nor 
paid by a venal parliament. The political liberty 
of that nation, owing to the inequality of represen- 
tation, is at the mercy of its rulers. He means not 
to insinuate that there is any parallel between the 
situation of that country and ours, at present. But it 
is a lesson we ought not to disregard, that the small- 
est bodies in Great Britain are notoriously the 
most corrupt. Every other source of influence 
must also be stronger in small than in large bodies 
of men. When Lord Chesterfield had told us that 
one of the Dutch provinces had been seduced into 
the views of France, he need not have added, that 
it was not Holland, but one of the smallest of them. 
There are facts among ourselves which are known to 
all. Passing over others, we will only remark that 
the Impost, so anxiously wished for by the public, was 
defeated not by any of the larger States in the Union. 

2. Congress is a single Legislature. Despotism 
comes on mankind in different shapes, sometimes in 
an Executive, sometimes in a military one. Is 
there no danger of a Legislative despotism ? The- 
ory and practice both proclaim it. If the Legisla- 
tive authority be not restrained, there can be neither 
liberty nor stability ; and it can only be restrained 
by dividing it within itself, into distinct and inde- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 875 

pendent branches. In a single House there is no 
check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue and 
good sense of those who compose it. 

On another great point, the contrast was equally 
favorable to the plan reported by the Committee of 
the Whole. It vested the Executive powers in a 
single magistrate. The plan of New Jersey, vested 
them in a plurality. In order to control the Legisla- 
tive authority, you must divide it. In order to control 
the Executive you must unite it. One man will be 
more responsible than three. Three will contend 
among themselves, till one becomes the master of his 
colleagues. In the triumvirates of Rome, first, Csesar, 
then Augustus, are witnesses of this truth. The 
Kings of Sparta, and the Consuls of Rome, prove 
also the factious consequences of dividing the Ex- 
ecutive magistracy. Having already taken up so 
much time, he would not, he said, proceed to any of 
the other points. Those on which he had dwelt 
are sufficient of themselves ; and on the decision of 
them the fate of the others will depend. 

Mr. Pinckney. 212 The whole comes to this, as he 
conceived. Give New Jersey an equal vote, and 
she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Na- 
tional system. He thought the Convention author- 
ized to go any length, in recommending, which they 
found necessary to remedy the evils which pro- 
duced this Convention. 

Mr. Ellsworth proposed, as a more distinctive 
form of collecting the mind of the Committee on the 
subject, "that the Legislative power of the United 
States should remain in Congress." This was not 
seconded, though it seemed better calculated for 



876 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the purpose than the first proposition of Mr. Pat- 
terson, in place of which Mr. Ellsworth wished to 
substitute it. 

Mr. Randolph was not scrupulous on the point of 
power. When the salvation of the Republic was at 
stake, it would be treason to our trust, not to pro- 
pose what we found necessary. He painted in 
strong colours the imbecility of the existing con- 
federacy, and the danger of delaying a substantial 
reform. In answer to the objection drawn from 
the sense of our constituents, as denoted by their 
acts relating to the Convention and the objects 
of their deliberation, he observed, that, as each 
State acted separately in the case, it would have 
been indecent for it to have charged the existing 
Constitution, with all the vices which it might have 
perceived in it. The first State that set on foot this 
experiment would not have been justified in going 
so far, ignorant as it was of the opinion of others, 
and sensible as it must have been of the uncertainty 
of a successful issue to the experiment. There are 
reasons certainly of a peculiar nature, where the 
ordinary cautions must be dispensed with ; and this 
is certainly one of them. He would not, as far as 
depended on him, leave any thing that seemed ne- 
cessary, undone. The present moment is favorable, 
and is probably the last that will offer. 

The true question is, whether we shall adhere to 
the Federal plan, or introduce the National plan. 
The insufficiency of the former has been fully dis- 
played by the trial already made. There are but two 
modes by which the end of a General Government 
can be attained : the first, by coercion, as proposed 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 877 

by Mr. Patterson's plan ; the second, by real legis- 
lation, as proposed by the other plan. Coercion he 
pronounced to be impracticable, expensive, cruel to 
individuals. It tended, also, to habituate the instru- 
ments of it to shed the blood, and riot in the spoils, 
of their fellow citizens, and consequently trained 
them up for the service of ambition. We must re- 
sort therefore to a national legislation over individuals ; 
for which Congress are unfit. To vest such power 
in them would be blending the Legislative with the 
Executive, contrary to the received maxim on this 
subject. If the union of these powers, heretofore, in 
Congress has been safe, it has been owing to the 
general impotency of that body. Congress are, 
moreover, not elected by the people, but by the Le- 
gislatures, who retain even a power of recall. They 
have therefore no will of their own; they are a 
mere diplomatic body, and are always obsequious to 
the views of the States, who are always encroach- 
ing on the authority of the United States. A pro- 
vision for harmony among the States, as in trade, 
naturalization, &c. ; for crushing rebellion, when- 
ever it may rear its crest ; and for certain other 
general benefits, must be made. The powers for 
these purposes can never be given to a body inade- 
quate as Congress are in point of representation, 
elected in the mode in which they are, and possessing 
no more confidence than they do : for notwithstand- 
ing what has been said to the contrary, his own ex- 
perience satisfied him, that a rooted distrust of 
Congress pretty generally prevailed. A National 
Government alone, properly constituted, will answer 
the purpose ; and he begged it to be considered that 



878 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the present is the last moment for establishing one. 
After this select experiment, the people will yield 
to despair. 213 

The Committee rose, and the House adjourned. 



Monday, June 18th. 

In Committee of the Whole, on the propositions of 
Mr. Patterson and Mr. Randolph, — On motion of 
Mr. Dickinson, to postpone the first Resolution in Mr. 
Patterson's plan, in order to take up the following, 
viz. : " that the Articles of Confederation ought to 
be revised and amended, so as to render the Gov- 
ernment of the United States adequate to the exi- 
gencies, the preservation, and the prosperity of the 
Union," — the postponement was agreed to by ten 
States; Pennsylvania, divided. 

Mr. Hamilton had been hitherto silent on the bu- 
siness before the Convention, partly from respect to 
others whose superior abilities, age and experience, 
rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dis- 
similar to theirs ; and partly from his delicate situ- 
ation with respect to his own State, to whose sen- 
timents, as expressed by his colleagues, he could by 
no means accede. The crisis, however, which now 
marked our affairs, was too serious to permit any 
scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed 
on every man to contribute his efforts for the public 
safety and happiness. He was obliged, therefore, to 
declare himself unfriendly to both plans. He was 
particularly opposed to that from New Jersey, being 
fully convinced, that no amendment of the Confed- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 879 

eration, leaving the States in possession of their 
sovereignty, could possibly answer the purpose. On 
the other hand, he confessed he was much discour- 
aged by the amazing extent of country, in expect- 
ing the desired blessings from any general sove- 
reignty that could be substituted. As to the powers 
of the Convention, he thought the doubts started 
on that subject had arisen from distinctions and rea- 
sonings too subtle. A federal government he con- 
ceived to mean an association of independent com- 
munities into one. Different confederacies have dif- 
ferent powers, and exercise them in different ways. 
In some instances, the powers are exercised over 
collective bodies, in others, over individuals, as in 
the German Diet ; and among ourselves, in cases of 
piracy. Great latitude, therefore, must be given to 
the signification of the term. The plan last pro- 
posed departs, itself, from the federal idea, as under- 
stood by some, since it is to operate eventually on 
individuals. He agreed, moreover, with the Honor- 
able gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph), that 
we owed it to our country, to do, on this emergency, 
whatever we should deem essential to its happiness. 
The States sent us here to provide for the exigencies 
of the Union. To rely on and propose any plan 
not adequate to these exigencies, merely because it 
was not clearly within our powers, would be to 
sacrifice the means to the end. It may be said, that 
the States cannot ratify a plan not within the pur- 
view of the Article of the Confederation providing 
for alterations and amendments. But may not the 
States themselves, in which no constitutional au- 
thority equal to this purpose exists in the Legisla- 



880 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

tures, have had in view a reference to the people 
at large ? In the Senate of New York, a proviso 
was moved, that no act of the Convention should 
be binding until it should be referred to the people 
and ratified ; and the motion was lost by a single 
voice only, the reason assigned against it being, that 
it might possibly be found an inconvenient shackle. 

The great question is, what provision shall we 
make for the happiness of our country ? He would 
first make a comparative examination of the two 
plans — prove that there were essential defects in 
both — and point out such changes as might render 
a national one efficacious. The great and essential 
principles necessary for the support of government 
are. 1. An active and constant interest in supporting 
it. This principle does not exist in the States, in 
favor of the Federal Government. They have 
evidently in a high degree, the esprit de corps. 
They constantly pursue internal interests adverse to 
those of the whole. They have their particular 
debts, their particular plans of finance, &c. All 
these, when opposed to, invariably prevail over, the 
requisitions and plans of Congress. 2. The love of 
power. Men love power. The same remarks are 
applicable to this principle. The States have con- 
stantly shown a disposition rather to regain the 
powers delegated by them, than to part with more, 
or to give effect to what they had parted with. 
The ambition of their demagogues is known to hate 
the control of the General Government. It may be 
remarked, too, that the citizens have not that anxi- 
ety to prevent a dissolution of the General Govern- 
ment, as of the particular governments. A dissolu- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 881 

tion of the latter would be fatal ; of the former, 
would still leave the purposes of government attain- 
able to a considerable degree. Consider what such 
a State as Virginia will be in a few years, a few 
compared with the life of nations. How strongly 
will it feel its importance .and self-sufficiency ! 3. 
An habitual attachment of the people. The whole 
force of this tie is on the side of the State Govern- 
ment. Its sovereignty is immediately before the 
eyes of the people; its protection is immediately 
enjoyed by them. From its hand distributive justice, 
and all those acts which familiarize and endear a 
government to a people, are dispensed to them. 

4. Force, by which may be understood a coercion of 
laws or coercion of arms. Congress have not the 
former, except in few cases. In particular States, 
this coercion is nearly sufficient ; though he held it, 
in most cases, not entirely so. A certain portion ol 
military force is absolutely necessary in large com- 
munities. Massachusetts is now feeling this ne- 
cessity, and making provision for it. But how can 
this force be exerted on the States collectively? It 
is impossible. It amounts to a War between the 
parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spec- 
tators. They will interpose; the confusion will 
increase ; and a dissolution of the Union will ensue. 

5. Influence, — he did not mean corruption, but a 
dispensation of those regular honors and emoluments 
which produce an attachment to the government. 
Almost all the weight of these is on the side of the 
States ; and must continue so as long as the States 
continue to exist. All the passions, then, we see, 
of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern most 

56 



882 DEBATES IN THE [1787* 

individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the cur- 
rent of the States, and do not flow into the stream 
of the General Government. The former, therefore, 
will generally be an overmatch for the General 
Government, and render any confederacy in its very 
nature precarious. Theory is in this case fully con- 
firmed by experience. The Amphictyonic Council 
had, it would seem, ample powers for general pur- 
poses. It had, in particular, the power of fining and 
using force against, delinquent members. What 
was the consequence ? Their decrees were mere 
signals of war. The Phocian war is a striking ex- 
ample of it. Philip at length, taking advantage of 
their disunion, and insinuating himself into their 
councils, made himself master of their fortunes. 
The German confederacy affords another lesson. 
The authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as 
great as could be necessary. The great feudal 
chiefs, however, exercising their local sovereignties, 
soon felt the spirit, and found the means, of encroach- 
ments, which reduced the Imperial authority to a 
nominal sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded, 
which, though aided by a Prince at its head, of great 
authority independently of his imperial attributes, is 
a striking illustration of the weakness of confeder- 
ated governments. Other examples instruct us in the 
same truth. The Swiss Cantons have scarce any 
union at all, and have been more than once at war 
with one another. How then are all these evils to 
be avoided 1 Only by such a complete sovereignty 
in the General Government as will turn all the 
strong principles and passions above-mentioned on 
its side. Does the scheme of New Jersey produce 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 883 

this effect ? Does it afford any substantial remedy 
whatever ? On the contrary it labors under great 
defects, and the defect of some of its provisions will 
destroy the efficacy of others. It gives a direct 
revenue to Congress, but this will not be sufficient. 
The balance can only be supplied by requisitions ; 
which experience proves cannot be relied on. If 
States are to deliberate on the mode, they will also 
deliberate on the object, of the supplies ; and will 
grant or not grant, as they approve or disapprove 
of it. The delinquency of one will invite and coun- 
tenance it in others. Quotas too, must, in the 
nature of things, be so unequal, as to produce the 
same evil. To what standard will you resort? 
Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland with 
Eussia; France, or England, with other countries 
of Europe ; Pennsylvania with North Carolina, — 
will the relative pecuniary abilities, in those in- 
stances, correspond with the relative value of land ? 
Take numbers of inhabitants for the rule, and make 
like comparison of different countries, and you will 
find it to be equally unjust. The different degrees 
of industry and improvement in different countries 
render the first object a precarious measure of 
wealth. Much depends, too, on situation. Con- 
necticut, New Jersey, and North Carolina, not being 
commercial States, and contributing to the wealth 
of the commercial ones, can never bear quotas 
assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion. 
They will, and must, fail in their duty. Their 
example will be followed, — and the union itself 
be dissolved. Whence, then, is the national rev- 
enue to be drawn ? From commerce ; even from 



884 DEBATESINTHE [ 1787. 

exports, which, notwithstanding the common opin- 
ion, are fit objects of moderate taxation; from 
excise, &c, &c. — These, though not equal, are less 
unequal than quotas. Another destructive ingre- 
dient in the plan is that equality of suffrage which 
is so much desired by the small States. It is not in 
human nature that Virginia and the large States 
should consent to it; or, if they did, that they should 
long abide by it. It shocks too much all ideas of 
justice, and every human feeling. Bad principles in 
a government, though slow, are sure in their opera- 
tion, and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has 
been raised whether Congress at present have a 
right to keep ships or troops in time of peace. He 
leans to the negative. Mr. Patterson's plan pro- 
vides no remedy. If the powers proposed were ad- 
equate, the organization of Congress is such, that 
they could never be properly and effectually exer- 
cised. The members of Congress, being chosen by 
the States and subject to recall, represent all the 
local prejudices. Should the powers be found effec- 
tual, they will from time to time be heaped on them, 
till a tyrannic sway shall be established. The Gen- 
eral power, whatever be its form, if it preserves it- 
self, must swallow up the state powers. Otherwise, 
it will be swallowed up by them. It is against all 
the principles of a good government, to vest the re- 
quisite powers in such a body as Congress. Two 
sovereignties cannot co-exist within the same limits. 
Giving powers to Congress must eventuate in a bad 
government, or in no government. The plan of 
New Jersey, therefore, will not do. What, then, is 
to be done? Here he was embarrassed. The ex- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 885 

tent of the country to be governed discouraged him. 
The expense of a General Government was also 
formidable ; unless there were such a diminution of 
expense on the side of the State Governments, as 
the case would admit. If they were extinguished, 
he was persuaded that great economy might be ob- 
tained by substituting a General Government. He 
did not mean, however, to shock the public opinion 
by proposing such a measure. On the other hand, 
he saw no other necessity for declining it. They are 
not necessary for any of the great purposes of com- 
merce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authori- 
ties, he was aware, would be necessary. There 
must be district tribunals; corporations for local 
purposes. But cui bono the vast and expensive ap- 
paratus now appertaining to the States 1 The only 
difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him, 
was that of drawing representatives from the ex- 
tremes to the centre of the community. What in- 
ducements can be offered that will suffice? The 
moderate wages for the first branch could only be a 
bait to little demagogues. Three dollars, or there- 
abouts, he supposed, would be the utmost. The 
Senate, he feared, from a similar cause, would be 
filled by certain undertakers, who wish for particular 
offices under the government. This view of the sub- 
ject almost led him to despair that a republican gov- 
ernment could be established over so great an ex- 
tent. He was sensible, at the same time, that it 
would be unwise to propose one of any other form. 
In his private opinion, he had no scruple in declaring, 
supported as he was by the opinion of so many of 
the wise and good, that the British Government was 



886 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the best in the world : and that he doubted much 
whether any thing short of it would do in America. 
He hoped gentlemen of different opinions would bear 
with him in this, and begged them to recollect the 
change of opinion on this subject which had taken 
place, and was still going on. It was once thought 
that the power of Congress was amply sufficient to 
secure the end of their institution. The error was 
now seen by every one. The members most tena- 
cious of republicanism, he observed, were as loud as 
any in declaiming against the vices of democracy. 
This progress of the public mind led him to anticipate 
the time, when others as well as himself, would join 
in the praise bestowed by Mr. Neckar on the British 
Constitution, namely, that it is the only government 
in the world " which unites public strength with indi- 
vidual security." In every community where indus- 
try is encouraged, there will be a division of it into 
the few and the many. Hence, separate interests 
will arise. There will be debtors and creditors, &c. 
Give all power to the many, they will oppress the 
few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress 
the many. Both, therefore, ought to have the power, 
that each may defend itself against the other. To 
the want of this check we owe our paper-money, 
instalment laws, &c. To the proper adjustment of 
it the British owe the excellence of their Constitu- 
tion. Their House of Lords is a most noble institu- 
tion. Having nothing to hope for by a change, and 
a sufficient interest, by means of their property, in 
being faithful to the national interest, they form a 
permanent barrier against every pernicious innova- 
tion, whether attempted on the part of the Crown or 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 887 

of the Commons. No temporary Senate will have 
firmness enough to answer the purpose. The Senate 
of Maryland which seems to be so much appealed 
to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had the peo- 
ple been unanimous and eager in the late appeal to 
them on the subject of a paper emission, they would 
have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing in 
such an appeal is a proof of it. Gentlemen differ in 
their opinions concerning the necessary checks, from 
the different estimates they form of the human pas- 
sions. They suppose seven years a sufficient period 
to give the Senate an adequate firmness, from not 
duly considering the amazing violence and turbu- 
lence of the democratic spirit. When a great ob- 
ject of government is pursued, which seizes the pop- 
ular passions, they spread like wild-fire and become 
irresistible. He appealed to the gentlemen from 
the New England States, whether experience had 
not there verified the remark. As to the Executive, 
it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be 
established on republican principles. Was not this 
giving up the merits of the question; for can there 
be a good government without a good Executive ? 
The English model was the only good one on this 
subject: The hereditary interest of the King was 
so interwoven with that of the nation, and his per- 
sonal emolument so great, that he was placed above 
the danger of being corrupted from abroad ; and at 
the same time was both sufficiently independent and 
sufficiently controlled, to answer the purpose of the 
institution at home. One of the weak sides of re- 
publics w r as their being liable to foreign influence 
and corruption. Men of little character, acquiring 



888 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

great power, become easily the tools of intermed- 
dling neighbours. Sweden was a striking instance. 
The French and English had each their parties dur- 
ing the late revolution, which was effected by the 
predominant influence of the former. What is the 
inference from all these observations'? That we 
ought to go as far, in order to attain stability and 
permanency, as republican principles will admit. 
Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places 
for life, or at least during good behaviour. Let the 
Executive, also, be for life. He appealed to the feel- 
ings of the members present, whether a term of seven 
years would induce the sacrifices of private affairs 
which an acceptance of public trust would require, so 
as to ensure the services of the best citizens. On this 
plan, we should have in the Senate a permanent 
will, a weighty interest, whicb would answer essen- 
tial purposes. But is this a republican government, 
it will be asked ? Yes, if all the magistrates are 
appointed and vacancies are filled by the people, or 
a process of election originating with the people. 
He was sensible that an Executive, constituted as he 
proposed would have in fact but little of the power 
and independence that might be necessary. On the 
other plan of appointing him for seven years, he 
thought the Executive ought to have but little 
power. He would be ambitious, with the means of 
making creatures ; and as the object of his ambition 
would be to prolong his power, it is probable that in 
case of war he would avail himself of the emergen- 
cy, to evade or refuse a degradation from his place. 
An Executive for life has not this motive for forget- 
ting his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer deposi- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 889 

tory of power. It will be objected, probably, that 
such an Executive will be an elective monarch, and 
will give birth to the tumults which characterize 
that form of government. He would reply, that 
monarch is an indefinite term. It marks not either 
the degree or duration of power. If this Executive 
magistrate would be a monarch for life, the other 
proposed by the Report from the Committee of the 
Whole would be a monarch for seven years. The 
circumstance of being elective was also applicable 
to both. It had been observed by judicious writers, 
that elective monarchies would be the best if they 
could be guarded against the tumults excited by the 
ambition and intrigues of competitors. He was not 
sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He 
thought this character of elective monarchies had 
been taken rather from particular cases, than from 
general principles. The election of Roman Empe- 
rors was made by the army. In Poland the elec- 
tion is made by great rival princes, with independent 
power, and ample means of raising commotions. In 
the German Empire, the appointment is made by 
the Electors and Princes, who have equal motives 
and means for exciting cabals and parties. Might 
not such a mode of election be devised among our- 
selves, as will defend the community against these 
effects in any dangerous degree ? Having made 
these observations, he would read to the Committee 
a sketch of a plan which he should prefer to either 
of those under consideration. He was aware that it 
went beyond the ideas of most members. But will 
such a plan be adopted out of doors ? In return he 
Vol. I.— 56* 



■* 



890 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

would ask, will the people adopt the other plan? 
At present they will adopt neither. But he sees the 
Union dissolving, or already dissolved — he sees evils 
operating in the States which must soon cure the 
people of their fondness for democracies — he sees 
that a great progress has been already made, and is 
still going on, in the public mind. He thinks, there- 
fore, that the people will in time be unshackled from 
their prejudices ; and whenever that happens, they 
will themselves not be satisfied at stopping where 
the plan of Mr. Randolph would place them, but be 
ready to go as far at least as he proposes. He did 
not mean to offer the paper he had sketched as a 
proposition to the Committee. It was meant only 
to give a more correct view of his ideas, and to sug- 
gest the amendments which he should probably pro- 
pose to the plan of Mr. Randolph, in the proper sta- 
ges of its future discussion. He reads his sketch in 
the words following : to wit. 

"I. The supreme Legislative power of the United 
States of America to be vested in two different bod- 
ies of men ; the one to be called the Assembly, the 
other the Senate ; who together shall form the Le- 
gislature of the United States, with power to pass 
all laws whatsoever, subject to the negative here- 
after mentioned. 

" II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected 
by the people to serve for three years. 

"III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to 
serve during good behaviour ; their election to be 
made by electors chosen for that purpose by the 
people. In order to this, the States to be divided 
into election districts. On the death, removal or re- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 891 

signation of any Senator, his place to be filled out of 
the district from which he came. 

"IV. The supreme Executive authority of the 
United States to be vested in a Governor, to be 
elected to serve during good behaviour ; the election 
to be made by Electors chosen by the people in the 
Election Districts aforesaid. The authorities ana\ 
functions of the Executive to be as follows : to have j 
a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the/ 
execution of all laws passed ; to have the direction 
of war when authorized or begun ; to have, with the 
advice and approbation of the Senate, the power of 
making all treaties ; to have the sole appointment of 
the heads or chief officers of the Departments of Fi- 
nance, War, and Foreign Affairs ; to have the nom- 
ination of all other officers, (ambassadors to foreign 
nations included,) subject to the approbation or re- 
jection of the Senate ; to have the power of pardon- 
ing all offences except treason, which he shall not 
pardon without the approbation of the Senate. 

" V. On the death, resignation, or removal of the 
Governor, his authorities to be exercised by the 
President of the Senate till a successor be appointed. 

" VI. The Senate to have the sole power of de- 
claring war ; the power of advising and approving 
all treaties ; the power of approving or rejecting all 
appointments of officers, except the heads or chiefs 
of the Departments of Finance, War, and Foreign 
Affairs. 

" VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vest- 
ed in Judges, to hold their offices during good be- 
haviour, with adequate and permanent salaries. 
This court to have original jurisdiction in all causes 



892 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

of capture, and an appellative jurisdiction in all causes 
in which the revenues of the General Government, 
or the citizens of foreign nations, are concerned. 

" VIII. The Legislature of the United States to 
have power to institute courts in each State for the 
determination of all matters of general concern. 

" IX. The Governor, Senators, and all officers of 
the United States, to be liable to impeachment for 
mal-, and corrupt conduct ; and upon conviction to 
be removed from office, and disqualified for holding 
any place of trust or profit : all impeachments to be 

tried by a Court to consist of the Chief , or 

Judge of the Superior Court of Law of each State, 
provided such Judge shall hold his place during 
good behaviour and have a permanent salary. 

" X. All laws of the particular States contrary to 
the Constitution or laws of the United States to be 
utterly void ; and the better to prevent such laws 
being passed, the Governor or President of each 
State shall be appointed by the General Govern- 
ment, and shall have a negative upon the laws about 
to be passed in the State of which he is the Governor 
or President. 

" XI. No State to have any forces land or naval ; 
and the militia of all the States to be under the sole 
and exclusive direction of the United States, the 
officers of which to be appointed and commissioned 
by them." 

On these several articles he entered into explana- 
tory observations* corresponding with the principles 
of his introductory reasoning. 214 

The Committee rose, and the House adjourned. 

* The speech introducing the plan, as above taken down and written out, was 



1787. j FEDERAL CONVENTION. 893 

Tuesday, June 19th. 

In Committee of the Whole, on the propositions of 
Mr. Patterson, — The substitute offered yesterday 
by Mr. Dickinson being rejected by a vote now 
taken on it, — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
Delaware, aye — 4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
no — 6 ; Maryland, divided, — Mr. Patterson's plan 
was again at large before the Committee. 

Mr. Madison. Much stress has been laid by some 
gentlemen on the want of power in the Convention 
to propose any other than a federal plan. To what 
had been answered by others, he would only add, 
that neither of the characteristics attached to a. fed- 
eral plan would support this objection. One char- 
acteristic was, that in a federal government the 
power was exercised not on the people individually, 
but on the people collectively, on the States. Yet in 
some instances, as in piracies, captures, (&c, the ex- 
isting Confederacy, and in many instances the 
amendments to it proposed by Mr. Patterson, must 
operate immediately on individuals. The other 
characteristic was, that a federal government de- 
rived its appointments not immediately from the 



seen by Mr. Hamilton, who approved its correctness, with one or two verbal 
changes, which were made as he suggested. The explanatory observations 
which did not immediately follow, were to have been furnished by Mr. H. who 
did not find leisure at the time to write them out, and they were not obtained. 
Judge Yates, in his notes, appears to have consolidated the explanatory with the 
introductory observations of Mr. Hamilton (under date of June 19th, a typograph- 
ical error). It was in the former, Mr. Madison observed, that Mr. Hamilton, 
in speaking of popular governments, however modified, made the remark at- 
tributed to him by Judge Yates, that they were " but pork still, with a little 
change of sauce." 



894 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

people, but from the States which they respect- 
ively composed. Here, too, were facts on the other 
side. In two of the States, Connecticut and Rhode 
Island, the Delegates to Congress were chosen, not 
by the Legislatures, but by the people at large ; and 
the plan of Mr. Patterson intended no change in 
this particular. ■ ' 

It had been alleged (by Mr. Patterson), that the 
Confederation, having been formed by unanimous 
consent, could be dissolved by unanimous consent 
only. Does this doctrine result from the nature of 
compacts? Does it arise from any particular stipu- 
lation in the Articles of Confederation ? If we con- 
sider the Federal Union as analagous to the funda- 
mental compact by which individuals compose one 
society, and which must, in its theoretic origin at 
least, have been the unanimous act of the compo- 
nent members, it cannot be said that no dissolution 
of the compact can be effected without unanimous 
consent. A breach of the fundamental principles 
of the compact by a part of the society, would cer- 
tainly absolve the other part from their obligations 
to it. If the breach of any article by any of the 
parties, does not set the others at liberty, it is be- 
cause the contrary is implied in the compact itself, 
and particularly by that law of it which gives an 
indefinite authority to the majority to bind the whole, 
in all cases. This latter circumstance shows, that 
we are not to consider the Federal Union as anala- 
gous to the social compact of individuals : for if it 
were so, a majority would have a right to bind the 
rest, and even to form a new Constitution for the 
whole ; which the gentleman from New Jersey 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 895 

would be among the last to admit. If we consider 
the Federal Union as analagous, not to the social 
compacts among individual men ; but to the Conven- 
tions among individual States, what is the doctrine 
resulting from these Conventions ? Clearly, ac- 
cording to the expositors of the law of nations, that 
a breach of any one article by any one party, leaves 
all the other parties at liberty to consider the whole 
convention as dissolved, unless they choose rather 
to compel the delinquent party to repair the breach. 
In some treaties, indeed, it is expressly stipulated, 
that a violation of particular articles shall not have 
this consequence, and even that particular articles 
shall remain in force during war which is in general 
understood to dissolve all subsisting treaties. But 
are there any exceptions of this sort to the Articles 
of Confederation ? So far from it, that there is not 
even an express stipulation that force shall be used 
to compel an offending member of the Union to dis- 
charge its duty. He observed, that the violations of 
the Federal Articles had been numerous and notori- 
ous. Among the most notorious was an act of New 
Jersey herself; by which she expressly refused to 
comply with a constitutional requisition of Con- 
gress, and yielded no further to the expostulations 
of their Deputies, than barely to rescind her vote of 
refusal, without passing any positive act of compli- 
ance. He did not wish to draw any rigid inferences 
from these observations. He thought it proper, 
however, that the true nature of the existing Con- 
federacy should be investigated, and he was not 
anxious to strengthen the foundations on which it 
now stands. 



896 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Proceeding to the consideration of Mr. Patter- 
son's plan, he stated the object of a proper plan to 
be twofold, — first, to preserve the Union ; secondly, 
to provide a Government that will remedy the evils 
felt by the States, both in their united and individual 
capacities. Examine Mr. Patterson's plan, and 
say whether it promises satisfaction in these re- 
spects. 

1. Will it prevent the violations of the law of 
nations and of treaties which, if not prevented, must 
involve us in the calamities of foreign wars ? The 
tendency of the States to these violations has been 
manifested in sundry instances. The files of Con- 
gress contain complaints, already, from almost every 
nation with which treaties have been formed. 
Hitherto indulgence has been shown to us. This 
cannot be the permanent disposition of foreign na- 
tions. A rupture with other powers is among the 
greatest of national calamities. It ought, therefore, 
to be effectually provided, that no part of a nation 
shall have it in its power to bring them on the 
whole. The existing Confederacy does not suffi- 
ciently provide against this evil. The proposed 
amendment to it does not supply the omission. It 
leaves the will of the States as uncontrolled as ever. 

2. Will it prevent encroachments on the Federal 
authority ? A tendency to such encroachments has 
been sufficiently exemplified among ourselves, as 
well as in every other confederated republic, ancient 
and modern. By the Federal Articles, transactions 
with the Indians appertain to Congress, yet in 
several instances the States have entered into 
treaties and wars with them. In like manner, no 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 897 

two or more States can form among themselves any 
treaties, &c, without the consent of Congress : yet 
Virginia and Maryland, in one instance — Pennsyl- 
vania and New Jersey, in another — have entered 
into compacts without previous application or subse- 
quent apology. No State, again, can of right raise 
troops in time of peace without the like consent. 
Of all cases of the league, this seems to require the 
most scrupulous observance. Has not Massachu- 
setts, notwithstanding, the most powerful member of 
the Union, already raised a body of troops ? Is she 
not now augmenting them, without having evei, 
deigned to apprise Congress of her intentions ? In 
fine, have we not seen the public land dealt out to 
Connecticut to bribe her acquiescence in the de- 
cree constitutionally awarded against her claim on 
the territory of Pennsylvania "l For no other pos- 
sible motive can account for the policy of Congress 
in that measure. If we recur to the examples of 
other confederacies, we shall find in all of them the 
same tendency of the parts to encroach on the au- 
thority of the whole. He then reviewed the Am- 
phictyonic and Achsean confederacies, among the 
ancients, and the Helvetic, Germanic, and Belgic, 
among the moderns; tracing their analogy to the 
United States in the constitution and extent of their 
federal authorities ; in the tendency of the particular 
members to usurp on these authorities, and to bring 
confusion and ruin on the whole. He observed, 
that the plan of Mr. Patterson, besides omitting a 
control over the States, as a general defence of the 
Federal prerogatives, was particularly defective in 
two of its provisions. In the first place, its ratifica- 
57 



898 DEBATESINTHE [ 1787. 

tion was not to be by the people at large ; but by 
the Legislatures. It could not, therefore, render the 
acts of Congress, in pursuance of their powers, even 
legally paramount to the acts of the States. And 
in the second place, it gave to the Federal tribunal 
an appellate jurisdiction only even in the criminal 
cases enumerated. The necessity of any such pro- 
vision supposed a danger of undue acquittal in the 
State tribunals, — of what avail would an appellate 
tribunal be after an acquittal ? Besides, in most, if 
not all, of the States, the Executives have, by their 
respective Constitutions, the right of pardoning, — 
how could this be taken from them by a legislative 
ratification only 1 

3. Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each 
other ? Of these enough has been already seen. He 
instanced acts of Virginia and Maryland, which gave 
a preference to their own citizens in cases where the 
citizens of other States are entitled to equality of 
privileges by the Articles of Confederation. He con- 
sidered the emissions of paper-money, and other kin- 
dred measures, as also aggressions. The States, rela- 
tively to one another, being each of them either debt- 
or or creditor, the creditor States must suffer unjust- 
ly from every emission by the debtor States. We 
have seen retaliating acts on the subject, which 
threatened danger, not to the harmony only, but the 
tranquillity of the Union. The plan of Mr. Patter- 
son, not giving even a negative on the acts of the 
States, left them as much at liberty as ever to exe- 
cute their unrighteous projects against each other. 

4. Will it secure the internal tranquillity of the 
States themselves ? The insurrections in Massachu- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 899 

setts admonished all the States of the danger to 
which they were exposed. Yet the plan of Mr. Pat- 
terson contained no provisions for supplying the de- 
fect of the Confederation on this point. According 
to the republican theory, indeed, right and power be- 
ing both vested in the majority, are held to be sy- 
nonymous. According to fact and experience, a mi- 
nority may, in an appeal to force, be an overmatch 
for the majority: — in the first place, if the minority 
happen to include all such as possess the skill and 
habits of military life, with such as possess the 
great pecuniary resources, one-third may conquer the 
remaining two-thirds; in the second place, one- 
third of those who participate in the choice of rulers, 
may be rendered a majority by the accession of 
those whose poverty disqualifies them from a suf- 
frage, and who, for obvious reasons, must be more 
ready to join the standard of sedition than that of 
established government ; and, in the third place, 
where slavery exists, the republican theory becomes 
still more fallacious. 

5. Will it secure a good internal legislation and 
administration to the particular States ? In devel- 
oping the evils which vitiate the political system of 
the United States, it is proper to take into view 
those which prevail within the States individually, 
as well as those which affect them collectively; 
since the former indirectly affect the whole, and 
there is great reason to believe that the pressure of 
them had a full share in the motives which produced 
the present Convention. Under this head he enu- 
merated and animadverted on, — first, the multiplicity 
of the laws passed by the several States ; secondly, 



900 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the mutability of their laws ; thirdly, the injustice 
of them ; and fourthly, the impotence of them ; — ob- 
serving that Mr. Patterson's plan contained no 
remedy for this dreadful class of evils, and could 
not therefore be received as an adequate provision 
for the exigencies of the community. 

6. Will it secure the Union against the influence 
of foreign powers over its members ? He pretended 
not to say that any such influence had yet been 
tried : but it was naturally to be expected that oc- 
casions would produce it. As lessons which claimed 
particular attention, he cited the intrigues practised 
among the Amphictyonic confederates, first by the 
Kings of Persia, and afterwards fatally, by Philip of 
Macedon; among the Achaeans, first by Macedon, 
and afterwards, no less fatally, by Rome ; among the 
Swiss, by Austria, France and the lesser neighbour- 
ing powers ; among the members of the Germanic 
body, by France, England, Spain and Russia ; and in 
the Belgic republic, by all the great neighbouring 
powers. The plan of Mr. Patterson, not giving to 
the general councils any negative on the will of the 
particular States, left the door open for the like per- 
nicious machinations among ourselves. 

7. He begged the smaller States, which were most 
attached to Mr. Patterson's plan, to consider the 
situation in which it would leave them. In the first 
place they would continue to bear the whole expense 
of maintaining their Delegates in Congress. It ought 
not to be said, that, if they were willing to bear this 
burthen, no others had a right to complain. As far 
as it led the smaller States to forbear keeping 
up a representation, by which the public business 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 901 

was delayed, it was evidently a matter of common 
concern. An examination of the minutes of Con- 
gress would satisfy every one, that the public busi- 
ness had been frequently delayed by this cause ; and 
that the States most frequently unrepresented in Con- 
gress were not the larger States. He reminded the 
Convention of another consequence of leaving on a 
small State the burden of maintaining a representa- 
tion in Congress. During a considerable period of 
the war, one of the Representatives of Delaware, in 
whom alone, before the signing of the Confederation, 
the entire vote of that State, and after that event one 
half of its vote, frequently resided, was a citizen and 
resident of Pennsylvania, and held an office in his 
own State incompatible with an appointment from 
it to Congress. During another period, the same 
State was represented by three Delegates, two of 
whom were citizens of Pennsylvania, and the third 
a citizen of New Jersey. These expedients must 
have been intended to avoid the burden of support- 
ing Delegates from their own State. But whatever 
might have been the cause, was not in effect the 
vote of one State doubled, and the influence of an- 
other increased by it V 15 In the second place the co- 
ercion on which the efficacy of the plan depends can 
never be exerted but on themselves. The larger 
States will be impregnable, the smaller only can feel 
the vengeance of it. He illustrated the position by 
the history of the Amphictyonic confederates ; and 
the ban of the German Empire. It was the cob- 
web which could entangle the weak, but would be 
the sport of the strong. 

8. He begged them to consider the situation in 



902 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

which they would remain, in case their pertinacious 
adherence to an inadmissible plan should prevent 
the adoption of any plan. The contemplation of 
such an event was painful ; but it would be prudent 
to submit to the task of examining it at a distance, 
that the means of escaping it might be the more 
readily embraced. Let the union of the States be 
dissolved, and one of two consequences must happen. 
Either the States must remain individually inde- 
pendent and sovereign ; or two or more confedera- 
cies must be formed among them. In the first event, 
would the small States be more secure against the 
ambition and power of their larger neighbours, than 
they would be under a General Government perva- 
ding with equal energy every part of the Empire, 
and having an equal interest in protecting every 
part against every other part ? In the second, can 
the smaller expect that their larger neighbours 
would confederate with them on the principle of the 
present Confederacy, which gives to each member 
an equal suffrage ; or that they would exact less 
severe concessions from the smaller States, than are 
proposed in the scheme of Mr. Randolph. 

The great difficulty lies in the affair of representa- 
tion ; and if this could be adjusted, all others would 
be surmountable. It was admitted by both the gen- 
tlemen from New Jersey, (Mr. Brearly and Mr. 
Patterson,) that it would not be just to allow Vir- 
ginia, which was sixteen times as large as Dela- 
ware, an equal vote only. Their language was, that 
it would not he safe for Delaware to allow Virginia 
sixteen times as many votes. The expedient pro- 
posed by them was, that all the States should be 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 903 

thrown into one mass, and a new partition be made 
into thirteen equal parts. Would such a scheme be 
practicable 1 The dissimilarities existing in the 
rules of property, as well as in the manners, habits 
and prejudices, of different States, amounted to a 
prohibition of the attempt. It had been found im- 
possible for the power of one of the most absolute 
princes in Europe (the King of France,) directed by 
the wisdom of one of the most enlightened and pa- 
triotic ministers (Mr. Neckar) that any age has pro- 
duced, to equalize, in some points only, the different 
usages and regulations of the different provinces. 
But admitting a general amalgamation and reparti- 
tion of the States to be practicable, and the danger 
apprehended by the smaller States from a propor- 
tional representation to be real, — would not a par- 
ticular and voluntary coalition of these with their 
neighbours, be less inconvenient to the whole com- 
munity, and equally effectual for their own safety? 
If New Jersey or Delaware conceived that an ad- 
vantage would accrue to them from an equalization 
of the States, in which case they would necessarily 
form a junction with their neighbours, why might 
not this end be attained by leaving them at liberty 
by the Constitution to form such a junction when- 
ever they pleased ? And why should they wish to 
obtrude a like arrangement on all the States, when 
it was, to say the least, extremely difficult, would 
be obnoxious to many of the States, and when nei- 
ther the inconvenience, nor the benefit of the expe- 
dient to themselves, would be lessened by confining 
it to themselves ? The prospect of many new 
States to the westward was another consideration 



904 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

of importance. If they should come into the Union 
at all, they would come when they contained but 
few inhabitants. If they should be entitled to vote 
according to their proportion of inhabitants, ail 
would be right and safe. Let them have an equal 
vote, and a more objectionable minority than ever, 
might give law to the whole. 216 

On a question for postponing generally the first 
proposition of Mr. Patterson's plan, it was agreed 
to, — New York and New Jersey only being, no. 217 

On the question, moved by Mr. King, whether the 
Committee should rise, and Mr. Randolph's proposi- 
tion be reported without alteration, which was in 
fact a question whether Mr. Randolph's should be 
adhered to as preferable to those of Mr. Patterson, — 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7; 
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no — 3 ; Mary- 
land, divided. 

Mr. Randolph's plan as reported from the Com- 
mittee [q. v. June 13th] being before the House, 
and — 

The first Resolution, "that a national Govern- 
ment ought to be established, consisting, cfcc," being 
taken up, 

Mr. Wilson observed that, by a national Govern- 
ment, he did not mean one that would swallow up 
the State Governments, as seemed to be wished by 
some gentlemen. He was tenacious of the idea of 
preserving the latter. He thought, contrary to the 
opinion of Colonel Hamilton, that they might not 
only subsist, but subsist on friendly terms with the 
former. They were absolutely necessary for certain 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 905 

purposes, which the former could not reach. All 
large governments must be subdivided into lesser 
jurisdictions. As examples he mentioned Persia, 
Rome, and particularly the divisions and subdivisions 
of England by Alfred. 

Colonel Hamilton coincided with the proposition 
as it stood in the Report. He had not been under- 
stood yesterday. By an abolition of the States, he 
meant that no boundary could be drawn between 
the National and State Legislatures; that the former 
must therefore have indefinite authority. If it were 
limited at all, the rivalship of the States would 
gradually subvert it. Even as corporations, the ex- 
tent of some of them, as Virginia, Massachusetts, 
&c, would be formidable. As States, he thought 
they ought to be abolished. But he admitted the 
necessity of leaving in them subordinate jurisdic- 
tions. The examples of Persia and the Roman 
Empire, cited by Mr. Wilson, were, he thought, in 
favor of his doctrine, the great powers delegated to 
the Satraps and Proconsuls having frequently pro- 
duced revolts and schemes of independence. 

Mr. King wished, as every thing depended on this 
proposition, that no objection might be improperly 
indulged against the phraseology of it. He con- 
ceived that the import of the term " States," " sove- 
reignty," " national" " federal," had been often used 
and applied in the discussions inaccurately and de- 
lusively. The States were not " sovereigns" in the 
sense contended for by some. They did not possess 
the peculiar features of sovereignty, — they could not 
make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties. 
Considering them as political beings, they were 
57 * 



906 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

dumb, for they could not speak to any foreign 
sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they 
could not hear any propositions from such sovereign. 
They had not even the organs or faculties of defence 
or offence, for they could not of themselves raise 
troops, or equip vessels, for war. On the other side, 
if the union of the States comprises the idea of a 
confederation, it comprises that also of consolida- 
tion. A union of the States is a union of the men 
composing them, from whence a national character 
results to the whole. Congress can act alone with- 
out the States ; they can act, and their acts will he 
binding, against the instructions of the States. If 
they declare war, war is de jure declared ; captures 
made in pursuance of it are lawful ; no acts of the 
States can vary the situation, or prevent the judicial 
consequences. If the States, therefore, retained 
some portion of their sovereignty, they had certainly 
divested themselves of essential portions of it. If 
they formed a confederacy in some respects, they 
formed a nation in others. The Convention could 
clearly deliberate on and propose any alterations 
that Congress could have done under the Federal 
Articles. And could not Congress propose, by vir- 
tue of the last Article, a change in any article what- 
ever, — and as well that relating to the equality 
of suffrage, as any other ? He made these remarks 
to obviate some scruples which had been expressed. 
He doubted much the practicability of annihilating 
the States ; but thought that much of their power 
ought to be taken from them. 218 

Mr. Martin said, he considered that the separa- 
tion from Great Britain placed the thirteen States 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 907 

I in a state of nature towards each other ; that they 
S would have remained in that state till this time, but 
> for the Confederation ; that they entered into the 
Confederation on the footing of equality ; that they 
met now to amend it, on the same footing ; and 
that he could never accede to a plan that would in- 
troduce an inequality, and lay ten States at the 
mercy of Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. 
Mr. Wilson could not admit the doctrine that 
when the colonies became independent of Great 
Britain, they became independent also of each other. 
He read the Declaration of Independence, observing 
thereon, that the United Colonies were declared to 
be free and independent States ; and inferring, that 
they were independent, not individually but unitedly, 
and that they were confederated, as they were in- 
dependent States. 

Colonel Hamilton assented to the doctrine of Mr. 
Wilson. He denied the doctrine that the States 
were thrown into a state of nature. He was not 
yet prepared to admit the doctrine that the Confed- 
eracy could be dissolved by partial infractions of it. 
He admitted that the States met now on an equal 
footing, but could see no inference from that against 
concerting a change of the system in this particular. 
He took this occasion of observing, for the purpose 
of appeasing the fear of the small States, that two 
circumstances would render them secure under a 
national Government in which they might lose the 
equality of rank which they now held: one was the 
local situation of the three largest States, Virginia, 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. They were sepa- 
rated from each other by distance of place, and 



908 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

equally so, by all the peculiarities which distinguish 
the interests of one State from those of another. 
No combination, therefore, could be dreaded. In 
the second place, as there was a gradation in the 
States, from Virginia, the largest, down to Dela- 
ware, the smallest, it would always happen that 
ambitious combinations among a few States might 
and would be counteracted by defensive combina- 
tions of greater extent among the rest. No combi- 
nation has been seen among the large counties, 
merely as such, against lesser counties. The more 
close the union of the States, and the more complete 
the authority of the whole, the less opportunity will 
be allowed to the stronger States to injure the 
weaker. 219 
Adjourned. 



Wednesday, June 20th. 

In Convention, — Mr. William Blount, from North 
Carolina, took his seat. 

The first Resolution of the Report of the Com- 
mittee of the Whole being before the House- 
Mr. Ellsworth, seconded by Mr. Gorham, mores 
to alter it, so as to run " that the government of the 
United States ought to consist of a supreme Legis- 
lative, Executive and Judiciary." This alteration, 
he said, would drop the word national, and retain 
the proper title "the United States." He could not 
admit the doctrine that a breach of any of the Fed- 
eral Articles could dissolve the whole. It would be 
highly dangerous not to consider the Confederation 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 909 

as still subsisting. He wished, also, the plan of the 
Convention to go forth as an amendment of the Ar- 
ticles of the Confederation, since, under this idea the 
authority of the Legislatures could ratify it. If they 
are unwilling, the people will be so too. If the 
plan goes forth to the people for ratification, several 
succeeding conventions within the States would be 
unavoidable. He did not like these conventions. 
They were better fitted to pull down than to build 
up constitutions. 

Mr. Randolph did not object to the change of ex- 
pression, but apprised the gentleman who wished 
for it, that he did not admit it for the reasons assign- 
ed ; particularly that of getting rid of a reference to 
the people for ratification. 

The motion of Mr. Ellsworth was acquiesced in, 
nem. con. 

The second Resolution, " that the national legis- 
lature ought to consist of two branches," being taken 
up, the word " national" struck out, as of course. 

Mr. Lansing observed, that the true question here 
was, whether the Convention would adhere to, or 
depart from, the foundation of the present confed- 
eracy; and moved, instead of the second Resolution, 
"that the powers of legislation be vested in the 
United States in Congress." He had already 
assigned two reasons against such an innovation as 
was proposed, — first, the want of competent powers 
in the Convention ; secondly, the state of the public 
mind. It had been observed by (Mr. Madison), in 
discussing the first point, that in two States the 
Delegates to Congress were chosen by the people. 
Notwithstanding the first appearance of this remark, 



910 DEBATES IN THE [1787 

it had in fact no weight, as the Delegates, however 
chosen, did not represent the people, merely as so 
many individuals ; but as forming a sovereign State. 
Mr. Randolph put it, he said, on its true footing, 
namely that the public safety superseded the scruple 
arising from the review of our powers. But in order 
to feel the force of this consideration, the same im- 
pression must be had of the public danger. He had 
not himself the same impression, and could not there- 
fore dismiss his scruple. Mr. Wilson contended, 
that, as the Convention were only to recommend, 
they might recommend what they pleased. He 
differed much from him. Any act whatever of so 
respectable a body must have a great effect ; and 
if it does not succeed will be a source of great dis- 
sensions. He admitted that there was no certain 
criterion of the public mind on the subject. He 
therefore recurred to the evidence of it given by the 
opposition in the States to the scheme of an Impost. 
It could not be expected that those possessing sove- 
reignty could ever voluntarily part with it. It was 
not to be expected from any one State, much less 
from thirteen. He proceeded to make some obser- 
vations on the plan itself, and the arguments urged 
in support of it. The point of representation could 
receive no elucidation from the case of England. 
The corruption of the boroughs did not proceed from 
their comparative smallness; but from the actual 
fewness of the inhabitants, some of them not having 
more than one or two. A great inequality existed 
in the counties of England. Yet the like complaint 
of peculiar corruption in the small ones had not 
been made. It had been said that Congress repre- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 911 

sent the State prejudices, — will not any other body 
whether chosen by the Legislatures or people of 
the States, also represent their prejudices? It had 
been asserted by his colleague (Colonel Hamilton), 
that there was no coincidence of interests among the 
large States that ought to excite fears of oppression in 
the smaller. If it were true that such a uniformity of 
interests existed among the States, there was equal 
safety for all of them whether the representation re- 
mained as heretofore, or were proportioned as now 
proposed. It is proposed that the General Legislature 
shall have a negative on the laws of the States. 
Is it conceivable that there will be leisure for such a 
task ? There will, on the most moderate calculation, 
be as many acts sent up from the States as there 
are days in the year. Will the members of the 
General Legislature be competent judges? Will 
a gentleman from Georgia be a judge of the expedi- 
ency of a law which is to operate in New Hamp- 
shire ? Such a negative would be more injurious 
than that of Great Britain heretofore was. It is said 
that the National Government must have the influ- 
ence arising from the grant of offices and honors. 
In order to render such a government effectual, he 
believed such an influence to be necessary. But if 
the States will not agree to it, it is in vain, worse 
than in vain, to make the proposition. If this influ- 
ence is to be attained, the States must be entirely 
abolished. Will any one say, this would ever be 
agreed to? He doubted whether any General 
Government, equally beneficial to all, can be at- 
tained. That now under consideration, he is sure, 
must be utterly unattainable. He had another ob- 
jection. The system was too novel and complex. 



912 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

No man could foresee what its operation will be, 
either with respect to the General Government, or 
the State Governments. One or other, it has been 
surmised, must absorb the whole. 220 

Col. Mason did not expect this point would have 
been reagitated. The essential differences between 
the two plans had been clearly stated. The princi- 
pal objections against that of Mr. Randolph were, 
the icant of 'power, and the want of practicability. 
There can be no weight in the first, as the fiat is not 
to be here, but in the people. He thought with his 
colleague (Mr. Randolph,) that there were, besides, 
certain crises, in which all the ordinary cautions 
yielded to public necessity. He gave as an exam- 
ple, the eventual treaty with Great Britain, in form- 
ing which the Commissioners of the United States 
had boldly disregarded the improvident shackles of 
Congress; had given to their country an honorable and 
happy peace, and, instead of being censured for the 
transgression of their powers, had raised to themselves 
a monument more durable than brass. The impracti- 
cability of gaining the public concurrence, he thought, 
was still more groundless. Mr. Lansing had cited 
the attempts of Congress to gain an enlargement of 
their powers, and had inferred from the miscarriage 
of these attempts, the hopelessness of the plan which 
he (Mr. Lansing) opposed. He thought a very dif- 
ferent inference ought to have been drawn, viz. that 
the plan which Mr. Lansing espoused, and which 
proposed to augment the powers of Congress, never 
could be expected to succeed. He meant not to 
throw any reflections on Congress as a body, much 
less on any particular members of it. He meant, 
however, to speak his sentiments without reserve on 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 913 

this subject ; it was a privilege of age, and perhaps 
the only compensation which nature had given for 
the privation of so many other enjoyments ; and he 
should not scruple to exercise it freely. Is it to be 
thought that the people of America, so watchful 
over their interests, so jealous of their liberties, will 
give up their all, will surrender both the sword and 
the purse, to the same body, — and that, too, not cho- 
sen immediately by themselves ? They never will. 
They never ought. Will they trust such a body 
with the regulation of their trade, with the regula- 
tion of their taxes, with all the other great powers 
which are in contemplation ? Will they give un- 
bounded confidence to a secret Journal, — to the in- 
trigues, to the factions, which in the nature of things 
appertain to such an assembly ■? If any man doubts 
the existence of these characters of Congress, let 
him consult their Journals for the years '78, '79, and 
'80. It will be said, that if the people are averse to 
parting with power, why is it hoped that they will 
part with it to a national Legislature? The proper 
answer is, that in this case they do not part with 
power : they only transfer it from one set of imme- 
diate representatives to another set. Much has been 
said of the unsettled state of the mind of the people. 
He believed the mind of the people of America, as 
elsewhere, was unsettled as to some points, but set- 
tled as to others. In two points he was sure it was 
well settled, — first, in an attachment to republican 
government; secondly, in an attachment to more 
than one branch in the Legislature. Their constitu- 
tions accord so generally in both these circumstances, 
that they seem almost to have been preconcerted. 
58 



914 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

This must either have been a miracle, or have re- 
sulted from the genius of the people. The only ex- 
ceptions to the establishment of two branches in the 
Legislature are the State of Pennsylvania, and Con- 
gress ; and the latter the only single one not chosen 
by the people themselves. What has been the con- 
sequence ? The people have been constantly averse 
to giving that body further powers. It was ac- 
knowledged by Mr. Patterson, that his plan could 
not be enforced without military coercion. Does he 
consider the force of this concession ? The most 
jarring elements of nature, fire and water them- 
selves, are not more incompatible than such a mix- 
ture of civil liberty and military execution. Will the 
militia march from one State into another, in order 
to collect the arrears of taxes from the delinquent 
members of the Republic ? Will they maintain an 
army for this purpose ? Will not the citizens of the 
invaded State assist one another, till they rise as one 
man and shake off the Union altogether ? Rebellion 
is the only case in which the military force of the 
State can be properly exerted against its citizens. 
In one point of view, he was struck with horror at 
the prospect of recurring to this expedient. To 
punish the non-payment of taxes with death was a 
severity not yet adopted by despotism itself; yet 
this unexampled cruelty would be mercy compared 
to a military collection of revenue, in which the bay- 
onet could make no discrimination between the in- 
nocent and the guilty. He took this occasion to 
repeat, that, notwithstanding his solicitude to estab- 
lish a national Government, he never would agree 
to abolish the State Governments, or render them 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 915 

absolutely insignificant. They were as necessary as 
the General Government, and he would be equally 
careful to preserve them. He was aware of the 
difficulty of drawing the line between them, but 
hoped it was not insurmountable. The Convention, 
though comprising so many distinguished characters, 
could not be expected to make a faultless Govern- 
ment. And he would prefer trusting to posterity 
the amendment of its defects, rather than to push 
the experiment too far. 221 

Mr. LutherMartin agreed with Colonel Mason 
as to the importance of the State Governments : he 
would support them at the expense of the General 
Governmeut, which was instituted for the purpose of 
that support. He saw no necessity for two branch- 
es; and if it existed, Congress might be organized 
into two. He considered Congress as representing 
the people, being chosen by the Legislatures, who 
were chosen by the people. At any rate, Congress 
represented the Legislatures ; and it was the Legis- 
latures, not the people, who refused to enlarge their 
powers. Nor could the rule of voting have been the 
ground of objection, otherwise ten of the States must 
always have been ready to place further confidence 
in Congress. The causes of repugnance must there- 
fore be looked for elsewhere. At the separation 
from the British Empire, the people of America pre- 
ferred the establishment of themselves into thirteen 
separate sovereignties, instead of incorporating them- 
selves into one. To these they look up for the secu- 
rity of their lives, liberties, and properties ; to these 
they must look up. The Federal Government they 
formed to defend the whole against foreign nations 



916 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

in time of war, and to defend the lesser States 
against the ambition of the larger. They are afraid 
of granting power unnecessarily, lest they should de- 
feat the original end of the Union ; lest the powers 
should prove dangerous to the sovereignties of the 
particular States which the Union was meant to sup- 
port ; and expose the lesser to being swallowed up 
by the larger. He conceived also that the people of 
the States, having already vested their powers in their 
respective Legislatures, could not resume them with- 
out a dissolution of their Governments. He was 
against conventions in the States — was not against 
assisting States against rebellious subjects — thought 
the federal plan of Mr. Patterson did not require 
coercion more than the national one, as the latter 
must depend for the deficiency of its revenues on re- 
quisitions and quotas — and that a national judiciary, 
extended into the States, would be ineffectual, and 
would be viewed with a jealousy inconsistent with 
its usefulness. 222 

Mr. Sherman seconded and supported Mr. Lan- 
sing's motion. He admitted two branches to be ne- 
cessary in the State Legislatures, but saw no neces- 
sity in a confederacy of States. The examples were 
all of a single council. Congress carried us through 
the war, and perhaps as well as any government 
could have done. The complaints at present are, 
not that the vieVs of Congress are unwise or un- 
faithful, but that that their powers are insufficient 
for the execution of their views. The national 
debt, and the want of power somew 7 here to draw 
forth the national resources, are the great matters 
that press. All the States were sensible of the de- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 917 

feet of power in Congress. He thought much might 
be said in apology for the failure of the State Legis- 
latures, to comply with the Confederation. They 
were afraid of leaning too hard on the people by ac- 
cumulating taxes; no constitutional rule had been, 
or could be observed in the quotas ; the accounts al- 
so were unsettled, and every State supposed itself in 
advance, rather than in arrears. For want of a gen- 
eral system, taxes to a due amount had not been 
drawn from trade, which was the most convenient 
resource. As almost all the States had agreed to the 
recommendation of Congress on the subject of an 
impost, it appeared clearly that they were willing to 
trust Congress with power to draw a revenue from 
trade. There is no weight, therefore, in the argument 
drawn from a distrust of Congress ; for money mat- 
ters being the most important of all, if the people 
will trust them with power as to them, they will 
trust them with any other necessary powers. Con- 
gress, indeed, by the Confederation, have in fact the 
right of saying how much the people shall pay, and 
to what purpose it shall be applied ; and this right 
was granted to them in the expectation that it would 
in all cases have its effect. If another branch were 
to be added to Congress, to be chosen by the people, 
it would serve to embarrass. The people would not 
much interest themselves in the elections, a few de- 
signing men in the large districts would carry their 
points ; and the people would have no more confi- 
dence in their new representatives than in Congress. 
He saw no reason why the State Legislatures should 
be unfriendly, as had been suggested, to Congress. 
If they appoint Congress, and approve of their mea- 



918 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

sures, they would be rather favourable and partial 
to them. The disparity of the States in point of 
size he perceived was the main difficulty. But the 
large States had not yet suffered from the equality 
of votes enjoyed by the smaller ones. In all great 
and general points, the interests of all the States 
were the same. The State of Virginia, notwith- 
standing the equality of votes, ratified the Confed- 
eration without even proposing any alteration. 
Massachusetts also ratified without any material dif- 
ficulty, &c. In none of the ratifications is the want 
of two branches noticed or complained of. To con- 
solidate the States, as some had proposed, would dis- 
solve our treaties with foreign nations, which had 
been formed with us, as confederated States. He 
did not, however, suppose that the creation of two 
branches in the Legislature would have such an ef- 
fect. If the difficulty on the subject of representation 
cannot be otherwise got over, he would agree to 
have two branches, and a proportional representa- 
tion in one of them, provided each State had an 
equal voice in the other. This was necessary to se- 
cure the rights of the lesser States ; otherwise three 
or four of the large States would rule the others as 
they please. Each State, like each individual, had 
its peculiar habits, usages, and manners, which con- 
stituted its happiness. It would not, therefore, give 
to others a power over this happiness, any more than 
an individual would do, when he could avoid it. w 

Mr. Wilson urged the necessity of two branches ; 
observed, that if a proper model was not to be found 
in other confederacies, it was not to be wondered at. 
The number of them was small, and the duration of 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 919 

some at least short. The Amphictyonic and Achae- 
an were formed in the infancy of political science; 
and appear, by their history and fate, to have con- 
tained radical defects. The Swiss and Belgic con- 
federacies were held together, not by any vital prin- 
ciple of energy, but by the incumbent pressure of 
formidable neighbouring nations. The German 
owed its continuance to the influence of the House 
of Austria. He appealed to our own experience 
for the defects of our confederacy. He had been 
six years, of the twelve since the commencement of 
the Revolution, a member of Congress, and had felt 
all its weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection 
of others, whether, on many important occasions, 
the public interest had not been obstructed by the 
small members of the Union. The success of the 
Revolution was owing to other causes, than the con- 
stitution of Congress. In many instances it went 
on even against the difficulties arising from Congress 
themselves. He admitted that the large States did 
accede, as had been stated to the Confederation in 
its present form. But it was the effect of necessity 
not of choice. There are other instances of their 
yielding, from the same motive, to the unreasonable 
measures of the small States. The situation of 
things is now a little altered. He insisted that a 
jealousy would exist between the State Legislatures 
and the General Legislature; observing, that the 
members of the former would have views and feel- 
ings very distinct in this respect from their constit- 
uents. A private citizen of a State is indifferent 
whether power be exercised by the General or State 
Legislatures, provided it be exercised most for his 



% 



920 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

happiness. His representative has an interest in its 
being exercised by the body to which he belongs. 
He will therefore view the National Legislature with 
the eye of a jealous rival. He observed that the 
addresses of Congress to the people at large had 
always been better received, and produced greater 
effect, than those made to the Legislatures. 224 

On the question for postponing, in order to take 
up Mr. Lansing's proposition, " to vest the powers of 
legislation in Congress," — Connecticut, New York, 
New Jersey, Delaware, aye — 4; Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Car- 
olina, Georgia, no — 6 ; Maryland, divided. 

On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the 
question on the second Resolution in the Report 
from the Committee of the Whole, was postponed 
till to-morrow. 

Adjourned. 



Thursday, June 21 st. 

In Convention, — Mr. Jonathan Dayton, from New 
Jersey, took his seat. 

The second Resolution in the Report from the Com- 
mittee of the Whole, being under consideration, — 

Doctor Johnson. On a comparison of the two 
plans which had been proposed from Virginia and 
New Jersey, it appeared that the peculiarity which 
characterized the latter was its being calculated to 
preserve the individuality of the States. The plan 
from Virginia did not profess to destroy this individ- 
uality altogether ; but was charged with such a ten- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 921 

dency. One gentleman alone (Col. Hamilton), in 
his animadversions on the plan of New Jersey, 
boldly and decisively contended for an abolition of 
the State Governments. Mr. Wilson and the gen- 
tleman from Virginia, who also were adversaries of 
the plan of New Jersey, held a different language. 
They wished to leave the States in possession of a 
considerable, though a subordinate, jurisdiction. 
They had not yet, however, shewn how this could 
consist with, or be secured against, the general sove- 
reignty and jurisdiction which they proposed to give 
to the National Government. If this could be 
shewn, in such a manner as to satisfy the patrons 
of the New Jersey propositions, that the individu- 
ality of the States would not be endangered, many 
of their objections would no doubt be removed. If 
this could not be shewn, their objections would have 
their full force. He wished it, therefore, to be well 
considered, whether, in case the States, as was pro- 
posed, should retain some portion of sovereignty at 
least, this portion could be preserved, without allow- 
ing them to participate effectually in the General 
Government, without giving them each a distinct 
and equal vote for the purpose of defending them- 
selves in the general councils. 

Mr Wilson's respect for Doctor Johnson, added 
to the importance of the subject, led him to attempt, 
unprepared as he was, to solve the difficulty which 
had been started. It was asked, how the General 
Government and individuality of the particular 
States could be reconciled to each other, — and how 
the latter could be secured against the former? 
Might it not, on the other side, be asked, how the 
58 * 



922 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

former was to be secured against the latter? It 
was generally admitted, that a jealousy and rival- 
ship would be felt, between the general and par- 
ticular Governments. As the plan now stood, 
though indeed contrary to his opinion, one branch 
of the General Government (the Senate, or second 
branch) was to be appointed by the State Legisla- 
tures. The State Legislatures, therefore, by this 
participation in the General Government, would 
have an opportunity of defending their rights. Ought 
not a reciprocal opportunity to be given to the Gen- 
eral Government of defending itself, by having an 
appointment of some one constituent branch of the 
State Governments. If a security be necessary on 
one side, it would seem reasonable to demand it on 
the other. But taking the matter in a more general 
view, he saw no danger to the States, from the Gen- 
eral Government. In case a combination should be 
made by the large ones, it would produce a general 
alarm among the rest, and the project would be 
frustrated. But there was no temptation to such a 
project. The States having in general a similar in- 
terest, in case of any propositions in the National 
Legislature to encroach on the State Legislatures, 
he conceived a general alarm would take place in 
the National Legislature itself; that it would com- 
municate itself to the State Legislatures ; and would 
finally spread among the people at large. The Gen- 
eral Government will be as ready to preserve the 
rights of the States, as the latter are to preserve the 
rights of individuals, — all the members of the for- 
mer having a common interest, as representatives 
of all the people of the latter, to leave the State 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 923 

Governments in possession of what the people wish 
them to retain. He could not discover, therefore, 
any danger whatever on the side from which it was 
apprehended. On the contrary, he conceived, that, 
in spite of every precaution, the General Govern- 
ment would be in perpetual danger of encroach- 
ments from the State Governments. 225 

Mr. Madison was of opinion, — in the first place, 
that there was less danger of encroachment from 
the General Government than from the State Gov- 
ernments ; and in the second place, that the mis- 
chiefs from encroachments would be less fatal if 
made by the former, than if made by the latter. 

1. All the examples of other confederacies prove the 
greater tendency, in such systems, to anarchy than 
to tyranny ; to a disobedience of the members, than 
usurpations of the Federal head. Our own experi- 
ence had fully illustrated this tendency. But it will 
be said, that the proposed change in the principles 
and form of the Union will vary the tendency ; that 
the General Government will have real and greater 
powers, and will be derived, in one branch at least, 
from the people, not from the Governments of the 
States. To give full force to this objection, let it be 
supposed for a moment that indefinite powder should 
be given to the General Legislature, and the States 
reduced to corporations dependent on the General 
Legislature, — why should it follow that the General 
Government would take from the States any branch 
of their power, as far as its operation was beneficial, 
and its continuance desirable to the people ? In 
some of the States, particularly in Connecticut, all 
the townships are incorporated, and have a certain 



924 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

limited jurisdiction, — have the representatives of the 
people of the townships in the Legislature of the 
State ever endeavoured to despoil the townships of 
any part of their local authority ? As far as this 
local authority is convenient to the people, they are 
attached to it ; and their representatives, chosen by 
and amenable to them, naturally respect their at- 
tachment to this, as much as their attachment to 
any other right or interest. The relation of a Gen- 
eral Government to State Governments is parallel. 

2. Guards were more necessary against encroach- 
ments of the State Governments on the General 
Government, than of the latter on the former. The 
great objection made against an abolition of the 
State Governments was, that the General Govern- 
ment could not extend its care to all the minute ob- 
jects which fall under the cognizance of the local 
jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not 
against the probable abuse of the general power, 
but against the imperfect use that could be made of 
it throughout so great an extent of country, and over 
so great a variety of objects. As far as its operation 
would be practicable, it could not in this view be 
improper ; as far as it would be impracticable, the 
convenience of the General Government itself would 
concur with that of the people in the maintenance 
of subordinate governments. Were it practicable 
for the General Government to extend its care to 
every requisite object without the co-operation of 
the State Governments, the people would not be less 
free as members of one great Republic, than as mem- 
bers of thirteen small ones. A citizen of Delaware 
was not more free than a citizen of Virginia ; nor 



L787. ] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 925 

would either be more free than a citizen of America. 
Supposing, therefore, a tendency in the General 
Government to absorb the State Governments, no 
fatal consequence could result. Taking the reverse 
as the supposition, that a tendency should be left in 
the State Governments towards an independence on 
the General Government, and the gloomy conse- 
quences need not be pointed out. The imagination 
of them must have suggested to the States the 
experiment we are now making, to prevent the 
calamity, and must have formed the chief motive 
with those present to undertake the arduous task. 

On the question for resolving, u that the Legisla- 
ture ought to consist of two branches," — Massachu- 
setts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7; New 
York, New Jersey, Delaware, no — 3 ; Maryland, di- 
vided. 226 

The third Resolution of the Report being taken 
into consideration — 

General Pinckney moved, " that the first branch, 
instead of being elected by the people, should be 
elected in such manner as the Legislature of each 
State should direct." He urged, — first, that this lib- 
erty would give more satisfaction, as the Legisla- 
tures could then accommodate the mode to the con- 
venience and opinions of the people ; secondly, that 
it would avoid the undue influence of large counties, 
which would prevail if the elections were to be 
made in districts, as must be the mode intended by 
the report of the Committee ; thirdly, that otherwise 
disputed elections must be referred to the General 
Legislature, which would be attended with intolera- 



y 



926 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ble expense and trouble to the distant parts of the 
Republic. 

Mr. L. Martin seconded the motion. 

Col. Hamilton considered the motion as intended 
manifestly to transfer the election from the people 
to the State Legislatures, which would essentially 
vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influ- 
ence which could not be too watchfully guarded 
against. All, too, must admit the possibility, in case 
the General Government should maintain itself, that 
the State Governments might gradually dwindle in- 
to nothing. The system, therefore, should not be 
engrafted on what might possibly fail. 

Mr. Mason urged the necessity of retaining the 
election by the people. Whatever inconvenience 
may attend the democratic principle, it must actuate 
one part of the Government. It is the only security 
for the rights of the people. 

Mr. Sherman would like an election by the Le- 
gislatures best, but is content with the plan as it 
stands. 

Mr. Rutledge could not admit the solidity of the 
distinction between a mediate and immediate elec- 
tion by the people. It was the same thing to act by 
one's self, and to act by another. An election by 
the Legislature would be more refined, than an elec- 
tion immediately by the people ; and would be more 
likely to correspond with the sense of the whole 
community. If this Convention had been chosen by 
the people in districts, it is not to be supposed that 
such proper characters would have been preferred. 
The Delegates to Congress, he thought, had also 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 927 

been fitter men than would have been appointed by 
the people at large. 

Mr. Wilson considered the election of the first 
branch by the people not only as the corner-stone, 
but as the foundation of the fabric ; and that the 
difference between a mediate and immediate elec- 
tion was immense. The difference was particularly 
worthy of notice in this respect, that the Legisla- 
tures are actuated not merely by the sentiment of 
the people ; but have an official sentiment opposed 
to that of the General Government, and perhaps to 
that of the people themselves. 

Mr. King enlarged on the same distinction. He 
supposed the Legislatures would constantly choose 
men subservient to their own views, as contrasted 
to the general interest ; and that they might even 
devise modes of election that would be subversive 
of the end in view. He remarked several instances 
in which the views of a State might be at variance 
with those of the General Government ; and men- 
tioned particularly a competition between the Na- 
tional and State debts, for the most certain and pro- 
ductive funds. 

General Pinckney was for making the State 
Governments a part of the general system. If they 
were to be abolished, or lose their agency, South 
Carolina and the other States would have but a 
small share of the benefits of government. 

On the question for General Pinckney 's motion, 
to substitute " election of the first branch in such 
mode as the Legislatures should appoint," instead of 
its being "elected by the people," — Connecticut, 
New Jersey, Delaware, South Carolina, aye — 4; 



928 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
North Carolina, Georgia, no — 6 ; Maryland divided? 

General Pinckney then moved, " that the first 
branch be elected by the 'people in such mode as the 
Legislatures should direct ;" but waived it on its 
being hinted that such a provision might be more 
properly tried in the detail of the plan. 

On the question for the election of the first branch 
" by the people" — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; New 
Jersey, no — 1 ; Maryland divided. 

The election of the first branch " for the term 
of three years," being considered, — • 

Mr. Randolph moved to strike out " three years," 
and insert "two years." He was sensible that 
annual elections were a source of great mischiefs in 
the States, yet it was the want of such checks 
against the popular intemperance as were now pro- 
posed, that rendered them so mischievous. He 
would have preferred annual to biennial, but for 
the extent of the United States, and the incon- 
venience which would result from them to the 
representatives of the extreme parts of the Em- 
pire. The people were attached to frequency of 
elections. All the Constitutions of the States, ex- 
cept that of South Carolina, had established an- 
nual elections. 

Mr. Dickinson. The idea of annual elections was 
borrowed from the ancient usage of England, a 
country much less extensive than ours. He sup- 
posed biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred 
triennial; and in order to prevent the inconven:- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 929 

ence of an entire change of the whole number at 
the same moment, suggested a rotation, by an 
annual election of one-third. 

Mr. Ellsworth was opposed to three years, 
supposing that even one year was preferable to 
two years. The people were fond of frequent elec- 
tions, and might be safely indulged in one branch 
of the Legislature. He moved for " one year." 

Mr. Strong seconded and supported the motion. 

Mr. Wilson, being for making the first branch an 
effectual representation of the people at large, pre- 
ferred an annual election of it. This frequency was 
most familiar and pleasing to the people. It would 
not be more inconvenient to them than triennial elec- 
tions, as the people in all the States have annual 
meetings with which the election of the national 
Representatives might be made to coincide. He 
did not conceive that it would be necessary for 
the National Legislature to sit constantly, perhaps 
not half, perhaps not one-fourth of the year. 

Mr. Madison was persuaded that annual elec- 
tions would be extremely inconvenient, and appre- 
hensive that biennial would be too much so; he did 
not mean inconvenient to the electors^ but to the 
Representatives. They would have to travel seven 
or eight hundred miles from the distant parts of the 
Union ; and would probably not be allowed even a 
reimbursement of their expenses. Besides, none of 
those who wished to be re elected would remain at 
the seat of government, confiding that their absence 
would not affect them. The members of Congress 
had done this with few instances of disappointment. 
But as the choice was here to be made by the 
59 



930 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

people themselves, who would be much less com- 
plaisant to individuals, and much more susceptible 
of impressions from the presence of a rival candi- 
date, it must be supposed that the members from the 
most distant States would travel backwards and 
forwards at least as often as the elections should be 
repeated. Much was to be said, also, on the time 
requisite for new members, who would always 
form a large proportion, to acquire that knowledge 
of the affairs of the States in general, without 
which their trust could not be usefully discharged. 

Mr. Sherman preferred annual elections, but 
would be content with biennial. He thought the 
Representatives ought to return home and mix 
with the people. By remaining at the seat of 
government, they would acquire the habits of the 
place, which might differ from those of their con- 
stituents. 

Colonel Mason observed, that, the States being 
differently situated, such a rule ought to be formed 
as would put them as nearly as possible on a level. 
If elections were annual, the middle States would 
have a great advantage over the extreme ones. He 
wished them to be biennial, and the rather as in 
that case they would coincide with the periodical 
elections of South Carolina, as well of the other 
States. 

Colonel Hamilton urged the necessity of three 
years. There ought to be neither too much nor too 
little dependence on the popular sentiments. The 
checks in the other branches of the Government 
would be but feeble, and would need every auxiliary 
principle that could be interwoven. The British 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 931 

House of Commons were elected septennially, yet 
the democratic spirit of the Constitution had not 
ceased. Frequency of elections tended to make the 
people listless to them ; and to facilitate the success 
of little cabals. This evil was complained of in all 
the States. In Virginia it had been lately found ne- 
cessary to force the attendance and voting of the 
people by severe regulations. 

On the question for striking out " three years," — 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania. Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7; 
New York, Delaware, Maryland, no — 3 ; New Jer- 
sey divided. 

The motion for " two years" was then inserted, 
nem.con. 228 

Adjourned. 



Friday, June 22d. 

In Convention, — The clause in the third Resolu- 
tion, " to receive fixed stipends, to be paid out of the 
National Treasury," being considered, — 

Mr. Ellsworth moved to substitute payment by 
the States, out of their own treasuries : observing, 
that the manners of different States were very 
different in the style of living, and in the profits ac- 
cruing from the exercise of like talents. What 
Would be deemed, therefore, a reasonable compensa- 
tion in some States, in others would be very unpopu- 
lar, and might impede the system of which it made 
a part. 



932 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Williamson favored the idea. He reminded 
the House of the prospect of new States to the 
westward. They would be too poor — would pay- 
little into the common treasury — and would have 
a different interest from the old States. He did 
not think, therefore, that the latter ought to pay 
the expense of men who would be employed in 
thwarting their measures and interests. 

Mr. Gorham wished not to refer the matter to the 
State Legislatures, who were always paring down 
salaries in such a manner as to keep out of office 
men most capable of executing the functions of 
them. He thought, also, it would be wrong to fix 
the compensation by the Constitution, because we 
could not venture to make it as liberal as it ought 
to be, without exciting an enmity against the whole 
plan. Let the National Legislature provide for their 
own wages from time to time, as the State Legisla- 
tures do. He had not seen this part of their power 
abused, nor did he apprehend an abuse of it. 

Mr. Randolph said he feared w r e were going too 
far in consulting popular prejudices. Whatever re- 
spect might be due to them in lesser matters, or in 
cases where they formed the permanent character 
of the people, he thought it neither incumbent on, 
nor honorable for, the Convention, to sacrifice right 
and justice to that consideration. If the States 
were to pay the members of the National Legisla- 
ture, a dependence would be created that would vi- 
tiate the whole system. The whole nation has an 
interest in the attendance and services of the mem- 
bers. The National Treasury therefore is the proper 
fund for supporting them. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 933 

Mr. King urged the danger of creating a depend- 
ence on the States by leaving to them the payment 
of the members of the National Legislature. He 
supposed it would be best to be explicit as to the 
compensation to be allowed. A reserve on that 
point, or a reference to the National Legislature of 
the quantum, would excite greater opposition than 
any sum that would be actually necessary or proper. 

Mr. Sherman contended for referring both the 
quantum and the payment of it to the State Legis- 
latures. 

Mr. Wilson was against fixing the compensation, 
as circumstances would change and call for a change 
of the amount. He thought it of great moment 
that the members of the National Government should 
be left as independent as possible of the State Gov- 
ernments in all respects. 

Mr. Madison concurred in the necessity of pre- 
serving the compensations for the National Govern- 
ment independent on the State Governments ; but 
at the same time approved oi fixing them by the 
Constitution, which might be done by taking a 
standard which would not vary with circumstances. 
He disliked particularly the policy, suggested by 
Mr. Williamson, of leaving the members from the 
poor States beyond the mountains to the precarious 
and parsimonious support of their constituents. If 
the Western States hereafter arising should be ad- 
mitted into the Union, they ought to be considered 
as equals and as brethren. If their representatives 
were to be associated in the common councils, it 
was of common concern that such provisions should 



934 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

be made as would invite the most capable and re- 
spectable characters into the service. 

Mr. Hamilton apprehended inconvenience from 
fixing the wages. He was strenuous against ma- 
king the national council dependent on the legisla- 
tive rewards of the States. Those who pay are 
the masters of those who are paid. Payment by 
the States would be unequal, as the distant States 
would have to pay for the same term of attendance 
and more days in travelling to and from the seat of 
government. He expatiated emphatically on the 
difference between the feelings and views of the 
people and the governments of the States, arising 
from the personal interest and official inducements 
which must render the latter unfriendly to the Gen- 
eral Government. 

Mr. Wilson moved that the salaries of the first 
branch " be ascertained by the National Legisla- 
ture and be paid out of the National Treasury." 

Mr. Madison thought the members of the Legis- 
lature too much interested, to ascertain their own 
compensation. It would be indecent to put their 
hands into the public purse for the sake of their 
own pockets. 

On this question, " shall the salaries of the first 
branch be ascertained by the national Legislature?" 
—New Jersey, Pennsylvania, aye — 2; Massachu- 
setts, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, no — 7 ; New York, 
Georgia, divided. 

On the question for striking out " National Trea- 
sury," as moved by Mr. Ellsworth,— 

Mr. Hamilton renewed his opposition to it He 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 935 

pressed the distinction between the State Govern- 
ments and the people. The former would be the 
rivals of the General Government. The State Le- 
gislatures ought not, therefore, to be the paymasters 
of the latter. 

Mr. Ellsworth. If we are jealous of the State 
Governments, they will be so of us. If on going 
home I tell them, we gave the General Govern- 
ment such powers because we could not trust you, 
will they adopt it ? And without their approbation 
it is a nullity. 229 

On the question, — Massachusetts,* Connecticut, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 4 ; New Jer- 
sey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
no — 5 ; New York, Georgia, divided ; so it passed in 
the negative. 

On a question for substituting " adequate com- 
pensation" in place of "fixed stipends," it was 
agreed to, nem. con n the friends of the latter being 
willing that the practicability oi fixing the com- 
pensation should be considered hereafter in forming 
the details. 230 

It was then moved by Mr. Butler, that a ques- 
tion be taken on both points jointly, to wit, ■■ ade- 
quate compensation to be paid out of the National 
Treasury." It was objected to as out of order, the 
parts having been separately decided on. The Pres- 
ident referred the question of order to the House, 
and it was determined to be in order, — Connecticut, 

* It appeared that Massachusetts concurred, not because they thought the 
State Treasury ought to be substituted ; but because they thought nothing 
should be said on the subject, in which case it would silently devolve on the 
National Treasury to support the National Legislature 



936 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, aye — 6 ; New York, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, Georgia, no — 4; Massachusetts, divided. 
The question on the sentence was then postponed 
by South Carolina, in right of the State. 2 ** 1 

Col. Mason moved to insert " tw T enty-five years of 
age as a qualification for the members of the first 
branch." He thought it absurd that a man to-day 
should not be permitted by the law to make a bar- 
gain for himself, and to-morrow should be author- 
ized to manage the affairs of a great nation. It was 
the more extraordinary, as every man carried with 
him, in his own experience, a scale for measuring 
the deficiency of young politicians ; since he would, 
if interrogated, be obliged to declare that his politi- 
cal opinions at the age of twenty-one were too crude 
and erroneous to merit an influence on public mea- 
sures. It had been said, that Congress had proved 
a good school for our young men. It might be so, 
for any thing he knew ; but if it were, he chose 
that they should bear the expense of their own edu- 
cation. 

Mr. Wilson was against abridging the rights of 
election in any shape. It was the same thing 
whether this were done by disqualifying the objects 
of choice, or the persons choosing. The motion 
tended to damp the efforts, of genius and of laudable 
ambition. There was no more reason for incapaci- 
tating youth than age, where the requisite qualifica- 
tions were found. Many instances might be men- 
tioned of signal services, rendered in high stations, 
to the public, before the age of twenty-five. The 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 937 

present Mr. Pitt and Lord Bolingbroke were striking 
instances. 

On the question for inserting " twenty-five years 
of age," — Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Ma- 
ryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
aye, — 7 ; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Georgia, no 
—3 ; New York, divided. 232 

Mr. Gorham moved to strike out the last member 
of the third Resolution, concerning ineligibility of 
members of the first branch to office during the term 
of their membership, and for one year after. He 
considered it unnecessary and injurious. It was 
true, abuses had been displayed in Great Britain; 
but no one could say how far they might have con- 
tributed to preserve the due influence of the Govern- 
ment, nor what might have ensued in case the con- 
trary theory had been tried. 

Mr. Butler opposed it. This precaution against 
intrigue was necessary. He appealed to the exam- 
ple of Great Britain ; where men get into Parlia- 
ment that they might get offices for themselves or 
their friends. This was the source of the corruption 
that ruined their government. 

Mr. King thought we were refining too much. 
Such a restriction on the members would discourage 
merit. It would also give a pretext to the Execu- 
tive for bad appointments, as he might always plead 
this as a bar to the choice he wished to have made. 

Mr. Wilson was against fettering elections, and 
discouraging merit. He suggested, also, the fatal 
consequence in time of war, of rendering, perhaps, 
the best commanders ineligible ; appealed to our 
situation during the late war, and indirectly leading 
59* 



938 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

to a recollection of the appointment of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief out of Congress. 

Colonel Mason was for shutting the door at all 
events against corruption. He enlarged on the 
venality and abuses, in this particular, in Great 
Britain ; and alluded to the multiplicity of foreign 
embassies by Congress. The disqualification he 
regarded as a corner-stone in the fabric. 

Colonel Hamilton. There are inconveniences on 
both sides. We must take man as we find him ; 
and if we expect him to serve the public, must in- 
terest his passions in doing so. A reliance on pure 
patriotism had been the source of many of our errors. 
He thought the remark of Mr. Gorham a just one. 
It was impossible to say what would be the effect 
in Great Britain of such a reform as had been urged. 
It was known that one of the ablest politicians 
(Mr. Hume) had pronounced all that influence on 
the side of the Crown which went under the name 
of corruption, an essential part of the weight which 
maintained the equilibrium of the Constitution. 

On Mr. Gorham's motion for striking out "in- 
eligibility," it was lovSt by an equal division of the 
votes, — Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
Georgia, aye — 4; Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, 
South Carolina, no— 4 ; New York, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, divided. 
Adjourned. 233 



Saturday, June 23d. 

In Convention, — the third Resolution being re- 
sumed, — 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 939 

On the question, yesterday postponed by South 
Carolina, for agreeing to the whole sentence, '" for 
allowing an adequate compensation, to be paid out 
of the Treasury of the United States" — Massa- 
chusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Vir- 
ginia, aye — 5 ; Connecticut, New York, Delaware, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, no — 5; Georgia, 
divided. So the question was lost, and the sentence 
not inserted. 234 

General Pinckney moves to strike out the in- 
eligibility of members of the first branch to offices 
established H by a particular State." He argued from 
the inconvenience to which such a restriction would 
expose both the members of the first branch, and the 
States wishing for their services; and from the 
smallness of the object to be attained by the restric- 
tion. It would seem from the ideas of some, that 
we are erecting a kingdom to be divided against 
itself: he disapproved such a fetter on the Legisla- 
ture. 

Mr. Sherman seconds the motion. It would seem 
that we are erecting a kingdom at war with itself. 
The Legislature ought not to be fettered in such a 



case. 235 



On the question, — Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Massachusetts, Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware, no — 3. 

Mr. Madison renewed his motion, yesterday made 
and waived, to render the members of the first 
branch "ineligible during their term of service, and 
for one year after, to such offices only, as should be 
established, or the emolument augmented, by the 



940 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Legislature of the United States during the time of 
their being members." He supposed that the un- 
necessary creation of offices, and increase of salaries, 
were the evils most experienced, and that if the 
door was shut against them, it might properly be 
left open for the appointment of members to other 
offices as an encouragement to the legislative ser- 
vice. 

Mr. Alexander Martin seconded the motion. 

Mr. Butler. The amendment does not go far 
enough, and would be easily evaded. 236 

Mr. Rutledge was for preserving the Legislature 
as pure as possible, by shutting the door against ap- 
pointments of its own members to office, which was 
one source of its corruption. 

Mr. Mason. The motion of my colleague is but a 
partial remedy for the evil. He appealed to him as a 
witness of the shameful partiality of the Legislature 
of Virginia to its own members. He enlarged on 
the abuses and corruption in the British Parliament 
connected with the appointment oif its members. He 
could not suppose that a sufficient number of citi- 
zens could not be found who would be ready, with- 
out the inducement of eligibility to offices, to under- 
take the Legislative service. Genius and virtue, it 
may be said, ought to be encouraged. Genius, for 
aught he knew, might ; but that virtue should be en- 
couraged by such a species of venality, was an idea 
that at least had the merit of being new. 

Mr. King remarked that we were refining too 
much in this business ; and that the idea of prevent- 
ing intrigue and solicitation of offices was chimeri- 
cal. You say, that no member shall himself be eli- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 941 

gible to any office. Will this restrain him from 
availing himself of the same means which would 
gain appointments for himself, to gain them for his 
son, his brother, or any other object of his partiali- 
ty ? We were losing, therefore, the advantages on 
one side, without avoiding the evils on the other. 

Mr. Wilson supported the motion. The proper 
cure, he said, for corruption in the Legislature was 
to take from it the power of appointing to offices. 
One branch of corruption would, indeed, remain, 
that of creating unnecessary offices, or granting un- 
necessary salaries, and for that the amendment 
would be a proper remedy. He animadverted on the 
impropriety of stigmatizing with the name of venality 
the laudable ambition of rising into the honourable 
offices of the Government, — an ambition most likely to 
be felt in the early and most incorrupt period of life, 
and which all wise and free governments had deem- 
ed it sound policy to cherish, not to check. The 
members of the Legislature have, perhaps, the hard- 
est and least profitable task of any who engage in 
the service of the State. Ought this merit to be 
made a disqualification ? 

Mr. Sherman observed that the motion did not go 
far enough. It might be evaded by the creation of 
a new office, the translation to it of a person from 
another office, and the appointment of a member of 
the Legislature to the latter. A new embassy 
might be established to a new Court, and an ambas- 
sador taken from another, in order to create a vacan- 
cy for a favorite member. He admitted that incon- 
veniences lay on both sides. He hoped there would 
be sufficient inducements to the public service with- 



942 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

out resorting to the prospect of desirable offices ; and 
on the whole was rather against the motion of Mr. 
Madison. 

Mr. Gerry thought, there was great weight in the 
objection of Mr. Sherman. He added, as another 
objection against admitting the eligibility of mem- 
bers in any case, that it would produce intrigues of 
ambitious men for displacing proper officers, in order 
to create vacancies for themselves. In answer to 
Mr. King, he observed, that, although members, if 
disqualified themselves, might still intrigue and ca- 
bal for their sons, brothers, &c, yet as their own in- 
terests would be dearer to them than those of their 
nearest connexions, it might be expected they 
w r ould go greater lengths to promote them. 

Mr. Madison had been led to this motion, as a 
middle ground between an eligibility in all cases and 
an absolute disqualification. He admitted the prob- 
able abuses of an eligibility of the members to offices 
particularly within the gift of the Legislature. He 
had witnessed the partiality of such bodies to their 
own members, as had been remarked of the Virginia 
Assembly by his colleague (Colonel Mason). He 
appealed, however, to him in turn to vouch another 
fact not less notorious in Virginia, that the back- 
wardness of the best citizens to engage in the Le- 
gislative service gave but too great success to unfit 
characters. The question was not to be viewed on 
one side only. The advantages and disadvantages 
on both ought to be fairly compared. The objects 
to be aimed at were to fill all offices with the fittest 
characters, and to draw the wisest and most worthy 
citizens into the legislative service. If, on one hand, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 943 

public bodies were partial to their own members, on 
the other, they were as apt to be misled by taking 
characters on report, or the authority of patrons and 
dependents. All who had been concerned in the ap- 
pointment of strangers, on those recommendations 
must be sensible of this truth. Nor would the partial- 
ities of such bodies be obviated by disqualifying their 
own members. Candidates for office would hover 
round the seat of government, or be found among 
the residents there, and practise all the means of 
courting the favor of the members. A great pro- 
portion of the appointments made by the States 
were evidently brought about in this way. In the 
General Government, the evil must be still greater, 
the characters of distant States being much less 
known throughout the United States, than those of 
the distant parts of the same State. The elections 
by Congress had generally turned on men living at 
the Seat of the Federal Government, or in its neigh- 
bourhood. As to the next object, the impulse to the 
legislative service was evinced by experience to be 
in general too feeble with those best qualified for it. 
This inconvenience would also be more felt in the 
National Government than in the State Govern- 
ments, as the sacrifices required from the distant 
members would be much greater, and the pecuni- 
ary provisions, probably, more disproportionate. It 
w T ould therefore be impolitic to add fresh objections 
to the legislative service by an absolute disqualifi- 
cation of its members. The point in question w T as, 
whether this would be an objection with the most ca- 
pable citizens. Arguing from experience, he conclu- 
ded that it would. The legislature of Virginia would 



944 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

probably have been without many of its best mem- 
bers, if in that situation they had been ineligible to 
Congress, to the Government, and other honourable 
offices of the State. 

Mr. Butler thought characters fit for office would 
never be unknown. 

Colonel Mason. If the members of the Legisla- 
ture are disqualified, still the honours of the State 
will induce those who aspire to them to enter that 
service, as the field in which they can best display 
and improve their talents, and lay the train for their 
subsequent advancement. 

Mr. Jenifer remarked, that in Maryland the Sen- 
ators, chosen for five years, could hold no other of- 
fice; and that this circumstance gained them the 
greatest confidence of the people. 

On the question for agreeing to the motion of Mr. 
Madison, — Connecticut, New Jersey, aye — 2; New 
York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 8; 
Massachusetts, divided. 

Mr. Sherman moved to insert the words, " and 
incapable of holding" after the words " ineligible 
to," which was agreed to without opposition. 

The word " established," and the words " under 
the national government," were struck out of the 
third Resolution. 

Mr. Spaight called for a division of the question, 
in consequence of which it was so put as that it 
turned on the first member of it, on the ineligibility 
of members during the term for which they were 
elected — thereon the States were, Connecticut, 
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Vir- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 945 

ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 8 , 
Pennsylvania, Georgia, no — 2 ; Massachusetts, di- 
vided. 

On the second member of the sentencej extending 
ineligibility of members to one year after the term 
for which they were elected, — 

Colonel Mason thought this essential to guard 
against evasions by resignations, and stipulations for 
office to be fulfilled at the expiration of the legisla- 
tive term. 

Mr. Gerry had known such a case. 

Mr. Hamilton. Evasions could not be prevented, 
— as by proxies — by friends holding for a year, and 
then opening the way, (fee. 

Mr. JRutledge admitted the possibility of evasions, 
but was for contracting them as far as possible. On 
the question, — New York, Delaware, Maryland, 
South Carolina, aye — 4; Massachusetts, Connec- 
ticut, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, Geor- 
gia, no — 6 ; Pennsylvania, divided. 237 

Adjourned. 



Monday, June 25th. 

In Convention, — The fourth Resolution being taken 
up — 

Mr. Pinckney spoke as follows : 

The efficacy of the system will depend on this 
article. In order to form a right judgment in the 
case, it will be proper to examine the situation of 
this country more accurately than it has yet been 
done. 

60 



946 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

The people of the United States are perhaps the 
most singular of any we are acquainted with. 
Among them there are fewer distinctions of for- 
tune, and less of rank, than among the inhabitants 
of any other nation. Every freeman has a right to 
the same protection and security ; and a very mode- 
rate share of property entitles them to the possession 
of all the honors and privileges the public can be- 
stow. Hence, arises a greater equality than is to 
be found among the people of any other country ; 
and an equality which is more likely to continue. I 
say, this equality is likely to continue ; because in a 
new country, possessing immense tracts of uncultiva- 
ted lands, where every temptation is offered to emigra- 
tion, and where industry must be rewarded with com- 
petency, there will be few poor, and few dependent. 
Every member of the society almost will enjoy an 
equal power of arriving at the supreme offices, and 
consequently of directing the strength and senti- 
ments of the whole community. None will be ex- 
cluded by birth, and few by fortune, from voting for 
proper persons to fill the offices of government. The 
whole community will enjoy, in the fullest sense, 
that kind of political liberty which consists in the 
power, the members of the State reserve to them- 
selves, of arriving at the public offices, or at least, 
of having votes in the nomination of those who fill 
them. 

If this state of things is true, and the prospect of 
its continuance probable, it is perhaps not politic to 
endeavour too close an imitation of a government 
calculated for a people whose situation is, and whose 
views ought to be, extremely different. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 947 

Much has been said of the Constitution of Great 
Britain. I will confess that I believe it to be the 
best constitution in existence; but, at the same 
time, I am confident it is one that will not or cannot 
be introduced into this country, for many centuries. 
If it were proper to go here into a historical disser- 
tation on the British Constitution, it might easily be 
shown that the peculiar excellence, the distinguish- 
ing feature, of that government cannot possibly be 
introduced into our system — that its balance between 
the Crown and the people cannot be made a part of 
our Constitution, — that we neither have nor can 
have the members to compose it, nor the rights, 
privileges and properties of so distinct a class of 
citizens to guard, — that the materials for forming 
this balance or check do not exist, nor is there a 
necessity for having so permanent a part of our Le- 
gislative, until the Executive power is so constituted 
as to have something fixed and dangerous in its 
principle. By this I mean a sole, hereditary, though 
limited Executive. 

That we cannot have a proper body for forming 
a Legislative balance between the inordinate power 
of the Executive and the people, is evident from a 
review of the accidents and circumstances which 
gave rise to the peerage of Great Britain. I believe 
it is well ascertained, that the parts which compose 
the British Constitution arose immediately from the 
forests of Germany ; but the antiquity of the estab- 
lishment of nobility is by no means clearly defined. 
Some authors are of opinion that the dignity denoted 
by the titles of dux and comes, was derived from the 
old Roman, to the German, Empire ; while others 



948 DEEATES IN THE [1787. 

are of opinion that they existed among the Germans 
long before the Romans were acquainted with them. 
The institution, however, of nobility is immemorial 
among the nations who may properly be termed the 
ancestors of Great Britain. At the time they were 
summoned in England to become a part of the 
national council, the circumstances which con- 
tributed to make them a constituent part of that 
Constitution, must be well known to all gentlemen 
who have had industry and curiosity enough to 
investigate the subject. The nobles, with their 
possessions and dependents, composed a body per- 
manent in their nature, and formidable in point of 
power. They had a distinct interest both from the 
King and the people, — an interest which could only 
be represented by themselves, and the guardianship of 
which could not be safely intrusted to others. At 
the time they were originally called to form a part 
of the national council, necessity perhaps, as much 
as other causes induced the monarch to look up to 
them. It was necessary to demand the aid of his 
subjects in personal and pecuniary services. The 
power and possessions of the nobility would not 
permit taxation from any assembly of which they 
were not a part : and the blending of the deputies 
of the commons with them, and thus forming what 
they called their parle? , -nient, was perhaps as much 
the effect of chance as of any thing else. The com- 
mons were at that time completely subordinate to 
the nobles, whose consequence and influence seem to 
have been the only reasons for their superiority ; a 
superiority so degrading to the commons, that in the 
first summons, we find the peers are called upon to 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 949 

consult, the commons to consent. From this time 
the peers have composed a part of the British Legis- 
lature ; and notwithstanding their power and influ- 
ence have diminished, and those of the commons 
have increased, yet still they have always formed 
an excellent balance against either the encroach- 
ments of the Crown or the people. 

I have said that such a body cannot exist in this 
country for ages ; and that until the situation of our 
people is exceedingly changed, no necessity will 
exist for so permanent a part of the Legislature. 
To illustrate this, I have remarked that the people 
of the United States are more equal in their circum- 
stances than the people of any other country ; that 
they have very few rich men among them — by rich 
men I mean those whose riches may have a danger- 
ous influence, or such as are esteemed rich in Eu- 
rope — perhaps there are not one hundred such on 
the continent ; that it is not probable this number 
will be greatly increased; that the genius of the 
people, their mediocrity of situation, and the pros- 
pects which are afforded their industry, in a coun- 
try which must be a new one for centuries, are un- 
favorable to the rapid distinction of ranks. The 
destruction of the right of primogeniture, and the 
equal division of the property of intestates, will also 
have an effect to preserve this mediocrity ; for laws 
invariably affect the manners of a people. On the 
other hand, that vast extent of unpeopled territory, 
which opens to the frugal and industrious a sure 
road to competency and independence, will effectu- 
ally prevent, for a considerable time, the increase of 
the poor or discontented, and be the means of pre- 



950 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

serving that equality of condition which so eminent- 
ly distinguishes us. 

If equality is, as I contend, the leading feature of 
the United States, where, then, are the riches and 
wealth whose representation and protection is the 
peculiar province of this permanent body ? Are 
they in the hands of the few who may be called 
rich, — in the possession of less than a hundred citi- 
zens ? Certainly not. They are in the great body 
of the people, among whom there are no men of 
wealth, and very few of real poverty. Is it proba- 
ble that a change will be created, and that a new 
order of men will arise ? If under the British gov- 
ernment for a century no such change was produced, 
I think it may be fairly concluded it will not take 
place while even the semblance of republicanism re- 
mains. How is this change to be effected ? Where 
are the sources from whence it is to flow ? From 
the landed interest ? No. That is too unproductive, 
and too much divided in most of the States. From 
the monied interest ? If such exists at present, lit- 
tle is to be apprehended from that source. Is it to 
spring from commerce ? I believe it would be the 
first instance in which a nobility sprang from mer- 
chants. Besides, sir, I apprehend that on this point 
the policy of the United States has been much mis- 
taken. We have unwisely considered ourselves as 
the inhabitants of an old, instead of a new, country. 
We have adopted the maxims of a state full of peo- 
ple, and manufactures, and established in credit. 
We have deserted our true interest, and instead of 
applying closely to those improvements in domestic 
policy which would have ensured the future impor- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. „ 951 

tance of our commerce, we have rashly and prema- 
turely engaged in schemes as extensive as they are 
imprudent. This, however, is an error which daily 
corrects itself; and I have no doubt that a few more 
severe trials will convince us, that very different 
commercial principles ought to govern the conduct 
of these States. 

The people of this country are not only very dif- 
ferent from the inhabitants of any state we are 
acquainted with in the modern world, but I assert 
that their situation is distinct from either the people 
of Greece or Rome, or of any states we are acquaint- 
ed with among the ancients. Can the orders intro- 
duced by the institution of Solon, can they be found 
in the United States % Can the military habits and 
manners of Sparta be resembled to our habits and 
manners ? Are the distinction of patrician and ple- 
beian known among us ? Can the Helvetic or Bel- 
gic confederacies, or can the unwieldy, unmeaning 
body called the Germanic Empire, can they be said 
to possess either the same, or a situation like ours ? 
I apprehend, not. They are perfectly different, in 
their distinctions of rank, their constitutions, their 
manners, and their policy. 

Our true situation appears to me to be this, — a 
new extensive country, containing within itself the 
materials for forming a government capable of ex- 
tending to its citizens all the blessings of civil and 
religious liberty — capable of making them happy at 
home. This is the great end of republican estab- 
lishments. We mistake the object of our Govern- 
ment, if we hope or wish that it is to make us re- 
spectable abroad. Conquest or superiority among 



952 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

other powers is not, or ought not ever to be, the ob- 
ject of republican systems. If they are sufficiently 
active and energetic to rescue us from contempt, and 
preserve our domestic happiness and security, it is 
all we can expect from them, — it is more than al- 
most any other government ensures to its citizens. 

I believe this observation will be found generally 
true, — that no two people are so exactly alike in 
their situation or circumstances, as to admit the ex- 
ercise of the same government with equal benefit; 
that a system must be suited to the habits and ge- 
nius of the people it is to govern, and must grow out 
of them. 

The people of the United States may be divided 
into three classes, — -professional men, who must, from 
their particular pursuits, always have a considerable 
weight in the government, while it remains popular, 
— commercial men, who may or may not have weight, 
as a wise or injudicious commercial policy is pur- 
sued. If that commercial policy is pursued which I 
conceive to be the true one, the merchants of this 
country will not, or ought not, for a considerable 
time, to have much weight in the political scale. 
The third is the landed interest, the owners and cul- 
tivators of the soil, who are, and ought ever to be, 
the governing spring in the system. These three 
classes, however distinct in their pursuits, are indi- 
vidually equal in the political scale, and may be 
easily proved to have but one interest. The de- 
pendence of each on the other is mutual. The mer- 
chant depends on the planter. Both must, in pri- 
vate as well as public affairs, be connected with the 
professional men ; who in their turn must in some 









1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 953 

measure depend on them. Hence it is clear, from 
this manifest connexion, and the equality which I 
before stated exists, and must, for the reasons then 
assigned, continue, that after all there is one, but 
one great and equal body of citizens composing the 
inhabitants of this country, among whom there are 
no distinctions of rank, and very few or none of for- 
tune. 

For a people thus circumstanced are we, then, to 
form a Government ; and the question is, what sort 
of government is best suited to them ? 

Will it be the British Government ? No. Why 1 
Because Great Britain contains three orders of peo- 
ple distinct in their situation, their possessions, and 
their principles. These orders, combined, form the 
great body of the nation ; and as in national expen- 
ses the wealth of the whole community must con- 
tribute, so ought each component part to be duly 
and properly represented. No other combination of 
power could form this due representation, but the one 
that exists. Neither the peers or the people could 
represent the royalty ; nor could the royalty and the 
people form a proper representation for the peers. 
Each, therefore, must of necessity be represented by 
itself, or the sign of itself ; and this accidental mix- 
ture has certainly formed a Government admirably 
well balanced. 

But the United States contain but one order that 
can be assimilated to the British nation — this is the 
order of Commons. They will not, surely, then, at- 
tempt to form a Government consisting of three 
branches two of which shall have nothing to repre- 
sent. They will not have an Executive and Senate 
60* 



954 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

[hereditary], because the King and Lords of Eng- 
land are so. The same reasons do not exist, and 
therefore the same provisions are not necessary. 

We must, as has been observed, suit our Govern- 
ment to the people it is to direct. These are, I be- 
lieve, as active, intelligent and susceptible of good 
government as any people in the world. The con- 
fusion which has produced the present relaxed state 
is not owing to them. It is owing to the weakness 
and [defects] of a government incapable of combi- 
ning the various interests it is intended to unite, and 
destitute of energy. All that we have to do, then, 
is to distribute the powers of government in such a 
manner, and for such limited periods, as, while it 
gives a proper degree of permanency to the magis- 
trate, will reserve to the people the right of election 
. they will not or ought not frequently to part with. 
I am of opinion that this may easily be done ; and 
that, with some amendments, the propositions before 
the Committee will fully answer this end. 

No position appears to me more true than this ; 
that the General Government cannot effectually 
exist without reserving to the States the possession 
of their local rights. They are the instruments 
upon which the Union must frequently depend for 
the support and execution of their powers, however 
immediately operating upon the people, and not 
upon the States. 

Much has been said about the propriety of abolish- 
ing the distinction of State Governments, and having 
but one general system. Suffer me for a moment 
to examine this question.* 238 

* The residue of this speech was not furnished, like the above, by Mr. Pinckney. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 955 

The mode of constituting the second branch being 
under consideration, the word " national" was struck 
out, and " United States" inserted. 

Mr. Gorham inclined to a compromise as to the 
rule of proportion. He thought there was some 
weight in the objections of the small States. If 
Virginia should have sixteen votes, and Delaware 
with several other States together sixteen, those 
from Virginia would be more likely to unite than the 
others, and would therefore have an undue influ- 
ence. This remark was applicable not only to 
States, but to counties or other districts of the same 
State. Accordingly the Constitution of Massachu- 
setts, had provided that the representatives of the 
larger districts should not be in an exact ratio to 
their numbers; and experience, he thought, had 
shown the provision to be expedient. 

Mr. Read. The States have heretofore been in 
a sort of partnership. They ought to adjust their 
old affairs before they opened a new account. He 
brought into view the appropriation of the common 
interest in the western lands to the use of particular 
States. Let justice be done on this head ; let the 
fund be applied fairly and equally to the discharge 
of the general debt ; and the smaller States, who 
had been injured, would listen then, perhaps, to 
those ideas of just representation which had been 
held out. 

Mr. Gorham could not see how the Convention 
could interpose in the case. Errors he allowed had 
been committed on the subject. But Congress were 
now using their endeavours to rectify them. The 
best remedy would be such a government as would 



956 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

have vigor enough to do justice throughout. This 
was certainly the best chance that could be afford- 
to the smaller States. 

Mr. Wilson. The question is, shall the members 
of the second branch be chosen by the Legislatures 
of the States ? When he considered the amazing 
extent of country — the immense population which is 
to fill it — the influence of the Government we are to 
form will have, not only on the present generation of 
our people and their multiplied posterity, but on the 
whole globe, — he was lost in the magnitude of the 
object. The project of Henry IV. and his states- 
men, was but the picture in miniature of the great 
portrait to be exhibited. He was opposed to an 
election by the State Legislatures. In explaining 
his reasons it was necessary to observe the twofold 
relation in which the people would stand, — first, as 
citizens of the General Government ; and secondly, 
as citizens of their particular State. The General 
Government was meant for them in the first capacity: 
the State Governments in the second. Both gov- 
ernments were derived from the people — both meant 
for the people — both therefore ought to be regulated 
on the same principles. The same train of ideas 
which belonged to the relation of the citizens to 
their State Governments, were applicable to their 
relation to the General Government; and in forming 
the latter we ought to proceed by abstracting as 
much as possible from the idea of the State Govern- 
ments. With respect to the province and object 
of the General Government they should be consider- 
ed as having no existence. The election of the 
second branch by the Legislatures will introduce 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 957 

and cherish local interests and local prejudices. 
The General Government is not an assemblage of 
States, but of individuals, for certain political 
purposes ; it is not meant for the States, but for the 
individuals composing them ; the individuals, there- 
fore, not the States, ought to be represented in it. 
A proportion in this representation can be preserved 
in the second, as well as in the first, branch ; and 
the election can be made by electors chosen by the 
people for that purpose. He moved an amendment 
to that effect; which was not seconded. 

Mr. Ellsworth saw no reason for departing from 
the mode contained in the Report. Whoever chooses 
the member, he will be a citizen of the State he is 
to represent ; and will feel the same spirit, and act 
the same part, whether he be appointed by the peo- 
ple or the Legislature. Every State has its particu- 
lar views and prejudices, which will find their way 
into the general council, through whatever channel 
they may flow. Wisdom was one of the character- 
istics which it was in contemplation to give the se- 
cond branch, — would not more of it issue from the 
Legislatures than from an immediate election by the 
people ? He urged the necessity of maintaining the 
existence and agency of the States. Without their 
co-operation it would be impossible to support a 
republican government over so great an extent of 
country. An army could scarcely render it practi- 
cable. The largest States are the worst governed. 
Virginia is obliged to acknowledge her incapacity to 
extend her government to Kentucky. Massachu- 
setts cannot keep the peace one hundred miles from 
from her capital, and is now forming an army for its 



958 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

support. How long Pennsylvania may be free from 
a like situation, cannot be foreseen. If the princi- 
ples and materials of our Government are not ade- 
quate to the extent of these single States, how can 
it be imagined that they can support a single gov- 
ernment throughout the United States ? The only 
chance of supporting a General Government lies in 
grafting it on those of the individual States. 

Doctor Johnson urged the necessity of preserving 
the State Governments, which would be at the mer- 
cy of the General Government on Mr. Wilson's 
plan. 

Mr. Madison thought it would obviate difficulty if 
the present Resolution were postponed, and the 
eighth taken up, which is to fix the right of suffrage 
in the second branch. 

Mr. Williamson professed himself a friend to 
such a system as would secure the existence of 
the State Governments. The happiness of the peo- 
ple depended on it. He was at a loss to give his 
vote as to the Senate until he knew the number of 
its members. In order to ascertain this, he moved 
to insert, after " second branch of the National Le- 
gislature," the words, " who shall bear such propor- 
tion to the number of the first branch as one to ." 

He was not seconded. 

Mr. Mason. It has been agreed on all hands that 
an efficient government is necessary ; that, to render 
it such, it ought to have the faculty of self-defence ; 
that to render its different branches effectual, each of 
them ought to have the same power of self-defence. 
He did not wonder that such an agreement should 
have prevailed on these points. He only wondered 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 959 

that there should be any disagreement about the ne- 
cessity of allowing the State Governments the same 
self-defence. If they are to be preserved, as he con- 
ceived to be essential, they certainly ought to have 
this power; and the only mode left of giving it to 
them was by allowing them to appoint the second 
branch of the National Legislature. 

Mr. Butler, observing that we were put to diffi- 
culties at every step by the uncertainty whether an 
equality or a ratio of representation would prevail 
finally in the second branch, moved to postpone the 
fourth Resolution, and to proceed to the eighth Res- 
olution on that point. Mr. Madison seconded him. 

On the question, — New York, Virginia, South Car- 
olina, Georgia, aye — 4 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
North Carolina, no — 7. 

On a question to postpone the fourth, and take up 
the seventh, Resolution, — Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5; Massa- 
chusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware, no — 6. 

On the question to agree, " that the members of 
the second branch be chosen by the individual Le- 
gislatures," — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, 
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, no — 2.* 239 

* It must be kept in view that the largest States, particularly Pennsylvania 
and Virginia', always considered the choice of the second branch by the State 
Legislatures as opposed to a proportional representation, to which they were 
attached as a fundamental principle of just government. The smaller States, 
who had opposite views, were reinforced by the members from the large States 
most anxious to secure the importance of the State Governments. 



960 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

On a question on the clause requiring the age of 
thirty years at least, — it was unanimously agreed to. 

On a question to strike out the words, " sufficient 
to ensure their independence," after the word 
" term," — it was agreed to. 

The clause, that the second branch hold their offi- 
ces for a term of " seven years," being considered, — 

Mr. Gorham suggests a term of " four years," one 
fourth to be elected every year. 

Mr. Randolph supported the idea of rotation, as 
favorable to the wisdom and stability of the corps ; 
which might possibly be always sitting, and aiding 
the Executive, and moves, after " seven years," to 
add, "to go out in fixed proportion ;" which was 
agreed to. 

Mr. Williamson suggests " six years," as more 
convenient for rotation than seven years. 

Mr. Sherman seconds him. 

Mr. Read proposed that they should hold their 
offices "during good behaviour." Mr. R. Morris 
seconds him. 

General Pinckney proposed " four years." A long- 
er time would fix them at the seat of government. 
They would acquire an interest there, perhaps trans- 
fer their property, and lose sight of the States they 
represent. Under these circumstances, the distant 
States would labor under great disadvantages. 240 

Mr. Sherman moved to strike out " seven years," 
in order to take questions on the several proposi- 
tions. 

On the question to strike out "seven," — Massa- 
chusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7; Penn- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 961 

sylvania, Delaware, Virginia, no — 3 ; Maryland, di- 
vided. 

On the question to insert " six years," which failed, 
five States being, aye ; five, no ; and one, divided, 
— Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, 
North Carolina, aye — 5 ; Massachusetts, New York, 
New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 5; 
Maryland divided. 

On a motion to adjourn, the votes were, five for, 
five against it ; and one divided, — Connecticut, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye: — 51 
Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 5 ; Maryland divided. 

On the question for "five years," it was lost, 
— Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia. 
North Carolina, aye — 5 ; Massachusetts, New York, 
New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 5 ; Mary- 
land divided. 

Adjourned. 



Tuesday, June 26th. 

In Convention, — The duration of the second 
branch being under consideration, — 

Mr. Gorham moved to fill the blank with "six 
years," one-third of the members to go out every 
second year. 

Mr. Wilson seconded the motion. 

General Pinckney opposed six years, in favor of 
four years. The States, he said, had different in- 
terests. Those of the Southern, and of South 
Carolina in particular, were different from the 
61 



962 . DEBATESINTHE [1787. 

Northern. If the Senators should be appointed for 
a long term, they would settle in the State where 
they exercised their functions, and would in a little 
time be rather the representatives of that, than of 
the State appointing them. 241 

Mr. Read moved that the term be nine years. 
This would admit of a very convenient rotation, 
one third going out triennially. He would still 
prefer "during good behaviour;" but being little sup- 
ported in that idea, he was willing to take the 
longest term that could be obtained. 

Mr. Broom seconded the motion. 

Mr. Madison. In order to judge of the form to 
be given to this institution, it will be proper to take a 
view of the ends to be served by it. These were, — - 
first, to protect the people against their rulers, 
secondly, to protect the people against the transient 
impressions into which they themselves might be 
led. A people deliberating in a temperate moment, 
and with the experience of other nations before 
them, on the plan of government most likely to 
secure their happiness, would first be aware, that 
those charged with the public happiness might 
betray their trust. An obvious precaution against 
this danger would be, to divide the trust between 
different bodies of men, who might watch and 
check each other. In this they would be governed 
by the same prudence which has prevailed in or- 
ganizing the subordinate departments of govern- 
ment, where all business liable to abuses is made to 
pass through separate hands, the one being a check 
on the other. It would next occur to such a people, 
that they themselves were liable to temporary 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 963 

errors, through want of information as to their true 
interest ; and that men chosen for a short term, 
and employed but a small portion of that in public 
affairs, might err from the same cause. This re- 
flection would naturally suggest, that the govern- 
ment be so constituted as that one of its branches 
might have an opportunity of acquiring a competent 
knowledge of the public interests. Another re- 
flection equally becoming a people on such an occa- 
sion, would be, that they themselves, as well as a 
numerous body of representatives, were liable to 
err, also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary 
fence against this danger would be, to select a 
portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited num- 
ber, and firmness, might seasonably interpose against 
impetuous counsels. It ought, finally, to occur to a 
people deliberating on a government for themselves, 
that as different interests necessarily result from 
the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest 
might, under sudden impulses, be tempted to com- 
mit injustice on the minority. In all civilized 
countries the people fall into different classes, having 
a real or supposed difference of interests. There 
will be creditors and debtors ; farmers, merchants, 
and manufacturers. There will be, particularly, 
the distinction of rich and poor. It was true, as 
had been observed (by Mr. Pinckney), we had 
not among us those hereditary distinctions of rank 
which were a great source of the contests in the 
ancient governments, as well as the modern States 
of Europe ; nor those extremes of wealth or poverty, 
which characterize the latter. We cannot, how- 
ever, be regarded, even at this time, as one homo- 



964 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

geneous mass, in which every thing that affects a 
part will affect in the same manner the whole. 
In framing a system which we wish to last for ages, 
we should not lose sight of the changes which ages 
will produce. An increase of population will of 
necessity increase the proportion of those who will 
labor under all the hardships of life, and secretly 
sigh for a v more equal distribution of its blessings. 
These may in time outnumber those who are placed 
above the feelings of indigence. According to the 
equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the 
hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have 
yet been made in this country ; but symptoms of a 
levelling spirit, as we have understood, have suffi- 
ciently appeared in a certain quarter, to give notice 
of the future danger. How is this danger to be 
guarded against, on the republican principles? 
How is the danger, in all cases of interested coali- 
itions to oppress the minority, to be guarded against? 
Among other means, by the establishment of a 
body, in the government, sufficiently respectable for 
its wisdom and virtue to aid, on such emergencies, 
the preponderance of justice, by throwing its weight 
into that scale. Such being the objects of the 
second branch in the proposed Government, he 
thought a considerable duration ought to be given 
to it. He did not conceive that the term of nine 
years could threaten any real danger ; but, in pur- 
suing his particular ideas on the subject, he should 
require that the long term allowed to the second 
branch should not commence till such a period oi 
life as would render a perpetual disqualification to 
be re-elected, little inconvenient, either in a public 



1787. J FEDERAL CONVENTION. 965 

or private view. He observed, that as it was more 
than probable we were now digesting a plan which 
in its operation would decide for ever the fate of 
republican government, we ought, not only to pro- 
vide every guard to liberty that its preservation could 
require, but be equally careful to supply the defects 
which our own experience had particularly pointed out. 

Mr. Sherman. Government is instituted for those 
who live under it. It ought, therefore to be so consti- 
tuted as not to be dangerous to their liberties. The 
more permanency it has, the worse, if it be a bad gov- 
ernment. Frequent elections are necessary to pre- 
serve the good behaviour of rulers. They also tend 
to give permanency to the government, by preserving 
that good behaviour, because it ensures their re-elec- 
tion. In Connecticut elections have been very fre- 
quent, yet great stability and uniformity, both as to 
persons and measures, have been experienced from 
its original establishment to the present time ; a pe- 
riod of more than a hundred and thirty years. He 
wished to have provision made for steadiness and 
wisdom, in the system to be adopted ; but he thought 
six, or four, years would be sufficient. He should be 
content with either. 

Mr. Read wished it to be considered by the small 
States, that it was their interest that we should be- 
come one people as much as possible ; that State at- 
tachments should be extinguished as much as possi- 
ble ; that the Senate should be so constituted as to 
have the feelings of citizens of the whole. 

Mr. Hamilton. He did not mean to enter partic- 
ularly into the subject. He concurred with Mr. 
Madison in thinking we were now to decide forever 



966 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the fate of republican government ; and that if we did 
not give to that form due stability and wisdom, it 
would be disgraced and lost among ourselves, dis- 
graced and lost to mankind forever. He acknowl- 
edged himself not to think favorably of republican 
government; but addressed his remarks to those 
who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail 
on them to tone their government as high as possi- 
ble. He professed himself to be as zealous an advo- 
cate for liberty as any man whatever; and trusted 
he should be as willing a martyr to it, though he dif- 
fered as to the form in which it was most eligible. 
He concurred, also, in the general observations of 
Mr. Madison on the subject, which might be sup- 
ported by others if it were necessary. Tt was cer- 
tainly true, that nothing like an equality of property 
existed ; that an inequality would exist as long as 
liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result 
from that very liberty itself. This inequality of 
property constituted the great and fundamental dis- 
tinction in society. When the Tribunitial power 
had levelled the boundary between the patricians 
and plebeians, what followed ? The distinction be- 
tween rich and poor was substituted. He meant 
not, however, to enlarge on the subject. He rose 
principally to remark, that Mr. Sherman seemed 
not to recollect that one branch of the proposed Gov- 
ernment was so formed as to render it particularly 
the guardians of the poorer orders of citizens ; nor to 
have adverted to the true causes of the stability 
which had been exemplified in Connecticut. Under 
the British system, as well as the Federal, many of 
the great powers appertaining to government, par- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 967 

ticularly all those relating to foreign nations, were 
not in the hands of the government there. Their 
internal affairs, also, were extremely simple, owing 
to sundry causes, many of which were peculiar to 
that country. Of late the Government had entirely 
given way to the people, and had in fact suspended 
many of its ordinary functions, in order to prevent 
those turbulent scenes which had appeared else- 
where. He asks Mr. Sherman, whether the State, at 
this time, dare impose and collect a tax on the peo- 
ple 1 To these causes, and not to the frequency of 
elections, the effect, as far as it existed, ought to be 
chiefly ascribed. 

Mr. Gerry wished we could be united in our ideas 
concerning a permanent Government. All aim at 
the same end, but there are great differences as to 
the means. One circumstance, he thought, should 
be carefully attended to. There was not a one- 
thousandth part of our fellow-citizens who were not 
against every approach towards monarchy, — will 
they ever agree to a plan which seems to make such 
an approach? The Convention ought to be ex- 
tremely cautious in what they hold out to the people. 
Whatever plan may be proposed will be espoused 
with warmth by many, out of respect to the quarter 
it proceeds from, as well as from an approbation 
of the plan itself. And if the plan should be of such 
a nature as to rouse a violent opposition, it is easy to 
foresee that discord and confusion will ensue; and it 
is even possible that we may become a prey to for- 
eign powers. He did not deny the position of Mr. 
Madison, that the majority will generally violate just- 
ice when they have an interest in so doing ; but did 



968 DEBATES IN THE f 1787, 

not think there was any such temptation in this 
country. Our situation was different from that of 
Great Britain ; and the great body of lands yet to 
be parcelled out and settled would very much pro- 
long the difference. Notwithstanding the symptoms 
of injustice which had marked many of our public 
councils, they had not proceeded so far as not to 
leave hopes that there would be a sufficient sense of 
justice and virtue for the purpose of government. 
He admitted the evils arising from a frequency of 
elections, and would agree to give the Senate a du- 
ration of four or five years. A longer term would 
defeat itself. It never would be adopted by the 

people. 

Mr. Wilson did not mean to repeat what had 
fallen from others, but would add an observation or 
two which he believed had not yet been suggested. 
Every nation may be regarded in two relations, first, 
to its own citizens ; secondly, to foreign nations. It 
is, therefore, not only liable to anarchy and tyranny 
within, but has wars to avoid and treaties to obtain 
from abroad. The Senate will probably be the de- 
pository of the powers concerning the latter objects. 
It ought therefore to be made respectable in the 
eyes of foreign nations. The true reason why Great 
Britain has not yet listened to a commercial treaty 
with us has been, because she had no confidence in 
the stability or efficacy of our Government. Nine 
years, with a rotation, will provide these desirable 
qualities ; and give our Government an advantage 
in this respect over monarchy itself. In a monar- 
chy, much must always depend on the temper of the 
man. In such a body, the personal character will 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 969 

be lost in the political. He would add another ob- 
servation. The popular objection against appoint- 
ing any public body for a long term, was, that it 
might, by gradual encroachments, prolong itself, first 
into a body for life, and finally become a hereditary 
one. It would be a satisfactory answer to this ob- 
jection, that as one- third would go out triennally, 
there would be always three divisions holding their 
places for unequal times, and consequently acting 
under the influence of different views, and different 
impulses. 

On the question for nine years, one-third to go out 
triennially, — Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye 
— 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 8. 

On the question for six years, one-third to go out 
biennally, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylva- 
nia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
aye — 7 ; New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 4. 243 

The clause of the fourth Resolution, " to receive 
fixed stipends by which they may be compensated 
for their services" being considered, — 

General Pinckney proposed, that no salary should 
be allowed. As this (the Senatorial) branch was 
meant to represent the wealth of the country, it 
ought to be composed of persons of wealth ; and if 
no allowance was to be made, the wealthy alone 
would undertake the service. He moved to strike 
out the clause. 

Doctor Franklin seconded the motion. He wish- 
ed the Convention to stand fair with the people. 
61* 



970 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

There were in it a number of young men who would 
probably be of the Senate. If lucrative appoint- 
ments should be recommended, we might be charge- 
able with having carved out places for ourselves. 

On the question, — Massachusetts, Connecticut,* 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, aye — 5; 
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, North 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 6. 

Mr. Williamson moved to change the expression 
into these words, to wit, " to receive a compensation 
for the devotion of their time to the public service." 
The motion was seconded by Mr. Ellsworth, and 
agreed to by all the States except South Caro- 
lina. It seemed to be meant only to get rid of the 
word " fixed," and leave greater room for modifying 
the provision on this point, t 

Mr. Ellsworth moved to strike out, " to be paid 
out of the National Treasury," and insert, " to be 
paid by their respective States." If the Senate was 
meant to strengthen the Government, it ought to 
have the confidence of the States. The States will 
have an interest in keeping up a representation, and 
will make such provision for supporting the members 
as will ensure their attendance. 

Mr. Madison considered this as a departure from 
a fundamental principle, and subverting the end in- 
tended by allowing the Senate a duration of six 
years. They would, if this motion should be agreed 
to, hold their places during pleasure ; during the 
pleasure of the State Legislatures. One great end 



* Quere. Whether Connecticut should not be, no, and Delaware, aye* 

J. M. 



1 787. ] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 971 

of the institution was, that being a firm, wise and 
impartial body, it might not only give stability to the 
General Government, in its operations on individu- 
als, but hold an even balance among different States. 
The motion would make the Senate, like Congress, 
the mere agents and advocates of State interests and 
views, instead of being the impartial umpires and 
guardians of justice and the general good. Con- 
gress had lately, by the establishment of a board 
with full powers to decide on the mutual claims be- 
tween the United States and the individual States, 
fairly acknowledged themselves to be unfit for dis- 
charging this part of the business referred to them 
by the Confederation. 

Mr. Dayton considered the payment of the Senate 
by the States as fatal to their independence. He 
was decided for paying them out of the National 
Treasury. 

On the question for payment of the Senate to be 
left to the States, as moved by Mr. Ellsworth, it 
passed in the negative, — Connecticut, New York, 
New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5 ; Mas- 
sachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Vir- 
ginia, North Carolina, no — 6. 244 

Col. Mason. He did not rise to make any motion, 
but to hint an idea which seemed to be proper for 
consideration. One important object in constituting 
the Senate was, to secure the rights of property. 
To give them weight and firmness for this purpose, 
a considerable duration in office was thought neces- 
sary. But a longer term than six years would be 
of no avail in this respect, if needy persons should 
be appointed. He suggested, therefore, the propriety 



972 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

of annexing to the office a qualification of property. 
He thought this would be very practicable ; as the 
rules of taxation would supply a scale for measuring 
the degree of wealth possessed by every man. 

A question was then taken, whether the words 
" to be paid out of the National Treasury," should 
stand, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Ma- 
ryland, Virginia, aye — 5 ; Connecticut, New York, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Geor- 
gia, no — 6. 

Mr. Butler moved to strike out the ineligibility 
of Senators to State offices. 

Mr. Williamson seconded the motion. 

Mr. Wilson remarked the additional dependence 
this would create in the Senators on the States. 
The longer the time, he observed, allotted to the 
officer, the more complete will be the dependence, if 
it exists at all. 

General Pinckney was for making the States, as 
much as could be conveniently done, a part of the 
General Government. If the Senate was to be ap- 
pointed by the States, it ought, in pursuance of the 
same idea, to be paid by the States ; and the States 
ought not to be barred from the opportunity of call- 
ing members of it into offices at home. Such a re- 
striction would also discourage the ablest men from 
going into the Senate. 

Mr. Williamson moved a Resolution, so penned 
as to admit of the two following questions, — first, 
whether the members of the Senate should be ineli- 
gible to, and incapable of holding, offices under the 
United States ; secondly, whether cfcc. under the par- 
ticular States. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 973 

On the question to postpone, in order to consider 
Mr. Williamson's Resolution, — Connecticut, Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Car- 
olina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye— 8; Massachu- 
setts, New York, New Jersey, no — 3. 245 

Mr. Gerry and Mr. Madison move to add to Mr. 
Williamson's first question, " and for one year there- 
after." 

On this amendment, — Connecticut, New York, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, aye — 7 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, Georgia, no — 4. 

On Mr. Williamson's first question as amended, 
viz, u ineligible and incapable &c. for one year &c." 
— agreed to unanimously. 

On the second question as to ineligibility, &c. to 
State offices, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
aye — 3 ; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 8. 

The fifth Resolution, a that each branch have the 
right of originating acts," was agreed to, nem. con. 246 

Adjourned. 



Wednesday, June 27th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Rutledge moved to postpone 
the sixth Resolution, defining the powers of Con- 
gress, in order to take up the seventh and eighth, 
which involved the most fundamental points, the 
rules of suffrage in the two branches ; which was 
agreed to, nem. con. 



974 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

A question being proposed on the seventh Resolu- 
tion, declaring that the suffrage in the first branch 
should be according to an equitable ratio,-^- 

Mr. L. Martin contended, at great length, and 
with great eagerness, that the General Govern- 
ment was meant merely to preserve the State Gov- 
ernments, not to govern individuals. That its powers 
ought to be kept within narrow limits. That if too 
little power was given to it, more might be added ; 
but that if too much, it could never be resumed. 
That individuals, as such, have little to do, but with 
their own States ; that the General Government has 
no more to apprehend from the States composing 
the Union, while it pursues proper measures, than a 
government over individuals has to apprehend from 
its subjects. That to resort to the citizens at large 
for their sanction to a new government, will be 
throwing them back into a state of nature ; that the 
dissolution of the State Governments is involved in 
the nature of the process ; that the people have no 
right to do this, without the consent of those to 
whom they have delegated their power for State 
purposes. Through their tongues only they can 
speak, through their ears only can hear. That the 
States have shewn a good disposition to comply 
with the acts of Congress, weak, contemptibly weak, 
as that body has been , and have failed through in- 
ability alone to comply. That the heaviness of the 
private debts, and the waste of property during the 
war, were the chief causes of this inability, — that 
he did not conceive the instances mentioned by Mr. 
Madison, of compacts between Virginia and Mary- 
land, between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or of 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 975 

troops raised by Massachusetts for defence against 
the rebels, to be violations of the Articles of Con- 
federation. That an equal vote in each State was 
essential to the Federal idea, and was founded in 
justice and freedom, not merely in policy. That 
though the States may give up this right of sove- 
reignty, yet they had not, and ought not. That the 
States, like individuals, were in a state of nature 
equally sovereign and free. In order to prove that 
individuals in a state of nature are equally free and 
independent, he read passages from Locke, Vattel, 
Lord Somers, Priestley. To prove that the case 
is the same with states, till they surrender their 
equal sovereignty, he read other passages in Locke 
and Vattel, and also Rutherford. That the States, 
being equal, cannot treat or confederate so as to 
give up an equality of votes, without giving up their 
liberty. That the propositions on the table were a 
system of slavery for ten States. That as Virginia, 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have forty-two 
ninetieths of the votes, they can do as they please, 
without a miraculous union of the other ten. That 
they will have nothing to do but to gain over one of 
the ten, to make them complete masters of the rest ; 
that they can then appoint an Executive, and Judi- 
ciary, and Legislature for them, as they please. 
That there was, and would continue, a natural pre- 
dilection and partiality in men for their own States ; 
that the states, particularly the smaller, would never 
allow a negative to be exercised over their laws : 
that no State, in ratifying the Confederation, had 
objected to the equality of votes ; that the com- 
plaints at present ran not against this equality, but 



976 DEBATES IN THE [1787 

the want of power. That sixteen members from 
Virginia would be more likely to act in concert, 
than a like number formed of members from differ- 
ent States. That instead of a junction of the small 
States as a remedy, he thought a division of the 
large States would be more eligible. This was the 
substance of a speech which was continued more 
than three hours. He was too much exhausted, he 
said, to finish his remarks, and reminded the House 
that he should to-morrow resume them. 
Adjourned. 



Thursday, June 28th. 

In Convention, — Mr. L. Martin resumed his dis- 
course, contending that the General Government 
ought to be formed for the States, not for individ- 
uals : that if the States were to have votes in pro- 
portion to their numbers of people, it would be the 
same thing, whether their Representatives were 
chosen by the Legislatures or the people ; the 
smaller States would be equally enslaved. That 
if the large States have the same interest with the 
smaller, as was urged, there could be no danger in 
giving them an equal vote ; they would not injure 
themselves, and they could not injure the large ones, 
on that supposition, without injuring themselves; 
and if the interests were not the same, the inequality 
of suffrage would be dangerous to the smaller States. 
That it will be in vain to propose any plan offensive 
to the rulers of the States, whose influence over the 
people will certainly prevent their adopting it. 
That the large States were weak at present in pro- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 977 

portion to their extent ; and could only be made for- 
midable to the small ones by the weight of their 
votes. That in case a dissolution of the Union 
should take place, the small States would have 
nothing to fear from their power ; that if, in such a 
case, the three great States should league themselves 
together, the other ten could do so too ; and that he 
had rather see partial confederacies take place, than 
the plan on the table. This was the substance of 
the residue of his discourse, which was delivered with 
much diffuseness, and considerable vehemence. 247 

Mr. Lansing and Mr. Dayton moved to strike out 
"not," so that the seventh article might read, "that 
the right of suffrage in the first branch ought to be 
according to the rule established by the Confedera- 
tion." 

Mr. Dayton expressed great anxiety that the 
question might not be put till to-morrow, Governor 
Livingston being kept away by indisposition, and 
the representation of New Jersey thereby suspended. 

Mr. Williamson thought, that, if any political 
truth could be grounded on mathematical demonstra- 
tion, it was, that if the States were equally sove- 
reign now, and parted with equal proportions of 
sovereignty, that they would remain equally sove- 
reign. He could not comprehend how the smaller 
States would be injured in the case, and wished 
some gentleman would vouchsafe a solution of it. 
He observed that the small States, if they had a 
plurality of votes, would have an interest in throw- 
ing the burdens off their own shoulders on those of 
the large ones. He begged that the expected addi- 
tion of new States from the westward might be ta- 
62 



978 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

ken into view. They would be small States ; they 
would be poor States ; they would be unable to pay 
in proportion to their numbers, their distance from 
market rendering the produce of their labor less val- 
uable ; they would consequently be tempted to com- 
bine for the purpose of laying burdens on commerce 
and consumption, which would fall with greater 
weight on the old States. 

Mr. Madison said, he was much disposed to con- 
cur in any expedient, not inconsistent with funda- 
mental principles, that could remove the difficulty 
concerning the rule of representation. But he could 
neither be convinced that the rule contended for 
was just, nor that it was necessary for the safety of 
the small States against the large States. That it 
was not just, had been conceded by Mr. Brearly 
and Mr. Patterson themselves. The expedient pro- 
posed by them was a new partition of the territory 
of the United States. The fallacy of the reasoning 
drawn from the equality of sovereign states, in the 
formation of compacts, lay in confounding mere trea- 
ties, in which were specified certain duties to which 
the parties were to be bound, and certain rules by 
which their subjects were to be reciprocally gov- 
erned in their intercourse, with a compact by which 
an authority was created paramount to the parties, 
and making laws for the government of them. If 
France, England and Spain were to enter into a 
treaty for the regulation of commerce, &c, with the 
Prince of Monacho, and four or Hye other of the 
smallest sovereigns of Europe, they would not hesi- 
tate to treat as equals, and to make the regulations 
perfectly reciprocal. Would the case be the same, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 979 

if a Council were to be formed of deputies from 
each, with authority and discretion to raise money, 
levy troops, determine the value of coin, &c? 
Would thirty or forty millions of people submit their 
fortunes into the hands of a few thousands 9 If 
they did, it would only prove that they expected 
more from the terror of their superior force, than 
they feared from the selfishness of their feeble asso- 
ciates. Why are counties of the same States repre- 
sented in proportion to their numbers? Is it be- 
cause the representatives are chosen by the people 
themselves ? So will be the Representatives in the 
National Legislature. Is it because the larger have 
more at stake than the smaller ? The case will be 
the same with the larger and smaller States. Is it 
because the laws are to operate immediately on 
their persons and properties ? The same is the case, 
in some degree, as the Articles of Confederation 
stand; the same will be the case, in a far greater 
degree, under the plan proposed to be substituted. 
In the cases of captures, of piracies, and of offences 
in a Federal army, the property and persons of indi- 
viduals depend on the laws of Congress. By the 
plan proposed a complete power of taxation, the 
highest prerogative of supremacy, is proposed to be 
vested in the National Government. Many other 
powers are added which assimilate it to the gov- 
ernment of individual States. The negative pro- 
posed on the State laws will make it an essential 
branch of the State Legislatures, and of course will 
require that it should be exercised by a body, estab- 
lished on like principles with the branches of those 
Legislatures. That it is not necessary to secure the 



980 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

small States against the large ones, he conceived to 
be equally obvious. Was a combination of the large 
ones dreaded ? This must arise either from some 
interest common to Virginia, Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania, and distinguishing them from the 
other States ; or from the mere circumstance of simi- 
larity of size. Did any such common interest exist ? 
In point of situation, they could not have been more 
effectually separated from each other, by the most 
jealous citizen of the most jealous States. In point 
of manners, religion, and the other circumstances 
which sometimes beget affection between different 
communities, they were not more assimilated than 
the other States. In point of the staple productions, 
they were as dissimilar as any three other States in 
the Union. The staple of Massachusetts was fish, 
of Pennsylvania flour, of Virginia tobacco. Was a 
combination to be apprehended from the mere cir- 
cumstance of equality of size ? Experience sug- 
gested no such danger. The Journals of Congress 
did not present any peculiar association of these 
States in the votes recorded. It had never been 
seen that different counties in the same State, con- 
formable in extent, but disagreeing in other circum- 
stances, betrayed a propensity to such combinations. 
Experience rather taught a contrary lesson. Among 
individuals of superior eminence and weight in so- 
ciety, rivalships were much more frequent than coali- 
tions. Among independent nations, pre-eminent over 
their neighbours, the same remark was verified. 
Carthage and Rome tore one another to pieces, in- 
stead of uniting their forces to devour the weaker 
nations of the earth. The Houses of Austria and 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 981 

France were hostile as long as they remained the 
greatest powers of Europe. England and France 
have succeeded to the pre-eminence and to the en- 
mity. To this principle we owe perhaps our lib- 
erty. A coalition between those powers would have 
been fatal to us. Among the principal members of 
ancient and modern confederacies, we find the same 
effect from the same cause. The contentions, not 
the coalitions, of Sparta, Athens, and Thebes, proved 
fatal to the smaller members of the Amphictyonic 
confederacy. The contentions, not the combina- 
tions, of Russia and Austria, have distracted and 
oppressed the German Empire. Were the large 
States formidable, singly, to their smaller neigh- 
bours ? On this supposition, the latter ought to 
wish for such a General Government as will operate 
with equal energy on the former as on themselves. 
The more lax the band, the more libertv the larger 
will have to avail themselves of their superior force. 
Here again, experience was an instructive monitor. 
What is the situation of the weak compared with 
the strong, in those stages of civilization in which 
the violence of individuals is least controlled by an 
efficient government ? The heroic period of ancient 
Greece, the feudal licentiousness of the middle ages 
of Europe, the existing condition of the American 
savages, answer this question. What is the situa- 
tion of the minor sovereigns in the great society of 
independent nations, in which the more powerful are 
under no control, but the nominal authority of the 
law of nations ? Is not the danger to the former 
exactly in proportion to their weakness ? But there 
are cases still more in point. What was the condi- 



982 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

tion of the weaker members of the Amphictyonic 
confederacy 1 Plutarch (see Life of Themistocles) 
will inform us, that it happened but too often, that 
the strongest cities corrupted and awed the weaker, 
and that judgment went in favor of the more power- 
ful party. What is the condition of the lesser States 
in the German confederacy 1 We all know that 
they are exceedingly trampled upon, and that they 
owe their safety, as far as they enjoy it, partly to their 
enlisting themselves under the rival banners of the 
pre-eminent members, partly to alliances with neigh- 
bouring princes, which the constitution of the Em- 
pire does not prohibit. What is the state of things 
in the lax system of the Dutch confederacy ? Hol- 
land contains about half the people, supplies about 
half the money, and by her influence silently and 
indirectly governs the whole republic. In a word, 
the two extremes before us are, a perfect separation, 
and a perfect incorporation of the thirteen States. 
In the first case, they would be independent nations, 
subject to no law but the law of nations. In the 
last, they would be mere counties of one entire re- 
public, subject to one common law. In the first 
case, the smaller States would have every thing to 
fear from the larger. In the last they would have 1 
nothing to fear. The true policy of the small 
States, therefore, lies in promoting those principles, 
and that form of government, which will most ap- 
proximate the States to the condition of counties. 
Another consideration may be added. If the Gen- 
eral Government be feeble, the larger States, dis- 
trusting its continuance, and foreseeing that their 
importance and security may depend on their own 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 983 

size and strength, will never submit to a partition. 
Give to the General Government sufficient energy 
and permanency, and you remove the objection. 
Gradual partitions of the large, and junctions of the 
small States, will be facilitated, and time may effect 
that equalization which is wished for by the small 

248 

States now, but can never be accomplished at once. 

Mr. Wilson. The leading argument of those who 
contend for equality of votes among the States is, 
that the States, as such, being equal, and being re- 
presented, not as districts of individuals, but in thejft 
political and corporate capacities, are entitled to an 
equality of suffrage. According to this mode of rea- 
soning, the representation of the boroughs in England, 
which has been allowed on all hands to be the rotten 
part of the Constitution, is perfectly right and proper. 
They are, like the States, represented in their cor- 
porate capacity ; like the States, therefore, they are 
entitled to equal voices — Old Sarum to as many as 
London. And instead of the injury supposed hith- 
erto to be done to London, the true ground of com- 
plaint lies with Old Sarum : for London instead of 
two, which is her proper share, sends four represen- 
tatives to Parliament. 249 

Mr. Sherman. The question is, not what rights 
naturally belong to man, but how they may be 
most equally and effectually guarded in society. 
And if some give up more than others, in order to 
obtain this end, there can be no room for complaint. 
To do otherwise, to require an equal concession 
from all, if it would create danger to the rights 
of some, would be sacrificing the end to the means. 
The rich man who enters into society along with 



984 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the poor man gives up more than the poor man, yet 
with an equal vote he is equally safe. Were he to 
have more votes than the poor man, in proportion to 
his superior stake, the rights of the poor man would 
immediately cease to be secure. This consideration 
prevailed when the Articles of Confederation were 
formed. 250 / 

The determination of the question, for striking out 
the word " not," was put off till to-morrow, at the 
request of the Deputies from New York. 
A Doctor Franklin. Mr. President, The small pro- 
gress we have made after four or five weeks close 
attendance and continual reasonings with each 
other — our different sentiments on almost every 
question, several of the last producing as many noes 
as ayes — is, methinks, a melancholy proof of the 
imperfection of the human understanding. We in- 
deed seem to feel our own want of political wisdom, 
since we have been running about in search of it. 
We have gone back to ancient history for models 
of government, and examined the different forms 
of those republics which, having been formed with 
the seeds of their own dissolution, now no longer 
exist. And we have viewed modern states all 
round Europe, but find none of their constitutions 1 
suitable to our circumstances. 

In this situation of this Assembly, groping as it 
were in the dark to find political truth, and scarce 
able to distinguish it when presented to us, how has 
it happened, Sir, that we have not hitherto once 
thought of humbly applying to the Father of lights, 
to illuminate our understandings ? In the beginning 
of the contest with Great Britain, when we were 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION^ 985 

sensible of danger, we had daily prayer in this 
roomWor the divine protection. Our prayers, sir, 
were heard, and they were graciously answered. 
All of us who were engaged in the struggle must 
have observed frequent instances of a superintending 
Providence in our favor. To that kind Providence 
we owe this happy opportunity of consulting in 
peace on the means of establishing our future na- 
tional felicity. And have we now forgotten that 
powerful friend? Or do we imagine that we no 
longer need his assistance? I have lived, Sir, a 
long time, and the longer I live, the more convincing 
proofs I see of this truth — that God governs in the 
affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the 
ground without his notice, is it probable that an 
empire can rise without his aid ? We have been 
assured, Sir, in the sacred writings, that " except 
the Lord build the house they labor in vain that 
build it." I firmly believe this ; and I also believe 
that without his concurring aid we shall succeed in 
this political building no better than the builders of 
Babel. We shall be divided by our little partial 
local interests; our projects will be confounded; 
and we ourselves shall become a reproach and by- 
Vord down to future ages. And what is worse, 
mankind may hereafter, from this unfortunate in- 
stance, despair of establishing governments by 
human wisdom, and leave it to chance, war, and 
conquest. 

I therefore beg leave to move — that henceforth 

prayers imploring the assistance of Heaven, and 

its blessings on our deliberations, be held in this 

Assembly every morning before we proceed to 

62* 



986 DEEATES IN THE [1787. 

business, and that one or more of the clergy of this 
city be requested to officiate in that service. %f 

Mr. Sherman seconded the motion. 

Mr. Hamilton and several others expressed their 
apprehensions, that, however proper such a resolu- 
tion might have been at the beginning of the Con- 
vention, it might at this late day, in the first place, 
bring on it some disagreeable animadversions ; and 
in the second, lead the public to believe that the 
embarrassments and dissensions within the Conven- 
tion had suggested this measure. It was answered, 
by Doctor Franklin, Mr. Sherman, and others, that 
the past omission of a duty could not justify a 
further omission ; that the rejection of such a pro- 
position would expose the Convention to more un- 
pleasant animadversions than the adoption of it; 
and that the alarm out of doors that might be ex- 
cited for the state of things within would at least 
be as likely to do good as ill. 

Mr. Williamson observed, that the true cause 
of the omission could not be mistaken. The Con- 
vention had no funds. 

Mr. Randolph proposed, in order to give a favor- 
able aspect to the measure, that a sermon be 
preached at the request of the Convention on the 
Fourth of July, the anniversary of Independence; 
and thenceforward prayers, (fee. to be read in the 
Convention every morning. Doctor Franklin sec- 
onded this motion. After several unsuccessful at- 
tempts for silently postponing this matter by ad- 
journing, the adjournment was at length carried, 
without any vote on the motion. 251 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 987 



Friday, June 29th. 

In Convention. — Doctor Johnson. The contro- 
versy must be endless whilst gentlemen differ in the 
grounds of their arguments ; those on one side con- 
sidering the States as districts of people composing 
one political society : those on the other, considering 
them as so many political societies. The fact is, 
that the States do exist as political societies, and a 
government is to be formed for them in their polit- 
ical capacity, as well as for the individuals com- 
posing them. Does it not seem to follow, that if 
the States, as such, are to exist, they must be armed 
with some power of self-defence ? This is the idea 
of Colonel Mason, who appears to have looked to 
the bottom of this matter. Besides the aristocratic 
and other interests, which ought to have the means 
of defending themselves, the States have their inter- 
ests as such, and are equally entitled to like means. 
On the whole he thought, that, as in some respects 
the States are to be considered in their political 
capacity, and in others as districts of individual 
citizens, the two ideas embraced on different sides, 
instead of being opposed to each other, ought to be 
combined ; that in one branch the people ought to 
be represented, in the other the States. 

Mr. Gorham. The States, as now confederated, 
have no doubt a right to refuse to be consolidated, or 
to be formed iuto any new system. But he wished 
the small States, which seemed most ready to object, 
to consider which are to give up most, they or the 
larger ones. He conceived that a rupture of the 



988 DEBATESINTHE [ 1787. 

Union would be an event unhappy for all; but 
surely the large States would be least unable to 
take care of themselves, and to make connections 
with one another. The weak, therefore, were most 
interested in establishing some general system for 
maintaining order. If, among individuals composed 
partly of weak, and partly of strong, the former 
most need the protection of law and government, 
the case is exactly the same with weak and pow- 
erful States. What would be the situation of Del- 
aware, (for these things he found must be spoken out, 
and it might as well be done at first as last), what 
would be the situation of Delaware in case of a 
separation of the States ? Would she not be at the 
mercy of Pennsylvania ? Would not her true inter- 
est lie in being consolidated with her ; and ought 
she not now to wish for such a union with Penn- 
sylvania, under one Government, as will put it out 
of the power of Pennsylvania to oppress her 1 No- 
thing can be more ideal than the danger apprehended 
by the States from their being formed into one na- 
tion. Massachusetts was originally three colonies, 
viz. ; old Massachusetts, Plymouth, and the Province 
of Maine. These apprehensions existed then. An 
incorporation took place ; all parties were safe and 
satisfied; and every distinction is now forgotten. 
The case was similar with Connecticut and New 
Haven. The dread of union was reciprocal ; the 
consequence of it equally salutary and satisfactory. 
In like manner, New Jersey has been made one so- 
ciety out of two parts. Should a separation of the 
States take place, the fate of New Jersey would be 
worst of all. She has no foreign commerce, and 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 989 

can have but little. Pennsylvania and New York 
will continue to levy taxes on her consumption. If 
she consults her interest, she would beg of all things 
to be annihilated. The apprehensions of the small 
States ought to be appeased by another reflection. 
Massachusetts will be divided. The Province of 
Maine is already considered as approaching the 
term of its annexation to it : and Pennsylvania will 
probably not increase, considering the present state 
of her population, and other events that may hap- 
pen. On the whole, he considered a union of the 
States as necessary to their happiness, and a firm 
General Government as necessary to their union. 
He should consider it his duty, if his colleagues 
viewed the matter in the same light he did, to 
stay here as long as any other State would remain 
with them, in order to agree on some plan that 
could, with propriety, be recommended to the people. 

Mr. Ellsworth did not despair. He still trusted 
that some good plan of government would be devised 
and adopted. 

Mr. Read. He should have no objection to the 
system if it were truly national, but it has too much 
of a federal mixture in it. The little States, he 
thought, had not much to fear. He suspected that 
the large States felt their want of energy, and 
wished for a General Government to supply the de- 
fect. Massachusetts was evidently laboring under 
her weakness, and he believed Delaware would not 
be in much danger if in her neighbourhood. Dela- 
ware had enjoyed tranquillity, and he flattered him- 
self would continue to do so. He was not, however, 
so selfish as not to wish for a good General Govern- 



990 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

merit. In order to obtain one, the whole States 
must be incorporated. If the States remain, the 
representatives of the large ones will stick together, 
and carry every thing before them. The Execu- 
tive, also, will be chosen under the influence of this 
partiality, and will betray it in his administration. 
These jealousies are inseparable from the scheme of 
leaving the States in existence. They must be done 
away. The ungranted lands, also, which have been 
assumed by particular States, must be given up. 
He repeated his approbation of the plan of Mr. 
Hamilton, and wished it to be substituted for that 
on the table. 

Mr. Madison agreed with Doctor Johnson, that 
the mixed nature of the Government ought to be 
kept in view ; but thought too much stress was laid 
on the rank of the States as political societies. 
There was a gradation, he observed, from the small- 
est corporation, with the most limited powers, to the 
largest empire, with the most perfect sovereignty. 
He pointed out the limitations on the sovereignty of 
the States, as now confederated. Their laws, in re- 
lation to the paramount law of the Confederacy, 
were analagous to that of bye-laws to the supreme 
law within a State. Under the proposed Govern- 
ment the powers of the States will be much farther 
reduced. According to the views of every member, 
the General Government will have powers far be- 
yond those exercised by the British Parliament 
when the States were part of the British Empire. 
It will, in particular, have the power, without the 
consent of the State Legislatures, to levy money di- 
rectly from the people themselves; and therefore, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 991 

not to divest such unequal portions of the people as 
composed the several States of an equal voice, would 
subject the system to the reproaches and evils which 
have resulted from the vicious representation in 
Great Britain. 

He entreated the gentlemen representing the small 
States to renounce a principle which was confessedly 
unjust ; which could never be admitted ; and which 7 
if admitted, must infuse mortality into a Constitution 
which we wished to last forever. He prayed them 
to ponder well the consequences of suffering the 
Confederacy to go to pieces. It had been said that 
the want of energy in the large States would be a 
security to the small. It was forgotten that this 
want of energy proceeded from the supposed securi- 
ty of the States against all external danger. Let 
each State depend on itself for its security, and let 
apprehensions arise of danger from distant powers or 
from neighbouring States, and the languishing con- 
dition of all the States, large as well as small, would 
soon be transformed into vigorous and high-toned 
Governments. His great fear was, that their Gov- 
ernments would then have too much energy; that 
this might not only be formidable in the large to the 
small States, but fatal to the internal liberty of 
all. The same causes which have rendered the old 
world the theatre of incessant wars, and have ban- 
ished liberty from the face of it, would soon produce 
the same effects here. The weakness and jealousy 
of the small States would quickly introduce some 
regular military force, against sudden danger from 
their powerful neighbours. The example would 
be followed by others, and would soon become 



992 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

universal. In time of actual war, great discretion- 
ary powers are constantly given to the Execu- 
tive magistrate. Constant apprehension of war 
has the same tendency to render the head too 
large for the body. A standing military force, with 
an overgrown Executive, will not long be safe com- 
panions to liberty. The means of defence against 
foreign danger have been always the instruments of 
tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a 
standing maxim, to excite a war whenever a revolt 
was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the ar- 
mies kept up under the pretext of defending, have 
enslaved, the people. It is, perhaps, questionable, 
whether the best concerted system of absolute power 
in Europe, could maintain itself, in a situation where 
no alarms of external danger could tame the people 
to the domestic yoke. The insular situation of 
Great Britain was the principal cause of her being 
an exception to the general fate of Europe. It has 
rendered less defence necessary, and admitted a kind 
of defence which could not be used for the purpose 
of oppression. These consequences, he conceived, 
ought to be apprehended, whether the States should 
run into a total separation from each other, or should 
enter into partial confederacies. Either event would 
be truly deplorable ; and those who might be acces- 
sary to either, could never be forgiven by their coun- 
try, nor by themselves. 252 

* Mr. Hamilton observed, that individuals forming 
political societies modify their rights differently, with 
regard to suffrage. Examples of it are found in all 

* From this date he was absent till the 13th of August. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 993 

the States. In all of them, some individuals are de- 
prived of the right altogether, not having the requi- 
site qualification of property. In some of the States, 
the right of suffrage is allowed in some cases, and 
refused in others. To vote for a member in one 
branch, a certain quantum of property; to vote for 
a member in another branch of the Legislature, a 
higher quantum of property, is required. In like 
manner, States may modify their right of suffrage 
differently, the larger exercising a larger, the small- 
er a smaller, share of it. But as States are a col- 
lection of individual men, which ought we to respect 
most, the rights of the people composing them, or of 
the artificial beings resulting from the composition ? 
Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than 
to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been 
said, that if the smaller States renounce their equali- 
ty, they renounce at the same time their liberty. The 
truth is, it is a contest for power, not for liberty. 
Will the men composing the small States be less 
free than those composing the larger 1 The State 
of Delaware having forty thousand souls will lose 
power, if she has one-tenth only of the votes allowed 
to Pennsylvania having four hundred thousand ; but 
will the people of Delaware be less free, if each citi- 
zen has an equal vote with each citizen of Pennsyl- 
vania ? He admitted that common residence within 
the same State would produce a certain degree of 
attachment ; and that this principle might have a 
certain influence on public affairs. He thought, 
however, that this might, by some precautions, be in 
a great measure excluded : and that no material in- 
convenience could result from it ; as there could not 
63 



994 • DEBATESINTHE [ 1787. 

be any ground for combination among the States 
whose influence was most dreaded. The only con- 
siderable distinction of interests lay between the 
carrying and non-carrying States, which divides, 
instead of uniting, the largest States. No consider- 
able inconvenience had been found from the division 
of the State of New York into different districts of 
different sizes. 

Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the 
Union, and the establishment of partial confedera- 
cies, had been pointed out. He w r ould add another 
of a most serious nature. Alliances will immedi- 
ately be formed With different rival and hostile na- 
tions of Europe, who will foment disturbances among 
ourselves, and make us parties to all their own quar- 
rels. Foreign nations having American dominion 
are, and must be, jealous of us. Their representa- 
tives betray the utmost anxiety for our fate ; and for 
the result of this meeting, which must have an essen- 
tial influence on it. It had been said, that respecta- 
bility in the eyes of foreign nations was not the 
object at which we aimed ; that the proper object 
of republican government was domestic tranquillity 
and happiness. This was an ideal distinction. No 
government could give us tranquillity and happiness 
at home, which did not possess sufficient stability 
and strength to make us respectable abroad. This 
was the critical moment for forming such a govern- 
ment. We should run every risk in trusting to fu- 
ture amendments. As yet we retain the habits of 
union. We are weak, and sensible of our weakness. 
Henceforward, the motives will become feebler, and 
the difficulties greater. It is a miracle that we are 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 995 

now here, exercising our tranquil and free delibera- 
tions on the subject. It would be madness to trust 
to future miracles. A thousand causes must obstruct 
a re-production of them. 253 

Mr. Pierce considered the equality of votes under 
the Confederation as the great source of the public 
difficulties. The members of Congress were advo- 
cates for local advantages. State distinctions must 
be sacrificed, as far as the general good required, 
but without destroying the States. Though from a 
small State, he felt himself a citizen of the United 
States. ; 

Mr. Gerry urged, that we never were independent 
States, were not such now, and never could be, even 
on the principles of the Confederation. The States, 
and the advocates for them, Were intoxicated with 
the idea of their sovereignty. He was a member of 
Congress at the time the Federal Articles were 
formed. The injustice of allowing each State an 
equal vote was long insisted on. He voted for it, 
but it was against his judgment, and under the pres- 
sure of public danger, and the obstinacy of the lesser 
States. The present Confederation he considered 
as dissolving. The fate of the Union will be decided 
by the Convention. If they do not agree on some- 
thing, few delegates will probably be appointed to 
Congress. If they do, Congress will probably be 
kept up till the new system should be adopted. He 
lamented that, instead of coming here like a band 
of brothers, belonging to the same family, we seemed 
to have brought with us the spirit of political nego- 
tiators. 

Mr. L. Martin remarked, that the language, of 



996 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the States being sovereign and independent, was once 
familiar and understood ; though it seemed now so 
strange and obscure. He read those passages in the 
Articles of Confederation which describe them in 
that languague. 

On the question, as moved by Mr. Lansing, shall 
the word " not " be struck out 1 — Connecticut, New 
York, New Jersey, Delaware, aye — 4 ; Massachu- 
setts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 6 ; Maryland, divided. 

On the motion to agree to the clause as reported, 
" that the rule of suffrage in the first branch ought 
not to be according to that established by the Articles 
of the Confederation," — Massachusetts, Pennsylva- 
nia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Geor- 
gia, aye — 6 ; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
Delaware, no — 4; Maryland, divided. 

Doctor Johnson and Mr. Ellsworth moved to 
postpone the residue of the clause, and take up the 
eighth Resolution. 

On the question,— Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; Massa- 
chusetts, Delaware, no — 2. 

Mr. Ellsworth moved, " that the rule of suffrage 
in the second branch be the same with that estab- 
lished by the Articles of Confederation." He was 
not sorry, on the whole, he said, that the vote just 
passed had determined against this rule in the first 
branch. He hoped it would become a ground of 
compromise with regard to the second branch. 
We were partly national, partly federal. The pro- 
portional representation in the first branch was 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 997 

conformable to the national principle, and would 
secure the large States against the small. An 
equality of voices was conformable to the federal 
principle, and was necessary to secure the small 
States against the large. He trusted that on this 
middle ground a compromise would take place. 
He did not see that it could on any other, and if no 
compromise should take place, our meeting would 
not only be in vain, but worse than in vain. To the 
eastward, he was sure Massachusetts was the only 
State that would listen to a proposition for exclu- 
ding the States, as equal political societies, from an 
equal voice in both branches. The others would 
risk every consequence rather than part with so 
dear a right. An attempt to deprive them of it was 
at once cutting the body of America in two, and, as 
he supposed would be the case, somewhere about 
this part of it. The large States he conceived 
would, notwithstanding the equality of votes, have 
an influence that would maintain their superiority. 
Holland, as had been admitted (by Mr. Madison), 
had, notwithstanding a like equality in the Dutch 
confederacy, a prevailing influence in the public 
measures. The power of self-defence was essential to 
the small States. Nature had given it to the small- 
est insect of the creation. He could never admit 
that there was no danger of combinations among 
the large States. They will like individuals find 
out and avail themselves of the advantage to be 
gained by it. It was true the danger would be 
greater if they were contiguous, and had a more 
immediate and common interest. A defensive com- 
bination of the small States was rendered more 



998 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

difficult by their greater number. He would men- 
tion another consideration of great weight. The 
existing Confederation was founded on the equality 
of the States in the article of suffrage, — was it 
meant to pay no regard to this antecedent plighted 
faith. Let a strong Executive, a Judiciary, and 
Legislative power, be created, but let not too much 
be attempted, by which all may be lost. He was 
not in general a half-way man, yet he preferred 
doing half the good we could, rather than do 
nothing at all. The other half may be added 
when the necessity shall be more fully experienced. 

Mr. Baldwin could have wished that the powers 
of the general Legislature had been defined, before 
the mode of constituting it had been agitated. He 
should vote against the motion of Mr. Ellsworth, 
though he did not like the Resolution as it stood in 
the Report of the Committee of the Whole. He 
thought the second branch ought to be the repre- 
sentation of property, and that, in forming it, there- 
fore, some reference ought to be had to the relative 
wealth of their constituents, and to the principles 
on which the Senate of Massachusetts was consti- 
tuted. He concurred with those who thought it 
would be impossible for the General Legislature 
to extend its cares to the local matters of the States. 

Adjourned. 



Saturday, June SOth. 

In Convention, — Mr. Brearly moved that the 
President write to the Executive of New Hamp- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 999 

shire, informing it that the business depending 
before the Convention was of such a nature as to 
require the immediate attendance of the Deputies 
of that State. In support of his motion, he observed 
that the difficulties of the subject, and the diversity 
of opinions called for all the assistance we could 
possibly obtain. (It was well understood that the 
object was to add New Hampshire to the number 
of States opposed to the doctrine of proportional 
representation, which it was presumed, from her 
relative size, she must be adverse to). 

Mr. Patterson seconded the motion. 

Mr. Rutledge could see neither the necessity nor 
propriety of such a measure. They are not unap- 
prized of the meeting, and can attend if they choose. 
Rhode Island might as well be urged to appoint and 
send deputies. Are we to suspend the business 
until the Deputies arrive ? If we proceed, he hoped 
all the great points would be adjusted before the 
letter could produce its effect. 

Mr. King said he had written more than once as 
a private correspondent, and the answer gave him 
every reason to expect that State would be repre- 
resented very shortly, if it should be so at all. Cir- 
cumstances of a personal nature had hitherto pre- 
vented it. A letter could have no effect. 

Mr. Wilson wished to know, whether it would be 
consistent with the rule or reason of secrecy, to 
communicate to New Hampshire that the business 
was of such a nature as the motion described. It 
would spread a great alarm. Besides, he doubted 
the propriety of soliciting any State on the subject, 
the meeting being merely voluntary. 



1000 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

On motion of Mr, Brearly, 

New York, New Jersey, aye — 2 ; Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- 
lina, no — 5 ; Maryland, divided ; Pennsylvania, Del- 
aware, Georgia, not on the floor. 255 

The motion of Mr. Ellsworth being resumed, 
for allowing each State an equal vote in the second 
branch, — 

Mr. Wilson did not expect such a motion after 
the establishment of the contrary principle in the 
first branch ; and considering the reasons which 
would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been al- 
lowed in the first branch. The gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Ellsworth) had pronounced, that 
if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the 
States north of Pennsylvania one only would agree 
to any General Government. He entertained more 
favorable hopes of Connecticut and of the other 
Northern States. He hoped the alarms exceeded 
their cause, and that they would not abandon a 
country to which they were bound by so many 
strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored 
event happen, it would neither stagger his senti- 
ments nor his duty. If the minority of the people 
of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on 
just and proper principles ; if a separation must 
take place, it could never happen on better grounds. 
The votes of yesterday against the just principle of 
representation, were as twenty-two to ninety, of the 
people of America. Taking the opinions to be the 
same on this point, and he was sure, if there was 
any room for change, it could not be on the side of 
the majority, the question will be, shall less than 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1001 

one- fourth of the United States withdraw themselves 
from the Union, or shall more than three-fourths re- 
nounce the inherent, indisputable and unalienable 
rights of men, in favor of the artificial system of 
States ? If issue must be joined, it was on this 
point he would choose to join it. The gentleman 
from Connecticut, in supposing that the preponder- 
ance secured to the majority in the first branch had 
removed the objections to an equality of votes in 
the second branch for the security of the minority, 
narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality 
will enable the minority to control, in all cases 
whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the 
majority. Seven States will control six : seven 
States, according to the estimates that had been 
used, composed twenty-four ninetieths of the whole 
people. It would be in the power, then, of less 
than one-third to overrule two-thirds, whenever a 
question should happen to divide the States in 
that manner. Can we forget for whom we are 
forming a Government"? Is it for men, or for the 
imaginary beings called States? Will our honest 
constituents be satisfied with metaphysical distinc- 
tions ? Will they, ought they to, be satisfied with 
being told, that the one-third compose the greater 
number of States ? The rule of suffrage ought on 
every principle to be the same in the second as in 
the first branch. If the Government be not laid on 
this foundation, it can be neither solid nor lasting. 
Any other principle will be local, confined and tem- 
porary. This will expand with the expansion, and 
grow with the growth of the United States. Much 
has been said of an imaginary combination of three 
63* 



1002 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

States. Sometimes a danger of monarchy, some- 
times of aristocracy, has been charged on it. No 
explanation, however, of the danger has been vouch- 
safed. It would be easy to prove, both from reason 
and history, that riv alships would be more probable 
than coalitions ; and that there are no coinciding in- 
terests that could produce the latter. No answer 
has yet been given to the observations of Mr. Madi- 
son on this subject. Should the Executive magis- 
trate be taken from one of the large States, would 
not the other two be thereby thrown into the scale 
with the other States ? Whence, then, the danger 
of monarchy ? Are the people of the three large 
States more aristocratic than those of the small 
ones? Whence, then, the danger of aristocracy 
from their influence ? It is all a mere illusion of 
names. We talk of States, till we forget what they 
are composed of. Is a real and fair majority the natu- 
ral hot-bed of aristocracy ? It is a part of the defini- 
tion of this species of government, or rather of ty- 
ranny, that the smaller number governs the greater. 
It is true that a majority of States in the second 
branch cannot carry a law against a majority of the 
people in the first. But this removes half only of the 
objection. Bad governments are of two sorts, — first, 
that which does too little ; secondly, that which does 
too much ; that which fails through weakness, and 
that which destroys through oppression. Under 
which of these evils do the United States at present 
groan ? Under the weakness and inefficiency of its 
government. To remedy this weakness we have 
been sent to this Convention. If the motion should 
be agreed to, we shall leave the United States fet- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1003 

tered precisely as heretofore; with the additional 
mortification of seeing the good purposes of the fair 
representation of the people in the first branch, de- 
feated in the second. Twenty-four will still con- 
trol sixty-six. He lamented that such a disagree- 
ment should prevail on the point of representation ; 
as he did not foresee that it would happen on the 
other point most contested, the boundary between 
the general and the local authorities. He thought 
the States necessary and valuable parts of a good 
system. 

Mr. Ellsworth. The capital objection of Mr. 
Wilson, "that the minority will rule the majority," 
is not true. The power is given to the few to save 
them from being destroyed by the many. If an 
equality of votes had been given to them in both 
branches, the objection might have had weight. Is 
it a novel thing that the few should have a check on 
the many ? Is it not the case in the British Consti- 
tution, the wisdom of which so many gentlemen 
have united in applauding ? Have not the House of 
Lords, who form so small a proportion of the nation, 
a negative on the laws, as a necessary defence of 
their peculiar rights against the encroachments of the 
Commons ? No instance of a confederacy has exist- 
ed in which an equality of voices has not been exer- 
cised by the members of it. We are running from 
one extreme to another. We are razing the founda- 
tions of the building, when we need only repair the 
roof. No salutary measure has been lost for want 
of a majority of the States to favor it. If security 
be all that the great States wish for, the first branch 
secures them. The danger of combinations among 



1004 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

them is not imaginary. Although no particular abu- 
ses could be foreseen by him, the possibility of them 
would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could ea- 
sily conceive cases in which they might result from 
such combinations. Suppose, that, in pursuance of 
some commercial treaty or arrangement, three or 
four free ports and no more were to be established, 
would not combinations be formed in favor of Bos- 
ton, Philadelphia, and some port of the Chesapeake 'I 
A like concert might be formed in the appointment 
of the great offices. He appealed again to the obli- 
gations of the Federal pact, which was still in 
force, and which had been entered into with so much 
solemnity; persuading himself that some regard 
would still be paid to the plighted faith under which 
each State, small as well as great, held an equal 
right of suffrage in the general councils. His re- 
marks were not the result of partial or local views. 
The State he represented (Connecticut) held a mid- 
dle rank. 256 

Mr. Madison did justice to the able and close rea- 
soning of Mr. Ellsworth, but must observe that it 
did not always accord with itself. On another oc- 
casion, the large States were described by him as 
the aristocratic States, ready to oppress the small. 
Now the small are the House of Lords, requiring a 
negative to defend them against the more numerous 
Commons. Mr. Ellsworth had also erred in say- 
ing that no instance had existed in which confede- 
rated states had not retained to themselves a perfect 
equality of suffrage. Passing over the German sys- 
tem, in which the King of Prussia has nine voices, 
he reminded Mr. Ellsworth of the Lycian confede- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1005 

racy, in which the component members had votes 
proportioned to their importance, and which Mon- 
tesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that 
form of government. Had the fact been as stated by 
Mr. Ellsworth, it would have been of little avail to 
him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments 
against him ; the history and fate of the several con- 
federacies, modern as well as ancient, demonstrating 
some radical vice in their structure. In reply to the 
appeal of Mr. Ellsworth to the faith plighted in 
the existing federal compact, he remarked, that the 
party claiming from others an adherence to a com- 
mon engagement, ought at least to be guiltless itself 
of a violation. Of all the States, however, Connec- 
ticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea. Be- 
sides the various omissions to perform the stipulated 
acts, from which no State was free, the Legislature 
of that State had, by a pretty recent vote, positively 
refused to pass a law for complying with the requi- 
sitions of Congress, and had transmitted a copy of 
the vote to Congress. It was urged, he said, con- 
tinually, that an equality of votes in the second 
branch was not only necessary to secure the small, 
but would be perfectly safe to the large ones ; whose 
majority in the first branch was an effectual bul- 
wark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence, 
the majority of States might still injure the majority 
of the people. In the first place, they could obstruct 
the wishes and interests of the majority. Secondly, 
they could extort measures repugnant to the wishes 
and interest of the majority. Thirdly, they could 
impose measures adverse thereto; as the second 
branch will probably exercise some great powers, 



1006 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

in which the first will not participate. He admitted 
that every peculiar interest, whether in any class of 
citizens, or any description of States, ought to be 
secured as far as possible. Wherever there is dan- 
ger of attack, there ought to be given a constitu- 
tional power of defence. But he contended that the 
States were divided into different interests, not by 
their difference of size, but by other circumstances ; 
the most material of which resulted partly from cli- 
mate, but principally from the effects of their having 
or not having slaves. These two causes concurred 
in forming the great division of interests in the 
United States. It did not lie between the large and 
small States. It lay between the Northern and 
Southern ; and if any defensive power were neces- 
sary, it ought to be mutually given to these two in- 
terests. He was so strongly impressed with this 
important truth, that he had been casting about in his 
mind for some expedient that would answer the pur- 
pose. The one which had occurred was, that, instead 
of proportioning the votes of the States in both branch- 
es, to their respective numbers of inhabitants, com- 
puting the slaves in the ratio of five to three, they 
should be represented in one branch according to 
the number of free inhabitants only ; and in the 
other according to the whole number, counting the 
slaves as free. By this arrangement the Southern 
scale would have the advantage in one House, and 
the Northern in the other. He had been restrained 
from proposing this expedient by two considerations ; 
one was his unwillingness to urge any diversity of 
interests on an occasion where it is but too apt to 
arise of itself; the other was the inequality of pow- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1007 

ers that must be vested in the two branches, and 
which w T ould destroy the equilibrium of interests. 

Mr. Ellsworth assured the House, that, what- 
ever might be thought of the Representatives 
of Connecticut, the State was entirely Federal in 
her disposition. He appealed to her great exertions 
during the war, in supplying both men and money. 
The muster-roils would show she had more troops 
in the field than Virginia. If she had been de- 
linquent, it had been from inability, and not more 
so than other States. 

Mr. Sherman. Mr. Madison animadverted on the 
delinquency of the States, when his object required 
him to prove that the constitution of Congress was 
faulty. Congress is not to blame for the faults 
of the States. Their measures have been right, 
and the only thing wanting has been a further 
power in Congress to render them effectual. 

Mr. Davie was much embarrassed, and wished 
for explanations. The Report of the Committee, 
allowing the Legislatures to choose the Senate, and 
establishing a proportional representation in it, 
seemed to be impracticable. There will, according 
to this rule, be ninety members in the outset, and 
the number will increase as new States are added. 
It was impossible that so numerous a body could 
possess the activity and other qualities required in 
it. Were he to vote on the comparative merits 
of the Report, as it stood, and the amendment, he 
should be constrained to prefer the latter. The ap- 
pointment of the Senate by electors, chosen by the 
people for that purpose, was, he conceived, liable 
to an insuperable difficulty. The larger counties or 



1008 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

districts, thrown into a general district, would cer- 
tainly prevail over the smaller counties or districts, 
and merit in the latter would be excluded alto- 
gether. The Report, therefore, seemed to be right 
in referring the appointment to the Legislatures, 
whose agency in the general system did not appear 
to him objectionable, as it did to some others. The 
fact w T as, that the local prejudices and interests 
wiiich could not be denied to exist, would find 
their way into the national councils, whether the 
Representatives should be chosen by the Legisla- 
tures, or by the people themselves. On the other 
hand, if a proportional representation was attended 
with insuperable difficulties, the making the Senate 
the representative of the States looked like bringing 
us back to Congress again, and shutting out all the 
advantages expected from it. Under this view of 
the subject, he could not vote for any plan for the 
Senate yet proposed. He thought that, in general, 
there w T ere extremes on both sides. We were 
partly federal, partly national, in our union; and 
lie did not see why the Government might not in 
some respects operate on the States, in others on 
the people. 

Mr. Wilson admitted the question concerning the 
number of Senators to be embarrassing. If the 
smallest States be allowed one, and the others in 
proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numer- 
ous. He looked forward to the time when the 
smallest States will contain a hundred thousand 
souls at least. Let there be then one Senator 
in each, for every hundred thousand souls, and 
let the States not having that number of in- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1009 

habitants be allowed one. He was willing him- 
self to submit to this temporary concession to the 
small States; and threw out the idea as a ground 
of compromise. 

Doctor Franklin. The diversity of opinions 
turns on two points. If a proportional representa- 
tion takes place, the small States contend that 
their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of 
votes is to be put in its place, the large States 
say their money will be in danger. When a broad 
table is to be made, and the edges of planks do 
not fit, the artist takes a little from both, and 
makes a good joint. In like manner, here, both sides 
must part with some of their demands, in order that 
they may join in some accommodating proposition. 
He had prepared one which he would read, that it 
might lie on the table for consideration. The 
proposition was in the words following : 

' " That the Legislatures of the several States shall 
choose and send an equal number of delegates, 

namely, , who are to compose the 

second branch of the General Legislature. 

" That in all cases or questions wherein the sove- 
reignty of individual States may be affected, or 
whereby their authority over their own citizens 
may be diminished, or the authority of the General 
Government within the several States augmented, 
each State shall have equal suffrage. 

"That in the appointment of all civil officers 
of the General Government, in the election of whom 
the second branch may by the constitution have 
part, each State shall have equal suffrage. 
64 



1010 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

" That in fixing the salaries of such officers, and 
in all allowances for public services, and generally 
in all appropriations and dispositions of money to 
be drawn out of the general Treasury ; and in all 
laws for supplying that Treasury, the Delegates 
of the several States shall have suffrage in propor- 
tion to the sums which their respective States do 
actually contribute to the Treasury." 

Where a ship had many owners, this was the 
rule of deciding on her expedition. He had been 
one of the ministers from this country to France 
daring the joint war, and would have been very 
glad if allowed a vote in distributing the money to 
carry it on. 

Mr. King observed, that the simple question was, 
whether each State should have an equal vote in the 
second branch ; that it must be apparent to those 
gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this 
equality, nor the Report as it stood, that the Report 
was as susceptible of melioration as the motion ; 
that a reform would be nugatory and nominal only, 
if we should make another Congress of the proposed 
Senate ; that if the adherence to an equality of votes 
was fixed and unalterable, there could not be less 
obstinacy on the other side ; and that we were in 
fact cut asunder already, and it was in vain to shut 
our eyes against it. That he was, however, filled 
with astonishment, that, if we were convinced that 
every man in America was secured in all his rights, 
we should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good 
to the phantom of State sovereignty. That his feel- 
ings were more harrowed and his fears more agita- 
ted for his country than he could express ; that he 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1011 

conceived this to be the last opportunity of providing 
for its liberty and happiness : that he could not, 
therefore, but repeat his amazement, that when a 
just government, founded on a fair representation of 
the people of America, was within our reach, we 
should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to 
the ideal freedom and importance of States. That 
should this wonderful illusion continue to prevail, 
his mind was prepared for every event, rather than 
sit down under a Government founded on a vicious 
principle of representation, and which must be as 
short-lived as it would be unjust. He might prevail 
on himself to accede to some such expedient as had 
been hinted by Mr. Wilson ; but he never could 
listen to an equality of votes as proposed in the 
motion. 

Mr. Dayton. When assertion is given for proof, 
and terror substituted for argument, he presumed 
they would have no effect, however eloquently spo- 
ken. It should have been shown that the evils we 
have experienced have proceeded from the equality 
now objected to ; and that the seeds of dissolution 
for the State Governments are not sown in the Gen- 
eral Government. He considered the system on the 
table as a novelty, an amphibious monster ; and was 
persuaded that it never would be received by the 
people. 

Mr. Martin would never confederate, if it could 
not be done on just principles. 

Mr. Madison would acquiesce in the concession 
hinted by Mr. Wilson, on condition that a due inde- 
pendence should be given to the Senate. The plan 
in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely 



1012 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

dependent on the States. The Senate, therefore, is 
only another edition of Congress. He knew the 
faults of that body, and had used a bold language 
against it. Still he would preserve the State rights 
as carefully as the trial by jury. 

Mr. Bedford contended, that there was no middle 
way between a perfect consolidation, and a mere 
confederacy of the States. The first is out of the 
question ; and in the latter they must continue, if 
not perfectly, yet equally, sovereign. If political 
societies possess ambition, avarice, and all the other 
passions which render them formidable to each 
other, ought we not to view them in this light here ? 
Will not the same motives operate in America as 
elsewhere? If any gentleman doubts it, let him 
look at the votes. Have they not been dictated by 
interest, by ambition? Are not the large States 
evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the 
expense of the small ? They think, no doubt, that 
they have right on their side, but interest had blind- 
ed their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small 
State at present, she is actuated by the prospect of 
soon being a great one. South Carolina is actuated 
both by present interest, and future prospects. She 
hopes, too, to see the other States cut down to her 
own dimensions. North Carolina has the same mo- 
tives of present and future interest. Virginia fol- 
lows. Maryland is not on that side of the question. 
Pennsylvania has a direct and future interest. Mas- 
sachusetts has a decided and palpable interest in the 
part she takes. Can it be expected that the small 
States will act from pure disinterestness. Look at 
Great Britain. Is the representation there less une- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1013 

qual ? But we shall be told again, that that is the 
rotten part of the Constitution. Have not the bor- 
oughs, however, held fast their constitutional rights ? 
And are we to act with greater purity than the rest 
of mankind ? An exact proportion in the represen- 
tation is not preserved in any one of the States. Will 
it be said that an inequality of power will not result 
from an inequality of votes. Give the opportunity, 
and ambition will not fail to abuse it. The whole 
history of mankind proves it. The three large 
States have a common interest to bind them to- 
gether in commerce. But whether a combination, 
as we supposed, or a competition, as others supposed, 
shall take place among them, in either case the 
small States must be ruined. We must, like Solon, 
make such a government as the people will approve. 
Will the smaller States ever agree to the proposed 
degradation of them ? It is not true that the people 
will not agree to enlarge the powers of the present 
Congress. The language of the people has been, 
that Congress ought to have the power of collecting 
an impost, and of coercing the States where it may 
be necessary. On the first point they have been 
explicit, and, in a manner, unanimous in their decla- 
rations. And must they not agree to this, and simi- 
lar measures, if they ever mean to discharge their 
engagements ? The little States are willing to ob- 
serve their engagements, but will meet the large 
ones on no ground but that of the Confederation. 
We have been told, with a dictatorial air, that this 
is the last moment for a fair trial in favor of a good 
government. It will be the last, indeed, if the pro- 
positions reported from the Committee go forth to 



1014 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the people. He was under no apprehensions. The 
large States dare not dissolve the Confederation. If 
they do, the small ones will find some foreign ally, 
of more honor and good faith, who will take them 
by the hand, and do them justice. He did not mean, 
by this, to intimidate or alarm. It w r as a natural 
consequence, which ought to be avoided by enlar- 
ging the Federal powers, not annihilating the Fed- 
eral system. This is what the people expect. All 
agree in the necessity of a more efficient govern- 
ment, and why not make such an one as they de- 
sire 7 s57 

Mr. Ells worth. Under a National Government, 
he should participate in the national security, as re- 
marked by Mr. King; but that was all. What he 
wanted was domestic happiness. The National 
Government could not descend to the local objects 
on which this depended. It could only embrace ob- 
jects of a general nature. He turned his eyes, there- 
fore, for the preservation of his rights, to the State 
Governments. From these alone he could derive 
the greatest happiness he expects in this life. His 
happiness depends on their existence, as much as a 
new-born infant on its mother for nourishment. If 
this reasoning was not satisfactory, he had nothing 
to add that could be so. 

Mr. King was for preserving the States in a sub- 
ordinate degree, and as far as they could be necessa- 
ry for the purposes stated by Mr. Ellsworth. He 
did not think a full answer had been given to those 
who apprehended a dangerous encroachment on 
their jurisdictions. Expedients might be devised, 
as he conceived, that would give them all the seen- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1015 

rity the nature of things would admit of. In the es- 
tablishment of societies, the Constitution was to the 
Legislature, what the laws were to individuals. As 
the fundamental rights of individuals are secured by 
express provisions in the State Constitutions, why 
may not a like security be provided for the rights of 
States in the National Constitution? The Articles 
of Union between England and Scotland furnish an 
example of such a provision, in favor of sundry 
rights of Scotland. When that union was in agita- 
tion, the same language of apprehension which has 
been heard from the smaller States, was in the 
mouths of the Scotch patriots. The articles, how- 
ever, have not been violated, and the Scotch have 
found an increase of prosperity and happiness. He 
was aware that this will be called a mere paper se- 
curity. He thought it a sufficient answer to say, 
that if fundamental articles of compact are no suffi- 
cient defence against physical power, neither will 
there be any safety against it, if there be no com- 
pact. He could not sit down without taking some 
notice of the language of the honorable gentleman 
from Delaware (Mr. Bedford). It was not he that had 
uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance 
had marked the honorable gentleman himself. It 
was not he who, with a vehemence unprecedented 
in that House, had declared himself ready to turn 
his hopes from our common country, and court the 
protection of some foreign hand. This, too, was the 
language of the honorable member himself. He 
was grieved that such a thought had entered his 
heart. He was more grieved that such an expres- 
sion had dropped from his lips. The gentleman 



1016 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

could only excuse it to himself on the score of pas- 
sion. For himself, whatever might be his distress, 
he would never court relief from a foreign power. 
Adjourned. 



Monday, July 2d. 

In Convention, — On the question for allowing each 
State one vote in the second branch, as moved by 
Mr. Ellsworth, it was lost, by an equal division of 
votes, — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Dela- 
ware, Maryland,* aye — 5 ; Massachusetts, Pennsyl- 
vania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
no — 5; Georgia, divided (Mr. Baldwin aye, Mr. 
Houston, no), 

Mr. Pinckney thought an equality of votes in the 
second branch inadmissible. At the same time, 
candor obliged him to admit, that the large States 
would feel a partiality for their own citizens, and 
give them a preference in appointments : that they 
might also find some common points in their commer- 
cial interests, and promote treaties favorable to them. 
There is a real distinction between the Northern 
and Southern interests. North Carolina, South Car- 
olina and Georgia, in their rice and indigo, had a 
peculiar interest which might be sacrificed. How, 
then, shall the larger States be prevented from ad- 
ministering the General Government as they please, 
without being themselves unduly subjected to the 
will of the smaller ? By allowing them some, but 

* Mr. Jenifer not being present, Mr. Martin alone voted. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1017 

not a full, proportion. He was extremely anxious 
that something should be done, considering this as 
the last appeal to a regular experiment. Congress 
have failed in almost every effort for an amendment 
of the Federal system. Nothing has prevented a 
dissolution of it, but the appointment of this Conven- 
tion; and he could not express his alarms for the 
consequence of such an event. He read his motion 
to form the States into classes, with an apportion- 
ment of Senators among them (see Article 4, of his 
plan- — ante, page 737.) 

General Pinckney was willing the motion might 
be considered. He did not entirely approve it. He 
liked better the motion of Doctor Franklin, (q. v. 
June 30, page 1009). Some compromise seemed to 
be necessary, the States being exactly divided on 
the question for an equality of votes in the second 
branch. He proposed that a Committee consisting 
of a member from each State should be appointed 
to devise and report some compromise. 

Mr. L. Martin had no objection to a commitment, 
but no modifications whatever could reconcile the 
smaller States to the least diminution of their equal 
sovereignty. 

Mr. Sherman. We are now at a full stop ; and 
nobody, he supposed, meant that we should break 
iup without doing something. A committee he 
thought most likely to hit on some expedient. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris* thought a Committee 
advisable, as the Convention had been equally di- 



* He had just returned from New York, having left the Convention a few 
days after it commenced business. 

64* 



1018 DEBATES IN THE [1787 

vided. He had a stronger reason also. The mode 
of appointing the second branch tended, he was sure, 
to defeat the object of it. What is this object? 
To check the precipitation, changeableness, and 
excesses of the first branch. Every man of ob- 
servation had seen in the democratic branches of 
the State Legislatures, precipitation — in Congress, 
changeableness — in every department, excesses 
against personal liberty, private property, and per- 
sonal safety. What qualities are necessary to con- 
stitute a check in this case ? Abilities and virtue 
are equally necessary in both branches. Something 
more, then, is now wanted. In the first place, the 
checking branch must have a personal interest in 
checking the other branch. One interest must be 
opposed to another interest. Vices, as they exist, 
must be turned against each other. In the second 
place, it must have great personal property ; it must 
have the aristocratic spirit ; it must love to lord it 
through pride. Pride is, indeed, the great principle 
that actuates both the poor and the rich. It is this 
principle which in the former resists, in the latter 
abuses, authority. In the third place, it should be 
independent. In religion, the creature is apt to 
forget its Creator. That it is otherwise in political 
affairs, the late debates here are an unhappy proof. 
The aristocratic body should be as independent, 
and as firm, as the democratic. If the members of 
it are to revert to a dependence on the democratic 
choice, the democratic scale will preponderate. 
All the guards contrived by America have not 
restrained the Senatorial branches of the Legisla- 
tures from a servile complaisance to the democratic. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1019 

If the second branch is to be dependent, we are 
better without it. To make it independent, it 
should be for life. It will then do wrong, it will be 
said. He believed so ; he hoped so. The rich will 
strive to establish their dominion, and enslave the 
rest. They always did. They always will. The 
proper security against them is to form them into a 
separate interest. The two forces will then control 
each other. Let the rich mix with the poor, and in 
a commercial country they will establish an oligar- 
chy. Take away commerce, and the democracy 
will triumph. Thus it has been all the world over. 
So it will be among us. Reason tells us we are but 
men; and we are not to expect any particular 
interference of Heaven in our favor. By thus com- 
bining, and setting apart, the aristocratic interest, 
the popular interest will be combined against it. 
There will be a mutual check and mutual security. 
In the fourth place, an independence for life, involves 
the necessary permanency. If we change our 
measures nobody will trust us, — and how avoid a 
change of measures, but by avoiding a change of 
men 1 Ask any man if he confides in Congress — if 
he confides in the State of Pennsylvania — if he will 
lend his money, or enter into contract ? He will 
tell you, no. He sees no stability. He can repose 
no confidence. If Great Britain were to explain 
her refusal to treat with us, the same reasoning 
would be employed. He disliked the exclusion 
of the second branch from holding offices. It is 
dangerous. It is like the imprudent exclusion of 
the military officers, during the war, from civil ap- 
pointments. It deprives the Executive of the prin- 



1020 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

cipal source of influence. If danger be apprehended 
from the Executive, what a left-handed way is this 
of obviating it ! If the son, the brother, or the 
friend can be appointed, the danger may be even in- 
creased, as the disqualified father, &c. can then 
boast of a disinterestedness which he does not pos- 
sess. Besides, shall the best, the most able, the 
most virtuous citizens not be permitted to hold 
offices? Who then are to hold them? He was 
also against paying the Senators. They will pay 
themselves, if they can. If they cannot, they will 
be rich, and can do without it. Of such the second 
branch ought to consist; and none but such can 
compose it, if they are not to be paid. He contend- 
ed, that the Executive should appoint the Senate, 
and fill up vacancies. This gets rid of the difficulty 
in the present question. You may begin with any 
ratio you please, it will come to the same thing. 
The members being independent, and for life, may 
be taken as well from one place as from another. 
It should be considered, too, how the scheme could 
be carried through the States. He hoped there was 
strength of mind enough in this House to look truth 
in the face. He did not hesitate, therefore, to say 
that loaves and fishes must bribe the demagogues. 
They must be made to expect higher offices under 
the General, than the State Governments. A 
Senate for life will be a noble bait. Without such 
captivating prospects, the popular leaders will op- 
pose and defeat the plan. He perceived that the 
first branch was to be chosen by the people of the 
States, the second by those chosen by the people. 
Is not here a government by the States — a govern- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1021 

ment by compact between Virginia in the first and 
second branch, Massachusetts in the first and second 
branch, <£c. ? This is going back to mere treaty. 
It is no government at all. It is altogether de- 
pendent on the States, and will act over again the 
part which Congress has acted. A firm government 
alone can protect our liberties. He fears the in- 
fluence of the rich. They will have the same effect 
here as elsewhere, if we do not, by such a govern- 
ment, keep them within their proper spheres. We 
should remember that the people never act from 
reason alone. The rich will take the advantage 
of their passions, and make these the instruments 
for oppressing them. The result of the contest will 
be a violent aristocracy, or a more violent despot- 
ism. The schemes of the rich will be favored by 
the extent of the country. The people in such 
distant parts cannot communicate and act in con- 
cert. They will be the dupes of those who have 
more knowledge and intercourse. The only se- 
curity against encroachments, will be a select and 
sagacious body of men, instituted to watch against 
them on all sides. He meant only to hint these 
observations, without grounding any motion on 
them. 

Mr. Randolph favored the commitment, though he 
did not expect much benefit from the expedient. He 
animadverted on the warm and rash language of 
Mr. Bedford on Saturday ; reminded the small 
States that if the large States should combine, some 
danger of which he did not deny, there would be a 
check in the revisionary power of the Executive ; 
and intimated, that, in order to render this still more 



1022 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

effectual, he would agree, that in the choice of an 
Executive each State should have an equal vote. 
He was persuaded that two such opposite bodies as 
Mr. Morris had planned could never long co-exist. 
Dissensions would arise, as has been seen even be- 
tween the Senate and House of Delegates in Mary- 
land ; appeals would be made to the people ; and 
in a little time commotions would be the result. He 
was far from thinking the large States could sub- 
sist of themselves, any more than the small; an 
avulsion would involve the whole in ruin ; and he 
was determined to pursue such a scheme of gov- 
ernment as would secure us against such a calamity. 

Mr. Strong was for the commitment; and hoped 
the mode of constituting both branches would be 
referred. If they should be established on different 
principles, contentions would prevail, and there 
would never be a concurrence in necessary mea- 
sures. 

Doctor Williamson. If we do not concede on 
both sides, our business must soon be at an end. 
He approved of the commitment, supposing that, as 
the Committee would be a smaller body, a compro- 
mise would be pursued with more coolness. 

Mr. Wilson objected to the Committee, because it 
would decide according to that very rule of voting, 
which was opposed on one side. Experience in 
Congress had also proved the inutility of Commit- 
tees consisting of members from each State. 

Mr. Lansing would not oppose the commitment, 
though expecting little advantage from it. 

Mr. Madison opposed the commitment. He had 
rarely seen any other effect than delay from such 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION-. 1023 

eommittees in Congress. Any scheme of compro- 
mise that could be proposed in the Committee might 
as easily be proposed in the House ; and the report 
of the Committee, where it contained merely the 
opinion of the Committee, would neither shorten the 
discussion, nor influence the decision of the House. 

Mr. Gerry was for the commitment. Something 
must be done, or we shall disappoint not only 
America, but the whole world. He suggested a 
consideration of the state we should be thrown into 
by the failure of the Union. We should be without 
an umpire to decide controversies, and must be at 
the mercy of events. What, too, is to become of our 
treaties — what of our foreign debts — what of our 
domestic ? We must make concessions on both 
sides. Without these, the Constitutions of the sev- 
eral States w T oukl never have been formed. 

On the question for committing, generally,— Mas- 
sachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- 
lina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; New Jersey, Delaware, no 
—2. 

On the question for committing it " to a member 
from each State," — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New 
York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 10; 
Pennsylvania, no — 1. 

The Committee, elected by ballot, were, Mr. Ger- 
ry, Mr. Ellsworth, Mr. Yates, Mr. Patterson, Dr. 
Franklin, Mr. Bedford, Mr. Martin, Mr. Mason, 
Mr. Davy, Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Baldwin. 

That time might be given to the Committee, and 
to such as chose to attend to the celebrations on the 



1024 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

anniversary of Independence the Convention ad- 
journed till Thursday. 



Thursday, July 5th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Gerry delivered in, from the 
Committee appointed on Monday last, the following 
Report: 259 

" The Committee to whom was referred the eighth 
Resolution of the Report from the Committee of the 
Whole House, and so much of the seventh as has 
not been decided on, submit the following Report : 

" That the subsequent propositions be recommend- 
ed to the Convention on condition that both shall 
be generally adopted. 

" 1. That in the first branch of the Legislature each 
of the States now in the Union shall be allowed one 
member for every forty thousand inhabitants, of the 
description reported in the seventh Resolution of the 
Committee of the Whole House : that each State 
not containing that number shall be allowed one 
member : that all bills for raising or appropriating 
money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of 
the Government of the United States, shall originate 
in the first branch of the Legislature, and shall not 
be altered or amended by the second branch ; and 
that no money shall be drawn from the public Trea- 
sury but in pursuance of appropriations to be ori- 
ginated in the first branch. 

11 2. That in the second branch, each State shall 
have an equal vote."* 

* This Report was founded on a motion in the Committee made by Doctor 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1025 

Mr. Gorham observed, that, as the report consisted 
of propositions mutually conditional, he wished to 
hear some explanations touching the grounds on 
which the conditions were estimated. 

Mr. Gerry. The Committee were of different 
opinions, as well as the Deputations from which the 
Committee were taken ; and agreed to the Report 
merely in order that some ground of accommodation 
might be proposed. Those opposed to the equality 
of votes have only assented conditionally ; and if the 
other side do not generally agree, will not be under 
any obligation to support the Report. 

Mr. Wilson thought the Committee had exceeded 
their powers. 

Mr. Martin was for taking the question on the 
whole Report. 

Mr. Wilson was for a division of the question; 
otherwise it would be a leap in the dark. 

Mr. Madison could not regard the privilege of ori- 
ginating money bills as any concession on the side of 
the small States. Experience proved that it had no 
effect. If seven States in the upper branch wished 
a bill to be originated, they might surely find some 
member from some of the same States in the lower 

Franklin. It was barely acquiesced in by the members from the States op- 
posed to an equity of votes in the second branch, and was evidently considered 
by the members on the other side, as a gaining of their point. A motion was 
made by Mr. Sherman, (who acted in the place of Mr. Ellsworth who was 
kept away by indisposition), in the Committee, to the following effect, " that 
each State should have an equal vote in the second branch ; provided that no 
decision therein should prevail unless the majority of States concurring should 
also comprise a majority of the inhabitants of the United States." This mo- 
tion was not much deliberated on, nor approved, in the Committee. A similar 
proviso had been proposed, in the debates on the Articles of Confederation, 
in 1777, to the articles giving certain powers to " nine States." See Jour- 
nals of Congress for 1777. page 462. 

Vol. I.— 65 



1026 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

branch, who would originate it. The restriction as 
to amendments was of as little consequence. Amend- 
ments could be handed privately by the Senate to 
members in the other House. Bills could be nega- 
tived, that they might be sent up in the desired shape. 
If the Senate should yield to the obstinacy of the 
first branch, the use of that body, as a check, would 
be lost. If the first branch should yield to that of 
the Senate, the privilege would be nugatory. Ex- 
perience had also shown, both in Great Britain, and 
the States having a similar regulation, that it was a 
source of frequent and obstinate altercations. These 
considerations had produced a rejection of a like mo- 
tion on a former occasion, when judged by its own 
merits. It could not, therefore, be deemed any con- 
cession on the present, and left in force all the ob- 
jections which had prevailed against allowing each 
State an equal voice. He conceived that the Con- 
vention was reduced to the alternative, of either de- 
parting from justice in order to conciliate the smaller 
States, and the minority of the people of the United 
States, or of displeasing these, by justly gratifying 
the larger States and the majority of the people. He 
could not himself hesitate as to the option he ought 
to make. The Convention, with justice and a ma- 
jority of the people on their side, had nothing 
to fear. With injustice and the minority on their 
side, they had every thing to fear. It was in 
vain to purchase concord in the Convention on 
terms which would perpetuate discord among their 
constituents. The Convention ought to pursue a 
plan which would bear the test of examination, 
which would be espoused and supported by the en- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1027 

lightened and impartial part of America, and which 
they could themselves vindicate and urge. It should 
be considered, that, although at first many may judge 
of the system recommended by their opinion of the 
Convention, yet finally all will judge of the Conven- 
tion by the system. The merits of the system alone 
can finally and effectually obtain the public suf- 
frage. He was not apprehensive that the people of 
the small States would obstinately refuse to accede 
to a government founded on just principles, and 
promising them substantial protection. He could 
not suspect that Delaware would brave the conse- 
quences of seeking her fortunes apart from the other 
States, rather than submit to such a Government ; 
much less could he suspect that she would pursue the 
rash policy, of courting foreign support, which the 
warmth of one of her Representatives (Mr. Bed- 
ford) had suggested ; or if she should, that any for- 
eign nation would be so rash as to hearken to the 
overture. As little could he suspect that the people 
of New Jersey, notwithstanding the decided tone of 
the gentleman from that State, would choose rather 
to stand on their own legs, and bid defiance to 
events, than to acquiesce under an establishment 
founded on principles the justice of which they could 
not dispute, and absolutely necessary to redeem 
them from the exactions levied on them by the com- 
merce of the neighbouring States. A review of oth- 
er States would prove that there was as little reason 
to apprehend an inflexible opposition elsewhere. 
Harmony in the Convention was, no doubt, much to 
be desired. Satisfaction to all the States, in the first 
instance, still more so. But if the principal States 



1028 DEBATES IN THE [178?. 

comprehending a majority of the people of the Uni- 
ted States, should concur in a just and judicious 
plan, he had the firmest hopes that all the other 
States would by degrees accede to it. 

Mr. Butler said, he could not let down his idea 
of the people of America so far as to believe they 
would, from mere respect to the Convention, adopt 
a plan evidently unjust. He did not consider the pri- 
vilege concerning money bills as of any consequence. 
He urged, that the second branch ought to represent 
the States according to their property. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought the form as well 
as the matter of the Report objectionable. It seem- 
ed, in the first place, to render amendment impracti- 
cable. In the next place, it seemed to involve a 
pledge to agree to the second part, if the first should 
be agreed to. He conceived the whole aspect of it 
to be wrong. He came here as a Representative of 
America ; he flattered himself he came here in some 
degree as a Representative of the whole human race ; 
for the whole human race will be affected by the 
proceedings of this Convention. He wished gentle- 
men to extend their views beyond the present mo- 
ment of time; beyond the narrow limits of place 
from which they derive their political origin. If he 
were to believe some things which he had heard, he 
should suppose that we were assembled to truck and 
bargain for our particular States. He cannot de- 
scend to think that any gentlemen are really actua- 
ted by these views. We must look forward to the 
effects of what we do. These alone ought to guide 
us. Much has been said of the sentiments of the 
people. They were unknown. They could not be 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1029 

known. All that we can infer is, that, if the plan 
we recommend be reasonable and right, all who 
have reasonable minds and sound intentions will em- 
brace it, notwithstanding what had been said by 
some gentlemen. Let us suppose that the larger 
States shall agree, and that the smaller refuse ; and 
let us trace the consequences. The opponents of the 
system in the smaller States will no doubt make a 
party, and a noise for a time, but the ties of interest, 
of kindred, and of common habits, which connect 
them with other States, will be too strong to be 
easily broken. In New Jersey, particularly, he 
was sure a great many would follow the senti- 
ments of Pennsylvania and New York. This coun- 
try must be united. If persuasion does not unite 
it, the sword will. He begged this consideration 
might have its due weight. The scenes of hor- 
ror attending civil commotion cannot be described; 
and the conclusion of them will be worse than the 
term of their continuance. The stronger party will 
then make traitors of the weaker; and the gal- 
lows and halter will finish the work of the sword. 
How far foreign powers would be ready to take 
part in the confusions, he would not say. Threats 
that they will be invited have, it seems, been thrown 
out. He drew the melancholy picture of foreign in- 
trusions, as exhibited in the history of Germany, and 
urged it as a standing lesson to other nations. He 
trusted that the gentlemen who may have hazarded 
such expressions did not entertain them till they 
reached their own lips. But returning to the Report, 
he could not think it in any respect calculated for 
the public good. As the second branch is now con- 



1030 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

stituted, there will be constant disputes and appeals 
to the States, which will undermine the General 
Government, and control and annihilate the first 
branch. Suppose that the Delegates from Massa- 
chusetts and Rhode Island, in the upper house, dis- 
agree, and that the former are outvoted. What re- 
sults ? They will immediately declare that their 
State will not abide by the decision, and make 
such representations as will produce that effect. 
The same may happen as to Virginia and other 
States. Of what avail, then, will be what is on 
paper ? State attachments, and State importance, 
have been the bane of this country. We cannot 
annihilate, but we may perhaps take out the teeth 
of, the serpents. He wished our ideas to be enlarged 
to the true interest of man, instead of being circum- 
scribed within the narrow compass of a particular 
spot. And, after all, how little can be the motive 
yielded by selfishness for such a policy? Who can 
say, whether he himself, much less whether his chil- 
dren, will the next year be an inhabitant of this or 
that State % 

Mr. Bedford. He found that what he had said, 
as to the small States being taken by the hand, had 
been misunderstood, — and he rose to explain. He 
did not mean that the small States would court the 
aid and interposition of foreign powers. He meant 
that they would not consider the federal compact as 
dissolved until it should be so by the acts of the 
large States. In this case, the consequence of the 
breach of faith on their part, and the readiness of 
the small States to fulfil their engagements, would 
be that foreign nations having demands on this 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1031 

Country, would find it their interest to take the 
small States by the hand, in order to do themselves 
justice. This was what he meant. But no man 
can foresee to what extremities the small States may 
be driven by oppression. He observed, also, in 
apology, that some allowance ought to be made for 
the habits of his profession, in which warmth was 
natural and sometimes necessary. But is there not 
an apology in what was said by (Mr. Gouverneur 
Morris), that the sword is to unite — by Mr. Gorham, 
that Delaware must be annexed to Pennsylvania, 
and New Jersey divided between Pennsylvania and 
New York ? To hear such language without emo- 
tion, would be to renounce the feelings of a man 
and the duty of a citizen. As to the propositions of 
the Committee, the lesser States have thought it 
necessary to have a security somewhere. This has 
been thought necessary for the Executive magistrate 
of the proposed government, who has a sort of neg- 
ative on the laws ; and is it not of more importance 
that the States should be protected, than that the 
Executive branch of the Government should be 
protected? In order to obtain this, the smaller 
States have conceded as to the constitution of the first 
branch, and as to money bills. If they be not grat- 
ified by correspondent concessions, as to the second 
branch, is it to be supposed they will ever accede 
to the plan? And what will be the consequence, 
if nothing should be done ? The condition of the 
United States requires that something should be 
immediately done. It will be better that a defective 
plan should be adopted, than that none should be 
recommended. He saw no reason why defects 



1032 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

might not be supplied by meetings ten, fifteen or 
twenty years hence. 

Mr. Ellsworth said, he had not attended the pro- 
ceedings of the Committee, but was ready to accede 
to the compromise they had reported. Some com- 
promise was necessary ; and he saw none more con- 
venient or reasonable. 

Mr. Williamson hoped that the expressions of in- 
dividuals would not be taken for the sense of their 
colleagues, much less of their States, which was not 
and could not be known. He hoped, also, that the 
meaning of those expressions would not be miscon- 
strued or exaggerated. He did not conceive that (Mr. 
Gouverneur Morris) meant that the sword ought to 
be drawn against the smaller States. He only point- 
ed out the probable consequences of anarchy in the 
United States. A similar exposition ought to be 
given of the expressions of (Mr. Gorham). He was 
ready to hear the Report discussed ; but thought the 
propositions contained in it the most objectionable 
of any he had yet heard. 

Mr. Patterson said that he had, when the report 
was agreed to in the Committee, reserved to himself 
the right of freely discussing it. He acknowledged 
that the warmth complained of was improper ; but 
he thought the sword and the gallows little calcula- 
ted to produce conviction. He complained of the 
manner in which Mr. Madison and Mr. G. Morris 
had treated the small States. 

Mr. Gerry. Though he had assented to the Re- 
port in the Committee, he had very material objec- 
tions to it. We were, however, in a peculiar situa- 
tion. We were neither the same nation, nor different 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1033 

nations. We ought not, therefore, to pursue the one 
or the other of these ideas too closely. If no com- 
promise should take place, what will be the conse- 
quence. A secession he foresaw would take place ; 
for some gentlemen seemed decided on it. Two 
different plans will be proposed, and the result no 
man could foresee. If we do not come to some 
agreement among ourselves, some foreign sword will 
probably do the work for us. 

Mr. Mason. The Report was meant not as spe- 
cific propositions to be adopted, but merely as a 
general ground of accommodation. There must be 
some accommodation on this point, or we shall make 
little further progress in the work. Accommodation 
was the object of the House in the appointment of 
the Committee, and of the Committee in the report 
they had made. And, however liable the Report 
might be to objections, he thought it preferable to 
an appeal to the world by the different sides, as had 
been talked of by some gentlemen. It could not be 
more inconvenient to any gentleman to remain ab- 
sent from his private affairs, than it was for him, but 
he would bury his bones in this city, rather than 
expose his country to the consequences of a disso- 
lution of the Convention without any thing being 
done. 

The first proposition in the Report for fixing the 
representation in the first branch, " one member 
for every forty thousand inhabitants," being taken 

up — 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris objected to that scale of 
apportionment. He thought property ought to be 
taken into the estimate as well as the number of 

Vol. i— 65* 



1034 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

inhabitants. Life and liberty were generally said 
to be of more value than property. An accurate 
view of the matter would, nevertheless, prove that 
property was the main object of society. The savage 
state was more favorable to liberty than the civil- 
ized ; and sufficiently so to life. It was preferred by 
all men who had not acquired a taste for property; 
it was only renounced for the sake of property which 
could only be secured by the restraints of regular 
government. These ideas might appear to some 
new, but they were nevertheless just. If property, 
then, was the main object of government, certainly 
it ought to be one measure of the influence due to 
those who were to be affected by the government. 
He looked forward, also, to that range of new States 
which would soon be formed in the West. He 
thought the rule of representatation ought to be so 
fixed, as to secure to the Atlantic States a preva- 
lence in the national councils. The new States will 
know less of the public interest than these ; will 
have an interest in many respects different ; in par- 
ticular will be little scrupulous of involving the 
community in wars the burdens and operations of 
which would fall chiefly on the maritime States. 
Provision ought, therefore, to be made to prevent 
the maritime States from being hereafter outvoted 
by them. He thought this might be easily done, by 
irrevocably fixing the number of representatives 
which the Atlantic States should respectively have, 
and the number which each new State will have. 
This would not be unjust, as the western settlers 
would previously know the conditions on which 
they were to possess their lands. It would be poli-* 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1035 

tic, as it would recommend the plan to the present, 
as well as future, interest of the States which must 
decide the fate of it. 

Mr. Rutledge. The gentleman last up had spo- 
ken some of his sentiments precisely. Property was 
certainly the principal object of society. If num- 
bers should be made the rule of representation, the 
Atlantic States would be subjected to the western. 
He moved that the first proposition in the Report be 
postponed, in order to take up the following, viz.: 
" that the suffrages of the several States be regu- 
lated and proportioned according to the sums to be 
paid towards the general revenue by the inhabitants 
of each State respectively : that an apportionment 
of suffrages, according to the ratio aforesaid shall be 

made and regulated at the end of years from 

the first meeting of the Legislature of the United 

States, and at the end of every years ; but 

that for the present, and until the period above men- 
tioned, the suffrages shall be for New Hampshire 
, for Massachusetts , &c." 

Col. Mason said, the case of new States was not 
unnoticed in the Committee; but it was thought, 
and he was himself decidedly of opinion, that if they 
made a part of the Union, they ought to be subject 
to no unfavorable discriminations. Obvious consid- 
erations required it. 

Mr. Randolph concurred with Mr. Mason. 

On the question on Mr. Rutledge's motion, — 
South Carolina, aye — 1 ; Massachusetts, Connecti- 
cut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no — 9 ; 
Georgia, not on the floor. Adjourned. 



1036 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Friday, July 6th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to 
commit so much of the Report as relates to " one 
member for every forty thousand inhabitants." His 
view was, that they might absolutely fix the num- 
ber for each State in the first instance ; leaving the 
Legislature at liberty to provide for changes in the 
relative importance of the States, and for the case 
of new States. 

Mr. Wilson seconded the motion; but with a 
view of leaving the Committee under no implied 
shackles. 

Mr. Gorham apprehended great inconvenience 
from fixing directly the number of Representatives 
to be allowed to each State. He thought the num- 
ber of inhabitants the true guide ; though perhaps 
some departure might be expedient from the full 
proportion. The States, also, would vary in their 
relative extent by separations of parts of the largest 
states. A part of Virginia is now on the point of 
a separation. In the province of Maine, a Conven- 
tion is at this time deliberating on a separation from 
Massachusetts. In such events the number of Rep- 
resentatives ought certainly to be reduced. He 
hoped to see all the States made small by proper 
divisions, instead of their becoming formidable as 
was apprehended to the small States. He con- 
ceived, that, let the government be modified as it 
might, there would be a constant tendency in the 
State Governments to encroach upon it : it was of 
importance, therefore, that the extent of the States 
should be reduced as much, and as fast, as possible. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1037 

The stronger the government shall be made in the 
first instance, the more easily will these divisions he 
effected; as it will be of less consequence in the 
opinion of the States, whether they be of great or 
small extent. 

Mr. Gerry did not think with his colleague, that 
the larger States ought to be cut up. This policy 
has been inculcated by the middling and small States, 
ungenerously and contrary to the spirit of the Con- 
federation. Ambitious men will be apt to solicit 
needless divisions, till the States be reduced to the 
size of counties. If this policy should still actuate 
the small States, the large ones could not confeder- 
ate safely with them; but would be obliged to 
consult their safety by confederating only with one 
another. He favored the commitment, and thought 
that representation ought to be in the combined 
ratio of numbers of inhabitants and of wealth, and 
not of either singly. 

Mr. King wished the clause to be committed, 
chiefly in order to detach it from the Report, with 
which it had no connection. He thought, also, that 
the ratio of representation proposed could not be 
safely fixed, since in a century and an half our com- 
puted increase of population would carry the num- 
ber of Representatives to an enormous excess ; that 
the number of inhabitants was not the proper index 
of ability and wealth; that property was the 
primary object of society ; and that, in fixing a 
ratio, this ought not to be excluded from the esti- 
mate. With regard to new States, he observed that 
there was something peculiar in the business, which 
had not been noticed. The United States were now 



1038 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

admitted to be proprietors of the country North 
West of the Ohio. Congress, by one of their ordi- 
nances, have impoliticly laid it out into ten States, 
and have made it a fundamental article of compact 
with those who may become settlers, that as soon as 
the number in any one State shall equal that of the 
smallest of the thirteen original States, it may claim 
admission into the Union. Delaware does not con- 
tain, it is computed, more than thirty-five thousand 
souls; and for obvious reasons will not increase 
much for a considerable time. It is possible, then, 
that if this plan be persisted in by Congress, ten 
new votes may be added, without a greater ad- 
dition of inhabitants than are represented by the 
single vote of Pennsylvania. The plan, as it re- 
spects one of the new States, is already irrevocable ; 
the sale of the lands having commenced, and the 
purchasers and settlers will immediately become 
entitled to all the privileges of the compact. 

Mr. Butler agreed to the commitment, if the 
Committee were to be left at liberty. He was per- 
suaded, that, the more the subject was examined, 
the less it would appear that the number of in- 
habitants would be a proper rule of proportion. 
If there were no other objection, the changeableness 
of the standard would be sufficient. He concurred 
with those who thought some balance was necessary 
between the old and the new States. He contended 
strenuously, that property was the only just meas- 
ure of representation. This was the great object 
of government ; the great cause of war ; the great 
means of carrying it on. 

Mr. Pinckney saw no good reason for committing. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1039 

The value of land had been found, on full investiga- 
tion, to be an impracticable rule. The contributions 
of revenue, including imports and exports, must be 
too changeable in their amount ; too difficult to be 
adjusted ; and too injurious to the non-commercial 
States. The number of inhabitants appeared to 
him the only just and practicable rule. He 
thought the blacks ought to stand on an equality 
with the whites; but would agree to the ratio 
settled by Congress. He contended that Congress 
had no right, under the Articles of Confederation, to 
authorize the admission of new States, no such case 
having been provided for. 

Mr. Davy was for committing the clause, in order 
to get at the merits of the question arising on the 
Report. He seemed to think that wealth or proper- 
ty ought to be represented in the second branch; 
and numbers in the first branch. 

On the motion for committing, as made by Mr. 
Gouverneur Morris, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- 
lina, Georgia, aye — 7 ; New York, New Jersey, Dela- 
aware, no — 3 ; Maryland, divided. 

The members appointed by ballot were Mr. Gou- 
verneur Morris, Mr. Gorham, Mr. Randolph, Mr. 
Rutledge, Mr. King. 

Mr. Wilson signified, that his view in agreeing to 
the commitment was, that the Committee might con- 
sider the propriety of adopting a scale similar to that 
established by the Constitution of Massachusetts, 
which would give an advantage to the small States 
without substantially departing from the rule of pro- 
portion. 



1040 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Wilson and Mr. Mason moved to postpone 
the clause relating to money bills, in order to take 
up the clause relating to an equality of votes in the 
second branch. 

On the question of postponement, — New York, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Massa- 
chusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, no — 3. 

The clause relating to equality of votes being un- 
der consideration, — 

Doctor Franklin observed, that this question 
could not be properly put by itself, the Committee 
having reported several propositions as mutual con- 
ditions of each other. He could not vote for it if 
separately taken ; but should vote for the whole to- 
gether. 

Colonel Mason perceived the difficulty, and sug- 
gested a reference of the rest of the Report to the 
Committee just appointed, that the whole might be 
brought into one view. 

Mr. Randolph disliked the reference to that Com- 
mittee, as it consisted of members from States op- 
posed to the wishes of the small States, and could 
not, therefore, be acceptable to the latter. 

Mr. Martin and Mr. Jenifer moved to postpone 
the clause till the Committee last appointed should 
report. 

Mr. Madison observed, that if the uncommitted 
part of the Report was connected with the part just 
committed, it ought also to be committed ; if not 
connected, it need not be postponed till report should 
be made. 

On the question for postponing, moved by Mr. Mar- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1041 

s 

tin and Mr. Jenifer, — Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye — 6; 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, no 
—3 ; Massachusetts, New York, divided. 

The first clause, relating to the originating of mo- 
ney bills, was then resumed. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was opposed to a restric- 
tion of this right in either branch, considered merely 
in itself, and as unconnected with the point of repre- 
sentation in the second branch. It will disable the 
second branch from proposing its own money plans, 
and give the people an opportunity of judging, by 
comparison, of the merits of those proposed by the 
first branch. 

Mr. Wilson could see nothing like a concession 
here, on the part of the smaller States. If both 
branches were to say yes or wo, it was of little con- 
sequence which should say yes or no first, which 
last. If either was, indiscriminately, to have the 
right of originating, the reverse of the Report would, 
he thought, be most proper ; since it was a maxim, 
that the least numerous body was the fittest for de-* 
liberation— the most numerous, for decision. He 
observed that this discrimination had been trans- 
scribed from the British into several American Con- 
stitutions. But he was persuaded that, on exami- 
nation of the American experiments, it would be 
found to be a ' trifle light as air.' Nor could he 
ever discover the advantage of it in the parliamen- 
tary history of Great Britain. He hoped, if there 
was any advantage in the privilege, that it would 
be pointed out. 

Mr. Williamson thought that if the privilege 

Vol. I.— 66 



1042 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

were not common to both branches, it ought rather 
to be confined to the second, as the bills in that case 
would be more narrowly watched, than if they ori- 
ginated with the branch having most of the popular 
confidence. 

Mr. Mason. The consideration which weighed 
with the Committee was, that the first branch 
would be the immediate representatives of the peo- 
ple ; the second would not. Should the latter have 
the power of giving away the people's money, they 
might soon forget the source from whence they re- 
ceived it. We might soon have an aristocracy. He 
had been much concerned at the principles which 
had been advanced by some gentlemen, but had the 
satisfaction to find they did not generally prevail. 
He was a friend to proportional representation in 
both branches ; but supposed that some points must 
be yielded for the sake of accommodation. 

Mr. Wilson. If he had proposed that the second 
branch should have an independent disposal of 
public money, the observations of (Colonel Mason) 
would have been a satisfactory answer. But no- 
thing could be farther from what he had said. His 
question was, how is the power of the first branch 
increased, or that of the second diminished, by giv- 
ing the proposed privilege to the former ? Where 
is the difference, in which branch it begins, if both 
must concur, in the end ? 

Mr. Gerry would not say that the concession was 
a sufficient one on the part of the small States. 
But he could not but regard it in the light of a con- 
cession. It would make it a constitutional principle, 
that the second branch were not possessed of the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1043 

confidence of the people in money matters, which 
would lessen their weight and influence. In the 
next place, if the second branch were dispossessed 
of the privilege, they would be deprived of the op- 
portunity which their continuance in office three 
times as long as the first branch would give them, 
of making three successive essays in favor of a par- 
ticular point. 

Mr, PrNCKNEY thought it evident that the conces- 
sion was wholly on one side, that of the large 
States ; the privilege of originating money bills be- 
ing of no account. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris had waited to hear the 
good effects of the restriction. As to the alarm 
sounded, of an aristocracy, his creed was that there 
never was, nor ever will be, a civilized society with- 
out an aristocracy. His endeavour was, to keep it 
as much as possible from doing mischief. The re- 
striction, if it has any real operation, will deprive 
us of the services of the second branch in digesting 
and proposing money bills, of which it will be more 
capable than the first branch. It will take away 
the responsibility of the second branch, the great 
security for good behaviour. It will always leave a 
plea, as to an obnoxious money bill, that it was dis- 
liked, but could not be constitutionally amended, 
nor safely rejected. It will be a dangerous source 
of disputes between the two Houses. We should 
either take the British Constitution altogether, or 
make one for ourselves. The Executive there has 
dissolved two Houses, as the only cure for such dis- 
putes. Will our Executive be able to apply such a 
remedy ? Every law, directly or indirectly, takes 



1044 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

money out of the pockets of the people. Again, 
what use may be made of such a privilege in case 
of great emergency? Suppose an enemy at the 
door, and money instantly and absolutely necessary 
for repelling him, — may not the popular branch 
avail itself of this duresse, to extort concessions from 
the Senate, destructive of the Constitution itself? 
He illustrated this danger by the example of the 
Long Parliament's expedients for subverting the 
House of Lords ; concluding, on the whole, that the 
restriction would be either useless or pernicious. 

Doctor Franklin did not mean to go into a 
justification of the Report ; but as it had been asked 
what would be the use of restraining the second 
branch from meddling with money bills, he could 
not but remark, that it was always of importance 
that the people should know who had disposed 
of their money, and how it had been disposed of. 
It was a maxim, that those who feel, can best judge. 
This end would, he thought, be best attained, if 
money affairs were to be confined to the immediate 
representatives of the people. This was his in- 
ducement to concur in the Report. As to the danger 
or difficulty that might arise from a negative in the 
second branch, where the people would not be 
proportionally represented, it might easily be got 
over by declaring that there should be no such 
negative ; or, if that will not do, by declaring that 
there shall be no such branch at all. 

Mr. Martin said, that it was understood in the 
Committee, that the difficulties and disputes which 
had been apprehended should be guarded against in 
the detailing of the plan. 






1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1045 

Mr. Wilson. The difficulties and disputes will 
increase with the attempts to define and obviate 
them. Queen Ann was obliged to dissolve her 
Parliament, in order to terminate one of these ob- 
stinate disputes between the two houses. Had it 
not been for the mediation of the Crown, no one 
can say what the result would have been. The 
point is still sub judice in England. He approved 
of the principles laid down by the Honourable 
President* (Doctor Franklin) his colleague, as to 
the expediency of keeping the people informed 
of their money affairs. But thought they would 
know as much, and be as well satisfied, in one way 
as in the other. 

General Pinckney was astonished that this point 
should have been considered as a concession. He 
remarked, that the restriction as to money bills 
had been rejected on the merits singly considered, 
by eight States against three; and that the very 
States which now called it a concession were then 
against it, as nugatory or improper in itself. 

On the question whether the clause relating to 
money bills in the Report of the Committee con- 
sisting of a member from each State, should stand 
as part of the Report,— Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye— 5; 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, no — 3; 
Massachusetts, New York, Georgia, divided. 

A question was then raised, whether the question 
was carried in the affirmative; there being but 



He was at that time President of the State of Pennsylvania. 



1046 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

five ayes, out of eleven States present. For the 
words of the Rule, see May 28th. 

On this question, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; 
New York, Virginia, no — 2. 

(In several preceding instances like votes had 
sub silentio been entered as decided in the affirm- 
ative.) 

Adjourned. 



Saturday, July 7th. 

In Convention, — The question, shall the clause 
■" allowing each State one vote in the second branch, 
stand as part of the Report," being taken up, — 

Mr. Gerry. This is the critical question. He 
had rather agree to it than have no accommoda- 
tion. A Government short of a proper national 
plan, if generally acceptable, would be preferable 
to a proper one which, if it could be carried at all, 
would operate on discontented States. He thought 
it would be best to suspend this question till the 
Committee appointed yesterday should make re- 
port. 

Mr. Sherman supposed that it was the wish of 
every one that some General Government should be 
established. An equal vote in the second branch 
would, he thought, be most likely to give it the ne- 
cessary vigor. The small States have more vigor 
in their Governments than the large ones ; the more 
influence therefore the large ones have, the weaker 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1047 

will be the Government. In the large States it will 
be most difficult to collect the real and fair sense of 
the people. Fallacy and undue influence will be 
practised with most success ; and improper men will 
most easily get into office. If they vote by States 
in the second branch, and each State has an equal 
vote, there must be always a majority of States, as 
well as a majority of the people, on the side of pub- 
lic measures, and the Government will have decision 
and efficacy. If this be not the case in the second 
branch, there may be a majority of States against 
public measures ; and the difficulty of compelling 
them to abide by the public determination will ren- 
der the Government feebler than it has ever yet 
been. 

Mr. Wilson was not deficient in a conciliating 
temper, but firmness was sometimes a duty of higher 
obligation. Conciliation was also misapplied in this 
instance. It was pursued here rather among the 
representatives, than among the constituents ; and it 
would be of little consequence if not established 
among the latter ; and there could be little hope of 
its being established among them, if the foundation 
should not be laid in justice and right. 

On the question, shall the words stand as part of 
the Report ? — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye — 6 ; Penn- 
sylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, no — 3; Massa- 
chusetts, Georgia, divided.* 

Mr. Gerry thought it would be proper to proceed 



* Several votes were given here in the affirmative, or were divided, because 
another final question was to be taken on the whole B*»— *■ 



1048 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

to enumerate and define the powers to be vested in 
the General Government, before a question on the 
Report should be taken as to the rule of representa- 
tion in the second branch. 

Mr. Madison observed, that it would be impossible 
to say what powers could be safely and properly 
vested in the Government, before it was known in 
what manner the States were to be represented in 
it. He was apprehensive that if a just representa- 
tion were not the basis of the Government, it would 
happen, as it did when the Articles of Confederation 
were depending, that every effectual prerogative 
would be withdrawn or withheld, and the new 
Government w T ould be rendered as impotent and as 
short-lived as the old. 

Mr. Patterson would not decide whether the 
privilege concerning money bills were a valuable 
consideration or not; but he considered the mode 
and rule of representation in the first branch as fully 
so ; and that after the establishment of that point, 
the small States would never be able to defend 
themselves without an equality of votes in the sec- 
ond branch. There was no other ground of accom- 
modation. His resolution was fixed. He would 
meet the large States on that ground, and no other. 
For himself, he should vote against the Report, be- 
cause it yielded too much. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. He had no resolution 
unalterably fixed except to do what should finally 
appear to him right. He w T as against the Report 
because it maintained the improper constitution of 
the second branch. It made it another Congress, a 
mere whisp of straw. It had been said (by Mr. 






1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1049 

Gerry), that the new Government would be partly- 
national, partly federal ; that it ought in the first 
quality to protect individuals ; in the second, the 
State. But in what quality was it to protect the 
aggregate interest of the whole 1 Among the many 
provisions which had been urged, he had seen none 
for supporting the dignity and splendor of the Ameri- 
can Empire. It had been one of our greatest mis- 
fortunes that the great objects of the nation had 
been sacrificed constantly to local views ; in like 
manner as the general interest of States had been 
sacrificed to those of the counties. What is to be 
the check in the Senate 1 None ; unless it be to 
keep the majority of the people from injuring par- 
ticular States. But particular States ought to be 
injured for the sake of a majority of the people, in 
case their conduct should deserve it. Suppose they 
should insist on claims evidently unjust, and pursue 
them in a manner detrimental to the whole body : 
suppose they should give themselves up to foreign 
influence : Ought they to be protected in such cases ? 
They were originally nothing more than colonial 
corporations. On the Declaration of Independence, 
a Government was to be formed. The small States 
aware of the necessity of preventing anarchy, and 
taking advantage of the moment, extorted from the 
large ones an equality of votes. Standing now on 
that ground, they demand, under the new system, 
greater rights, as men, than their fellow-citizens of 
the large States. The proper answer to them is 7 
that the same necessity of which they formerly took 
advantage does not now exist ; and that the large 
States are at liberty now to consider what is 
Vol;.!.— 66* 



1050 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

right, rather than what may be expedient. We 
must have an efficient Government, and if there be 
an efficiency in the local Governments, the former 
is impossible. Germany alone proves it. Notwith- 
standing their common Diet, notwithstanding the 
great prerogatives of the Emperor, as head of the 
Empire, and his vast resources, as sovereign of 
his particular dominions, no union is maintained; 
foreign influence disturbs every internal operation, 
and there is no energy whatever in the general gov- 
ernment. Whence does this proceed? From the 
energy of the local authorities ; from its being con- 
sidered of more consequence to support the Prince 
of Hesse, than the happiness of the people of Ger- 
many. Do gentlemen wish this to be the case here? 
Good God, Sir, is it possible they can so delude them- 
selves ? What if all the Charters and Constitutions 
of the States were thrown into the fire, and all their 
demagogues into the ocean — what would it be to the 
happiness of America ? And will not this be the 
case here, if we pursue the train in which the busi- 
ness lies ? We shall establish an Aulic Council, 
without an Emperor to execute its decrees. The 
same circumstances which unite the people here 
unite them in Germany. They have there a com- 
mon language, a common law, common usages and 
manners, and a common interest in being united; 
yet their local jurisdictions destroy every tie. The 
case was the same in the Grecian states. The Uni- 
ted Netherlands are at this time torn in factions. 
With these examples before our eyes, shall we form 
establishments which must necessarily produce the 
same effects ? It is of no consequence from what 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1051 

districts the second branch shall be drawn, if it be 
so constituted as to yield an asylum against these 
evils. As it is now constituted, he must be against 
its being drawn from the States in equal portions ; 
but shall be ready to join in devising such an amend- 
ment of the plan, as will be most likely to secure 
our liberty and happiness. 

Mr. Sherman and Mr. Ellsworth moved to post- 
pone the question on the Report from the Committee 
of a member from each State, in order to wait for 
the Report from the Committee of five last appoint- 
ed, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, aye— 6 ; New York, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
no — 5. 

Adjourned. 



Monday, July 9th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Daniel Carroll, from Mary- 
land, took his seat. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris delivered a Report from 
the Committee of five members, to whom was 
committed the clause in the Report of the Com- 
mittee consisting of a member from each State, 
stating the proper ratio of representatives in the 
first branch to be as one to every forty thousand 
inhabitants, as follows, viz : 

" The Committee to whom w T as referred the first 
elause of the first proposition reported from the 
Grand Committee, beg leave to report : 

"That in the first meeting of the Legisla*" 



1052 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the first branch thereof consist of fifty-six members, 
of which number New Hampshire shall have 2, 
Massachusetts 7, Rhode Island 1, Connecticut 4, 
New York 5, New Jersey 3, Pennsylvania 8, Dela- 
ware 1, Maryland 4, Virginia 9, North Carolina 5, 
South Carolina 5, Georgia 2. 

" But as the present situation of the States may 
probably alter, as well in point of wealth as in the 
number of their inhabitants, that the Legislature be 
authorized from time to time to augment the num- 
ber of Representatives. And in case any of the 
States shall hereafter be divided, or any two or 
more States united, or any new States created 
within the limits of the United States, the Legisla- 
ture shall possess authority to regulate the number of 
Representatives in any of the foregoing cases, upon 
the principles of their wealth and number of in- 
habitants." 

Mr. Sherman wished to know, on what principles 
or calculations the Report was founded. It did not 
appear to correspond with any rule of numbers, or 
of any requisition hitherto adopted by Congress. 

Mr. Gorham. Some provision of this sort was 
necessary in the outset. The number of blacks 
and whites, with some regard to supposed wealth, 
was the general guide. Fractions could not be 
observed. The Legislature is to make alterations 
from time to time, as justice and propriety may 
require. Two objections prevailed against the rule 
of one member for every forty thousand inhabitants. 
The first was, that the representation would soon 
be too numerous, the second that the Western 
States, who may have a different interest, might, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. lOSS 

if admitted on that principle, by degrees outvote 
the Atlantic. Both these objections are removed. 
The number will be small in the first instance, and 
may be continued so. And the Atlantic States, 
having the Government in their own hands, may 
take care of their own interest, by dealing out the 
right of representation in safe proportions to the 
Western States. These were the views of the 
Committee. 

Mr. L. Martin wished to know whether the 
Committee were guided in the ratio by the wealth, 
or number of inhabitants, of the States, or both ; 
noting its variations from former apportionments 
by Congress. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris and Mr. Rutledge 
moved to postpone the first paragraph, relating to 
the number of members to be allowed each State in 
the first instance, and to take up the second para- 
graph, authorizing the Legislature to alter the 
number from time to time according to wealth and 
inhabitants. The motion was agreed to, nem. con. 

On the question on the second paragraph, taken 
without any debate, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye- — 9; New 
York, New Jersey, no — 2. 

Mr. Sherman moved to refer the first part, ap- 
portioning the representatives, to a Committee of a 
member from each State. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion ; ob- 
serving that this was the only case in which such 
committees were useful. 

Mr. Williamson thought it would be necessary to 



1054 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

return to the rule of numbers, but that the Western 
States stood on different footing. If their property 
should be rated as high as that of the Atlantic 
States, then their representation ought to hold a like 
proportion. Otherwise, if their property was not 
to be equally rated. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The Report is little 
more than a guess. Wealth was not altogether dis- 
regarded by the Committee, Where it was ap- 
parently in favor of one State whose numbers were 
superior to the numbers of another, by a fraction 
only, a member extraordinary was allowed to the 
former ; and so vice versa. The Committee meant 
little more than to bring the matter to a point for 
the consideration of the House. 

Mr. Read asked, why Georgia was allowed two 
members, when her number of inhabitants had stood 
below that of Delaware ? 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. Such is the rapidity 
of the population of that State, that before the plan 
takes effect, it will probably be entitled to two Rep- 
resentatives. 

Mr. Randolph disliked the Report of the Commit- 
tee, but had been unwilling to object to it. He was 
apprehensive that, as the number was not be chang- 
ed, till the National Legislature should please, a pre- 
text would never be wanting to postpone alterations, 
and keep the power in the hands of those possessed 
of it. He was in favor of the commitment to a 
member from each State. 

Mr. Patterson considered the proposed estimate 
for the future according to the combined rules of 
numbers and wealth, as too vague. For this reason 






1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1055 

New Jersey was against it. He could regard negro 
slaves in no light but as property. They are no 
free agents, have no personal liberty, no faculty of 
acquiring property, but on the contrary are them- 
selves property, and like other property entirely at 
the will of the master. Has a man in Virginia a 
number of votes in proportion to the number of his 
slaves ? and if negroes are not represented in the 
States to which they belong, why should they be 
represented in the General Government. What is 
the true principle of representation ? It is an expe- 
dient by which an assembly of certain individuals, 
chosen by the people, is substituted in place of the 
inconvenient meeting of the people themselves. If 
such a meeting of the people was actually to take 
place, would the slaves vote 7 They would not. 
Why then should they be represented? He was 
also against such an indirect encouragement of the 
slave trade ; observing that Congress, in their Act 
relating to the change of the eighth Article of Con- 
federation, had been ashamed to use the term 
" slaves," and had substituted a description. 

Mr. Madison reminded Mr. Patterson that his 
doctrine of representation, which was in its principle 
the genuine one, must forever silence the pretensions 
of the small States to an equality of votes with the 
large ones. They ought to vote in the same pro- 
portion in which their citizens would do, if the peo- 
ple of all the States were collectively met. He 
suggested as a proper ground of compromise, that 
in the first branch the States should be represented 
according to their number of free inhabitants ; and 
in the second, which had for one of its primary ob- 



1056 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

jects the guardianship of property, according to the 
whole number, including slaves. 

Mr. Butler urged warmly the justice and neces- 
sity of regarding wealth in the apportionment of 
representation. 

Mr. King had always expected, that, as the South- 
ern States are the richest, they would not league 
themselves with the Northern, unless some respect 
were paid to their superior wealth. If the latter 
expect those preferential distinctions in commerce, 
and other advantages which they will derive from 
the connexion, they must not expect to receive them 
without allowing some advantages in return. Elev- 
en out of thirteen of the States had agreed to con- 
sider slaves in the apportionment of taxation ; and 
taxation and representation ought to go together. 

On the question for committing the first paragraph 
of the Report to a member from each State, — Mas- 
sachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Geor- 
gia, aye— 9 ; New York, South Carolina, no — 2. 

The Committee appointed were Messrs. King, 
Sherman, Yates, Brearly, Gouverneur Morris, 
Read, Carroll, Madison, Williamson, Rutledge, 
Houston. 

Adjourned, 



Tuesday, June 10th. 

In Convention, — Mr. King reported, from the Com- 
mittee yesterday appointed, " that the States at the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1057 

first meeting of the General Legislature, should be 
represented by sixty-five members, in the following 
proportions, to wit : — New Hampshire, by 3 ; Massa- 
chusetts, 8; Rhode Island, 1 ; Connecticut, 5 ; New 
York, 6 ; New Jersey, 4 ; Pennsylvania, 8 ; Dela- 
ware, 1 ; Maryland, 6 ; Virginia, 10 ; North Caroli- 
na, 5 ; South Carolina, 5 ; Georgia, 3." 

Mr. Rutledge moved that New Hampshire be re- 
duced from three to two members. Her numbers 
did not entitle her to three, and it was a poor State. 

General Pinckney seconds the motion. 

Mr. King. New Hampshire has probably more 
than 120,000 inhabitants, and has an extensive coun- 
try of tolerable fertility. Its inhabitants may there- 
fore be expected to increase fast. He remarked that 
the four Eastern States, having 800,000 souls, have 
one-third fewer representatives than the four South- 
ern States, having not more than 700,000 souls, ra- 
ting the blacks as five for three. The Eastern peo- 
ple will advert to these circumstances, and be dissat- 
isfied. He believed them to be very desirous of uni- 
ting with their Southern brethren, but did not think 
it prudent to rely so far on that disposition, as to 
subject them to any gross inequality. He was fully 
convinced that the question concerning a difference 
of interests did not lie where it had hitherto been 
discussed, between the great and small States ; but 
between the Southern and Eastern. For this rea- 
son he had been ready to yield something, in the 
proportion of representatives, for the security of the 
Southern. No principle would justify the giving 
them a majority. They were brought as near an 
equality as was possible. He was not averse to giv- 

Vol. I.— 67 



1058 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ing them a still greater security, but did not see how 
it could be done. 

General Pinckney. The Report before it was 
committed was more favorable to the Southern 
States than as it now stands. If they are to form 
so considerable a minority, and the regulation of 
trade is to be given to the General Government, 
they will be nothing more than overseers for the 
Northern States. He did not expect the Southern 
States to be raised to a majority of representatives ; 
but wished them to have something like an equality. 
At present, by the alterations of the Committee in 
favor of the Northern States, they are removed fur- 
ther from it than they were before. One member 
indeed had been added to Virginia, which he was 
glad of, as he considered her as a Southern State. 
He was glad also that the members of Georgia were 
increased. 

Mr. Williamson was not for reducing New Hamp- 
shire from three to two, but for reducing some others. 
The Southern interest must be extremely endan- 
gered by the present arrangement. The Northern 
States are to have a majority in the first instance, 
and the means of perpetuating it. 

Mr. Dayton observed, that the line between 
Northern and Southern interest had been improp- 
erly drawn; that Pennsylvania was the dividing 
State, there being six on each side of her. 

General Pinckney urged the reduction ; dwelt on 
the superior wealth of the Southern States, and in- 
sisted on its having its due weight in the Govern- 
ment. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris regretted the turn of the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1059 

debate. The States, he found, had many represen- 
tatives on the floor. Few, he feared, were to be 
deemed the Representatives of America. He 
thought the Southern States have, by the Report, 
more than their share of representation. Property 
ought to have its weight, but not all the weight. If 
the Southern States are to supply money, the North- 
ern States are to spill their blood. Besides, the 
probable revenue to be expected from the Southern 
States has been greatly overrated. He was against 
reducing New Hampshire. 

Mr. Randolph was opposed to a reduction of New 
Hampshire, not because she had a full title to three 
members ; but because it was in his contemplation, 
first, to make it the duty, instead of leaving it to the 
discretion, of the Legislature to regulate the repre- 
sentation by a periodical census ; secondly, to require 
more than a bare majority of votes in the Legisla- 
ture, in certain cases, and particularly in commercial 
cases. 

On the question for reducing New Hampshire 
from three to two Representatives, it passed in the 
negative,— North Carolina,* South Carolina, aye — 
2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia,* 
no — 8. 

General Pinckney and Mr. Alexander Martin 
moved that six Representatives, instead of five, be 
allowed to North Carolina. 

On the question it passed in the negative, — North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 3; Massa- 

* In the printed Journal, North Carolina, no ; Georgia, aye. 



1060 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

chusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no — 7. 

General Pinckney and Mr. Butler made the 
same motion in favor of South Carolina. 

On the question, it passed in the negative, — Dela- 
ware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye 
— 4 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no — 7. 

General Pinckney and Mr. Houston moved that 
Georgia be allowed four instead of three Represen- 
tatives ; urging the unexampled celerity of its popu- 
lation. 

On the question, it passed in the negative, — Vir- 
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye 
— 4 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, no — 7. 

Mr. Madison moved that the number allowed to 
each State be doubled. A majority of a Quorum of 
sixty-five members was too small a number to repre- 
sent the whole inhabitants of the United States. 
They would not possess enough of the confidence of 
the people, and would be too sparsely taken from 
the people, to bring with them all the local informa- 
tion which would be frequently wanted. Double 
the number will not be too great, even with the fu- 
ture additions from the new States. The additional 
expense was too inconsiderable to be regarded in so 
important a case. And as far as the augmentation 
might be unpopular on that score, the objection was 
overbalanced by its effect on the hopes of a greater 
number of the popular candidates. 

Mr. Ellsworth urged the objection of expense ; 
and that the greater the number, the more slowly 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1061 

would the business proceed ; and the less probably 
be decided as it ought, at last. He thought the 
number of representatives too great in most of the 
State Legislatures ; and that a large number was 
less necessary in the General Legislature, than in 
those of the States ; as its business would relate to 
a few great national objects only. 

Mr. Sherman would have preferred fifty to sixty- 
five. The great distance they will have to travel 
will render their attendance precarious, and will 
make it difficult to prevail on a sufficient number 
of fit men to undertake the service. He observed 
that the expected increase from new States also 
deserved consideration. 

Mr. Gerry was for increasing the number beyond 
sixty-five. The larger the number, the less the 
danger of their being corrupted. The people are 
accustomed to, and fond of, a numerous representa- 
tion ; and will consider their rights as better secured 
by it. The danger of excess in the number may be 
guarded against by fixing a point within which the 
number shall always be kept. 

Colonel Mason admitted, that the objection drawn 
from the consideration of expense had weight both 
in itself, and as the people might be affected by it. 
But he thought it outweighed by the objections 
against the smallness of the number. Thirty-eight 
will, he supposes, as being a majority of sixty-five, 
form a quorum. Twenty will be a majority of 
thirty-eight. This was certainly too small a num- 
ber to make laws for America. They would neither 
bring with them all the necessary information re- 
lative to various local interests, nor possess the ne- 



1062 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

cessary confidence of the people. After doubling the 
number, the laws might still be made by so few as 
almost to be objectionable on that account. 

Mr. Read was in favor of the motion. Two of 
the States (Delaware and Rhode Island) would 
have but a single member if the aggregate number 
should remain at sixty-five ; and in case of accident 
to either of these, one State would have no Repre- 
sentative present to give explanations or informa- 
tions of its interests or wishes. The people w T ould 
not place their confidence in so small a number. 
He hoped the objects of the General Government 
would be much more numerous than seemed to be 
expected by some gentlemen, and that they w r ould 
become more and more so. As to the new States, 
the highest number of Representatives for the w T hole 
might be limited, and all danger of excess thereby 
prevented. Mr. Rutledge opposed the motion. The 
Representatives were too numerous in all the 
States. The full number allotted to the States 
may be expected to attend, and the lowest possible 
quorum should not therefore be considered. The 
interests of their constituents will urge their at- 
tendance too strongly for it to be omitted : and he 
supposed the General Legislature would not sit 
more than six or eight weeks in the year. 

On the question for doubling the number, it 
passed in the negative, — Delaware, Virginia, aye— 
2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 9. 

On the question for agreeing to the apportion- 
ment of Representatives, as amended by the last 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1063 

Committee, it passed in the affirmative, — Massa- 
chusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Car- 
olina, aye — 9 ; South Carolina, Georgia, no — 2. 

Mr. Broome gave notice to the House, that he 
had concurred with a reserve to himself of an inten- 
tion to claim for his State an equal voice in the 
second branch ; which he thought could not be 
denied after this concession of the small States as to 
the first branch. 

Mr. Randolph moved, as an amendment to the 
Report of the Committee of five, " that in order to 
ascertain the alterations in the population and 
wealth of the several States, the Legislature should 
be required to cause a census and estimate to be 
taken within one year after its first meeting ; and 
every years thereafter ; and that the Legis- 
lature arrange the representation accordingly.' 7 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed it, as fettering 
the Legislature too much. Advantage may be 
taken of it in time of war or the apprehension of it, 
by new States to extort particular favors. If the 
mode was to be fixed for taking a census, it might 
certainly be extremely inconvenient : if unfixed, the 
Legislature may use such a mode as will defeat the 
object; and perpetuate the inequality. He was 
always against such shackles on the Legislature. 
They had been found very pernicious in most of the 
State Constitutions. He dwelt much on the danger 
of throwing such a preponderance into the western 
scale; suggesting that in time the western people 
would outnumber the Atlantic States. He wished 
therefore to put it in the power of the latter to 



1064 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

keep a majority of votes in their own hands. It 
was objected, he said, that, if the Legislature are 
left at liberty, they will never re-adjust the repre- 
sentation. He admitted that this was possible, but 
he did not think it probable, unless the reasons 
against a revision of it were very urgent ; and in 
this case, it ought not to be done. 

It was moved to postpone the proposition of Mr. 
Randolph, in order to take up the following, viz. : 
" that the Committee of eleven, to whom was re- 
ferred the Report of the Committee of five on the 
subject of Representation, be requested to furnish 
the Convention with the principles on which they 
grounded the Report ;" which was disagreed to, — 
South Carolina alone voting in the affirmative. 

Adjourned. 



Wednesday, July 11th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Randolph's motion, requi- 
ring the Legislature to take a periodical census for 
the purpose of redressing inequalities in the repre- 
sentation was resumed. 

Mr. Sherman was against shackling the Legisla- 
ture too much. We ought to choose wise and good 
men, and then confide in them. 

Mr. Mason. The greater the difficulty we find in 
fixing a proper rule of representation, the more 
unwilling ought we to be to throw the task from 
ourselves on the General Legislature. He did not 
object to the conjectural ratio which was to pre- 
vail in the outset ; but considered a revision from 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1065 

time to time, according to some permanent and pre- 
cise standard, as essential to the fair representation 
required in the first branch. According to the pres- 
ent population of America, the northern part of it 
had a right to preponderate, and he could not de- 
ny it. But he wished it not to preponderate here- 
after, when the reason no longer continued. From 
the nature of man, we may be sure that those who 
have power in their hands will not give it up, while 
they can retain it. On the contrary, we know that 
they will always, when they can, rather increase it. 
If the Southern States, therefore, should have three- 
fourths of the people of America within their limits, 
the Northern will hold fast the majority of Repre- 
sentatives. One-fourth will govern the three-fourths. 
The Southern States will complain, but they may 
complain from generation to generation without 
redress. Unless some principle, therefore, which 
will do justice to them hereafter, shall be inserted 
in the Constitution, disagreeable as the declaration 
was to him, he must declare he could neither vote 
for the system here, nor support it in his State. 
Strong objections had been drawn from the dan- 
ger to the Atlantic interests from new Western 
States. Ought we to sacrifice what we know to 
be right in itself, lest it should prove favorable to 
States which are not yet in existence ? If the 
Western States are to be admitted into the Union, 
as they arise, they must, he would repeat, be treated 
as equals, and subjected to no degrading discrimina- 
tions. They will have the same pride, and other 
passions, which we have ; and will either not unite 
with, or will speedily revolt from, the Union, if they 
Vol. I.— 67* 



1066 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

are not in all respects placed on an equal footing 
with their brethren. It has been said, they will be 
poor, and unable to make equal contributions to the 
general treasury. He did not know but that, in 
time, they would be both more numerous and more 
wealthy, than their Atlantic brethren. The extent 
and fertility of their soil made this probable ; and 
though Spain might for a time deprive them of the 
natural outlet for their productions, yet she will, be- 
cause she must, finally yield to their demands. He 
urged that numbers of inhabitants, though not al- 
ways a precise standard of wealth, was sufficiently 
so for every substantial purpose. 

Mr. Williamson was for making it a duty of the 
Legislature to do what was right, and not leaving it 
at liberty to do or not to do it. He moved that Mr. 
Randolph's propositions be postponed, in order to 
consider the following, " that in order to ascertain 
the alterations that may happen in the population 
and wealth of the several States, a census shall be 
taken of the free white inhabitants, and three-fifths 
of those of other descriptions on the first year after 
this government shall have been adopted, and every 

— year thereafter ; and that the representation 

be regulated accordingly." 

Mr. Randolph agreed that Mr. Williamson's pro- 
position should stand in place of his. He observed 
that the ratio fixed for the first meeting was a mere 
conjecture ; that it placed the power in the hands 
of that part of America which could not always be 
entitled to it ; that this power would not be volun- 
tarily renounced ; and that it was consequently the 
duty of the Convention to secure its renunciation, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1067 

when justice might so require, by some constitu- 
tional provisions. If equality between great and 
small States be inadmissible, because in that case 
unequal numbers of constituents would be represen- 
ted by equal numbers of votes, was it not equally 
inadmissible, that a larger and more populous dis- 
trict of America, should hereafter have less repre- 
sentation than a smaller and less populous district? 
If a fair representation of the people be not secured, 
the injustice of the Government will shake it to its 
foundations. What relates to suffrage, is justly sta- 
ted by the celebrated Montesquieu as a fundamental 
article in Republican Governments. If the danger 
suggested by Mr. Gouverneur Morris be real, of 
advantage being taken of the Legislature in pressing 
moments, it was an additional reason for tying their 
hands in such a manner, that they could not sacri- 
fice their trust to momentary considerations. Con- 
gress have pledged the public faith to new States, 
that they shall be admitted on equal terms. They 
never would, nor ought to, accede on any other. 
The census must be taken under the direction of 
the General Legislature. The States w T ill be too 
much interested, to take an impartial one for them- 
selves. 

Mr. Butler and General Pinckney insisted that 
blacks be included in the rule of representation 
equally with the whites ; and for that purpose 
moved that the words "three-fifths" be struck out. 

Mr. Gerry thought that three-fifths of them was, 
to say the least, the full proportion that could be 
admitted. 

Mr. Gorham. This ratio was fixed by Congress 



1068 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

as a rule of taxation. Then, it was urged, by the 
Delegates representing the States having slaves, 
that the blacks were still more inferior to freemen. 
At present, when the ratio of representation is to be 
established, we are assured that they are equal to 
freemen. The arguments on the former occasion 
had convinced him, that three-fifths was pretty near 
the just proportion, and he should vote according to 
the same opinion now. 

Mr. Butler insisted that the labor of a slave in 
South Carolina was as productive and valuable, as 
that of a freeman in Massachusetts ; that as wealth 
was the great means of defence and utility to the 
nation, they were equally valuable to it with free- 
men ; and that consequently an equal represen- 
tation ought to be allowed for them in a government 
which was instituted principally, for the protection 
of property, and was itself to be supported by prop- 
erty. 

Mr. Mason could not agree to the motion, notwith- 
standing it was favorable to Virginia, because he 
thought it unjust. It was certain that the slaves 
were valuable, as they raised the value of land, in- 
creased the exports and imports, and of course the 
revenue, would supply the means of feeding and sup- 
porting an army, and might in cases of emergency 
become themselves soldiers. As in these important 
respects they were useful to the community at large, 
they ought not to be excluded from the estimate of 
representation. He could not, however, regard them 
as equal to freemen, and could not vote for them as 
such. He added, as worthy of remark, that the 
Southern States have this peculiar species of proper- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1069 

ty, over and above the other species of property 
common to all the States. 

Mr. Williamson reminded Mr. Gorham that if the 
Southern States contended for the inferiority of 
blacks to whites when taxation was in view, the 
Eastern States, on the same occasion, contended for 
their equality. He did not, however, either then or 
now, concur in either extreme, but approved of the 
ratio of three-fifths. 

On Mr. Butler's motion, for considering blacks as 
equal to whites in the apportionment of representa- 
tion, — Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 3 ; 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsyl- 
vania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no — 7; 
New York, not on the floor. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris said he had several ob- 
jections to the proposition of Mr. Williamson. In 
the first place, it fettered the Legislature too much. 
In the second place, it would exclude some States 
altogether who would not have a sufficient number 
to entitle them to a single representation. In the 
third place, it will not consist with the resolution 
passed on Saturday last, authorizing the Legislature 
to adjust the representation from time to time on the 
principles of population and wealth ; nor with the 
principles of equity. If slaves were to be consid- 
ered as inhabitants, not as wealth, then the said 
Resolution would not be pursued ; if as wealth, then 
why is no other wealth but slaves included ? These 
objections may perhaps be removed by amendments. 
His great objection was, that the number of inhab- 
itants was not a proper standard of wealth. The 
amazing difference between the comparative num- 



1070 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

bers and wealth of different countries rendered all 
reasoning superfluous on the subject. Numbers 
might with greater propriety be deemed a measure 
of strength, than of wealth ; yet the late defence 
made by Great Britain, against her numerous ene- 
mies proved, in the clearest manner, that it is entirely 
fallacious even in this respect. 

Mr. King thought there was great force in the ob- 
jections of Mr. Gouverneur Morris. He would, 
however, accede to the proposition for the sake of 
doing something. 

Mr. Rutledge contended for the admission of 
wealth in the estimate by which representation 
should be regulated. The Western States will not 
be able to contribute in proportion to their numbers ; 
they should not therefore be represented in that pro- 
portion. The Atlantic States will not concur in 

such a plan. He moved that, " at the end of 

years after the first meeting of the Legislature, and 

of every years thereafter, the Legislature shall 

proportion the representation according to the prin- 
ciples of wealth and population." 

Mr. Sherman thought the number of people alone 
the best rule for measuring wealth as well as repre- 
sentation ; and that if the Legislature were to be 
governed by wealth, they would be obliged to esti- 
mate it by numbers. He was at first for leaving the 
matter wholly to the discretion of the Legislature ; 
but he had been convinced by the observation of 
(Mr. Randolph and Mr. Mason), that the periods and 
the ride, of revising the representation, ought to be 
fixed by the Constitution. 

Mr. Read thought, the Legislature ought not to 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1071 

be too much shackled. It would make the Consti- 
tution like religious creeds, embarrassing to those 
bound to conform to them, and more likely to pro- 
duce dissatisfaction and schism, than harmony and 
union. 

Mr. Mason objected to Mr. Rutledge's motion, as 
requiring of the Legislature something too indefinite 
and impracticable, and leaving them a pretext for 
doing nothing. 

Mr. Wilson had himself no objection to leaving 
the Legislature entirely at liberty, but considered 
wealth as an impracticable rule. 

Mr. Gorham. If the Convention, who are com- 
paratively so little biassed by local views, are so 
much perplexed, how can it be expected that the 
Legislature hereafter, under the full bias of those 
views will be able to settle a standard % He was 
convinced, by the arguments of others and his own 
reflections, that the Convention ought to fix some 
standard or other. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The argument of oth- 
ers and his own reflections had led him to a very 
different conclusion. If we cannot agree on a rule 
that will be just at this time, how can we expect to 
find one that will be just in all times to come ? Sure- 
ly those who come after us will judge better of 
things present, than we can of things future. He 
could not persuade himself that numbers would be 
a just rule at any time. The remarks of (Mr. Ma- 
son) relative to the Western country had not changed 
his opinion on that head. Among other objections, 
it must be apparent, they would not be able to fur- 
nish men equally enlightened, to share in the admin- 



1072 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

istration of our common interests. The busy haunts 
of men, not the remote wilderness, was the proper 
school of political talents. If the western people 
get the power into their hands, they will ruin the 
Atlantic interests. The back members are always 
most averse to the best measures. He mentioned 
the case of Pennsylvania formerly. The lower part 
of the State had the power in the first instance. 
They kept it in their own hands, and the country 
was the better for it. Another objection with him, 
against admitting the blacks into the census, was, 
that the people of Pennsylvania would revolt at the 
idea of being put on a footing with slaves. They 
would reject any plan that was to have such an ef- 
fect. Two objections had been raised against leav- 
ing the adjustment of the representation, from time 
to time, to the discretion of the Legislature. The 
first was, they would be unwilling to revise it at all. 
The second, that, by referring to wealth, they would 
be bound by a rule which, if willing, they would be 
unable to execute. The first objection distrusts their 
fidelity. But if their duty, their honor, and their 
oaths, will not bind them, let us not put into their 
hands our liberty, and all our other great interests ; 
let us have no government at all. In the second 
place, if these ties will bind them, we need not dis- 
trust the practicability of the rule. It was followed 
in part by the Committee in the apportionment of 
Representatives yesterday reported to the House. 
The best course that could be taken would be to 
leave the interests of the people to the representa- 
tives of the people. 

Mr. Madison was not a little surprised to hear this 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1073 

implicit confidence urged by a member who, on all 
occasions, had inculcated so strongly the political 
depravity of men, and the necessity of checking one 
vice and interest by opposing to them another vice 
and interest. If the representatives of the people 
would be bound by the ties he had mentioned, what 
need was there of a Senate ? What of a revisionary 
power ? But his reasoning was not only inconsist- 
ent with his former reasoning, but with itself. At 
the same time time that he recommended this impli- 
cit confidence to the Southern States in the North- 
ern majority, he was still more zealous in exhorting 
all to a jealousy of a western majority. To recon- 
cile the gentleman with himself, it must be imagined 
that he determined the human character by the 
points of the compass. The truth was, that all men 
having power ought to be distrusted, to a certain de- 
gree. The case of Pennsylvania had been mention- 
ed, where it was admitted that those who were pos- 
sessed of the power in the original settlement never 
admitted the new settlements to a due share of it, 
England was a still more striking example. The 
power there had long been in the hands of the bor- 
oughs — of the minority — who had opposed and de- 
feated every reform which had been attempted. 
Virginia w 7 as, in a less degree, another example, 
With regard to the Western States, he was clear and 
firm in opinion, that no unfavorable distinctions were 
admissible, either in point of justice or policy. He 
thought also, that the hope of contributions to the 
Treasury from them had been much underrated. 
Future contributions, it seemed to be understood on 
all hands, would be principally levied on imports 
Vol. I.— 68 



1074 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

and exports. The extent and fertility of the West- 
ern soil would for a long time give to agriculture a 
preference over manufactures. Trials would be re- 
peated till some articles could be raised from it, that 
would bear a transportation to places where they 
could be exchanged for imported manufactures. 
Whenever the Mississippi should be opened to them, 
which would of necessity be the case as soon as 
their population would subject them to any consid- 
erable share of the public burden, imposts on their 
trade could be collected with less expense, and great- 
er certainty, than on that of the Atlantic States. In 
the mean time, as their supplies must pass through 
the Atlantic States, their contributions would be levied 
in the same manner with those of the Atlantic States. 
He could not agree that any substantial objection 
lay against fixing numbers for the perpetual stand- 
ard of representation. It was said, that representa- 
tion and taxation were to go together ; that taxation 
and wealth ought to go together; that population 
and wealth were not measures of each other. He 
admitted that in different climates, under different 
forms of government, and in different stages of civil- 
ization, the inference was perfectly just. He would 
admit that in no situation numbers of inhabitants 
were an accurate measure of wealth. He contend- 
ed, however, that in the United States it was suffi- 
ciently so for the object in contemplation. Al- 
though their climate varied considerably, yet as the 
governments, the laws, and the manners of all, were 
nearly the same, and the intercourse between dif- 
ferent parts perfectly free, population, industry, arts, 
and the value of labor, would constantly tend to 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1075 

equalize themselves. The value of labor might be 
considered as the principal criterion of wealth and 
ability to support taxes; and this would find its 
level in different places, where the inter couse should 
be easy and free, with as much certainty as the 
value of money or any other thing. Wherever la- 
bor would yield most, people would resort ; till the 
competition should destroy the inequality. Hence 
it is that the people are constantly swarming from 
the more, to the less, populous places— from Europe 
to America — from the Northern and middle parts of 
the United States to the Southern and Western. 
They go where land is cheaper, because there labor 
is dearer. If it be true that the same quantity of 
produce raised on the banks of the Ohio is of less 
value than on the Delaware, it is also true that the 
same labor will raise twice or thrice the quantity in 
the former, that it will raise in the latter, situation. 

Colonel Mason agreed with Mr. G. Morris, that 
we ought to leave the interests of the people to 
the representatives of the people; but the objection 
was, that the Legislature would cease to be the 
representatives of the people. It would continue so 
no longer than the States now containing a majority 
of the people should retain that majority. As soon 
as the southern and western population should pre- 
dominate, which must happen in a few years, the 
power would be in the hands of the minority, and 
would never be yielded to the majority, unless 
provided for by the Constitution. 

On the question for postponing Mr. Williamson's 
motion, in order to consider that of Mr. Rutledge, 
it passed in the negative, — Massachusetts, Pennsyl- 



1076 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

vania, Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 
5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, no — 5. 

On the question on the first clause of Mr. Will- 
iamson's motion, as to taking a census of the free 
inhabitants, it passed in the affirmative, — Massachu- 
setts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vir- 
ginia, North Carolina, aye — 6; Delaware, Mary- 
land, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 4. 

The next clause as to three-fifths of the negroes 
being considered, — 

Mr. King, being much opposed to fixing numbers 
as the rule of representation, was particularly so 
on account of the blacks. He thought the admission 
of them along with whites at all, would excite great 
discontents among the States having no slaves. 
He had never said, as to any particular point, that 
he would in no event acquiesce in and support it ; 
but he would say that if in any case such a declam- 
ation was to be made by him, it would be in this. 
He remarked that in the temporary allotment of 
representatives made by the Committee, the South- 
ern States had received more than the number 
of their white and three-fifths of their black inhabi- 
tants entitled them to. 

Mr. Sherman. South Carolina had not more 
beyond her proportion than New York and New 
Hampshire; nor either of them more than was 
necessary in order to avoid fractions, or reducing 
them below their proportion. Georgia had more, 
but the rapid growth of that State seemed to justify 
it. In general the allotment might not be just, but 
considering all circumstances he was satisfied with it. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1077 

Mr. Gorham supported the propriety of establish- 
ing numbers as the rule. He said that in Massa- 
chusetts estimates had been taken in the different 
towns, and that persons had been curious enough to 
compare these estimates with the respective num- 
bers of people; and it had been found, even in- 
cluding Boston, that the most exact proportion 
prevailed between numbers and property. He was 
aware that there might be some weight in what had 
fallen from his colleague, as to the umbrage which 
might be taken by the people of the Eastern States. 
But he recollected that when the proposition of 
Congress for changing the eighth Article of the 
Confederation was before the Legislature of Massa- 
chusetts, the only difficulty then was, to satisfy 
them that the negroes ought not to have been 
counted equally with the whites, instead of being 
counted in the ratio of three-fifths only.* 

Mr. Wilson did not well see, on what principle 
the admission of blacks in the proportion of three- 
fifths could be explained. Are they admitted as 
citizens — then why are they not admitted on an 
equality with white citizens ? Are they admitted 
as property — then why is not other property ad- 
mitted into the computation ? These were difficul- 
ties, however, which he thought must be overruled 
by the necessity of compromise. He had some ap- 
prehensions also, from the tendency of the blending 
of the blacks with the* whites, to give disgust to the 
people of Pennsylvania, as had been intimated by 



* They were then to have been a rule of taxation only. 



1078 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

his colleague (Mr. Gouverneur Morris). But he 
differed from him in thinking numbers of inhabitants 
so incorrect a measure of wealth. He had seen the 
western settlements of Pennsylvania, and on a 
comparison of them with the city of Philadelphia 
could discover little other difference, than that 
property was more unequally divided here than 
there. Taking the same number in the aggregate, 
in the two situations, he believed there would be 
little difference in their wealth and ability to con- 
tribute to the public wants. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was compelled to de- 
clare himself reduced to the dilemma of doing in- 
justice to the Southern States, or to human nature ; 
and he must therefore do it to the former. For he 
could never agree to give such encouragement to 
the slave trade, as would be given by allowing 
them a representation for their negroes; and he 
did not believe those States would ever confederate 
on terms that would deprive them of that trade. 

On the question for agreeing to include three- 
fifths of the blacks, — Connecticut, Virginia, North 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 4; Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,* South 
Carolina, no — 6. 

On the question as to taking the census " the first 
year after the meeting of the Legislature," — Massa- 
chusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Vir- 
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 7; Con- 
necticut, Maryland, Georgia, no — 3. 



* Mr. Carroll said, in explanation of the vote of Maryland, that he wished 
the phraseology to be so altered as to obviate, if possible, the danger which 
had been expressed of giving umbrage to the Eastern and Middle States. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1079 

On filling the blank for the periodical census with 
fifteen years, — agreed to, nem. con. 

Mr. Madison moved to add, after " fifteen years," 
the words " at least," that the Legislature might an- 
ticipate when circumstances were likely to render a 
particular year inconvenient. 

On this motion, for adding " at least," it passed in 
the negative, the States being equally divided, — 
Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, South Car- 
olina, Georgia, aye — 5; Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, no— 5. 

A change in the phraseology of the other clause, 
so as to read, " and the Legislature shall alter or 
augment the representation accordingly," was agreed 
to, nem. con. 

On the question on the whole resolution of Mr. 
Williamson, as amended, — Massachusetts, Connec- 
ticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 9 ; so 
it was rejected unanimously. 

Adjourned. 



Thursday, July 12th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved 
to add to the clause empowering the Legislature to 
vary the representation according to the principles 
of wealth and numbers of inhabitants, a proviso, 
"that taxation shall be in proportion to representa- 
tion." 

Mr. Butler contended again, that representation 
should be according to the full number of inhabit- 



1080 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ants, including all the blacks ; admitting the justice 
of Mr. Gouverneur Morris's motion. 

Mr. Mason also admitted the justice of the princi- 
ple, but was afraid embarrassments might be occa- 
sioned to the Legislature by it. It might drive the 
Legislature to the plan of requisitions. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris admitted that some ob- 
jections lay against his motion, but supposed they 
would be removed by restraining the rule to direct 
taxation. With regard to indirect taxes on exports 
and imports, and on consumption, the rule would be 
inapplicable. Notwithstanding what had been said 
to the contrary, he was persuaded that the imports 
and consumption were pretty nearly equal through- 
out the Union. 

General Pinckney liked the idea. He thought it 
so just that it could not be objected to ; but foresaw, 
that, if the revision of the census was left to the dis- 
cretion of the Legislature, it would never be carried 
into execution. The rule must be fixed, and the 
execution of it enforced, by the Constitution. He 
was alarmed at what was said* yesterday, concern- 
ing the negroes. He was now again alarmed at 
what had been thrown out concerning the taxing of 
exports. South Carolina has in one year exported 
to the amount of £600,000 sterling, all which was 
the fruit of the labor of her blacks. Will she be 
represented in proportion to this amount ? She will 
not. Neither ought she then to be subject to a tax 
on it. He hoped a clause would be inserted in the 
system, restraining the Legislature from taxing ex^. 
ports. 

* By Mr. Gouverneur Morris. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1081 

Mr. Wilson approved the principle, but could not 
see how it could be carried into execution ; unless 
restrained to direct taxation. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris having so varied his mo- 
tion by inserting the word " direct," it passed, nem. 
con. } as follows : " provided always that direct taxa- 
tion ought to be proportioned to representation." 

Mr. Davie said it was high time now to speak out. 
He saw that it was meant by some gentlemen to de- 
prive the Southern States of any share of represen- 
tation for their blacks. He was sure that North 
Carolina would never confederate on any terms that 
did not rate them at least as three-fifths. If the 
Eastern States meant, therefore, to exclude them 
altogether, the business was at an end. 

Doctor Johnson thought that wealth and popula- 
tion were the true, equitable rules of representation ; 
but he conceived that these two principles resolved 
themselves into one, population being the best mea- 
sure of wealth. He concluded, therefore, that the 
number of people ought to be established as the rule, 
and that all descriptions, including blacks equally 
with the whites, ought to fall within the computa- 
tion. As various opinions had been expressed on 
the subject, he would move that a committee might 
be appointed to take them into consideration, and 
report them. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. It had been said that 
it is high time to speak out. As one member, he 
would candidly do so. He came here to form a 
compact for the good of America. He was ready 
to do so with all the States. He hoped, and believed, 
that all would enter into such a compact. If they 

Vol I.— 68 * • 



1082 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

would not, he was ready to join with any States 
that would. But as the compact was to he volun- 
tary, it is in vain for the Eastern States to insist on 
what the Southern States will never agree to. It 
is equally vain for the latter to require, what the 
other States can never admit ; and he verily believ- 
ed the people of Pennsylvania will never agree to 
a representation of negroes. What can be desired 
by these States more than has been already propo- 
sed — that the Legislature shall from time to time 
regulate representation according to population and 
wealth? 

General Pinckney desired that the rule of wealth 
should be ascertained, and not left to the pleasure 
of the Legislature; and that property in slaves 
should not be exposed to danger, under a govern- 
ment instituted for the protection of property. 

The first clause in the Report of the first Grand 
Committee was postponed. 

Mr. Ellsworth, in order to carry into effect the 
principle established, moved to add to the last clause 
adopted by the House the words following, " and 
that the rule of contribution by direct taxation, for 
the support of the Government of the United States, 
shall be the number of white inhabitants, and three- 
fifths of every other description in the several States, 
until some other rule that shall more accurately as- 
certain the wealth of the several States, can be 
devised and adopted by the Legislature." 

Mr. Butler seconded the motion, in order that it 
might be committed. 

Mr. Randolph was not satisfied with the motion. 
The danger will be revived, that the ingenuity of 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1083 

the Legislature may evade or pervert the rule, so 
as to perpetuate the power where it shall be lodged 
in the first instance. He proposed, in lieu of Mr. 
Ellsworth's motion, "that in order to ascertain 
the alterations in representation that may be re- 
quired, from time to time, by changes in the relative 
circumstances of the States, a census shall be taken 
within two years from the first meeting of the Gen- 
eral Legislature of the United States, and once 

within the term of every years afterwards, of 

all the inhabitants, in the manner and according to 
the ratio recommended by Congress in their Res- 
olution of the eighteenth day of April, 1783, (rating 
the blacks at three-fifths of their number) ; and that 
the Legislature of the United States shall arrange 
the representation accordingly." He urged strenu- 
ously that express security ought to be provided for 
including slaves in the ratio of representation. He 
lamented that such a species of property existed. 
But as it did exist, the holders of it would require 
this security. It was perceived that the design was 
entertained by some of excluding slaves altogether ; 
the Legislature therefore ought not to be left at 
liberty. 

Mr. Ellsworth withdraws his motion, and sec- 
onds that of Mr. Randolph. 

Mr. Wilson observed, that less umbrage would 
perhaps be taken against an admission of the slaves 
into the rule of representation, if it should be so ex- 
pressed as to make them indirectly only an ingredient 
in the rule, by saying that they should enter into the 
rule of taxation ; and as representation was to be 
according to taxation, the end would be equally at- 



1084 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

tained. He accordingly moved, and was seconded, 
so to alter the last clause adopted by the House, 
that, together with the amendment proposed, the 
whole should read as follows : " provided always 
that the representation ought to be proportioned 
according to direct taxation ; and in order to ascer- 
tain the alterations in the direct taxation which may 
be required from time to time by the changes in the 
relative circumstances of the States, Resolved, that 
a census be taken within two years from the first 
meeting of the Legislature of the United States, 
and once within the term of every years af- 
terwards, of all the inhabitants of the United 
States, in the manner and according to the ratio 
recommended by Congress in their Resolution of 
the eighteenth day of April, 1783; and that the 
Legislature of the United States shall proportion 
the direct taxation accordingly." 

Mr. King. Although this amendment varies the 
aspect somewhat, he had still two powerful objec- 
tions against tying down the Legislature to the rule 
of numbers, — first, they were at this time an uncer- 
tain index of the relative wealth of the States ; sec- 
ondly, if they were a just index at this time, it can- 
not be supposed always to continue so. He was far 
from wishing to retain any unjust advantage what- 
ever in one part of the Republic. If justice was not 
the basis of the connection, it could not be of long 
duration. He must be short-sighted indeed who 
does not foresee, that, whenever the Southern States 
shall be more numerous than the Northern, they can 
and will hold a language that will awe them into 
justice. If they threaten to separate now in case 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1085 

injury shall be done them, will their threats be less 
urgent or effectual when force shall back their de- 
mands. Even in the intervening period, there will 
be no point of time at which they will not be able 
to say, do us justice or we will separate. He urged 
the necessity of placing confidence to a certain de- 
gree in every government, and did not conceive that 
the proposed confidence, as to a periodical re-adjust- 
ment of the representation, exceeded that degree. 

Mr. Pinckney moved to amend Mr. Randolph's 
motion, so as to make " blacks equal to the whites 
in the ratio of representation." This he urged was 
nothing more than justice. The blacks are the la- 
borers, the peasants, of the Southern States. They 
are as productive of pecuniary resources as those 
of the Northern States. They add equally to the 
wealth, and, considering money as the sinew of war, 
to the strength, of the nation. It will also be politic 
with regard to the Northern States, as taxation is 
to keep pace with representation. 

General Pinckney moves to insert six years in- 
stead of two, as the period, computing from the first 
meeting of the Legislature, within which the first 
census should be taken. On this question for insert- 
ing six years, instead of " two," in the proposition of 
Mr. Wilson, it passed in the affirmative, — Connecti- 
cut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, South 
Carolina, aye — 5; Massachusetts, Virginia, North 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 4 ; Delaware, divided. 

On the question for filling the blank for the peri- 
odical census with twenty years, it passed in the 
negative, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,, 
aye — 3; Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, Vu> 



1086 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no 
—7. 

On the question for ten years, it passed in the af- 
firmative, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- 
lina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Connecticut, New Jersey, no 
—2. 

On Mr. Pinckney's motion, for rating blacks as 
equal to whites, instead of as three-fifths, — South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 2; Massachusetts, Con- 
necticut (Doctor Johnson, aye), New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania (three against two), Delaware, Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, no — 8. 

Mr. Randolph's proposition, as varied by Mr. 
Wilson, being read for taking the question on the 
whole, — 

Mr. Gerry urged that the principle of it could not 
be carried into execution, as the States were not to 
be taxed as States. With regard to taxes on im- 
posts, he conceived they would be more productive 
where there were no slaves, than where there were; 
the consumption being greater. 

Mr. Ellsworth. In case of a poll-tax there 
would be no difficulty. But there would probably 
be none. The sum allotted to a State may be 
levied without difficulty, according to the plan used 
by the State in raising its own supplies. 

On the question on the whole proposition, as pro- 
portioning representation to direct taxation, and both 
to the white and three-fifths of the black inhabit- 
ants, and requiring a census within six years, and 
within every ten years afterwards, — Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1087 

Georgia, aye — 6; New Jersey, Delaware, no — 2; 
Massachusetts, South Carolina, divided. 
Adjourned. 



Friday, July 13th. 



In Convention, — It being moved to postpone the 
clause in the Report of the Committee of Eleven as 
to the originating of money bills in the jftrst branch, 
in order to take up the following, "that in the 
second branch each State shall have an equal 



voices- 



Mr. Gerry moved to add, as an amendment to 
the last clause agreed to by the house," that from 
the first meeting of the Legislature of the United 
States till a census shall be taken, all moneys to 
be raised for supplying the public Treasury by 
direct taxation shall be assessed on the inhabi- 
tants of the several States according to the num- 
ber of their Representatives respectively in the 
first branch." He said this would be as just before 
as after the census, according to the general prin- 
ciple that taxation and representation ought to go 
together. 

Mr. Williamson feared that New Hampshire will 
have reason to complain. Three members were 
allotted to her as a liberal allowance, for this reason 
among others, that she might not suppose any ad~ 
vantage to have been taken of her absence. As 
she was still absent, and had no opportunity of de- 
ciding whether she would choose to retain the number 
on the condition of her being taxed in proportion 



1088 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

to it, he thought the number ought to be reduced 
from three to two, before the question was taken on 
Mr. Gerry's motion. 

Mr. Read could not approve of the proposition. 
He had observed, he said, in the Committee a back- 
wardness in some of the members from the larg^ 
States, to take their full proportion of Representa- 
tives. He did not then see the motive. He now 
suspects it was to avoid their due share of taxation. 
He had no objection to a just and accurate adjust- 
ment of representation and taxation to each other. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris and Mr. Madison an- 
swered, that the charge itself involved an acquittal ; 
since, notwithstanding the augmentation of the num- 
ber of members allotted to Massachusetts and Vir- 
ginia, the motion for proportioning the burdens there- 
to was made by a member from the former State, 
and was approved by Mr. Madison, from the latter, 
who was on the Committee. Mr. Gouverneur Morris 
said, that he thought Pennsylvania had her due share 
in eight members ; and he could not in candour ask 
for more. Mr. Madison said, that having always con- 
ceived that the difference of interest in the United 
States lay not between the large and small, but the 
Northern and Southern States, and finding that the 
number of members allotted to the Northern States 
was greatly superior, he should have preferred an 
addition of two members to the Southern States, 
to wit, one to North and one to South Carolina, 
rather than of one member to Virginia. He liked 
the present motion, because it tended to moderate 
the views both of the opponents and advocates for 
rating very high the negroes. 






1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1089 

Mr. Ellsworth hoped the proposition would be 
withdrawn. It entered too much into detail. The 
general principle was already sufficiently settled. 
As fractions cannot be regarded in apportioning the 
number of Representatives, the rule will be unjust, 
until an actual census shall be made. After that, 
taxation may be precisely proportioned, according 
to the principle established, to the number of inhaoi 
tants 

Mr. Wilson hoped the motion would not be with- 
drawn. If it should, it will be made from another 
quarter. The rule will be as reasonable and just 
before, as after, a census. As to fractional numbers, 
the census will not destroy, but ascertain them. 
And they will have the same effect after, as before, 
the census ; for, as he understands the rule, it is to 
be adjusted not to the number of inhabitants, but of 
Representatives. 

Mr. Sherman opposed the motion. He thought 
the Legislature ought to be left at liberty ; in which 
case they would probably conform to the principles 
observed by Congress. 

Mr. Mason did not know that Virginia would be 
a loser by the proposed regulation, but had some 
scruple as to the justice of it. He doubted much 
whether the conjectural rule which was to precede 
the census would be as just as it would be rendered 
by an actual census. 

Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Sherman moved to post- 
pone the motion of Mr. Gerry. 

On the question, it passed in the negative, — Con- 
necticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye — 4 ; 

Vol, I.— 69 



1090 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Caro- 
lina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6. 

On the question on Mr. Gerry's motion, it passed 
in the negative, the States being equally divided, — 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5 ; Connecticut, New Jer- 
sey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no — 5. 

Mr. Gerry finding that the loss of the question 
had proceeded from an objection, with some, to the 
proposed assessment of direct taxes on the inhab- 
itants of the States, which might restrain the Legis- 
lature to a poll-tax, moved his proposition again, but 
so varied as to authorize the assessment on the 
States, which leaves the mode to the Legislature, 
viz : " that from the first meeting of the Legislature 
of the United States, until a census shall be taken, 
all moneys for supplying the public Treasury by di- 
rect taxation shall be raised from the said several 
States, according to the number of their Representa- 
tives respectively in the first branch." 

On this varied question, it passed in the affirma- 
tive, — Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5; Connecticut, New Jer- 
sey, Delaware, Maryland, no — 4 ; Pennsylvania, di- 
vided. 

On the motion of Mr. Randolph, the vote of Mon- 
day last, authorizing the Legislature to adjust, from 
time to time, the representation upon the principles 
of wealth and numbers of inhabitants, was reconsid- 
ered by common consent, in order to strike out 
wealth and adjust the resolution to that requiring pe- 
riodical revisions according to the number of whites 
and three-fifths of the blacks. The motion was in 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1091 

the words following : — " But as the present situation 
of the States may probably alter in the number of 
their inhabitants, that the Legislature of the United 
States be authorized, from time to time, to apportion 
the number of Representatives ; and in case any of 
the States shall hereafter be divided, or any two or 
more States united, or new States created within 
the limits of the United States, the Legislature of 
the United States shall possess authority to regulate 
the number of Representatives in any of the forego- 
ing cases, upon the principle of their number of in- 
habitants, according to the provisions hereafter 
mentioned." 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed the alteration, 
as leaving still an incoherence. If negroes were to 
be viewed as inhabitants, and the revision was to 
proceed on the principle of numbers of inhabitants, 
they ought to be added in their entire number, and 
not in the proportion of three-fifths. If as property, 
the word wealth was right ; and striking it out would 
produce the very inconsistency which it was meant 
to get rid of. The train of business, and the late turn 
which it had taken, had led him, he said, into deep 
meditation on it, and he would candidly state the 
result. A distinction had been set up, and urged, 
between the Northern and Southern States. He 
had hitherto considered this doctrine as heretical. 
He still thought the distinction groundless. He 
sees, however, that it is persisted in ; and the South- 
ern gentlemen will not be satisfied unless they see 
the way open to their gaining a majority in the pub- 
lic councils. The consequence of such a transfer of 
power from the maritime to the interior and landed 



1092 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

interest, will, he foresees, be such an oppression to 
commerce, that he shall be obliged to vote for the 
vicious principle of equality in the second branch, in 
order to provide some defence for the Northern 
States against it. But to come more to the point, 
either this distinction is fictitious or real ; if fictitious, 
let it be dismissed, and let us proceed with due con- 
fidence. If it be real, instead of attempting to 
blend incompatible things, let us at once take a 
friendly leave of each other. There can be no end 
of demands for security, if every particular inter- 
est is to be entitled to it. The Eastern States 
may claim it for their fishery, and for other objects, 
as the Southern States claim it for their peculiar 
objects. In this struggle between the two ends of 
the Union, what part ought the Middle States, in 
point of policy, to take? To join their Eastern 
brethren, according to his ideas. If the Southern 
States get the power into their hands, and be joined, 
as they will be, with the interior country, they will- 
inevitably bring on a war with Spain for the Missis- 
sippi. This language is already held. The interior 
country, having no property nor interest exposed on 
the sea, will be little affected by such a war. He 
wished to know what security the Northern and 
Middle States will have against this danger. It 
has been said that North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and Georgia only, will in a little time have a ma- 
jority of the people of America. They must in 
that case include the great interior country, and 
every thing was to be apprehended from their get- 
ting the power into their hands. 

Mr. Butler. The security the Southern States 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1093 

want is, that their negroes may not be taken from 
them, which some gentlemen within or without 
doors have a very good mind to do. It was not sup- 
posed that North Carolina, South Carolina and 
Georgia would have more people than all the other 
States, but many more relatively to the other States, 
than they now have. The people and strength of 
America are evidently bearing southwardly, and 
south westwardly. 

Mr. Wilson. If a general declaration would sat- 
isfy any gentleman, he had no indisposition to declare 
his sentiments. Conceiving that all men, wherever 
placed, have equal rights, and are equally entitled 
to confidence, he viewed without apprehension the 
period when a few States should contain the supe- 
rior number of people. The majority of people, 
wherever found, ought in all questions, to govern the 
minority. If the interior country should acquire 
this majority, it will not only have the right, but 
will avail itself of it, whether we will or no. This 
jealousy misled the policy of Great Britain with re- 
gard to America. The fatal maxims espoused by 
her were, that the Colonies were growing too fast, 
and that their growth must be stinted in time. What 
were the consequences ? First, enmity on our part, 
then actual separation. Like consequences will 
result on the part of the interior settlements, if like 
jealousy and policy be pursued on ours. Further, 
if numbers be not a proper rule, why is not some 
better rule pointed out ? No one has yet ventured 
to attempt it. Congress have never been able to 
discover a better. No State, as far as he had heard, 
had suggested any other. In 1783, after elaborate 



1094 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

discussion of a measure of wealth, all were satisfied 
then, as they now are, that the rule of numbers does 
not differ much from the combined rule of numbers 
and wealth. Again, he could not agree that prop- 
erty was the sole or primary object of government 
and society. The cultivation and improvement of, 
the human mind was the most noble object. With 
respect to this object, as well as to other personal 
rights, numbers were surely the natural and precise 
measure of representation. And with respect to 
property, they could not vary much from the precise 
measure. In no point of view, however, could the 
establishment of numbers, as the rule of representa- 
tion in the first branch, vary his opinion as to the 
impropriety of letting a vicious principle into the 
second branch. 

On the question to strike out wealth, and to make 
the change as moved by Mr. Randolph, it passed in 
the affirmative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; Dela- 
ware, divided. 

Mr. Read moved to insert, after the word " di- 
vided," il or enlarged by addition of territory f which 
was agreed to, nem. con* 

Adjourned. 



Saturday, July 14th. 

In Convention, — Mr. L. Martin called for the 
question on the whole Report, including the parts 

* His object probably was to provide for such cases as an enlargement of 
Delaware by annexing to it the peninsula on the East side of the Chesapeake. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1095 

relating to the origination of money bills, and the 
equality of votes in the second branch. 

Mr. Gerry wished, before the question should be 
put, that the attention of the House might be turned 
to the dangers apprehended from Western States. 
He was for admitting them on liberal terms, but not 
for putting ourselves into their hands. They will, 
if they acquire power, like all men, abuse it. They 
will oppress commerce, and drain our wealth into 
the Western country. To guard against these con- 
sequences, he thought it necessary to limit the num- 
ber of new States to be admitted into the Union, 
in such a manner that they should never be able to 
outnumber the Atlantic States. He accordingly 
moved, " that in order to secure the liberties of the 
States already confederated, the number of Repre- 
sentatives in the first branch, of the States which 
shall hereafter be established, shall never exceed in 
number, the Representatives from such of the States 
as shall accede to this Confederation." 

Mr. King seconded the motion. 

Mr. Sherman thought there was no probability 
that the number of future States would exceed that 
of the existing States. If the event should ever 
happen, it was too remote to be taken into con- 
sideration at this time. Besides, we are providing 
for our posterity, for our children and our grand 
children, who would be as likely to be citizens 
of new western States, as of the old States. On 
this consideration alone, we ought to make no such 
discrimination as was proposed by the motion. 

Mr. Gerry. If some of our children should re- 
move, others will stay behind, and he thought in- 



1096 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

cumbent on us to provide for their interests. There 
was a rage for emigration from the Eastern States 
to the western country, and he did not wish those 
remaining behind to be at the mercy of the emi- 
grants. Besides, foreigners are resorting to that 
country, and it is uncertain what turn things may 
take there. 

On the question for agreeing to the motion of Mr. 
Gerry, it passed in the negative, — Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, aye — 4; New 
Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 5; Pennsylvania, divided. 

Mr. Rutledge proposed to reconsider the two 
propositions touching the originating of money bills, 
in the first, and the equality of votes in the second, 
branch. 

Mr. Sherman was for the question on the whole 
at once. It was, he said, a conciliatory plan ; it had 
been considered in all its parts ; a great deal of time 
had been spent upon it ; and if any part should now 
be altered, it would be necessary to go over the 
whole ground again. 

Mr. L. Martin urged the question on the whole. 
He did not like many parts of it. He did not like 
having two branches, nor the inequality of votes in 
the first branch. He was willing, however, to make 
trial of the plan, rather than do nothing, 

Mr. Wilson traced the progress of the report 
through its several stages ; remarking, that when on 
the question concerning an equality of votes the 
House w T as divided, our constituents, had they voted 
as their Representatives did, would have stood as 
two-thirds against the equality, and one-third only 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1097 

in favor of it. This fact would ere long be known, 
and it would apj^ir that this fundamental point has 
been carried bjWre-third against two- thirds. What 
hopes will our constituents entertain when they find 
that the essential principles of justice have been 
violated in the outset of the Government? As to 
the privilege of originating money bills, it was not 
considered by any as of much moment, and by many 
as improper in itself. He hoped both clauses would 
be reconsidered. The equality of votes was a point 
of such critical importance, that every opportunity 
ought to be allowed for discussing and collecting 
the mind of the Convention upon it. 

Mr. L. Martin denies that there were two- thirds 
against the equality of votes. The States that 
please to call themselves large, are the weakest in 
the Union. Look at Massachusetts — look at Vir- 
ginia — are they efficient States? He was for letting 
a separation take place, if they desired it. He had 
rather there should be two confederacies, than one 
founded on any other principle than an equality 
of votes in the second branch at least. 

Mr. Wilson w T as not surprised that those who say 
that a minority does more than a majority, should 
say the minority is stronger than the majority. 
He supposed the next assertion will be, that they 
are richer also ; though he hardly expected it would 
be persisted in, when the States shall be called on 
for taxes and troops. 

Mr. Gerry also animadverted on Mr. L. Martin's 
remarks on the weakness of Massachusetts. He 
favored the reconsideration, with a view, not of de- 

Vol. I.— 69* 



1098 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

stroying the equality of votes, but of providing that 
the States should vote per capitj^Nhioh, he said, 
would prevent the delays and inWiveniences that 
had been experienced in Congress, and would give a 
national aspect and spirit to the management of 
business. He did not approve of a reconsideration 
of the clause relating to money bills. It was of 
great consequence. It was the corner stone of the 
accommodation. If any member of the Convention 
had the exclusive privilege of making propositions, 
would any one say that it would give him no advan- 
tage over other members ? The Report was not 
altogether to his mind ; but he would agree to it as 
it stood, rather than throw it out altogether. 

The reconsideration being tacitly agreed to, — 

Mr. Pinckney moved, that, instead of an equality 
of votes, the States should be represented in the 
second branch as follows : New Hampshire by two 
members ; Massachusetts, four ; Rhode Island, one ; 
Connecticut, three ; New York, three ; New Jersey, 
two ; Pennsylvania, four ; Delaware, one ; Mary- 
land, three ; Virginia, five ; North Carolina, three ; 
South Carolina, three ; Georgia, two ; making in the 
whole, thirty-six. 

Mr. Wilson seconds the motion. 

Mr. Dayton. The smaller States can never give 
up their equality. For himself, he would in no event 
yield that security for their rights. 

Mr. Sherman urged the equality of votes, not so 
much as a security for the small States, as for the 
State Governments, which could not be preserved 
unless they were represented, and had a negative in 
the General Government. He had no objection to 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1099 

the members in the second branch voting per capita, 
as had been suggested by (Mr. Gerry). 

Mr. Madison concurred in this motion of Mr. 
Pinckney, as a reasonable compromise. 

Mr. Gerry said, he should like the motion, but 
could see no hope of success. An accommodation 
must ta£e place, and it was apparent from what had 
been seen, that it could not do so on the ground of 
the motion. He was utterly against a partial con- 
federacy, leaving other States to accede or not ac- 
cede, as had been intimated. 

Mr. King said, it was always with regret that he 
differed from his colleagues, but it was his duty to 
differ from (Mr. Gerry) on this occasion. He con- 
sidered the proposed Government as substantially 
and formally a General and National Government 
over the people of America. There never will be a 
case in which it will act as a Federal Government, 
on the States and not on the individual citizens. 
And is it not a clear principle, that in a free govern- 
ment, those who are to be the objects of a govern- 
ment, ought to influence the operations of it ? What 
reason can be assigned, why the same rule of repre- 
sentation should not prevail in the second, as in the 
first, branch? He could conceive none. On the 
contrary, every view of the subject that presented 
itself seemed to require it. Two objections had 
been raised against it, drawn, first, from the terms 
of the existing compact ; secondly, from a supposed 
danger to the smaller States. As to the first objec- 
tion, he thought it inapplicable. According to the 
existing Confederation, the rule by which the public 
burdens is to be apportioned is fixed, and must be 



1100 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

pursued. In the proposed Government, it cannot be 
fixed, because indirect taxation is to be substituted. 
The Legislature, therefore, will have full discretion 
to impose taxes in such modes and proportions as 
they may judge expedient. As to the second objec- 
tion, he thought it of as little weight. The General 
Government can never wish to intrude on the State 
Governments. There could be no temptation. None 
had been pointed out. In order to prevent the in- 
terference of measures which seemed most likely to 
happen, he would have no objection to throwing all 
the State debts into the Federal debt, making one 
aggregate debt of about $70,000,000, and leaving it 
to be discharged by the General Government. Ac- 
cording to the idea of securing the State Govern- 
ments, there ought to be three distinct legislative 
branches. The second was admitted to be neces- 
sary, and was actually meant, to check the first 
branch, to give more wisdom, system and stability 
to the Government ; and ought clearly, as it was to 
operate on the people, to be proportioned to them. 
For the third purpose of securing the States, there 
ought then to be a third branch, representing the 
States as such, and guarding, by equal votes, their 
rights and dignities. He would not pretend to be as 
thoroughly acquainted with his immediate constitu- 
ents as his colleagues, but it was his firm belief that 
Massachusetts would never be prevailed on to yield 
to an equality of votes. In New York, (he was 
sorry to be obliged to say any thing relative to that 
State in the absence of its representatives, but the 
occasion required it), in New York he had seen that 
the most powerful argument used by the considerate 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1101 

opponents to the grant of the Impost to Congress, 
was pointed against the vicious constitution of Con- 
gress with regard to representation and suffrage. 
He was sure that no government would last that 
was not founded on just principles. He preferred 
the doing of nothing, to an allowance of an equal 
vote to all the States. It would be better, he 
thought, to submit to a little more confusion and 
convulsion, than to submit to such an evil. It was 
difficult to say what the views of different gentle- 
men might be. Perhaps there might be some who 
thought no Government co-extensive with the Uni- 
ted States could be established with a hope of its 
answering the purpose. Perhaps there might be 
other fixed opinions incompatible with the object we 
are pursuing. If there were, he thought it but can- 
did, that gentlemen should speak out, that we might 
understand one another. 

.Mr. Strong. The Convention had been much di- 
vided in opinion. In order to avoid the consequences 
of it, an accommodation had been proposed. A 
committee had been appointed; and though some of 
the members of it were averse to an equality of 
votes, a report had been made in favor of it. It is 
agreed, on all hands, that Congress are nearly at an 
end. If no accommodation takes place, the Union 
itself must soon be dissolved. It has been suggested 
that if we cannot come to any general agreement, 
the principal States may form and recommend a 
scheme of government. But will the small States, 
in that case, ever accede to it ? Is it probable that 
the large States themselves will, under such circum- 
stances, embrace and ratify it? He thought the 



1102 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

small States had made a considerable concession, in 
the article of money bills, and that they might nat- 
urally expect some concessions on the other side. 
From this view of the matter, he was compelled to 
give his vote for the Report taken altogether. 

Mr. Madison expressed his apprehensions that if 
the proper foundation of government was destroyed, 
by substituting an equality in place of a proportional 
representation, no proper superstructure would be 
raised. If the small States really wish for a gov- 
ernment armed with the powers necessary to secure 
their liberties, and to enforce obedience on the larger 
members as well as themselves, he could not help 
thinking them extremely mistaken in the means. 
He reminded them of the consequences of laying 
the existing Confederation on improper principles. 
All the principal parties to its compilation joined 
immediately in mutilating and fettering the Govern- 
ment, in such a manner that it has disappointed 
every hope placed on it. He appealed to the doc- 
trine and arguments used by themselves, on a for- 
mer occasion. It had been very properly observed 
(by Mr. Patterson), that representation was an ex- 
pedient by which the meeting of the people them- 
selves was rendered unnecessary ; and that the rep- 
resentatives ought therefore to bear a proportion to 
the votes which their constituents, if convened, 
would respectively have. Was not this remark as 
applicable to one branch of the representation as 
to the other ? But it had been said that the Govern- 
ment would, in its operation, be partly federal, partly 
national; that although in the latter respect the 
representatives of the people ought to be in propor- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1103 

tion to the people, yet in the former, it ought to be 
according to the number of States. If there was 
any solidity in this distinction, he was ready to 
abide by it ; if there was none, it ought to be aban- 
doned. In all cases where the General Government 
is to act on the people, let the people be represented, 
and the votes be proportional. In all cases where 
the Government is to act on the States as such, in 
like manner as Congress now acts on them, let the 
States be represented and the votes be equal. This 
was the true ground of compromise, if there was any 
ground at all. But he denied that there was any 
ground. He called for a single instance in which 
the General Government was not to operate on the 
people individually. The practicability of making 
laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as polit- 
ical bodies, had been exploded on all hands. He 
observed that the people of the large States would, 
in some way or other, secure to themselves a weight 
proportioned to the importance accruing from their 
superior numbers. If they could not effect it by a 
proportional representation in the Government, they 
would probably accede to no government which did 
not, in a great measure, depend for its efficacy on 
their voluntary co-operation ; in which case they 
would indirectly secure their object. The existing 
Confederacy proved that where the acts of the Gen- 
eral Government were to be executed by the par- 
ticular Governments, the latter had a weight in pro- 
portion to their importance. No one would say, 
that, either in Congress or out of Congress, Dela- 
ware had equal weight with Pennsylvania. If the 
latter was to supply ten times as much money as 



1104 DEBATES IN THE' [1787. 

the former, and no compulsion could be used, it was 
of ten times more importance, that she should vol- 
untarily furnish the supply. In the Dutch Confede- 
racy the votes of the provinces were equal. But 
Holland, which supplies about half the money, gov- 
erned the whole Republic. He enumerated the ob- 
jections against an equality of votes in the second 
branch, notwithstanding the proportional representa- 
tion in the first. 1. The minority could negative 
the will of the majority of the people. 2. They 
could extort measures, by making them a condition 
of their assent to other necessary measures. 3. They 
could obtrude measures on the majority, by virtue 
of the peculiar powers which would be vested in 
the Senate. 4. The evil, instead of being cured by 
time, would increase with every new State that 
should be admitted, as they must all be admitted on 
the principle of equality. 5. The perpetuity it would 
give to the preponderance of the Northern against 
the Southern scale, was a serious consideration. It 
seemed now to be pretty well understood, that the 
real difference of interests lay, not between the large 
and small, but between the Northern and Southern, 
States. The institution of slavery, and its conse- 
quences, formed the line of discrimination. There 
Were five States on the Southern, eight on the North- 
ern side of this line. Should a proportional repre- 
sentation take place, it was true, the Northern 
Would still outnumber the other; but not in the 
same degree, at this time; and every day would 
tend towards an equilibrium. 

Mr. Wilson would add a few words only. If 
equality in the second branch was an error that 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1105 

time would correct, he should be less anxious to 
exclude it, being sensible that perfection was unat- 
tainable in any plan ; but being a fundamental and 
a perpetual error, it ought by all means to be 
avoided. A vice in the representation, like an error 
in the first concoction, must be followed by disease, 
convulsions, and finally death itself. The justice 
of the general principle of proportional representa- 
tion has not, in argument at least, been yet contra- 
dicted. But it is said that a departure from it, so 
far as to give the States an equal vote in one branch 
of the Legislature, is essential to their preservation. 
He had considered this position maturely, but could 
not see its application. That the States ought to 
be preserved, he admitted. But does it follow, that 
an equality of votes is necessary for the purpose ? 
Is there any reason to suppose that, if their preser- 
vation should depend more on the large than on the 
small States, the security of the States, against the 
general government, would be diminished? Are 
the large States less attached to their existence, 
more likely to commit suicide, than the small ? An 
equal vote, then, is not necessary, as far as he can 
conceive, and is liable, among other objections, to 
this insuperable one, — the great fault of the existing 
Confederacy is its inactivity. It has never been a 
complaint against Congress, that they governed over 
much. The complaint has been, that they have 
governed too little. To remedy this defect we were 
sent here. Shall we effect the cure by establishing 
an equality of votes, as is proposed ? No : this very 
equality carries us directly to Congress, — to the 
system which it is our duty to rectify. The small 
Vol. I.— 70 



1106 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this equality, 
but they may control the government, as they have 
done in Congress. This very measure is here prose- 
cuted by a minority of the people of America. Is 
then, the object of the Convention likely to be ac- 
complished in this way ? Will not our constituents 
say, we sent you to form an efficient government, 
and you have given us one, more complex, indeed, 
but having all the weakness of the former govern- 
ment. He was anxious for uniting all the States 
under one government. He knew there were some 
respectable men who preferred three Confederacies, 
united by offensive and defensive alliances. Many 
things may be plausibly said, some things may be 
justly said, in favor of such a project. He could not, 
however, concur in it himself; but he thought 
nothing so pernicious as bad first principles. 

Mr. Ellsworth asked two questions, — one of Mr. 
Wilson, whether he had ever seen a good measure 
fail in Congress for want of a majority of States in 
its favor ? He had himself never known such an 
instance. The other of Mr. Madison, whether a 
negative lodged with the majority of the States, 
even the smallest, could be more dangerous than 
the qualified negative proposed to be lodged in a 
single Executive Magistrate, who must be taken 
from some one State ? 

Mr. Sherman signified that his expectation was 
that the General Legislature would in some cases 
act on the federal principle, of requiring quotas. 
But he thought it ought to be empowered to carry 
their own plans into execution, if the States should 
fail to supply their respective quotas. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1107 

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Pinckney's 
motion, for allowing New Hampshire two; Massa- 
chusetts, four, &c. it passed in the negative, — Penn- 
sylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, aye — « 
4; Massachusetts, (Mr. King, aye, Mr. Gorham ab- 
sent), Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, North 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 6, 

Adjourned. 



Monday, July 16th. 

In Convention, — On the question for agreeing to 
the whole Report, as amended, and including the 
equality of votes in the second branch, it passed in 
the affirmative, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, North Carolina, (Mr. Spaight no) 
aye — 5; Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 4 ; Massachusetts, divided (Mr. Gerry, 
Mr. Strong, aye ; Mr. King, Mr. Gorham, no). 

The whole thus passed is in the words following, 
viz. 

u Resolved , that in the original formation of the 
Legislature of the United States, the first branch 
thereof shall consist of sixty-live members, of which 
number New Hampshire shall send, 3 ; Massachusetts, 
8 ; Rhode Island, 1 ; Connecticut 5 ; New York, 6 ; 
New Jersey, 4 ; Pennsylvania, 8 ; Delaware, 1 ; Mary- 
land, 6; Virginia, 10; North Carolina, 5; South 
Carolina, 5 ; Georgia, 3. But as the present situa- 
tion of the States may probably alter in the number 
of their inhabitants, the Legislature of the United 
States shall be authorized, from time to time, to 



1108 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

apportion the number of Representatives, and in 
case any of the States shall hereafter be divided, or 
enlarged by addition of territory, or any two or more 
States united, or any new States created within the 
limits of the United States, the Legislature of the 
United States shall possess authority to regulate the 
number of Representatives in any of the foregoing 
cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabi- 
tants, according to the provisions hereafter mention- 
ed : provided always, that representation ought to 
be proportioned according to direct taxation. And 
in order to ascertain the alteration in the direct tax- 
ation, which may be required from time by the 
changes in the relative circumstances of the 
States — ■ 

"Resolved, that a census be taken within six 
years from the first meeting of the Legislature of 
the United States, and once within the term of 
every ten years afterwards, of all the inhabitants of 
the United States, in the manner and according to 
the ratio recommended by Congress in their Resolu- 
tion of the eighteenth day of April, 1783 ; and that 
the Legislature of the United States shall proportion 
the direct taxation accordingly. 

" Resolved, that all bills for raising or appropria- 
ting money, and for fixing the salaries of officers of 
the Government of the United States, shall origin- 
ate in the first branch of the Legislature of the 
United States ; and shall not be altered or amend- 
ed in the second branch ; and that no money shall 
be drawn from the public Treasury, but in pursu- 
ance of appropriations to be originated in the first 
branch. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1109 

" Resolved, that in the second branch of the Legis- 
lature of the United States, each State shall have 
an equal vote." 

The sixth Resolution in the Report from the Com- 
mittee of the Whole House, which had been post- 
poned, in order to consider the seventh and eighth 
Resolutions, was now resumed, (see the Resolution.) 

" That the National Legislature ought to possess 
the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Con- 
federation," was agreed to, nem. con. 

"And moreover to legislate in all cases to which 
the separate States are incompetent ; or in which 
the harmony of the United States maybe interrupted 
by the exercise of individual legislation," being read 
for a question, — 

Mr. Butler calls for some explanation of the ex- 
tent of this power ; particularly of the word incompe- 
tent. The vagueness of the terms rendered it im- 
possible for any precise judgment to be formed. 

Mr. Gorham. The vagueness of the terms consti- 
tutes the propriety of them. We are now establish- 
ing general principles, to be extended hereafter into 
details, which will be precise and explicit 

Mr. Rutledge urged the objection started by Mr. 
Butler ; and moved that the clause should be com- 
mitted, to the end that a specification of the powers 
comprised in the general terms, might be reported. 

On the question for commitment, the votes were 
equally divided, — Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5; Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Caro- 
lina, no — 5. So it was lost. 

Mr. Randolph. The vote of this morning (invol- 



1110 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ving an equality of suffrage in the second branch) 
had embarrassed the business extremely. All the 
powers given in the Report from the Committee of 
the Whole were founded on the supposition that a 
proportional representation was to prevail in both 
branches of the Legislature. When he came here 
this morning, his purpose was to have offered some 
propositions that might, if possible, have united a 
great majority of votes, and particularly might pro- 
vide against the danger suspected on the part of the 
smaller States, by enumerating the cases in which 
it might lie, and allowing an equality of votes in 
such cases.* But finding from the preceding vote, 
that they persist in demanding an equal vote in all 
cases ; that they have succeeded in obtaining it ; 
and that New York, if present, would probably be 
on the same side ; he could not but think we were 
unprepared to discuss this subject further. It will 
probably be in vain to come to any final decision, 
with a bare majority on either side. For these rea- 
sons he wished the Convention to adjourn, that the 
large States might consider the steps proper to be 
taken, in the present solemn crisis of the business ; 
and that the small States might also deliberate on 
the means of conciliation. 

Mr. Patterson thought with Mr. Randolph, that 
it was high time for the Convention to adjourn ; that 
the rule of secrecy ought to be rescinded ; and that 
our constituents should be consulted. No concilia- 
tion could be admissible on the part of the smaller 



* See the paper, in the Appendix, communicated by Mr. Randolph to J. 
Madison, July 10, No. — 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1111 

States, on any other ground than that of an equality 
of votes in the second branch. If Mr. Randolph 
would reduce to form his motion for an adjournment 
sine die, he would second it with all his heart. 

General Pinckney wished to know of Mr. Ran- 
dolph, whether he meant an adjournment sine die, or 
only an adjournment for the day. If the former was 
meant, it differed much from his idea. He could 
not think of going to South Carolina and returning 
again to this place. Besides it was chimerical, to 
suppose that the States, if consulted, would ever 
accord separately and beforehand. 

Mr. Randolph had never entertained an idea of an 
adjournment sine die ; and was sorry that his mean- 
ing had been so readily and strangely misinterpre- 
ted. He had in view merely an adjournment till to- 
morrow, in order that some conciliatory experiment 
might, if possible, be devised ; and that in case the 
smaller States should continue to hold back, the 
larger might then take such measures — he would 
not say what — as might be necessary. 

Mr. Patterson seconded the adjournment till to- 
morrow, as an opportunity seemed to be wished by 
the larger States to deliberate further on conciliatory 
expedients. 

On the question for adjourning till to-morrow, the 
States were equally divided, — New Jersey, Pennsyl- 
vania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye — 5 ; 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, South Caro- 
lina, Georgia, no — 5 ; so it was lost. 

Mr. Broome thought it his duty to declare his 
opinion against an adjournment sine die, as had 
been urged by Mr. Patterson. Such a measure, he 



1112 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

thought, would be fatal. Something must be done 
by the Convention, though it should be by a bare 
majority. 

Mr. Gerry observed, that Massachusetts was op- 
posed to an adjournment, because they saw no new 
ground of compromise. But as it seemed to be the 
opinion of so many States that a trial should be 
made, the State would now concur in the adjourn- 
ment. 

Mr. Rutledge could see no need of an adjourn- 
ment, because he could see no chance of a compro- 
mise. The little States were fixed. They had re- 
peatedly and solemnly declared themselves to be so. 
All that the large States, then, had to do was, to 
decide whether they would yield or not. For his 
part, he conceived, that, although we could not do 
what we thought best in itself, we ought to do some- 
thing. Had we not better keep the Government up 
a little longer, hoping that another convention will 
supply our omissions, than abandon every thing to 
hazard ? Our constituents will be very little satis- 
fied with us, if we take the latter course. 

Mr. Randolph and Mr. King renewed the motion 
to adjourn till to-morrow. 

On the question, — Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, aye — 7 ; Connecticut, Delaware, no 
—2; Georgia, divided. 

Adjourned. 

[On the morning following, before the hour of the 
Convention, a number of the members from the larger 
States, by common agreement, met for the purpose 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1113 

of consulting on the proper steps to be taken in con- 
sequence of the vote in favor of an equal representa- 
tion in the second branch, and the apparent inflexi- 
bility of the smaller States on that point. Several 
members from the latter States also attended. The 
time was wasted in vague conversation on the sub- 
ject, without any specific proposition or agreement. 
It appeared, indeed, that the opinions of the mem- 
bers who disliked the equality of votes differed much 
as to the importance of that point ; and as to the 
policy of risking a failure of any general act of the 
Convention by inflexibly opposing it. Several of 
them — supposing that no good government could or 
would be built on that foundation ; and that, as a 
division of the Convention into two opinions was 
unavoidable, it would be better that the side com- 
prising the principal States, and a majority of the 
people of America, should propose a scheme of gov- 
ernment to the States, than that a scheme should 
be proposed on the other side — would have concur- 
red in a firm opposition to the smaller States, and in 
a separate recommendation, if eventually necessa- 
ry. Others seemed inclined to yield to the smaller 
States, and to concur in such an act, however imper- 
fect and exceptionable, as might be agreed on by 
the Convention as a body, though decided by a bare 
majority of States and by a minority of the people 
of the United States. It is probable that the result 
of this consultation satisfied the smaller States, that 
they had nothing to apprehend from a union of the 
larger in any plan whatever against the equality of 
votes in the second branch.] 
Vol. I.— 70* 



1114 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Tuesday, July 17th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to 
reconsider the whole Resolution agreed to yesterday 
concerning the constitution of the two branches of the 
Legislature. His object was to bring the House to a 
consideration, in the abstract, of the powers necessary 
to be vested in the General Government. It had been 
said, Let us know how the government is to be model- 
led, and then we can determine what powers can be 
properly given to it. He thought the most eligible 
course was, first to determine on the necessary powers, 
and then so to modify the Government, as that it might 
be justly and properly enabled to administer them. 
He feared, if we proceeded to a consideration of the 
powers, whilst the vote of yesterday, including an 
equality of the States in the second branch, remain- 
ed in force, a reference to it, either mental or ex- 
pressed, would mix itself with the merits of every 
question concerning the powers. This motion was 
not seconded. [It was probably approved by seve- 
ral members who either despaired of success, or 
were apprehensive that the attempt would inflame 
the jealousies of the smaller States.] 

The sixth Resolution in the Report of the Com- 
mittee of the Whole, relating to the powers, which 
had been postponed in order to consider the seventh 
and eighth, relating to the constitution, of the Na- 
tional Legislature, was now resumed. 

Mr. Sherman observed, that it would be difficult 
to draw the line between the powers of the Gene- 
ral Legislature, and those to be left with the States ; 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1115 

that he did not like the definition contained in the 
Resolution ; and proposed, in its place, to the words 
" individual legislation," inclusive, to insert " to make 
laws binding on the people of the United States in 
all cases which may concern the common interests 
of the Union ; but not to interfere with the govern- 
ment of the individual States in any matters of in- 
ternal police which respect the government of such 
States only, and wherein the general welfare of the 
United States is not concerned." 

Mr. Wilson seconded the amendment, as better 
expressing the general principle. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed it. The inter- 
nal police, as it would be called and understood by 
the States, ought to be infringed in many cases, as 
in the case of paper-money, and other tricks by 
which citizens of other States may be affected. 

Mr. Sherman, in explanation of his idea, read an 
enumeration of powers, including the power of 
levying taxes on trade, but not the power of direct 
taxation, 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris remarked the omission, 
and inferred, that, for the deficiencies of taxes on 
consumption, it must have been the meaning of M#. 
Sherman that the General Government should re- 
cur to quotas and requisitions, which are subversive 
of the idea of government. 

Mr. Sherman acknowledged that his enumeration 
did not include direct taxation. Some provision, he 
supposed, must be made for supplying the deficiency 
of other taxation, but he had not formed any. 

On the question on Mr. Sherman's motion, it 
passed in the negative, — Connecticut, Maryland, aye 



1116 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

— 2 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Del- 
aware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 8. 

Mr. Bedford moved that the second member of 
the sixth Resolution be so altered as to read, " and 
moreover to legislate in all cases for the general in- 
terests of the Union, and also in those to which the 
States are severally incompetent, or in which the har- 
mony of the United States may be interrupted by 
the exercise of individual legislation." 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconds the motion. 

Mr. Randolph. This is a formidable idea, indeed. 
It involves the power of violating all the laws and 
Constitutions of the States, and of intermeddling 
with their police. The last member of the sentence 
is also superfluous, being included in the first. 

Mr. Bedford. It is not more extensive or formi- 
dable than the clause as it stands : no State being 
separately competent to legislate for the general in- 
terest of the Union. 

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Bedford's mo- 
tion, it passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
North Carolina, aye — 6; Connecticut, Virginia, 
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 4. 

On the sentence as amended, it passed in the 
affirmative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jer- 
sey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, aye — 8; South Carolina, Georgia, 
no— 2. 

The next clause, " To negative all laws passed by 
the several States contravening, in the opinion of 
the National Legislature, the Articles of Union, or 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1117 

any treaties subsisting under the authority of the 
Union/' was then taken up. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed this power as 
likely to be terrible to the States, and not necessary 
if sufficient Legislative authority should be given to 
the General Government. 

Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary ; as the 
Courts of the States would not consider as valid any 
law contravening the authority of the Union, and 
which the Legislature would wish to be negatived. 

Mr. L. Martin considered the power as improper 
and inadmissible. Shall all the laws of the States 
be sent up to the General Legislature before they 
shall be permitted to operate ? 

Mr. Madison considered the negative on the laws 
of the States as essential to the efficacy and security 
of the General Government. The necessity of a 
General Government proceeds from the propensity 
of the States to pursue their particular interests, in 
opposition to the general interest. This propensity 
will continue to disturb the system unless effectually 
controlled. Nothing short of a negative on their 
laws will control it. They will pass laws which 
will accomplish their injurious objects before they 
can be repealed by the General Legislature, or set 
aside by the National tribunals. Confidence cannot 
be put in the state tribunals as guardians of the 
National authority and interests. In all the States 
these are more or less dependent on the Legisla- 
tures. In Georgia they are appointed annually by 
the Legislature. In Rhode Island the Judges who 
refused to execute an unconstitutional law were 
displaced, and others substituted, by the Legislature, 



1118 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

who would be the willing instruments of the wicked 
and arbitrary plans of their masters. A power of 
negativing the improper laws of the States is at 
once the most mild and certain means of preserving 
the harmony of the system. Its utility is sufficiently 
displayed in the British system. Nothing could main- 
tain the harmony and subordination of the various 
parts of the Empire, but the prerogative by which the 
Crown stifles in the birth every act of every part tend- 
ing to discord or encroachment. It is true the prerog- 
ative is sometimes misapplied, through ignorance or 
partiality to one particular part of the Empire ; but 
we have not the same reason to fear such misappli- 
cations in our system. As to the sending all laws 
up to the National Legislature, that might be ren- 
dered unnecessary by some emanation of the power 
into the States, so far at least as to give a temporary 
effect to laws of immediate necessity. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was more and more op- 
posed to the negative. The proposal of it would 
disgust all the States. A law that ought to be 
negatived, will be set aside in the Judiciary depart- 
ment ; and if that security should fail, may be re- 
pealed by a National law. 

Mr. Sherman. Such a power involves a wrong 
principle, to wit, that a law of a State contrary to 
the Articles of the Union would, if not negatived, be 
valid and operative. 

Mr. Pinckney urged the necessity of the negative. 

On the question for agreeing to the power of 

negativing laws of States, <&c. it passed in the 

negative, — Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, 

a ye — 3; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1119 

Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no 
-7. 

Mr. L. Martin moved the following resolution, 
"That the Legislative acts of the United States 
made by virtue and in pursuance of the Articles 
of Union, and all treaties made and ratified under 
the authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme law of the respective States, as far as those 
acts or treaties shall relate to the said States, or 
their citizens and inhabitants ; and that the Judici- 
aries of the several States shall be bound thereby in 
their decisions, any thing in the respective laws 
of the individual States to the contrary notwith- 
standing ;" which was agreed to, nem. con. 

The ninth Resolution being taken up, the first 
clause, u That a National Executive be instituted 7 
to consist of a single person," was agreed to, nem. 
con. 

The next clause, "To be chosen by the National 
Legislature," being considered, — 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was pointedly against 
his being so chosen. He will be the mere creature 
of the Legislature, if appointed and impeachable by 
that body. He ought to be elected by the people 
at large, by the freeholders of the country. That 
difficulties attend this mode, he admits. But they 
have been found superable in New York and in Con- 
necticut, and would, he believed, be found so in the 
case of an Executive for the United States. If 
the people should elect, they will never fail to pre- 
fer some man of distinguished character, or ser- 
vices; some man, if he might so speak, of conti- 
nental reputation. If the Legislature elect, it will 



1120 DEBATES IN THE [ 1787. 

be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction ; 
it will be like the election of a pope by a con- 
clave of cardinals; real merit will rarely be the 
title to the appointment. He moved to strike out 
" National Legislature/ 7 and insert " citizens of the 
United States." 

Mr. Sherman thought that the sense of the nation 
would be better expressed by the Legislature, than 
by the people at large. The latter will never be 
sufficiently informed of characters, and besides will 
never give a majority of votes to any one man. They 
will generally vote for some man in their own State, 
and the largest State will have the best chance for 
the appointment. If the choice be made by the 
Legislature, a majority of voices may be made ne- 
cessary to constitute an election. 

Mr. Wilson. Two arguments have been urged 
against an election of the Executive magistrate by 
the people. The first is, the example of Poland, 
where an election of the supreme magistrate is at- 
tended with the most dangerous commotions. The 
cases, he observed, were totally dissimilar. The 
Polish nobles have resources and dependants which 
enable them to appear in force, and to threaten the 
Republic as well as each other. In the next place, 
the electors all assemble at one place ; which would 
not be the case with us. The second argument is, 
that a majority of the people would never concur. 
It might be answered, that the concurrence of a 
majority of the people is not a necessary principle 
of election, nor required as such in any of the 
States. But allowing the objection all its force, it 
may be obviated by the expedient used in Massa- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1121 

chusetts, where the Legislature, by a majority of 
voices, decide in case a majority of the people do 
hot concur in favor of one of the candidates. This 
would restrain the choice to a good nomination at 
least, and prevent in a great degree intrigue and 
cabal. A particular objection with him against an 
absolute election by the Legislature was, that the 
Executive in that case would be too dependent to 
stand the mediator between the intrigues and sinis- 
ter views of the Representatives and the general 
liberties and interests of the people. 

Mr. Pinckney did not expect this question would 
again have been brought forward ; an election by 
the people being liable to the most obvious and stri- 
king objections. They will be led by a few active 
and designing men. The most populous States, by 
combining in favor of the same individual, will be 
able to carry their points. The national Legisla^- 
ture being most immediately interested in the laws 
made by themselves, will be most attentive to the 
choice of a fit man to carry them properly into exe- 
cution. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. It is said, that in case 
of an election by the people the populous States will 
combine and elect whom they please. Just the 
reverse. The people of such States cannot combine. 
If there be any combination, it must be among their 
Representatives in the Legislature. It is said, the 
people will be led by a few designing men. This 
might happen in a small district. It can never hap- 
pen throughout the continent. In the election of a 
Governor of New York, it sometimes is the case in 
particular spots, that the activity and intrigues of 

Vol. I— 71 



1122 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

little partizans are successful ; but the general voice 
of the State is never influenced by such artifices. 
It is said, the multitude will be uninformed. It 
is true they would be uninforned of what passed 
in the Legislative conclave, if the election were 
to be made there ; but they will not be uninform- 
ed of those great and illustrious characters which 
have merited their esteem and confidence. If the 
Executive be chosen by the national Legislature, 
he will not be independent of it ; and if not inde- 
pendent, usurpation and tyranny on the part of 
the Legislature will be the consequence. This was 
the case in England in the last century. It has 
been the case in Holland, where their Senates have 
engrossed all power. It has been the case every 
where. He was surprised that an election by the 
people at large should ever have been likened to the 
Polish election of the first Magistrate. An election 
by the Legislature will bear a real likeness to the 
election by the Diet of Poland. The great must be 
the electors in both cases, and the corruption and 
cabal which are known to characterize the one 
would soon find their way into the other. Appoint- 
ments made by numerous bodies are always worse 
than those made by single responsible individuals 
or by the people at large. 

Col. Mason. It is curious to remark the different 
language held at different times. At one moment 
we are told that the Legislature is entitled to thor- 
ough confidence, and to indefinite power. At an- 
other, that it will be governed by intrigue and cor- 
ruption, and cannot be trusted at all. But not to 
dwell on this inconsistency, he would observe that a 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1123 

government which is to last ought at least to be 
practicable. Would this be the case if the proposed 
election should be left to the people at large 1 He 
conceived it would be as unnatural to refer the 
choice of a proper character for Chief Magistrate to 
the people, as it would , to refer a trial of colors to a 
blind man. The extent of the country renders it 
impossible, that the people can have the requisite 
capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the 
candidates. 

Mr. Wilson could not see the contrariety stated 
by (Col. Mason.) The Legislature might deserve 
confidence in some respects, and distrust in others. 
In acts which were to affect them and their constitu- 
ents precisely alike, confidence was due ; in others, 
jealousy was warranted. The appointment to 
great offices, where the Legislature might feel 
many motives not common to the public, confidence 
was surely misplaced. This branch of business, 
it w T as notorious, was the most corruptly man- 
aged, of any that had been committed to legislative 
bodies. 

Mr. Williamson conceived that there was the 
same difference between an election, in this case, by 
the people and by the Legislature, as between an 
appointment by lot and by choice. There are at 
present distinguished characters, who are known 
perhaps to almost every man. This will not always 
be the case. The people will be sure to vote for 
some man in their own State ; and the largest State 
will be sure to succeed. This will not be Virginia, 
however. Her slaves will have no suffrage. As 
the salary of the Executive will be fixed and he 



1124 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

will not be eligible a second time, there will not be 
such a dependence on the Legislature as has been 
imagined. 

On the question on an election by the people, in- 
stead of the Legislature, it passed in the negative, — 
Pennsylvania, aye — 1 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 9. 

Mr. L. Martin moved that the Executive be cho- 
sen by Electors appointed by the several Legisla- 
tures of the individual States. 

Mr. Broome seconds. 

On the question, it passed in the negative, — Dela- 
ware, Maryland, aye — 2; Massachusetts, Connecti- 
cut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Car- 
olina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 8. 

On the question on the words, u to be chosen by 
the National Legislature," it passed unanimously in 
the affirmative. 

" For the term of seven years," — postponed, nem. 
con. } on motion of Mr. Houston and Mr. Gouverneur 
Morris. 

"To carry into execution the national laws," — 
agreed to, nem, con. 

? To appoint to offices in cases not otherwise pro- 
vided for," — agreed to, nem. con. 

" To be ineligible a second time," — Mr. Houston 
moved to strike out this clause. 

Mr. Sherman seconds the motion. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris espoused the motion. 
The ineligibility proposed by the clause, as it stood, 
tended to destroy the great motive to godji be- 
haviour, the hope of being rewarded by a re-appoint- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1125 

ment. It was saying to him, make hay while the 
sun shines. 

On the question for striking out, as moved by Mr. 
Houston, it passed in the affirmative, — Massachu- 
setts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ma- 
ryland, Georgia, aye — 6; Delaware, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, no — 4. 

The clause, " for the term of seven years," be- 
ing resumed, — 

Mr. Broome was for a shorter term, since the 
Executive Magistrate was now to be re-eligible. 
Had he remained ineligible a second time, he should 
have preferred a longer term. 

Doctor M'Clurg* moved to strike out seven years, 
and insert "during good behaviour." By striking 
out the words declaring him not re-eligible, he was 
put into a situation that would keep him dependent 
forever on the Legislature ; and he conceived the 
independence of the Executive to be equally essen- 
tial with that of the Judiciary department. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion. He 
expressed great pleasure in hearing it. This was 
the way to get a good Government. His fear that 
so valuable an ingredient would not be attained had 
led him to take the part he had done. He was in- 
different how the Executive should be chosen, pro- 
vided he held his place by this tenure. 

Mr. Broome highly approved the motion. It ob- 
viated all his difficulties. 



* The probable object of this motion was merely to enforce the argument 
against the re-eligibility of the Executive magistrate, by holding out a tenure 
during good behaviour as the alternative for keeping him independent of the 
Legislature. 



1126 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Sherman considered such a tenure as by no 
means safe or admissible. As the Executive Mag- 
istrate is now re-eligible, he will be on good be- 
haviour as far as will be necessary. If he behaves 
well, he will be continued ; if otherwise, displaced, 
on a succeeding election. 

Mr. Madison.* If it be essential to the preserva- 
tion of liberty that the Legislative, Executive, and 
Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a 
maintenance of the separation, that they should be 
independent of each other. The Executive could 
not be independent of the Legislature, if dependent 
on the pleasure of that branch for a re-appointment. 
Why was it determined that the Judges should not 
hold their places by such a tenure ? Because they 
might be tempted to cultivate the Legislature, by 
an undue complaisance, and thus render the Legis- 
lature the virtual expositor, as well as the maker 
of the laws. In like manner, a dependence of 
the Executive on the Legislature would render it 
the executor as well as the maker of laws; and 
then, according to the observation of Montesquieu, 
tyrannical laws may be made that they may be 
executed in a tyrannical manner. There was an 
analogy between the Executive and Judiciary de- 
partments in several respects. The latter executed 
the laws in certain cases as the former did in others. 
The former expounded and applied them for certain 
purposes, as the latter did for others. The difference 

* The view here taken of the subject was meant to aid in parrying the 
animadversions likely to fall on the motion of Doctor McClurg, for whom J. M. 
had a particular regard. The Doctor, though possessing talents of the highest 
order, was modest and unaccustomed to exert them in public debate. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1127 

between them seemed to consist chiefly in two 
circumstances, — first, the collective interest and se- 
curity were much more in the power belonging to 
the Executive, than to the Judiciary, department; 
secondly, in the administration of the former, much 
greater latitude is left to opinion and discretion, 
than in the administration of the latter. But if the 
second consideration proves that it will be more 
difficult to establish a rule sufficiently precise for 
trying the Executive, than the Judges, and forms an 
objection to the same tenure of office, both consider- 
ations prove that it might be more dangerous to 
suffer a union between the Executive and Legisla- 
tive powers, than between the Judiciary and Legis- 
lative powers. He conceived it to be absolutely 
necessary to a well constituted Republic, that the 
two first should be kept distinct and independent 
of each other. Whether the plan proposed by the 
motion was a proper one, was another question ; as 
it depended on the practicability of instituting a 
tribunal for impeachments as certain and as ade- 
quate in the one case, as in the other. On the 
other hand, respect for the mover entitled his pro- 
position to a fair hearing and discussion, until a less 
objectionable expedient should be applied for guard- 
ing against a dangerous union of the Legislative and 
Executive departments. 

Colonel Mason. This motion was made some 
time ago, and negatived by a very large majority. 
He trusted that it would be again negatived. It 
would be impossible to define the misbehaviour in 
such a manner as to subject it to a proper trial ; 
and perhaps still more impossible to compel so high 



1128 DEEATES IN THE [1787. 

an offender, holding his office by such a tenure, to 
submit to a trial. He considered an Executive 
during good behaviour as a softer name only for an 
Executive for life. And that the next would be an 
easy step to hereditary monarchy. If the motion 
should finally succeed, he might himself live to see 
such a revolution. If he did not, it was probable 
his children or grand children would. He trusted 
there were few men in that House who wished for 
it. No State, he was sure, had so far revolted from 
republican principles, as to have the least bias in its 
favor, 

Mr. Madison was not apprehensive of being 
thought to favor any step towards monarchy. The 
real object with him was to prevent its introduction. 
Experience had proved a tendency in our govern- 
ment to throw all power into the Legislative 
vortex. Tbe Executives of the States are in general 
little more than cyphers ; the Legislatures om- 
nipotent. If no effectual check be devised for re- 
straining the instability and encroachments of the 
latter, a revolution of some kind or other would be 
inevitable. The preservation of republican govern 
ment therefore required some expedient for the 
purpose, but required evidently, at the same time, 
that, in devising it, the genuine principles of that 
form should be kept in view. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was as little a friend to 
monarchy as any gentleman. He concurred in the 
opinion that the way to keep out monarchical gov- 
ernment was to establish such a Republican govern- 
ment as would make the people happy, and prevent 
a desire of change. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1129 

Doct. McClurg was not so much afraid of the 
shadow of monarchy, as to be unwilling to approach 
it; nor so wedded to republican government, as not 
to be sensible of the tyrannies that had been and may 
be exercised under that form. It was an essential 
object with him to make the Executive independent 
of the Legislature ; and the only mode left for effect- 
ing it, after the vote destroying his ineligibility a 
second time, was to appoint him during good be- 
haviour. 

On the question for inserting "during good be- 
haviour," in place of u seven years [with a re-eligi- 
bility]," it passed in the negative, — New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye — 4 ; Massa- 
chusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, no— 6 * 

On the motion to strike out " seven years," it passed 
in the negative, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Del- 
aware, North Carolina, aye — 4 ; Connecticut, New 
Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, 
no — 6.| 



* This vote is not to be considered as any certain index of opinion, as a num- 
ber in the affirmative probably had it chiefly in view to alarm those attached to 
a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, and thereby facilitate some 
final arrangement of a contrary tendency. The avowed friends of an Executive 
M during good behaviour" were not more than three or four, nor is it certain they 
would have adhered to such a tenure. 

An independence of the three great departments of each other, as far as possi- 
ble, and the responsibility of all to the will of the community, seemed to be gene- 
rally admitted as the true basis of a well constructed Government. 

t There was no debate on this motion. The apparent object of many in the 
affirmative was to secure the re-eligibility by shortening the term, and of many in 
the negative to embarrass the plan of referring the appointment and dependence 
of the Executive to the Legislature. 

Vol. I.— 71* 



1130 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

It was now unanimously agreed, that the vote 
which had struck out the words " to be ineligible a 
second time," should be reconsidered to-morrow. 

Adjourned. 



Wednesday July 18th. 

In Convention, — On motion of Mr. L. Martin to 
fix to-morrow for reconsidering the vote concerning 
the ineligibility of the Executive a second time, it 
passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, Connecti- 
cut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 8 ; New Jer- 
sey, Georgia, absent. 

The residue of the ninth Resolution, concerning 
the Executive, was postponed till to-morrow. 

The tenth Resolution, " that the Executive shall 
have a right to negative legislative acts not after- 
wards passed by two-thirds of each branch," was 
passed, nem. con. 

The eleventh Resolution, " that a National Judici- 
ary shall be established to consist of one supreme 
tribunal," agreed to nem. con. 

On the clause, " The judges of which to be ap- 
pointed by the second branch of the National Legis- 
lature," — 

Mr. Gorham would prefer an appointment by the 
second branch to an appointment by the whole Le- 
gislature ; but he thought even that branch too nu- 
merous, and too little personally responsible, to en- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1131 

sure a good choice. He suggested that the Judges 
be appointed by the Executive with the advice and 
consent of the second branch, in the mode prescribed 
by the Constitution of Massachusetts. This mode 
had been long practised in that country, and was 
found to answer perfectly well. 

Mr. Wilson would still prefer an appointment by 
the Executive; but if that could not be attained, 
would prefer, in the next place, the mode suggested 
by Mr. Gorham. He thought it his duty, however, 
to move in the first instance, " that the Judges be 
appointed by the Executive.' 7 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion. 

Mr. L. Martin was strenuous for an appointment 
by the second branch. Being taken, from all the 
the States, it would be best informed of characters, 
and most capable of making a fit choice. 

Mr. Sherman concurred in the observations of Mr. 
Martin, adding that the Judges ought to be diffused, 
which would be more likely to be attended to by 
the second branch, than by the Executive. 

Mr. Mason. The mode of appointing the Judges 
may depend in some degree on the mode of trying 
impeachments of the Executive. If the Judges 
were to form a tribunal for that purpose, they surely 
ought not to be appointed by the Executive./ There 
were insuperable objections besides against referring 
the appointment to the Executive. / He mentioned, 
as one, that as the seat of government must be in 
some one State; and as the Executive would re- 
main in office for a considerable time, for four, five, 
or six years at least, he would insensibly form 
local and personal attachments within the particular 



1132 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

State that would deprive equal merit elsewhere of 
an equal chance of promotion. 

Mr. Gorham. As the Executive will be respon- 
sible, in point of character at least, for a judicious 
and faithful discharge of his trust, he will be careful 
to look through all the States for proper characters. 
The Senators will be as likely to form their attach- 
ments at the seat of government where they reside, 
as the Executive. If they cannot get the man of 
the particular State to which they may respectively 
belong, they will be indifferent to the rest. Public 
bodies feel no personal responsibility, and give full 
play to intrigue and cabal. Rhode Island is a full 
illustration of the insensibility to character pro- 
duced by a participation of numbers in dishonourable 
measures, and of the length to which a public body 
may carry wickedness and cabal. 

Mr. Gofverneur Morris supposed it would be 
improper for an impeachment of the Executive to 
be tried before the Judges. The latter would in 
such case be drawn into intrigues with the Legisla- 
ture, and an impartial trial would be frustrated. 
As they would be much about the seat of govern- 
ment, they might even be previously consulted, 
and arrangements might be made for a prosecution 
of the Executive. He thought, therefore, that no 
argument could be drawn from the probability of 
such a plan of impeachments against the motion 
before the House. 

Mr. Madison suggested, that the Judges might be 
appointed by the Executive, with the concurrence 
of one-third at least of the second branch. This 
would unite the advantage of responsibility in the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1133 

Executive, with the security afforded in the second 
branch against any incautious or corrupt nomination 
by the Executive. 

Mr. Sherman was clearly for an election by the 
Senate. It would be composed of men nearly equal 
to the Executive, and would of course have on the 
whole more wisdom. They would bring into their 
deliberations a more diffusive knowledge of charac- 
ters. It would be less easy for candidates to intrigue 
with them, than with the Executive Magistrate. 
For these reasons he thought there would be a better 
security for a proper choice in the Senate, than in 
the Executive. 

Mr. Randolph. It is true that when the appoint- 
ment of the Judges was vested in the second branch 
an equality of votes had not been given to it. Yet 
he had rather leave the appointment there than give it 
to the Executive. He thought the advantage of per- 
sonal responsibility might be gained in the Senate, 
by requiring the respective votes of tho^HM|rs to 
be entered on the Journal. He thou°8 to< miat 
the hope of receiving appointments woS^l !><Kiore 
diffusive, if they depended on the Senate, the mem- 
bers of which would be diffusively known, than if 
they depended on a single man, who could not be 
personally known to a very great extent ; and con- 
sequently, that opposition to the system would be so 
far weakened. 

Mr. Bedford thought, there were solid reasons 
against leaving the appointment to the Executive. 
He must trust more to information than the Senate. 
It would put it in his power to gain over the larger 
States by gratifying them with a preference of their 



1134 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

citizens. The responsibility of the Executive, so 
much talked of, was chimerical. He could not be 
punished for mistakes. 

Mr. Gorham remarked, that the Senate could have 
no better information than the Executive. They 
must like him trust to information from the members 
belonging to the particular State where the candi- 
date resided. The Executive would certainly be 
more answerable for a good appointment, as the 
whole blame of a bad one would fall on him alone. 
He did not mean that he would be answerable under 
any other penalty than that of public censure, which 
with honourable minds was a sufficient one. 

On the question for referring the appointment of 
the Judges to the Executive, instead of the second 
branch, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, aye — 2 ; Con- 
necticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Caro- 
lina, South Carolina, no — 6 ; Georgia, absent. 

Mr. Gorham moved, " that the Judges be nomina- 
ted ajd|^kM)inted by the Executive, by and with 
the ■ ice Hi consent of the second branch ; and 

everjB 1 .'' ■iiPomination shall be made at least 

days prior to such appointment." This mode, he 
said, had been ratified by the experience of a hun- 
dred and forty years in Massachusetts. If the ap- 
pointment should be left to either branch of the 
Legislature, it will be a mere piece of jobbing. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded and supported 
the motion. 

Mr. Sherman thought it less objectionable than an 
absolute appointment by the Executive ; but dis- 
liked it, as too much fettering the Senate. 

On the question on Mr. Gor ham's motion, — Mas- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1135 

sachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye — 
4; Connecticut, Delaware, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, no — 4 ; Georgia, absent. 

Mr. Madison moved, " that the Judges should be 
nominated by the Executive, and such nomination 
should become an appointment if not disagreed to 
within days by two-thirds of the second branch." 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion. 

By common consent the consideration of it was 
postponed till to-morrow. 

u To hold their offices during good behaviour, and 
to receive fixed salaries," — agreed to, nem. con. 

11 In which [salaries of Judges] no increase or 
diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons 
actually in office at the time." 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to strike out " or 
increase." He thought the Legislature ought to be 
at liberty to increase salaries, as circumstances 
might require ; and that this would not create any 
improper dependence in the Judges. . * 

Doctor Franklin was in favor of *||;^ i^&tion. 
Money may not only become plentier; but lue busi- 
ness of the Department may increase, as the country 
becomes more populous. 

Mr. Madison. The dependence will be less if the 
increase alone should be permitted ; but it will be 
improper even so far to permit a dependence. When- 
ever an increase is wished by the Judges, or may be 
in agitation in the Legislature, an undue complai- 
sance in the former may be felt towards the latter. 
If at such a crisis there should be in court suits to 
which leading members of the Legislature may be 
parties, the Judges will be in a situation which 



1136 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ought not to be suffered, if it can be prevented. The 
variations in the value of money may be guarded 
against by taking for a standard wheat or some 
other thing of permanent value. The increase of 
business will be provided for by an increase of the 
number who are to do it. An increase of salaries 
may easily be so contrived as not to affect persons 
in office. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris, The value of money 
may not only alter, but the state of society may 
alter. In this event, the same quantity of wheat, 
the same value, would not be the same compensa- 
tion. The amount of salaries must always be regu- 
lated by the manners and the style of living in a 
country. The increase of business cannot be provi- 
ded for in the supreme tribunal, in the way that has 
been mentioned. All the business of a certain de- 
scription, whether more or less, must be done in 
that single tribunal. Additional labor alone in the 
Judges can provide for additional business. Addi- 
tion aL compensation, therefore, ought not to be pro- 
hibited. 

On the question for striking out, " or increase,"— 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, South Carolina, aye — 6; Virginia, 
North Carolina, no — 2; Georgia, absent. 

The whole clause, as amended, was then agreed 
to, nem. con. 

The twelfth Resolution, " that the National Legis- 
lature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals," 
being taken up,— 

Mr. Butler could see no necessity for such tribu- 
nals. The State tribunals might do the business. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1137 

Mr. L. Martin concurred. They will create jeal- 
ousies and oppositions in the State tribunals, with 
the jurisdiction of which they will interfere. 

Mr. Gorham. There are in the States already 
Federal Courts, with jurisdiction for trial of piracies, 
<fec. committed on the seas. No complaints have 
been made by the States or the courts of the States. 
Inferior tribunals are essential to render the au- 
thority of the National Legislature effectual. 

Mr. Randolph observed, that the courts of the 
States cannot be trusted with the administration of 
the National laws. The objects of jurisdiction are 
such as will often place the general and local policy 
at variance. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris urged also the necessity 
of such a provision. 

Mr. Sherman was willing to give the power to the 
Legislature, but wished them to make use of the 
State tribunals, whenever it could be done with 
safety to the general interest. 

Col. Mason thought many circumstances might 
arise, not now to be foreseen, which might render 
such a power absolutely necessary. 

On the question for agreeing to the twelfth Reso- 
lution, empowering the National Legislature to ap- 
point inferior tribunals, — it was agreed to, nem. con. 

The clause of "Impeachments of national officers," 
was struck out, on motion for the purpose. 

The thirteenth Resolution, " The jurisdiction of 
the National Judiciary, <fcc." being then taken up, 
several criticisms having been made on the defini- 
tion, it was proposed by Mr. Madison so to alter it 
as to read thus; "that the jurisdiction shall' extend 

Vol. I.— 72 



1138 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

/ to all cases arising under the national laws ; and to 

J such other questions as may involve the national 

peace and harmony ;" which was agreed to, nem. con. 

The fourteenth Resolution, providing for the ad- 
mission of new States, was agreed to, nem. con. 

The fifteenth Resolution, " that provision ought to 
be made for the continuance of Congress, <&c. and 
for the completion of their engagements," being con- 
sidered, — 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought the assumption 
of their engagements might as well be omitted ; and 
that Congress ought not to be continued till all the 
States should adopt the reform ; since it may be- 
come expedient to give effect to it whenever a cer- 
tain number of States shall adopt it. 

Mr. Madison. The clause can mean nothing 
more than that provision ought to be made for pre- 
venting an interregnum ; which must exist, in the 
interval between the adoption of the new Government 
and the commencement of its operation, if the old 
Government should cease on the first of these events. 

Mr. Wilson did not entirely approve of the man- 
ner in which the clause relating to the engagements 
of Congress was expressed; but he thought some 
provision on the subject would be proper in order to 
prevent any suspicion that the obligations of the 
Confederacy might be dissolved along with the 
Government under which they were contracted. 

On the question on the first part, relating to the 
continuance of Congress, — Virginia, North Caro- 
lina, South Carolina,* aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, Con- 

* In the printed Journal, South Carolina, no. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1139 

necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Geor- 
gia, no — 6. The second part, as to the completion 
of their engagements, was disagreed to, nem. con. 

The sixteenth Resolution, " That a republican 
Constitution and its existing laws ought to be guar- 
anteed to each State by the United States" being 
considered, — 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought the Resolution 
very objectionable. He should be very unwilling 
that such laws as exist in Rhode Island should be 
guaranteed. 

Mr. Wilson. The object is merely to secure the 
States against dangerous commotions, insurrections 
and rebellions. 

Col. Mason, If the General Government should 
have no right to suppress rebellions against partic- 
ular States, it will be in a bad situation indeed. As 
rebellions against itself originate in and against in- 
dividual States, it must remain a passive spectator 
of its own subversion. 

Mr. Randolph. The Resolution has two objects, — 
first, to secure a republican government ; secondly, 
to suppress domestic commotions. He urged the 
necessity of both these provisions. 

Mr. Madison moved to substitute, " that the con- 
stitutional authority of the States shall be guaran- 
teed to them respectively against domestic as well 
as foreign violence." 

Doctor McClurg seconded the motion. 

Mr. Houston was afraid of perpetuating the ex- 
isting Constitutions of the States. That of Georgia 
was a very bad one, and he hoped would be revised 
and amended. It may also be difficult for the Gen- 



1140 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

eral Government to decide between contending par- 
ties, each of which claim the sanction of the Con- 
stitution. 

Mr. L. Martin was for leaving the States to sup- 
press rebellions themselves. 

Mr. Gorham thought it strange that a rebellion 
should be known to exist in the Empire, and the 
General Government should be restrained from in- 
terposing to subdue it. At this rate an enterprising 
citizen might erect the standard of monarchy in a 
particular State, might gather together partizans 
from all quarters, might extend his views from State 
to State, and threaten to establish a tyranny over 
the whole, and the General Government be com- 
pelled to remain an inactive witness of its own de- 
struction. With regard to different parties in a 
State, as long as they confine their disputes to words, 
they will be harmless to the General Government 
and to each other. If they appeal to the sword, it 
will then be necessary for the General Government, 
however difficult it may be, to decide on the merits 
of their contest, to interpose and put an end to it. 

Mr. Carroll. Some such provision is essential. 
Every State ought to wish for it. It has been 
doubted whether it is a casus foederis at present ; 
and no room ought to be left for such a doubt here- 
after. 

Mr. Randolph moved to add, as an amendment to 
the motion, " and that no State be at liberty to form 
any other than a republican government." 

Mr. Madison seconded the motion. 

Mr. Rutledge thought it unnecessary to insert 
any guarantee. No doubt could be entertained but 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1141 

that Congress had the authority, if they had the 
means, to co-operate with any State in subduing a 
rebellion. It was and would be involved in the na- 
ture of the thing. 

Mr. Wilson moved, as a better expression of the 
idea, " that a republican form of Government shall 
be guaranteed to each State; and that each State 
shall be protected against foreign and domestic 
violence." 

This seeming to be well received, Mr. Madison 
and Mr. Randolph withdrew their propositions, and 
on the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's motion, 
it passed, nem. con. 

Adjourned. 



Thursday, July 19th. 

In Convention, — On re-consideration of the vote 
rendering the Executive re-eligible a second time, 
Mr.^MARTiN moved to re-instate the words, "-to be 
ineligible a second time." 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. It is necessary to take 
into one view all that relates to the establishment 
of the Executive ; on the due formation of which 
must depend the efficacy and utility of the union 
among the present and future States. It has been 
a maxim in political science, that republican govern- 
ment is not adapted to a large extent of country, 
because the energy of the executive magistracy 
cannot reach the extreme parts of it. Our country 
is an extensive one. We must either then renounce 
the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive 



1142 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it. 
This subject was of so much importance that he 
hoped to be indulged in an extensive view of it. 
One great objecj; of the Executive is, to control the 
Legislature. /The Legislature will continually seek 
to aggrandize and perpetuate themselves ; and will 
seize those critical moments produced by war, in- 
vasion, or convulsion, for that purpose. It is neces- 
sary, then, that the Executive magistrate should be 
the guardian of the people, even of the lower classes, 
against legislative tyranny ; against the great and 
the wealthy, who in the course of things will ne- 
cessarily compose the legislative body. Wealth 
tends to corrupt the mind ; — to nourish its love of 
power; and to stimulate it to oppression. History 
proves this to be the spirit of the opulent. The 
check provided in the second branch was not meant 
as a check on legislative usurpations of power, but 
on the abuse of lawful powers, on the propensity 
of the first branch to legislate too much, to run into 
projects of paper-money, and similar expedients^ It 
is no check on legislative tyranny. On the contrary 
it may favor it ; and, if the first branch can be 
seduced, may find the means of success. The Ex- 
ecutive, therefore, ought to be so constituted, as to 
be the great protector of the mass of the people. It 
is the duty of the Executive to appoint the officers, 
and to command the forces, of the Republic ; to ap- 
point, first, ministerial officers for the administration 
of public affairs ; secondly, officers for the dispensa- 
tion of justice. Who will be the best judges whether 
these appointments be well made ? The people at 
large, who will know, will see, will feel, the effects 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1143 

of them. Again, who can judge so well of the dis- 
charge of military duties for the protection and 
security of the people, as the people themselves, 
who are to be protected and secured ? He finds, 
too, that the Executive is not to be re-eligible. What 
effect will this have? In the first place, it will 
destroy the great incitement to merit, public esteem, 
by taking away the hope of being rewarded with a 
re-appointment. It may give a dangerous turn to 
one of the strongest passions in the human breast. 
The love of fame is the great spring to noble and 
illustrious actions. Shut the civil road to glory, 
and he may be compelled to seek it by the sword. 
In the second place, it will tempt him to make the 
most of the short space of time allotted him, to ac- 
cumulate wealth and provide for his friends. In the 
third place, it will produce violations of the very 
Constitution it is meant to secure. In moments of 
pressing danger, the tried abilities and established 
character of a favorite magistrate will prevail over 
respect for the forms of the Constitution. The 
Executive is also to be impeachable. This is a 
dangerous part of the plan. It will hold him in 
such dependence, that he will be no check on the 
Legislature, will not be a firm guardian of the 
people and of the public interest. He will be the 
tool of a faction, of some leading demagogue in the 
Legislature. These, then, are the faults of the Ex- 
ecutive establishment, as now proposed. Can no 
better establishment be devised ? If he is to be the 
guardian of the people, let him be appointed by the 
people. If he is to be a check on the Legislature, 
let him not be impeachable. Let him be of short 



1144 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

duration, that he may with propriety be re-eligibie. 
It has been said that the candidates for this office 
will not be known to the people. If they be known 
to the Legislature, they must have such a notoriety 
and eminence of character, that they cannot pos- 
sibly be unknown to the people at large. It cannot 
be possible that a man shall have sufficiently dis- 
tinguished himself to merit this high trust, without 
having his character proclaimed by fame through- 
out the Empire. As to the danger from an unim- 
peachable magistrate, he could not regard it as 
formidable. There must be certain great officers 
of state, a minister of finance, of war, of foreign 
affairs, &c. These, he presumes, will exercise their 
functions in subordination to the Executive, and 
will be amenable, by impeachment, to the public 
justice. Without these ministers, the Executive 
can do nothing of consequence. He suggested a 
biennial election of the Executive, at the time of 
electing the first branch ; and the Executive to hold 
over, so as to prevent any interregnum in the ad- 
ministration. An election by the people at large, 
throughout so great an extent of country, could not 
be influenced by those little combinations and those 
momentary lies, which often decide popular elec- 
tions within a narrow sphere. It will probably be 
objected, that the election will be influenced by the 
members of the Legislature, particularly of the first 
branch ; and that it will be nearly the same thing 
with an election by the Legislature itself. It could 
not be denied that such an influence would exist. 
But it might be answered, that as the Legislature or 
the candidates for it, would be divided the enmity 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. L145 

of one part would counteract the friendship of an- 
other; that if the administration of the Executive 
were good, it would be unpopular to oppose his re- 
election ; if bad, it ought to be opposed, and a re- 
appointment prevented ; and lastly, that in every 
view this indirect dependence on the favor of the 
Legislature could not be so mischievous as a direct 
dependence for his appointment. He saw no alter- 
native for making the Executive independent of the 
Legislature, but either to give him his office for 
life, or make him eligible by the people. Again, it 
might be objected, that two years would be too 
short a duration. But he believes that as long as he 
should behave himself well he would be continued 
in his place. The extent of the country would se- 
cure his re-election against the factions and discon- 
tents of particular States. It deserved considera- 
tion, also, that such an ingredient in the plan would 
render it extremely palatable to the people. These 
were the general ideas which occurred to him on 
the subject, and which led him to wish and move 
that the whole constitution of the Executive might 
undergo re-consideration. 

Mr. Randolph urged the motion of Mr. L. Martin 
for restoring the words making the Executive ineli- 
gible a second time. If he ought to be independent, 
he should not be left under a temptation to court a 
re-appointment. If he should be re-appointable by the 
Legislature, he will be no check on it. His revision- 
ary power will be of no avail. He had always 
thought and contended, as he still did, that the dan- 
ger apprehended by the little States was chimerical ; 
but those who thought otherwise ought to be pecu- 

Vol. L— 72* 



1146 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

liarly anxious for the motion. If the Executive be 
appointed, as has been determined, by the Legisla- 
ture, he will probably be appointed, either by joint 
ballot of both houses, or be nominated by the first 
and appointed by the second branch. In either case 
the large States will preponderate. If he is to court 
the same influence for his re-appointment, will he 
not make his revisionary power, and all the other 
functions of his administration, subservient to the 
views of the large States ? Besides, is there not 
great reason to apprehend, that, in case he should 
be re-eligible, a false complaisance in the Legisla- 
ture might lead them to continue an unfit man in 
office, in preference to a fit one ? It has been said, 
that a constitutional bar to re-appointment, will in- 
spire unconstitutional endeavours to perpetuate him- 
self. It may be answered, that his endeavours can 
have no effect unless the people be corrupt to such 
a degree as to render all precautions hopeless ; to 
which may be added, that this argument supposes 
him to be more powerful and dangerous, than other 
arguments which have been used admit, and conse- 
quently calls for stronger fetters on his authority. 
He thought an election by the Legislature, with an 
incapacity to be elected a second time, would be 
more acceptable to the people than the plan sug- 
gested by Mr. Gouverneur Morris. 

Mr. King did not like the ineligibility. He thought 
there was great force in the remarks of Mr. Sher- 
man, that he who has proved himself most fit for an 
office, ought not to be excluded by the Constitution 
from holding it. He would therefore prefer any 
other reasonable plan that could be substituted. He 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1147 

was much disposed to think, that in such cases the 
people at large would choose wisely. There was 
indeed some difficulty arising from the improbability 
of a general concurrence of the people in favor of 
any one man. On the whole, he was of opinion 
that an appointment by electors chosen by the peo- 
ple for the purpose would be liable to fewest objec- 
tions. 

Mr. Patterson's ideas nearly coincided, he said, 
with those of Mr. King. He proposed that the Ex- 
ecutive should be appointed by electors, to be cho- 
sen by the States in a ratio that would allow one 
elector to the smallest, and three to the largest, 
States. 

Mr. Wilson. It seems to be the unanimous sense 
that the Executive should not be appointed by the 
Legislature, unless he be rendered ineligible a second 
time : he perceived with pleasure that the idea was 
gaining ground of an election, mediately or immedi- 
ately, by the people. 

Mr. Madison. If it be a fundamental principle of 
free government that the Legislative, Executive and 
Judiciary powers should be separately exercised, it 
is equally so that they be independently exercised. 
There is the same, and perhaps greater, reason why 
the Executive should be independent of the Legisla- 
ture, than why the Judiciary should. A coalition of 
the two former powers, would be more immediately 
and certainly dangerous to public liberty. It is es- 
sential, then, that the appointment of the Executive 
should either be drawn from some source, or held by 
some tenure, that will give him a free agency with 
regard to the Legislature. This could not be, if he 



1148 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

was to be appointable, from time to time, by the 
Legislature. It was not clear that an appointment 
in the first instance, even with an ineligibility after- 
wards, would not establish an improper connection 
between the two Departments. Certain it was, that 
the appointment would be attended with intrigues 
and contentions, that ought not to be unnecessarily 
admitted. He was disposed, for these reasons, to 
refer the appointment to some other source. The 
people at large was, in his opinion, the fittest in it- 
self. It would be as likely as any that could be 
devised, to produce an Executive Magistrate of dis- 
tinguished character. The people generally could 
only know and vote for some citizen whose merits 
had rendered him an object of general attention and 
esteem. There was one difficulty, however, of a 
serious nature, attending an immediate choice by the 
people. The right of suffrage was much more diffu- 
sive in the Northern than the Southern States ; and 
the latter could have no influence in the election, on 
the score of the negroes. The substitution of Elec- 
tors obviated this difficulty, and seemed on the whole 
to be liable to fewest objections. 

Mr. Gerry. If the Executive is to be elected by 
the Legislature, he certainly ought not to be re-eli- 
gible. This w T ould make him absolutely dependent. 
He was against a popular election. The people are 
uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing 
men. He urged the expediency of an appointment 
of the Executive, by Electors to be chosen by the 
State Executives. The people of the States will 
then choose the first branch ; the Legislatures of the 
States, the second branch of the National Legisla- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1149 

ture ; and the Executives of the States, the National 
Executive. This he thought would form a strong 
attachment in the States to the National system. 
The popular mode of electing the Chief Magistrate 
would certainly be the worst of all. If he should 
be so elected, and should do his duty, he will be 
turned out for it, like Governor Bowdoin in Mas- 
sachusetts, and President Sullivan in New Hamp- 
shire. 

On the question on Mr. Gouverneur Morris's mo- 
tion, to reconsider generally the constitution of the 
Executive, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jer- 
sey, and all the others, aye. 

Mr. Ellsworth moved to strike out the appoint- 
ment by the National Legislature, and to insert, " to 
be chosen by Electors, appointed by the Legislatures 
of the States in the following ratio ; to wit : one for 
each State not exceeding two hundred thousand in- 
habitants; two for each above that number and not 
exceeding three hundred thousand ; and three for 
each State exceeding three hundred thousand." 

Mr. Broome seconded the motion. 

Mr. Rutledge was opposed to all the modes, ex- 
cept the appointment by the National Legislature. 
He will be sufficiently independent, if he be not re- 
eligible. 

Mr. Gerry preferred the motion of Mr. Ells- 
worth to an appointment by the National Legisla- 
ture, or by the people ; though not to an appoint- 
ment by the State Executives. He moved that the 
Electors proposed by Mr. Ellsworth should be 
twenty-five in number, and allotted in the following 
proportion : to New Hampshire, one \ to Massachu- 



1150 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

setts, three; to Rhode Island, one; to Connecticut, 
two ; to New York, two ; to New Jersey, two ; to 
Pennsylvania, three; to Delaware, one; to Mary- 
land, two ; to Virginia, three ; to North Carolina, 
two ; to South Carolina, two ; to Georgia, one. 

The question, as moved by Mr. Ellsworth, being 
divided, on the first part " Shall the National Execu- 
tive be appointed by Electors V 1 — Connecticut, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
aye — 6; North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
no — 3 ; Massachusetts, divided. 

On the second part, " Shall the Electors be cho- 
sen by the State Legislatures?" — Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Vir- 
ginia, South Carolina, no — 2. 

The part relating to the ratio in which the States 
should choose Electors was postponed, nem. con. 

Mr. L. Martin moved that the Executive be ineli- 
gible a second time. 

Mr. Williamson seconds the motion. He had no 
great confidence in electors to be chosen for the spe- 
cial purpose. They would not be the most respec- 
table citizens ; but persons not occupied in the high 
offices of government. They would be liable to 
undue influence, which might the more readily be 
practised, as some of them will probably be in ap- 
pointment six or eight months before the object of it 
comes on. 

Mr. Ellsworth supposed any persons might be 
appointed Electors, except, solely, members of the 
National Legislature. 

On the question, u Shall he be ineligible a second 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1151 

time?' 7 — North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 2; 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsyl- 
vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, 
no — 8. 

On the question, " Shall the Executive continue 
for seven years V It passed in the negative, — * Con- 
necticut, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 3 ; * New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
no — 5 ; Massachusetts, North Carolina, divided. 

Mr. King was afraid we should shorten the term 
too much. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was for a short term, in 
order to avoid impeachments, which would be other- 
wise necessary. 

Mr. Butler was against the frequency of the 
elections. Georgia and South Carolina were too 
distant to send electors often. 

Mr. Ellsworth was for six years. If the elec- 
tions be too frequent, the Executive will not be firm 
enough. There must be duties which will make 
him unpopular for the moment. There will be outs 
as well as ins. His administration, therefore, will be 
attacked and misrepresented. 

Mr. Williamson was for six years. The expense 
will be considerable, and ought not to be unnecessa- 
rily repeated. If the elections are too frequent, the 
best men will not undertake the service, and those 
of an inferior character will be liable to be cor- 
rupted. 

On the question for six years, — Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 

* In the printed Journal, Connecticut, no : New Jersey, aye. 



1152 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
aye — 9; Delaware, no. 
Adjourned. 



Friday, July 20th. 



In Convention, — The proposed ratio of Electors 
for appointing the Executive, to wit : one for each 
State whose inhabitants do not exceed two hundred 
thousand, &c, being taken up, — 

Mr. Madison observed that this would make, in 
time, all or nearly all the States equal, since there 
were few that would not in time contain the num- 
ber of inhabitants entitling them to three Electors ; 
that this ratio ought either to be made temporary, 
or so varied as that it would adjust itself to the 
growing population of the States. 

Mr. Gerry moved that in the first instance the Elec- 
tors should be allotted to the States in the following 
ratio : to New Hampshire, one ; Massachusetts, three ; 
Rhode Island one; Connecticut, two; New York, 
two ; New Jersey, two ; Pennsylvania, three ; Dela- 
ware, one ; Maryland, two ; Virginia, three ; North 
Carolina, two ; South Carolina, two ; Georgia, one. 

On the question to postpone in order to take up 
this- motion of Mr. Gerry, it passed in the affirma- 
tive, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Connec- 
ticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no — 4. 

Mr. Ellsworth moved that two Electors be al- 
lotted to New Hampshire. Some rule ought to be 



1787-] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1.153 

pursued; and New Hampshire has more than a 
hundred thousand inhabitants. He thought it would 
be proper also to allot two to Georgia. 

Mr. Broom and Mr. Martin moved to postpone 
Mr. Gerry's allotment of Electors, leaving a fit 
ratio to be reported by the Committee to be ap- 
pointed for detailing the Resolutions. 

On this motion, — New Jersey, Delaware, Mary- 
land, aye— 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Penn- 
sylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 7. 

Mr. Houston seconded the motion of Mr. Ells- 
worth to add another Elector to New Hampshire 
and Georgia. 

On the question,— Connecticut, South Carolina, 
Georgia, aye — 3 ; Masssachusetts, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, no — 7. 

Mr. Williamson moved as an amendment to Mr. 
Gerry's allotment of Electors, in the first instance, 
that in future elections of the National Executive 
the number of Electors to be appointed by the sev- 
eral States shall be regulated by their respective 
numbers of representatives in the first branch, pur- 
suing as nearly as may be, the present proportions. 

On the question on Mr. Gerry's ratio of Elec- 
tors, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 6 ; 
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, no — 4. 

On the clause, " to be removable on impeachment 
and conviction for malpractice or neglect of duty," 
(see the ninth Resolution), — 281 

Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved 

Vol. I.— 73 



1154 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

to strike out this part of the Resolution. Mr. 
Pinckney observed, he ought not to be impeachable 
whilst in office. 

Mr. Davie. If he be not impeachable whilst in 
office, he will spare no efforts or means whatever to 
get himself re-elected. He considered this as an 
essential security for the good behaviour of the Ex- 
ecutive. 

Mr, Wilson concurred in the necessity of making 
the Executive impeachable whilst in office. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. He can do no criminal 
act without coadjutors, who may be punished. In 
case he should be re-elected, that will be a sufficient 
proof of his innocence. Besides, who is to impeach 1 
Is the impeachment to suspend his functions ? If it 
is not, the mischief will go on. If it is, the im- 
peachment will be nearly equivalent to a displace- 
ment ; and will render the Executive dependent on 
those who are to impeach. 

Colonel Mason. No point is of more importance 
than that the right of impeachment should be con- 
tinued. Shall any man be above justice? Above 
all, shall that man be above it who can commit the 
most extensive injustice ? When great crimes were 
committed, he was for punishing the principal as 
well as the coadjutors. There had been much de- 
bate and difficulty as to the mode of choosing the 
Executive. He approved of that which had been 
adopted at first, namely, of referring the appointment 
to the National Legislature. One objection against 
Electors was the danger of their being corrupted by 
the candidates, and this furnished a peculiar reason 
in favor of impeachments whilst in office. Shall 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1155 

the man who has practised corruption, and by that 
means procured his appointment in the first in- 
stance, be suffered to escape punishment by repeat- 
ing his guilt 1 

Doctor Franklin was for retaining the clause as 
favorable to the Executive. History furnishes one 
example only of a First Magistrate being formally 
brought, to public justice. Every body cried out 
against this as unconstitutional. What was the 
practice before this, in cases where the Chief Magis- 
trate rendered himself obnoxious ? Why, recourse 
was had to assassination, in which he was not only 
deprived of his life, but of the opportunity of vin- 
dicating his character. It would be the best way, 
therefore, to provide in the Constitution for the 
regular punishment of the Executive, where his mis- 
conduct should deserve it, and for his honorable 
acquittal, where he should be unjustly accused. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris admits corruption, and 
some few other offences, to be such as ought to be 
impeachable; but thought the cases ought to be 
enumerated and defined. 

Mr. Madison thought it indispensable that some 
provision should be made for defending the com- 
munity against the incapacity, negligence, or per- 
fidy of the Chief Magistrate. The limitation of the 
period of his service was not a sufficient security. 
He might lose his capacity after his appointment. 
He might pervert his administration into a scheme 
of peculation or oppression. He might betray his 
trust to foreign powers. The case of the Executive 
magistracy was very distinguishable from that of 
the Legislature, or any other public body, holding 



1156 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

offices of limited duration. It could not be presumed 
that all, or even the majority, of the members of 
an Assembly would either lose their capacity for 
discharging, or be bribed to betray, their trust. 
Besides, the restraints of their personal integrity 
and honor, the difficulty of acting in concert for 
purposes of corruption was a security to the public. 
And if one or a few members only should be seduced, 
the soundness of the remaining members would 
maintain the integrity and fidelity of the body. In 
the case of the Executive magistracy, which was to 
be administered by a single man, loss of capacity or 
corruption was more within the compass of probable 
events, and either of them might be fatal to the 
Republic. 

Mr. Pinckney did not see the necessity of im- 
peachments. He was sure they ought not to issue 
from the Legislature, who would in that case hold 
them as a rod over the Executive, and by that 
means effectually destroy his independence. His 
revisionary power in particular would be rendered 
altogether insignificant. 

Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of impeach- 
ments. A good magistrate will not fear them. A 
bad one ought to be kept in fear of them. He 
hoped the maxim would never be adopted here, that 
the chief magistrate could do no wrong. 

Mr. King expressed his apprehensions that an 
extreme caution in favor of liberty, might enervate 
the government we were forming. He wished the 
House to recur to the primitive axiom, that the 
three great departments of government should be 
separate and independent ; that the Executive and 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1157 

Judiciary should be so as well as the Legislative ; 
that the Executive should be so equally with the 
Judiciary. Would this be the case if the Executive 
should be impeachable? It had been said, that the 
Judiciary would be impeachable. But it should 
have been remembered, at the same time, that the 
Judiciary hold their places not for a limited time, 
but during good behaviour. It is necessary, there- 
fore, that a form should be established for trying 
misbehaviour. Was the Executive to hold his 
place during good behaviour ? The Executive was 
to hold his place for a limited time, like the members 
of the Legislature. Like them, particularly the 
Senate, whose members would continue in appoint- 
ment the same term of six years, he would periodi- 
cally be tried for his behaviour by his electors, who 
would continue or discontinue him in trust according 
to the manner in which he had discharged it. Like 
them, therefore, he ought to be subject to no inter- 
mediate trial, by impeachment. He ought not to 
be impeachable unless he held his office during good 
behaviour, a tenure which would be most agreeable 
to him, provided an independent and effectual forum 
could be devised. But under no circumstances 
ought he to be impeachable by the Legislature. 
This would be destructive of his independence, and 
of the principles of the Constitution. He relied on 
the vigor of the Executive, as a great security for 
the public liberties. 

Mr. Randolph. The propriety of impeachments 
was a favorite principle with him. Guilt, wherever 
found, ought to be punished. The Executive will 
have great opportunities of abusing his power ; par- 



1158 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ticularly in time of war, when the military force, 
and in some respects the public money, will be in 
his hands. Should no regular punishment be pro- 
vided, it will be irregularly inflicted by tumults and 
insurrections. He is aware of the necessity of pro- 
ceeding Avith a cautious hand, and of excluding as 
much as possible the influence of the Legislature 
from the business. He suggested for consideration 
an idea which had fallen (from Colonel Hamilton), 
of composing a forum out of the Judges belonging to 
the States ; and even of requiring some preliminary 
inquest, whether just ground of impeachment ex- 
isted. 

Doctor Franklin mentioned the case of the Prince 
of Orange, during the late war. An arrangement 
was made between France and Holland, by which 
their two fleets were to unite at a certain time and 
place. The Dutch fleet did not appear. Every 
body began to wonder at it. At length it was sus- 
pected that the Stadtholder was at the bottom of 
the matter. This suspicion prevailed more and 
more. Yet as he could not be impeached, and no 
regular examination took place, he remained in his 
office ; and strengthening his own party, as the party 
opposed to him became formidable, he gave birth to 
the most violent animosities and contentions. Had 
he been impeachable, a regular and peaceable in- 
quiry would have taken place, and he would, if 
guilty, have been duly punished, — if innocent, re- 
stored to the confidence of the public. 

Mr. King remarked, that the case of the Stadt- 
holder was not applicable. He held his place for 
life, and was not periodically elected. In the former 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1159 

case, impeachments are proper to secure good be- 
haviour. In the latter, they are unnecessary ; the 
periodical responsibility to the Electors being an 
equivalent security. 

Mr. Wilson observed, that if the idea were to be 
pursued, the Senators who are to hold their places 
during the same term with the Executive, ought to 
be subject to impeachment and removal. 

Mr. Pinckney apprehended that some gentlemen 
reasoned on a supposition that the Executive was 
to have powers which would not be committed to 
him. He presumed that his powers w T ould be so 
circumscribed as to render impeachments unneces- 
sary. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris's opinion had been chang- 
ed by the arguments used in the discussion. He was 
now sensible of the necessity of impeachments, if the 
Executive was to continue for any length of time in 
office. Our Executive was not like a magistrate 
having a life interest, much less, like one having an 
hereditary interest, in his office. He may be bribed 
by a greater interest to betray his trust ; and no one 
would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the 
danger of seeing the First Magistrate in foreign pay, 
without being able to guard against it by displacing 
him. One would think the King of England well 
secured against bribery. He has, as it were, a fee 
simple in the whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II. was 
bribed by Louis XIV. The Executive ought, there- 
fore, to be impeachable for treachery. Corrupting 
his Electors, and incapacity, were other causes of 
impeachment. For the latter he should be punish- 
ed, not as a man, but as an officer, and punished on- 



1160 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ly by degradation from his office. This Magistrate 
is not the King, but the prime minister. The people 
are the King. When we make him amenable to 
justice, however, we should take care to provide 
some mode that will not make him dependent on the 
Legislature. 

It was moved and seconded to postpone the 
question of impeachments ; which was negativ- 
ed, — Massachusetts and South Carolina, only, being 
aye. 

On the question, Shall the Executive be remova- 
ble on impeachments, (fee. ? — Connecticut, New Jer* 
sey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Massachusetts, 
South Carolina, no — 2. 

" The Executive to receive fixed compensation," — * 
agreed to, nem. con. 

"To be paid out of the National Treasury," — 
agreed to, New Jersey only in the negative. 

Mr. Gerry and Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved, 
"that the Electors of the Executive shall not be 
members of the National Legislature, nor officers of 
the United States, nor shall the Electors themselves 
be eligible to the supreme magistracy." Agreed to, 
nem. con. 

Doctor McClurg asked, whether it would not be 
necessary, before a committee for detailing the Con- 
stitution should be appointed, to determine on the 
means by which the Executive is to carry the laws 
into effect, and to resist combinations against them. 
Is he to have a military force for the purpose, or to 
have the command of the Militia, the only existing 
force that can be applied to that use ? As the Res- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1161 

olutions now stand, the Committee will have no de- 
terminate directions on this great point. 

Mr. Wilson thought that some additional direc- 
tions to the Committee would be necessary. 

Mr. King. The Committee are to provide for 
the end. Their discretionary power to provide for 
the means is involved, according to an established 
axiom. 

Adjourned. 



Saturday, July 21st. 

In Convention, — Mr. Williamson moved, " that 
the Electors of the Executive should be paid out of 
the National Treasury for the service to be perform- 
ed by them." Justice required this, as it was a na- 
tional service they were to render. The motion was 
agreed to, nem. con. 

Mr. Wilson moved, as an amendment to the tenth 
Resolution, "that the Supreme National Judiciary 
should be associated with the Executive in the re- 
visionary power." This proposition had been before 
made and failed ; but he was so confirmed by reflec- 
tion in the opinion of its utility, that he thought it 
incumbent on him to make another effort. The Ju- 
diciary ought to have an opportunity of remonstra- 
ting against projected encroachments on the people 
as well as on themselves. It had been said, that the 
Judges, as expositors of the laws, would have an 
opportunity of defending their constitutional rights. 
There was weight in this observation ; but this 
power of the Judges did not go far enough. Laws 

Vol, I.— 73* 



1162 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, 
may be destructive ; and yet may not be so uncon- 
stitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give 
them effect. Let them have a share in the revision- 
ary power, and they will have an opportunity of 
taking notice of those characters of a law, and of 
counteracting, by the weight of their opinions, the 
improper views of the Legislature. — Mr. Madison 
seconded the motion. 

Mr. Gorham did not see the advantage of employ- 
ing the Judges in this way. As Judges they are not 
to be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge 
of the mere policy of public measures. Nor can it 
be necessary as a security for their constitutional 
rights. The Judges in England have no such addi- 
tional provision for their defence, yet their jurisdic- 
tion is not invaded. He thought it would be best to 
let the Executive alone be responsible, and at most 
to authorize him to call on the Judges for their 
opinions. 

Mr. Ellsworth approved heartily of the motion. 
The aid of the Judges will give more wisdom and 
firmness to the Executive. They will possess a sys- 
tematic and accurate knowledge of the laws, which 
the Executive cannot be expected always to possess. 
The Law of Nations also w T ill frequently come into 
question. Of this the Judges alone will have com- 
petent information. 

Mr. Madison considered the object of the motion 
as of great importance to the meditated Constitu- 
tion. It would be useful to the Judiciary Depart- 
ment by giving it an additional opportunity of de- 
fending itself against Legislative encroachments. It 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1163 

would be useful to the Executive, by inspiring addi- 
tional confidence and firmness in exerting the re- 
visionary power. It would be useful to the Legis- 
lature, by the valuable assistance it would give in 
preserving a consistency, conciseness, perspicuity, 
and technical propriety in the laws, qualities pecu- 
liarly necessary, and yet shamefully wanting in our 
Republican codes. It would, moreover, be useful to 
the community at large, as an additional check 
against a pursuit of those unwise and unjust mea- 
sures which constituted so great a portion of our 
calamities. If any solid objection could be urged 
against the motion, it must be on the supposition 
that it tended to give too much strength, either to 
the Executive, or Judiciary. He did not think there 
was the least ground for this apprehension. It was 
much more to be apprehended, that, notwithstand- 
ing this co-operation of the two departments, the 
Legislature would still be an overmatch for them. 
{Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful 
tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into 
its vortex. This was the real source of danger to 
the American Constitutions ^and suggested the ne- 
cessity of giving every defensive authority to the 
other departments that was consistent with republi- 
can principles. 

Mr. Mason said, he had always been a friend to 
this provision. It would give a confidence to the 
Executive, which he would not otherwise have, and 
without which the revisionary power would be of 
little avail. 

Mr. Gerry did not expect to see this point, which 
had undergone full discussion, again revived. The 



1164 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

object he conceived of the revisionary power was 
merely to secure the Executive department against 
Legislative encroachment. The Executive, there- 
fore, who will best know and be ready to defend his 
rights, ought alone to have the defence of them. 
The motion was liable to strong objections. It was 
combining and mixing together the Legislative and 
the other departments. It was establishing an im- 
proper coalition between the Executive and Judi- 
ciary departments. It was making statesmen of the 
Judges, and setting them up as the guardians of the 
rights of the people. He relied, for his part, on the 
Representatives of the people, as the guardians of 
their rights and interests. It was making the ex- 
positors of the laws the legislators, which ought 
never to be done. A better expedient for correcting 
the laws would be to appoint, as had been done in 
Pennsylvania, a person or persons of proper skill, to 
draw bills for the Legislature. 

Mr. Strong thought, with Mr. Gerry, that the 1 
power of making, ought to be kept distinct from 
that of expounding, the laws. No maxim was bet- 
ter established. The Judges in exercising the func- 
tion of expositors might be influenced by the part 
they had taken in passing the laws. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. Some check being ne- 
cessary on the Legislature, the question is, in what 
hands it should be lodged 1 On one side, it was con- 
tended, that the Executive alone ought to exercise 
it. He did not think that an Executive appointed 
for six years, and impeachable whilst in office, would 
be a very effectual check. On the other side, it was 
urged, that he ought to be reinforced by the Judici- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1165 

ary department. Against this it was objected, that 
expositors of laws ought to have no hand in making 
them, and arguments in favor of this had been drawn 
from England. What weight was due to them 
might be easily determined by an attention to facts. 
The truth was, that the Judges in England had a 
great share in the legislation. They are consulted 
in difficult and doubtful cases. They may be, and 
some of them are, members of the Legislature. 
They are, or may be, members of the Privy Coun- 
cil ; and can there advise the Executive, as they will 
do with us if the motion succeeds. The influence 
the English Judges may have, in the latter capacity, 
in strengthening the Executive check, cannot be as- 
certained, as the King, by his influence, in a manner 
dictates the laws. There is one difference in the 
two cases, however, which disconcerts all reasoning 
from the British to our proposed Constitution. The 
British Executive has so great an interest in his pre- 
rogatives, and such power for means of defending 
them, that he will never yield any part of them. 
The interest of our Executive is so inconsiderable 
and so transitory, and his means of defending it so 
feeble, that there is the justest ground to fear his 
want of firmness in resisting encroachments. He 
was extremely apprehensive that the auxiliary firm- 
ness and weight of the Judiciary would not supply 
the deficiency. /He concurred in thinking the pub- 
lic liberty in greater danger from Legislative usur- 
pations, than from any other source^ It had been 
said that the Legislature ought to be relied on, as 
the proper guardians of liberty. The answer was 
short and conclusive. Either bad laws will be 



1166 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

pushed, or not. On the latter supposition, no check 
will be wanted. On the former, a strong check 
will be necessary. And this is the proper supposi- 
tion. Emissions of paper-money, largesses to the 
people, a remission of debts, and similar measures, 
will at some times be popular, and will be pushed for 
that reason. At other times, such measures will coin- 
cide with the interests of the Legislature themselves, 
and that will be a reason not less cogent for pushing 
them. It may be thought that the people will not be 
deluded and misled in the latter case. But experience 
teaches another lesson. The press is indeed a great 
means of diminishing the evil ; yet it is found to be 
unable to prevent it altogether. 

Mr. L. Martin considered the association of the 
Judges with the Executive, as a dangerous innova- 
tion; as well as one that could not produce the par- 
ticular advantage expected from it. A knowledge 
of mankind, and of Legislative affairs, cannot be pre- 
sumed to belong in a higher degree to the Judges 
than to the Legislature. | And as to the constitution- 
ality of laws, that point will come before the Judges 
in their official character. In this character they 
have a negative on the laws. Join them with the 
Executive in the revision, and they will have a 
double negative. It is necessary that the Supreme 
Judiciary should have the confidence of the people. 
This will soon be lost, if they are employed in the 
the task of remonstrating against popular measures 
of the Legislature. Besides, in what mode and pro- 
portion are they to vote in the Council of Revision ? 

Mr. Madison could not discover in the proposed 
association of the Judges with the Executive, in the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1167 

revisionary check on the Legislature, any violation 
of the maxim which requires the great departments 
of power to be kept separate and distinct. On the 
contrary, he thought it an auxiliary precaution, in 
favor of the maxim. If a constitutional discrimina- 
tion of the departments on paper were a sufficient 
security to each against encroachments of the oth- 
ers, all further provisions would indeed be superfluous. 
But experience had taught us a distrust of that se- 
curity ; and that it is necessary to introduce such a 
balance of powers and interests as will guarantee 
the provisions on paper. Instead, therefore, of con- 
tenting ourselves with laying down the theory in the 
Constitution, that each department ought to be sepa- 
rate and distinct, it was proposed to add a defensive 
power to each, which should maintain the theory in 
practice. In so doing, we did not blend the depart- 
ments together. We erected effectual barriers for 
keeping them separate. The most regular example 
of this theory was in the British Constitution. Yet 
it was not only the practice there to admit the 
Judges to a seat in the Legislature, and in the Ex- 
ecutive Councils, and submit to their previous exam- 
ination all laws of a certain description, but it was 
a part of their Constitution that the Executive 
might negative any law whatever ; a part of their 
Constitution which had been universally regarded as 
calculated for the preservation of the whole. The 
objection against a union of the Judiciary and Ex- 
ecutive branches, in the revision of the laws, had 
either no foundation, or was not carried far enough. 
If such a union was an improper mixture of powers, 
or such a Judiciary check on the laws was inconsist- 



1 168 DEBATES IN THE [ 1787. 

ent with the theory of a free constitution, it was 
equally so to admit the Executive to any participa- 
tion in the making of laws; and the revisionary 
plan ought to be discarded altogether. 

Colonel Mason observed, that the defence of the 
Executive was not the sole object of the revisionary 
power. He expected even greater advantages from 
it. Notwithstanding the precautions taken in the 
constitution of the Legislature, it would still so 
much resemble that of the individual States, that it 
must be expected frequently to pass unjust and per- 
nicious laws. This restraining power was therefore 
essentially necessary. It would have the effect, not 
only of hindering the final passage of such laws, 
but would discourage demagogues from attempting 
to get them passed. It has been said (by Mr. L. 
Martin), that if the Judges were joined in this 
check on the laws, they would have a double nega- 
tive, since in their expository capacity of Judges 
they would have one negative. He would reply, 
that in this capacity they could impede, in one case 
only, the operation of laws. They could declare an 
unconstitutional law void. But with regard to every 
law, however unjust, oppressive or pernicious, that 
did not come plainly under this description, they 
would be under the necessity, as Judges, to give it 
a free course. He wished the further use to be made 
of the Judges of giving aid in preventing every im- 
proper law. Their aid will be the more valuable, 
as they are in the habit and practice of considering 
laws in their true principles, and in all their conse- 
quences. 

Mr. Wilson. The separation of the departments 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1169 

does not require that they should have separate ob- 
jects; but that they should act separately, though 
on the same objects. It is necessary that the two 
branches of the Legislature should be separate and 
distinct, yet they are both to act precisely on the 
same object. 

Mr. Gerry had rather give the Executive an ab- 
solute negative for its own defence, than thus to blend 
together the Judiciary and Executive departments. 
It will bind them together in an offensive and defen- 
sive alliance against the Legislature, and render the 
latter unwilling to enter into a contest with them. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was surprised that any 
defensive provision for securing the effectual separa- 
tion of the departments should be considered as an 
improper mixture of them. Suppose that the three 
powers were to be vested in three persons, by com- 
pact among themselves ; that one was to have the 
power of making, another of executing, and a third 
of judging, the laws. Would it not be very natural 
for the two latter, after having settled the partition 
on paper, to observe, and would not candor oblige 
the former to admit, that, as a security against legis- 
lative acts of the former, which might easily be so 
framed as to undermine the powers of the two 
others, the two others ought to be armed with a 
veto for their own defence ; or at least to have an 
opportunity of stating their objections against acts 
of encroachment? And would any one pretend, 
that such a right tended to blend and confound 
powders that ought to be separately exercised ? As 
w^ell might it be said that if three neighbours had 
three distinct farms, a right in each to defend his 

Vol. I.— 74 



1170 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

farm against his neighbours, tended to blend the 
farms together. 

Mr. Gorham. All agree that a check on the 
Legislature is necessary. But there are two ob- 
jections against admitting the Judges to share in it, 
which no observations on the other side seem to 
obviate. The first is, that the Judges ought to carry 
into the exposition of the laws no prepossessions 
with regard to them ; the second, that, as the Judges 
will outnumber the Executive, the revisionary check 
would be thrown entirely out of the Executive 
hands, and, instead of enabling him to defend him- 
self, would enable the Judges to sacrifice him. 

Mr, Wilson. The proposition is certainly not 
liable to all the objections which have been urged 
against it. According to (Mr. Gerry), it will unite 
the Executive and Judiciary in an offensive and 
defensive alliance against the Legislature. Accord- 
ing to (Mr. Gorham), it will lead to a subversion of 
the Executive by the Judiciary influence. To the 
first gentleman the answer was obvious: that the 
joint weight of the two Departments was necessary 
to balance the single weight of the Legislature. To 
the first objection stated by the other gentleman it 
might be answered, that, supposing the preposses- 
sion to mix itself with the exposition, the evil would 
be over-balanced by the advantages promised by 
the expedient. To the second objection, th^t such 
a rule of voting might be provided, in the detail, as 
would guard against it. 

Mr. Rutledge thought the Judges of all men the 
most unfit to be concerned in the Revisionary Coun- 
cil. The Judges ought never to give their opinion 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1171 

on a law, till it conies before them. He thought it 
equally unnecessary. The Executive could advise 
with the officers of state, as of War, Finance, &c, 
and avail himself of their information and opinions. 

On the question on Mr. Wilson's motion for 
joining the Judiciary in the revision of laws, it passed 
in the negative, — Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, 
aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, no — 4; Pennsylvania, Georgia, di- 
vided ; New Jersey, not present. 282 

The tenth Resolution, giving the Executive a quali- 
fied veto, requiring two-thirds of each branch of the 
Legislature to overrule it, was then agreed to nem. con. 

The motion made by Mr. Madison, on the eight- 
eenth of July, and then postponed, "that the 
Judges should be nominated by the Executive, and 
such nominations become appointments unless dis- 
agreed to by two-thirds of the second branch of the 
Legislature," was now resumed. 283 

Mr. Madison stated as his reasons for the motion : 
first, that it secured the responsibility of the Executive, 
who would in general be more capable and likely to 
select fit characters than the Legislature, or even the 
second branch of it, who might hide their selfish 
motives under the number concerned in the appoint- 
ment. Secondly, that in case of any flagrant parti- 
ality or error in the nomination, it might be fairly 
presumed that two-thirds of the second branch 
would join in putting a negative on it. Thirdly, 
that as the second branch was very differently 
constituted, when the appointment of the Judges 
was formerly referred to it, and was now to be com- 
posed of equal votes from all the States, the principle 



1172 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

of compromise which had prevailed in other in- 
stances required in this that there should be a con- 
currence of two authorities, in one of which the 
people, in the other the States, should be represented. 
The Executive magistrate would be considered as a 
national officer, acting for and equally sympathizing 
with every part of the United States. If the second 
branch alone should have this power, the Judges 
might be appointed by a minority of the people, 
though by a majority of the States ; which could 
not be justified on any principle, as their proceedings 
were to relate to the people rather than to the 
States; and as it would, moreover, throw the ap- 
pointments entirely into the hands of the Northern 
States, a perpetual ground of jealousy and discon- 
tent would be furnished to the Southern States. 

Mr. Pinckney was for placing the appointment in 
the second branch exclusively. The Executive will 
possess neither the requisite knowledge of charac- 
ters, nor confidence of the people, for so high a trust. 

Mr. Randolph would have preferred the mode 
of appointment proposed formerly by Mr. Gorham, 
as adopted in the Constitution of Massachusetts, but 
thought the motion depending so great an improve- 
ment of the clause as it stands, that he anxiously 
wished it success. He laid great stress on the re- 
sponsibility of the Executive, as a security for fit 
appointments. Appointments by the Legislatures 
have generally resulted from cabal, from personal 
regard, or some other consideration than a title 
derived from the proper qualifications. The same 
inconveniences will proportionally prevail, if the ap- 
pointments be referred to either branch of the Legis- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1173 

lature, or to any other authority administered by a 
number of individuals. 

Mr. Ellsworth would prefer a negative in the 
Executive on a nomination by the second branch, 
the negative to be overruled by a concurrence of two- 
thirds of the second branch, to the mode proposed by 
the motion, but preferred an absolute appointment 
the second branch to either. The Executive will 
be regarded by the people with a jealous eye. 
Every power for augmenting unnecessarily his influ- 
ence will be disliked. As he will be stationary, it was 
not to be supposed he could have a better knowledge 
of characters. He will be more open to caresses and in- 
trigues than the Senate. The right to supersede his no- 
mination will be ideal only. A nomination under such 
circumstances will be equivalent to an appointment. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris supported the motion. 
First, the States, in their corporate capacity, w 7 ill 
frequently have an interest staked on the determin- 
ation of the Judges. As in the Senate the States 
are to vote, the Judges ought not to be appointed 
by the Senate. Next to the impropriety of being 
judge in one's own cause, is the appointment of the 
Judge. Secondly, it had been said, the Executive 
w r ould be uninformed of characters. The reverse 
w T as the truth. The Senate will be so. They must 
take the character of candidates from the flattering 
pictures drawn by their friends. The Executive, in 
the necessary intercourse with every part of the 
United States required by the nature of his ad- 
ministration, will or may have the best possible in- 
formation. Thirdly, it had been said that a jealousy 
would be entertained of the Executive. If the Ex* 



1174 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

ecutive can be safely trusted with the command 
of the army, there cannot surely be any reasonable 
ground of jealousy in the present case. He added, 
that if the objections against an appointment of the 
Executive by the Legislature had the weight that 
had been allowed, there must be some weight in 
the objection to an appointment of the Judges by 
the Legislature, or by any part of it. 

Mr. Gerrv. The appointment of the Judges, like 
every other part of the Constitution, should be so 
modelled as to give satisfaction both to the people 
and to the States. The mode under consideration 
will give satisfaction to neither. He could not con- 
ceive that the Executive could be as well informed 
of characters throughout the Union, as the Senate. 
It appeared to him, also, a strong objection, that 
two-thirds of the Senate were required to reject a 
nomination of the Executive. The Senate would be 
constituted in the same manner as Congress, and the 
appointments of Congress have been generally good. 

Mr. Madison observed, that he was not anxious 
that two-thirds should be necessary, to disagree to a 
nomination. He had given this form to his motion, 
chiefly to vary it the more clearly from one which 
had just been rejected. He was content to obviate 
the objection last made, and accordingly so varied 
the motion as to let a majority reject. 

Col. Mason found it his duty to differ from his col- 
leagues in their opinions and reasonings on this sub- 
ject. Notwithstanding the form of the proposition, 
by which the appointment seemed to be divided 
between the Executive and Senate, the appoint- 
ment was substantially vested in the former alone, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1175 

The false complaisance which usually prevails in 
such cases will prevent a disagreement to the first 
nominations. He considered the appointment by 
the Executive as a dangerous prerogative. It might 
even give him an influence over the Judiciary De- 
partment itself. He did not think the difference of 
interest between the Northern and Southern States 
could be properly brought into this argument. It 
would operate, and require some precautions in the 
case of regulating navigation, commerce and im- 
posts; but he could not see that it had any connec- 
tion with the Judiciary department. 

On the question, the motion being now, " that the 
Executive should nominate, and such nominations 
should become appointments unless disagreed to by 
the Senate," Masschusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
aye — 3 ; Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6. 284 

On the question for agreeing to the clause as it 
stands, by which the Judges are to be appointed by 
the second branch, — Connecticut, Delaware, Mary- 
land, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye 
— 6 ; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, no — 3 ; 
so it passed in the affirmative. 

Adjourned. * 



Monday, June 23d. 

In Convention, — Mr. John Langdon and Mr. Nich- 
olas Gillman, from New Hampshire, took their 
seats. 

The seventeenth Resolution, that provision ought 



1176 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

to be made for future amendments of the Articles 
of the Union, was agreed to, nem. con. 

The eighteenth Resolution, requiring the Legisla- 
tive, Executive and Judiciary of the States to be 
bound by oath to support the Articles of Union, was 
taken into consideration. 

Mr. Williamson suggests, that a reciprocal oath 
should be required from the National officers, to sup- 
port the Governments of the States. 

Mr. Gerry moved to insert, as an amendment, 
that the oath of the officers of the National Gov- 
ernment also should extend to the support of the 
National Government, which was agreed to, nem. con. 

Mr. Wilson said, he was never fond of oaths, con- 
sidering them as a left-handed security only. A 
good government did not need them, and a bad one 
could not or ought not to be supported. He was 
afraid they might too much trammel the members 
of the existing government, in case future alterations 
should be necessary ; and prove an obstacle to the 
seventeenth Resolution, just agreed to. 

Mr. Gorham did not know that oaths would be of 
much use ; but could see no inconsistency between 
them and the seventeenth Resolution, or any regular 
amendment of the Constitution. The oath could 
only require fidelity to the existing Constitution. 
A constitutional alteration of the Constitution could 
never be regarded as a breach of the Constitution, 
or of any oath to support it. 

Mr. Gerry thought, with Mr. Gorham, there could 
be no shadow of inconsistency in the case. Nor 
could he see any other harm that could result from the 
Resolution. On the other side, he thought one good 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1177 

effect would be produced by it. Hitherto the officers 
of the two Governments had considered them as 
distinct from, and not as parts of, the general sys- 
tem, and had, in all cases of interference given a 
preference to the State Governments. The pro- 
posed oath will cure that error. 

The Resolution (the eighteenth) was agreed to, 
nem con. 

The nineteenth Resolution, referring the new 
Constitution to Assemblies to be chosen by the peo- 
ple, for the express purpose of ratifying it, was next 
taken into consideration. 

Mr. Ellsworth moved that it be referred to the 
Legislatures of the States for ratification. Mr. Pat- 
terson seconded the motion. 

Colonel Mason considered a reference of the plan 
to the authority of the people, as one of the most im- 
portant and essential of the Resolutions. The Le- 
gislatures have no power to ratify it. They are the 
mere creatures of the State Constitutions, and can- 
not be greater than their creators. And he knew 
of no power in any of the Constitutions — he knew 
there was no power in some of them — that could be 
competent to this object. Whither, then, must we 
resort ? To the people, with whom all power re- 
mains that has not been given up in the constitutions 
derived from them. It was of great moment, he ob- 
served, that this doctrine should be cherished, as the 
basis of free government. Another strong reason 
was, that admitting the Legislatures to have a com- 
petent authority, it would be w T rong to refer the 
plan to them, because succeeding Legislatures, hav- 
ing equal authority, could undo the acts of their 

Vol. I.— 74* 



1178 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

predecessors ; and the National Government would 
stand in each State on the weak and tottering foun- 
dation of an act of Assembly. There was a remain- 
ing consideration, of some weight. In some of the 
States, the governments were not derived from the 
clear and undisputed authority of the people. This 
was the case in Virginia. Some of the best and 
wisest citizens considered the Constitution as estab- 
lished by an assumed authority. A National Con- 
stitution derived from such a source would be ex- 
posed to the severest criticisms. 

Mr. Randolph. One idea has pervaded all our 
proceedings, to wit., that opposition as well from the 
States as from individuals, will be made to the sys- 
tem to be proposed. Will it not then be highly im- 
prudent to furnish any unnecessary pretext, by the 
mode of ratifying it? Added to other objections 
against a ratification by the Legislative authority 
only, it may be remarked, that there have been in- 
stances in which the authority of the common law 
has been set up in particular States against that of 
the Confederation, which has had no higher sanction 
than Legislative ratification. Whose opposition will 
be most likely to be excited against the system? 
That of the local demagogues who will be degra- 
ded by it, from the importance they now hold. 
These will spare no efforts to impede that progress 
in the popular mind, which will be necessary to the 
adoption of the plan ; and which every member will 
find to have taken place in his own, if he will com- 
pare his present opinions with those he brought with 
him into the Convention. It is of great importance, 
therefore, that the consideration of this subject 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1179 

should be transferred from the Legislatures, where 
this class of men have their full influence, to a field 
in which their efforts can be less mischievous. It is 
moreover worthy of consideration, that some of the 
States are averse to any change in their Constitu- 
tion, and will not take the requisite steps, unless ex- 
pressly called upon, to refer the question to the 
people. 

Mr. Gerry. The arguments of Colonel Mason 
and Mr. Randolph prove too much. They prove an 
unconstitutionality in the present Federal system, 
and even in some of the State Governments. Infer- 
ences drawn from such a source must be inadmissi- 
ble. Both the State Governments and the Federal 
Government have been too long acquiesced in, to be 
now shaken. He considered the Confederation to 
be paramount to any State Constitution. The last 
Article of it, authorizing alterations, must conse- 
quently be so as well as the others ; and every thing 
clone in pursuance of the article, must have the same 
high authority with the article. Great confusion, 
he was confident, would result from a recurrence to 
the people. They would never agree on any thing. 
He could not see any ground to suppose, that the 
people will do what their rulers will not. The ru- 
lers will either conform to, or influence the sense of 
the people. 

Mr. Gorham was against referring the plan to the 
Legislatures. 1. Men chosen by the people for the 
particular purpose will discuss the subject more can- 
didly than members of the Legislature, who are to 
lose the power which is to be given up to the Gene- 
ral Government. 2. Some of the Legislatures are 



1180 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

composed of several branches. It will consequently 
be more difficult, in these cases, to get the plan 
through the Legislatures, than through a Conven- 
tion. 3. In the States, many of the ablest men are 
excluded from the Legislatures, but may be elected 
into a Convention. Among these may be ranked 
many of the clergy, who are generally friends to 
good government. Their services were found to be 
valuable in the formation and establishment of the 
Constitution of Massachusetts. 4. The Legislatures 
will be interrupted with a variety of little business ; 
by artfully pressing which, designing men will find 
means to delay from year to year, if not to frustrate 
altogether, the national system. 5. If the last Arti- 
cle of the confederation is to be pursued, the unani- 
mous concurrence of the States will be necessary. 
But will any one say that all the States are to suffer 
themselves to be ruined, if Rhode Island should per- 
sist in her opposition to general measures ? Some 
other States might also tread in her steps. The 
present advantage, which New York seems to be so 
much attached to, of taxing her neighbours by the 
regulation of her trade, makes it very probable that 
she will be of the number. It would, therefore, de- 
serve serious consideration, whether provision ought 
not to be made for giving effect to the system, with- 
out waiting for the unanimous concurrence of the 
States. 

Mr. Ellsworth. If there be any Legislatures 
who should find themselves incompetent to the rati- 
fication, he should be content to let them advise with 
their constituents and pursue such a mode as would 
be competent. He thought more was to be expected 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 118.1 

from the Legislatures, than from the people. The 
prevailing wish of the people in the Eastern States 
is, to get rid of the public debt; and the idea of 
strengthening the National Government carries with 
it that of strengthening the public debt. It was 
said by Colonel Mason, — -in the first place, that the 
Legislatures have no authority in this case ; and in. 
the second, that their successors, having equal 
authority, could rescind their acts. As to the second 
point he could not admit it to be well founded. An 
act to which the States, by their Legislatures, make 
themselves parties, becomes a compact from which 
no one of the parties can recede of itself. As to the 
first point, he observed that a new set of ideas 
seemed to have crept in since the Articles of Con- 
federation were established. Conventions of the 
people, or with power derived expressly from the 
people, were not then thought of. The Legislatures 
were considered as competent. Their ratification 
has been acquiesced in without complaint. To 
whom have Congress applied on subsequent occa- 
sions for further powers 1 To the Legislatures, not 
to the people. The fact is, that we exist at present, 
and we need not inquire how, as a federal society, 
united by a charter, one article of which is, that 
alterations therein may be made by the Legislative 
authority of the States. It has been said, that if the 
Confederation is to be observed, the States must 
unanimously concur in the proposed innovations. He 
would answer, that if such were the urgency and 
necessity of our situation as to warrant a new com- 
pact among a part of the States, founded on the 
consent of the people; the same pleas would be 



1182 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

equally valid, in favor of a partial compact, founded 
on the consent of the Legislatures. 

Mr. Williamson thought the Resolution(the nine- 
teenth) so expressed, as that it might be submitted 
either to the Legislatures or to Conventions recom- 
mended by the Legislatures. He observed that 
some Legislatures were evidently unauthorized to 
ratify the system. He thought, too, that Conven- 
tions were to be preferred, as more likely to be com- 
posed of the ablest men in the States. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris considered the inference 
of Mr. Ellsworth from the plea of necessity, as ap- 
plied to the establishment of a new system, on the 
consent of the people of a part of the States, in favor 
of a like establishment, on the consent of a part of 
the Legislatures, as a non-seqiiitar. If the Confeder- 
ation is to be pursued, no alteration can be made 
without the unanimous consent of the Legislatures. 
Legislative alterations not conformable to the Fed- 
eral compact would clearly not be valid. The 
Judges would consider them as null and void. 
Whereas, in case of an appeal to the people of 
the United States, the supreme authority, the 
Federal compact may be altered by a majority 
of them, in like manner as the Constitution of a 
particular State may be altered by a majority of the 
people of the State. The amendment moved by 
Mr. Ellsworth erroneously supposes, that we are 
proceeding on the basis of the Confederation. This 
Convention is unknown to the Confederation. 

Mr. King thought with Mr. Ellsworth that the 
Legislatures had a competent authority, the acqui- 
escence of the people of America in the Confedera- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1183 

tion being equivalent to a formal ratification by the 
people. He thought with Mr. Ellsworth, also, 
that the plea of necessity was as valid in the one 
ease, as the other. At the same time, he preferred 
a reference to the authority of the people ex- 
pressly delegated to Conventions, as the most 
certain means of obviating all disputes and doubts 
concerning the legitimacy of the new Constitution, 
as well as the most likely means of drawing forth 
the best men in the States to decide on it. He 
remarked that among other objections, made in 
the State of New York to granting powers to 
Congress, one had been, that such powers as would 
operate within the States could not be reconciled 
to the Constitution, and therefore were not grant- 
able by the Legislative authority. He considered 
it as of some consequence, also, to get rid of the 
scruples which some members of the State Legis- 
latures might derive from their oaths to support 
and maintain the existing Constitutions. 

Mr. Madison thought it clear that the Legislatures 
were incompetent to the proposed changes. These 
changes would make essential inroads on the State 
Constitutions ; and it would be a novel and danger- 
ous doctrine, that a Legislature could change the 
Constitution under which it held its existence. 
There might indeed be some Constitutions within 
the Union, which had given a power to the Legisla-* 
ture to concur in alterations of the Federal compact. 
But there were certainly some which had not ; and 
in the case of these, a ratification must of necessity 
be obtained from the people. He considered the 
difference between a system founded on the Legisla- 



1184 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

tures only, and one founded on the people, to be the 
true difference between a league or treaty ', and a 
Constitution. The former, in point of moral obliga- 
tion, might be as inviolable as the latter. In point 
of political operation, there were two important dis- 
tinctions in favor of the latter. First, a law viola- 
ting a treaty ratified by a pre-existing law might be 
respected by the Judges as a law, though an unwise 
or perfidious one. A law violating a Constitution 
established by the people themselves, would be con- 
sidered by the Judges as null and void. Secondly, 
the doctrine laid down by the law of nations in the 
case of treaties is, that a breach of any one article 
by any of the parties frees the other parties from 
their engagements. In the case of a union of people 
under one constitution, the nature of the pact has 
always been understood to exclude such an interpre- 
tation. Comparing the two modes, in point of ex- 
pediency, he thought all the considerations which 
recommended this Convention, in preference to Con- 
gress, for proposing the reform, were in favor of 
State Conventions, in preference to the Legislatures 
for examining and adopting it. 

On the question on Mr. Ellsworth's motion to 
refer the plan to the Legislatures of the States, — 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, aye — 3; New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 7. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved, that the reference 
of the plan be made to one General Convention, 
chosen and authorized by the people, to consider, 
amend, and establish the same. Not seconded. 

On the question for agreeing to the nineteenth 



178?.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1185 

Resolution, touching the mode of ratification as re- 
ported from the Committee of the Whole, viz, to 
refer the Constitution, after the approbation of Con- 
gress, to assemblies chosen by the people, — New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylva- 
nia, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Car- 
olina, Georgia, aye — 9; Delaware, no — 1. 285 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris and Mr. King moved, 
that the representation in the second branch consist 

of members from each State, who shall vote 

per capita. 

Mr. Ellsworth said he had always approved of 
voting in that mode. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to fill the blank 
with three. He wished the Senate to be a pretty 
numerous body. If two members only should be 
allowed to each State, and a majority be made a 
quorum, the power would be lodged in fourteen 
members, which was too small a number for such a 
trust. 

Mr. Gorham preferred two to three members for 
the blank. A small number was most convenient 
for deciding on peace and war, &c, which he ex- 
pected would be vested in the second branch. The 
number of States will also increase. Kentucky, 
Vermont, the Province of Maine and Franklin, Avill 
probably soon be added to the present number. He 
presumed also that some of the largest States would 
be divided. The strength of the General Govern- 
ment will be, not in the largeness, but the smallness, 
of the States. 

Col. Mason thought three from each State, inclu- 
ding new States, would make the second branch too 

Vol. I.— 75 



1186 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

numerous. Besides other objections, the additional 
expense ought always to form one, where it was not 
absolutely necessary. 

Mr. Williamson. If the number be too great, the 
distant States will not be on an equal footing with the 
nearer States. The latter can more easily send and 
support their ablest citizens. He approved of the 
voting per capita. 

On the question for filling the blank with " three" 
— Pennsylvania, aye — 1 ; New Hampshire, Massa- 
chusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 8. 286 

On the question for filling it with " two" — agreed 
to, nem. con. 

Mr. L. Martin was opposed to voting per capita, 
as departing from the idea of the States being repre- 
sented in the second branch. 

Mr. Carroll was not struck with any particular 
objection against the mode ; but he did not wish so 
hastily to make so material an innovation. 

On the question on the whole motion, viz. : " the 
second branch to consist of two members from each 
State, and to vote per capita" — New Hampshire, 
Msssachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Dela- 
ware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, aye — 9 ; Maryland, no — 1. 

Mr. Houston and Mr. Spaight moved, " that the 
appointment of the Executive by Electors chosen 
by the Legislatures of the States," be reconsidered. 
Mr. Houston urged the extreme inconveniency and 
the considerable expense of drawing together men 
from all the States for the single purpose of electing 
the chief magistrate. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1187 

On the question, which was put without debate, — 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Dela- 
ware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye 
— 7; Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no — 3. 

Ordered, that tomorrow be assigned for the recon- 
sideration ; — Connecticut and Pennsylvania, no ; all 
the rest, aye. 

Mr. Gerry moved, that the proceedings of the 
Convention for the establishment of a National Gov- 
ernment (except the part relating to the Executive) 
be referred to a Committee to prepare and report a 
Constitution conformable thereto. 

General Pinckney reminded the Convention, that 
if the Committee should fail to insert some security 
to the Southern States against an emancipation of 
slaves, and taxes on exports, he should be bound by 
duty to his State to vote against their report. 287 

The appointment of a Committee, as moved by 
Mr. Gerry, was agreed to, nem. con. 

On the question, Shall the Committee consist of 
ten members, one from each State present ? — all the 
States were no, except Delaware, aye. 

Shall it consist of seven members % — New Hamp- 
shire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, South 
Carolina, aye — 5 ; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Vir- 
ginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 5. 

The question being lost by an equal division of 
votes, it was agreed, nem. con., that the Committee 
should consist of five members to be appointed to- 
morrow. 

Adjourned. 



1188 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Tuesday, July 24th. 

In Convention, — The appointment of the Execu- 
tive by Electors being reconsidered, — 

Mr. Houston moved that he be appointed by the 
National Legislature, instead of " Electors appointed 
by the State Legislatures," according to the last de- 
cision of the mode. He dwelt chiefly on the improb- 
ability that capable men would undertake the ser- 
vice of Electors from the more distant States. 

Mr. Spaight seconded the motion. 

Mr. Gerry opposed it. He thought there was no 
ground to apprehend the danger urged by Mr. Hous- 
ton. The election of the Executive Magistrate will 
be considered as of vast importance, and will 
create great earnestness. The best men, the Gov- 
ernors of the States, will not hold it derogatory 
from their character to be the Electors. If the mo- 
tion should be agreed to, it will be necessary to 
make the Executive ineligible a second time, in 
order to render him independent of the Legislature ; 
which was an idea extremely repugnant to his way 
of thinking. 

Mr. Strong supposed that there w r ould be no 
necessity, if the Executive should be appointed by 
the Legislature, to make him ineligible a second 
time ; as new Elections of the Legislature will have 
intervened ; and he will not depend for his second 
appointment on the same set of men that his first 
was received from. It had been suggested that grat- 
itude for his past appointment would produce the 
same effect as dependence for his future appointment. 
He thought very differently. Besides, this objection 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1189 

would lie against the Electors, who would be objects 
of gratitude as well as the Legislature. It was of 
great importance not to make the government too 
complex, which would be the case if a new set of 
men, like the Electors, should be introduced into it. 
He thought, also, that the first characters in the 
States would not feel sufficient motives to undertake 
the office of Electors. 

Mr. Williamson was for going back to the ori- 
ginal ground, to elect the Executive for seven years, 
and render him ineligible a second time. The pro- 
posed Electors would certainly not be men of the 
first, nor even of the second, grade in the. States. 
These would all prefer a seat in the Senate, or the 
other branch of the Legislature. He did not like 
the unity in the Executive. He had wished the 
Executive power to be lodged in three men, taken 
from three districts, into which the States should be 
divided. As the Executive is to have a kind of veto 
on the laws, and there is an essential difference of 
interests between the Northern and Southern States, 
particularly in the carrying trade, the power will be 
dangerous, if the Executive is to be taken from part 
of the LTnion, to the part from which he is not taken. 
The case is different here from what it is in Eng- 
land ; where there is a sameness of interests through- 
out the kingdom. Another objection against a 
single magistrate is, that he will be an elective king, 
and will feel the spirit of one. He will spare no 
pains to keep himself in for life, and will then lay a 
train for the succession of his children. It was 
pretty certain, he thought, that we should at some 
time or other have a king ; but he wished no pre- 



1190 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

caution to be omitted that might postpone the event 
as long as possible. Ineligibility a second time ap- 
peared to him to be the best precaution. With this 
precaution he had no objection to a longer term than 
seven years. He would go as far as ten or twelve 
years. 

Mr. Gerry moved that the Legislatures of the 
States should vote by ballot for the Executive, in 
the same proportions as it had been proposed they 
should choose Electors ; and that in case a majority 
of the votes should not centre on the same person, 
the first branch of the National Legislature should 
choose two out of the four candidates having most 
votes; and out of these two the second branch 
should choose the Executive. 

Mr. King seconded the motion ; and on the ques- 
tion to postpone, in order to take it into considera- 
tion, the noes were so predominant, that the States 
were not counted. 

On the question on Mr. Houston's motion, that 
the Executive be appointed by the National Legis- 
lature, — New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jer- 
sey, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, aye — 7 ; Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Mary- 
land, Virginia, no — 4. 

Mr. L. Martin and Mr. Gerry moved to re-instate 
the ineligibility of the Executive a second time. 

Mr. Ellsworth. With many this appears a 
natural consequence of his being elected by the 
Legislature. It was not the case with him. The 
Executive he thought should be re-elected if his 
conduct proved him worthy of it. And he will be 
more likely to render himself worthy of it if he be 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1191 

rewardable with it. The most eminent characters, 
also, will be more willing to accept the trust under 
this condition, than if they foresee a necessary de- 
gradation at a fixed period. 

Mr. Gerry. That the Executive should be in- 
dependent of the Legislature, is a clear point. The 
longer the duration of his appointment, the more 
will his dependence be diminished. It will be 
better, then, for him to continue ten, fifteen, or even 
twenty years, and be ineligible afterwards. 

Mr. King was for making him re-eligible. This 
is too great an advantage to be given up, for the 
small effect it will have on his dependence, if im- 
peachments are to lie. He considered these as 
rendering the tenure during pleasure. 

Mr. L. Martin, suspending his motion as to the 
ineligibility, moved, " that the appointment of the 
Executive shall continue for eleven years." 

Mr. Gerry suggested fifteen years. 

Mr. King twenty years.* This is the medium 
life of princes. 

Mr. Davie eight years. 

Mr. Wilson. The difficulties and perplexities 
into which the House is thrown, proceed from the 
election by the Legislature, which he was sorry had 
been re-instated. The inconvenience of this mode 
was such, that he would agree to almost any length 
of time in order to get rid of the dependence which 
must result from it. He was persuaded that the 
longest term would not be equivalent to a proper 



# Thus might possibly be meant as a caricature of the previous motions, in 
order to defeat the object of them. 



1192 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

mode of election, unless indeed it should be during 
good behaviour. It seemed to be supposed that 
at a certain advance of life a continuance in 
office would cease to be agreeable to the officer, as 
well as desirable to the public. Experience had 
shown in a variety of instances, that both a capacity 
and inclination for public service existed in very 
advanced stages. He mentioned the instance of a 
Doge of Venice who was elected after he was eighty 
years of age. The Popes have generally been 
elected at very advanced periods, and yet in no case 
had a more steady or a better concerted policy been 
pursued than in the Court of Rome. If the Execu- 
tive should come into office at thirty-five years of 
age, which he presumes may happen, and his con- 
tinuance should be fixed at fifteen years, at the age 
of fifty, in the very prime of life, and with all the 
aid of experience, he must be cast aside like a useless 
hulk. What an irreparable loss would the British 
jurisprudence have sustained, had the age of fifty 
been fixed there as the ultimate limit of capacity or 
readiness to serve the public. The great luminary 
Lord Mansfield, held his seat for thirty years after 
his arrival at that age. Notwithstanding what had 
been done, he could not but hope that a better mode 
of election would yet be adopted; and one that 
would be more agreeable to the general sense of 
the House. That time might be given for further 
deliberation, he would move that the present ques- 
tion be postponed till to-morrow. 

Mr. Broom seconded the motion to postpone. 

Mr. Gerry. We seem to be entirely at a loss on 
this head. He would suggest whether it would not 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1193 

be advisable to refer the clause relating to the 
Executive to the committee of detail to be appoint- 
ed. Perhaps they will be able to hit on something 
that may unite the various opinions which have been 
thrown out. 

Mr. Wilson. As the great difficulty seems to 
spring from the mode of election, he would suggest 
a mode which had not been mentioned. It was, 
that the Executive be elected for six years by a 
small number, not more than fifteen of the National 
Legislature, to be drawn from it, not by ballot, but 
by lot, and who should retire immediately and make 
the election without separating. By this mode in- 
trigue would be avoided in the first instance, and the 
dependence would be diminished. This was not, he 
said, a digested idea, and might be liable to strong 
objections. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. Of all possible modes 
of appointment that by the Legislature is the worst. 
If the Legislature is to appoint, and to impeach, or 
to influence the impeachment, the Executive will be 
the mere creature of it. He had been opposed to 
the impeachment, but was now convinced that im- 
peachments must be provided for, if the appointment 
was to be of any duration. No man would say, that 
an Executive known to be in the pay of an enemy 
should not be removable in some way or other. He 
had been charged heretofore, (by Col. Mason), with 
inconsistency in pleading for confidence in the Le- 
gislature on some occasions, and urging a distrust on 
others. The charge was not well founded. The 
Legislature is worthy of unbounded confidence in 
some respects, and liable to equal distrust in others. 

Vol. I.— 75* 



1194 DEBATES IN THE [1787, 

When their interest coincides precisely with that of 
their constituents, as happens in many of their acts, 
no abuse of trust is to be apprehended. When a 
strong personal interest happens to be opposed to 
the general interest, the Legislature cannot be too 
much distrusted. In all public bodies there are two 
parties. The Executive will necessarily be more 
connected w T ith one than with the other. There 
will be a personal interest, therefore, in one of the 
parties, to oppose, as well as in the other to sup- 
port, him. Much had been said of the intrigues 
that will be practised by the Executive to get into 
office. Nothing had been said on the other side, of 
the intrigues to get him out of office. Some leader 
of a party will always covet his seat, will perplex 
his administration, will cabal with the Legislature, till 
he succeeds in supplanting him. This was the way 
in which the King of England was got out, he meant 
the real king, the Minister. This was the way in 
which Pitt (Lord Chatham) forced himself into 
place. Fox was for pushing the matter still further. 
If he had carried his India bill, which he was very 
near doing, he would have made the Minister the 
king in form almost, as well as in substance. Our 
President will be the British Minister, yet we are 
about to make him appointable by the Legislature. 
Something has been said of the danger of monarchy. 
If a good government should not now be formed, if a 
good organization of the Executive should not be 
provided, he doubted whether we should not have 
something worse than a limited monarchy. In or- 
der to get rid of the dependence of the Executive on 
the Legislature, the expedient of making him ineli- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1195 

gible a second time had been devised. This was as 
much as to say, we should give him the benefit of 
experience, and then deprive ourselves of the use of 
it. But make him ineligible a second time — and 
prolong his duration even to fifteen years — will he, 
by any wonderful interposition of Providence at that 
period, cease to be a man 7 No ; he will be unwil- 
ling to quit his exaltation ; the road to his object 
through the Constitution will be shut ; he will be in 
possession of the sword ; a civil war will ensue, and 
the commander of the victorious army, on which 
ever side, will be the despot of America. This con- 
sideration renders him particularly anxious that the 
Executive should be properly constituted. The 
vice here would not, as in some other parts of the 
system, be curable. It is the most difficult of all, 
rightly to balance the Executive. Make him too 
weak — the Legislature will usurp his power. Make 
him too strong — he will usurp on the Legislature. 
He preferred a short period, a re-eligibility, but a 
different mode of election. A long period would 
prevent an adoption of the plan. It ought to do so. 
He should himself be afraid to trust it. He was not 
prepared to decide on Mr. Wilson's mode of election 
just hinted by him. He thought it deserved con- 
sideration. It would be better that chance should 
decide than intrigue. 

On the question to postpone the consideration of 
the resolution on the subject of the Executive, — 
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye 
— 4 ; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6j 
Delaware, divided. 



1196 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Wilson then moved, that the Executive be 

chosen every years by Electors, to 

be taken by lot from the National Legislature, who 
shall proceed immediately to the choice of the Ex- 
ecutive, and not separate until it be made. 

Mr. Carroll seconds the motion. 

Mr. Gerry. This is committing too much to 
chance. If the lot should fall on a set of unworthy 
men, an unworthy Executive must be saddled on 
the country. He thought it had been demonstrated 
that no possible mode of electing by the Legislature 
could be a good one. 

Mr. King. The lot might fall on a majority from 
the same State, which would ensure the election of 
a man from that State. We ought to be governed 
by reason, not by chance. As nobody seemed to be 
satisfied, he wished the matter to be postponed. 

Mr. Wilson did not move this as the best mode. 
His opinion remained unshaken, that we ought to 
resort to the people for the election. He seconded 
the postponement. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris observed, that the chan- 
ces were almost infinite against a majority of Elec- 
tors from the same State. 

On a question whether the last motion was in or- 
der, it was determined in the affirmative, — ayes, 7 ; 
noes, 4. 

On the question of postponement, it was agreed 
to, nem. con. 

Mr. Carroll took occasion to observe, that he 
considered the clause declaring that direct taxation 
on the States should be in proportion to representa- 
tion, previous to the obtaining an actual census, as 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1197 

very objectionable ; and that he reserved to himself 
the right of opposing it, if the report of the Commit- 
tee of detail should leave it in the plan. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris hoped the Committee 
would strike out the whole of the clause proportion- 
ing direct taxation to representation. He had only 
meant it as a bridge* to assist us over a certain 
gulf; having passed the gulf, the bridge may be 
removed. He thought the principle laid down with 
so mucn strictness liable to strong objections. 

On a ballot for a committee to report a Constitu- 
tion conformable to the Resolutions passed by the 
Convention, the members chosen were : — 

Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Gorham, Mr. 
Ellsworth, Mr. Wilson. 

On motion to discharge the Committee of the 
Whole from the propositions submitted to the Con- 
vention by Mr. C. Pinckney as the basis of a Con- 
stitution, and to refer them to the Committee of De- 
tail just appointed, it was agreed to, nem. con. 

A like motion was then made and agreed to, nem. 
con., with respect to the propositions of Mr. Patter- 
son. 

Adjourned. 



Wednesday, July 25th. 

In Convention, — The clause relating to the Execu- 
tive being again under consideration, — 

* The object was to lessen the eagerness, on one side, for, and the opposition, 
on the other, to the share of representation claimed by the Southern States on 
account of the negroes. 



1198 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Ellsworth moved, " that the Executive be ap- 
pointed by the Legislature, except ^when the magis- 
trate last chosen shall have continued in office the 
whole term for which he was chosen, and be re-eli- 
gible ; in which case the choice shall be by Electors 
appointed by the Legislatures of the States for that 
purpose." By this means a deserving magistrate 
may be re-elected without making him dependent on 
the Legislature. 

Mr. Gerry repeated his remark, that an election 
at all by the National Legislature was radically and 
incurably wrong ; and moved, " that the Executive 
be appointed by the Governors and Presidents of the 
States, with advice of their Councils; and where 
there are no Councils, by Electors chosen by the 
Legislatures. The Executives to vote in the follow- 
ing proportions, viz : ." 

Mr. Madison. There are objections against every 
mode that has been, or perhaps can be, proposed. 
The election must be made, either by some existing 
authority under the National or State Constitutions, 
— or by some special authority derived from the 
people, — or by the people themselves. The two ex- 
isting authorities under the National Constitution 
would be the Legislative and Judiciary. The lat- 
ter he presumed was out of the question. The 
former was, in his judgment, liable to insuperable 
objections. Besides the general influence of that 
mode on the independence of the Executive, in the 
first place, the election of the chief magistrate would 
agitate and divide the Legislature so much, that the 
public interest would materially suffer by it. Pub- 
lic bodies are always apt to be thrown into con ten- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1199 

tions, but into more violent ones by such occasions 
than by any others. In the second place, the can- 
didate would intrigue with the Legislature ; would 
derive his appointment from the predominant fac- 
tion, and be apt to render his administration subser- 
vient to its views. In the third place, the ministers 
of foreign powers would have, and would make use 
of, the opportunity to mix their intrigues and influ- 
ence with the election. Limited as the powers of 
the Executive are, it will be an object of great mo- 
ment with the great rival powers of Europe who 
have American possessions, to have at the head of 
our government a man attached to their respective 
politics and interests. No pains, nor perhaps ex- 
pense, will be spared, to gain from the Legislature 
an appointment favorable to their wishes. Germany 
and Poland are witnesses of this danger. In the 
former, the election of the Head of the Empire, till 
it became in a manner hereditary, interested all Eu- 
rope, and was much influenced by foreign inter- 
ference. In the latter, although the elective magis- 
trate has very little real power, his election has at 
all times produced the most eager interference of 
foreign princes, and has in fact at length slid en- 
tirely into foreign hands. The existing authorities 
in the States are the Legislative, Executive and Ju- 
diciary. The appointment of the National Execu- 
tive by the first was objectionable in many points of 
view, some of which had been already mentioned. 
He would mention one which of itself would decide 
his opinion. The Legislatures of the States had 
betrayed a strong propensity to a variety of perni- 
cious measures. One object of the National Legis- 



1200 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

lature was to control this propensity. One object 
of the National Executive, so far as it would have 
a negative on the laws, was to control the Na- 
tional Legislature, so far as it might be infected with 
a similar propensity. Refer the appointment of the 
National Executive to the State Legislatures, and 
this controlling purpose may be defeated. The Le- 
gislatures can and will act with some kind of regu- 
lar plan, and will promote the appointment of a man 
who will not oppose himself to a favorite object. 
Should a majority of the Legislatures, at the time 
of election, have the same object, or different objects 
of the same kind, the National Executive would 
be rendered subservient to them. An appoint- 
ment by the State Executives was liable, among 
other objections, to this insuperable one, that being 
standing bodies, they could and would be courted, 
and intrigued with by the candidates, by their par- 
tizans, and by the ministers of foreign powers. The 
State Judiciaries had not been, and he presumed 
would not be, proposed as a proper source of ap- 
pointment. The option before us, then, lay be- 
tween an appointment by Electors chosen by the 
people, and an immediate appointment by the peo- 
ple. He thought the former mode free from many 
of the objections which had been urged against it, 
and greatly preferable to an appointment by the Na- 
tional Legislature. As the Electors would be chosen 
for the occasion, would meet at once, and proceed 
immediately to an appointment, there would be very 
little opportunity for cabal, or corruption: as a further 
precaution, it might be required that they should 
meet at some place distinct from the seat of govern- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1201 

ment; and even that no person within a certain dis- 
tance of the place at the time, should be eligible. 
This mode, however, had been rejected so recently, 
and by so great a majority, that it probably would 
not be proposed anew. The remaining mode was 
an election by the people, or rather by the qualified 
part of them at large. With all its imperfections, 
he liked this best. He would not repeat either the 
general arguments for, or the objections against, 
this mode. He would only take notice of two diffi- 
culties, which he admitted to have weight. The 
first arose from the disposition in the people to pre- 
fer a citizen of their own State, and the disadvan- 
tage this would throw on the smaller States. Great 
as this objection might be, he did not think it equal 
to such as lay against every other mode which had 
been proposed. He thought, too, that some expedi- 
ent might be hit upon that would obviate it. The 
second difficulty arose from the disproportion of 
qualified voters in the Northern and Southern States, 
and the disadvantages which this mode would throw 
on the latter. The answer to this objection was — 
in the first place, that this disproportion would be 
continually decreasing under the influence of the 
republican laws introduced in the Southern States, 
and the more rapid increase of their population ; in 
the second place, that local considerations must give 
way to the general interest. As an individual from 
the Southern States, he was willing to make the 
sacrifice. 

Mr. Ellsworth. The objection drawn from the 
different sizes of the States is unanswerable. The 
citizens of the largest States would invariably pre- 

Vol. I.— 76 



1202 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

fer the candidate within the State ; and the largest 
States would invariably have the man. 

On the question on Mr. Ellsworth's motion, as 
above, — New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, aye — 4 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Del- 
aware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 7. 

Mr. Pinckney moved, " that the election by the 
Legislature be qualified with a proviso, that no per- 
son be eligible for more than six years in any twelve 
years." He thought this would have all the advan- 
tage, and at the same time avoid in some degree the 
inconvenience, of an absolute ineligibility a second 
time. 

Col. Mason approved the idea. It had the sanc- 
tion of experience in the instance of Congress, and 
some of the Executives of the States. It rendered 
the Executive as effectually independent, as an inel- 
igibility after his first election ; and opened the way, 
at the same time, for the advantage of his future 
services. He preferred on the whole the election 
by the National Legislature ; though candor obliged 
him to admit, that there was great danger of foreign 
influence, as had been suggested. This was the 
most serious objection, with him, that had been 
urged. 

Mr. Butler. The two great evils to be avoided 
are, cabal at home, and influence from abroad. It 
will be difficult to avoid either, if the election be 
made by the National Legislature. On the other 
hand the Government should not be made so com- 
plex and unwieldy as to disgust the States. This 
would be the case if the election should be referred 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1203 

to the people. He liked best an election by Electors 
chosen by the Legislatures of the States. He was 
against a re-eligibility at all events. He was also 
against a ratio of votes in the States. An equality 
should prevail in this case. The reasons for depart- 
ing from it do not hold in the case of the Executive, 
as in that of the Legislature. 

Mr. Gerry approved of Mr. Pinckney's motion, as 
lessening the evil. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was against a rotation 
in every case. It formed a political school, in which 
we were always governed by the scholars, and not 
by the masters. The evils to be guarded against in 
this case are, — first, the undue influence of the Le- 
gislature ; secondly, instability of councils ; thirdly, 
misconduct in office. To guard against the first, we 
run into the second evil. We adopt a rotation which 
produces instability of councils. To avoid Scylla 
we fall into Charybdis. A change of men is ever 
followed by a change of measures. We see this 
fully exemplified in the vicissitudes among ourselves, 
particularly in the State of Pennsylvania. The 
self-sufficiency of a victorious party scorns to tread 
in the paths of their predecessors. Rehoboam will 
not imitate Solomon. Secondly, the rotation in of- 
fice will not prevent intrigue and dependence on the 
Legislature. The man in office will look forward to 
the period at which he will become re-eligible. The 
distance of the period, the improbability of such a 
protraction of his life, will be no obstacle. Such is the 
nature of man — formed by his benevolent Author, no 
doubt, for wise ends — that although he knows his 
existence to be limited to a span, he takes his mea- 



1204 DEEATESINTHE [1787. 

sures as if he were to live forever. But taking an- 
other supposition, the inefficacy of the expedient 
will be manifest. If the magistrate does not look 
forward to his re-election to the Executive, he will 
be pretty sure to keep in view the opportunity of his 
going into the Legislature itself. He will have little 
objection then to an extension of power on a theatre 
where he expects to act a distinguished part ; and 
will be very unwilling to take any step that may 
endanger his popularity with the Legislature, on his 
influence over which the figure he is to make will 
depend. Finally, to avoid the third evil, impeach- 
ments will be essential ; and hence an additional 
reason against an election by the Legislature. He 
considered an election by the people as the best, 
by the Legislature as the worst, mode. Putting 
both these aside, he could not but favor the idea 
of Mr. Wilson, of introducing a mixture of lot. It 
will diminish, if not destroy, both cabal and de- 
pendence. 

Mr. Williamson was sensible that strong objec- 
tions lay against an election of the Executive by the 
Legislature, and that it opened a door for foreign 
influence. The principal objection against an elec- 
tion by the people seemed to be, the disadvantage 
under which it would place the smaller States. He 
suggested as a cure for this difficulty, that each man 
should vote for three candidates ; one of them, he 
observed, would be probably of his own State, the 
other two of some other States ; and as probably of 
a small as a large one. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris liked the idea ; suggest- 
ing as an amendment, that each man should vote for 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1205 

two persons, one of whom at least should not be of 
his own State. 

Mr. Madison also thought something valuable 
might be made of the suggestion, with the proposed 
amendment of it. The second best man in this case 
would probably be the first in fact. The only ob- 
jection which occurred was, that each citizen, after 
having given his vote for his favorite fellow citizen, 
would throw away his second on some obscure citizen 
of another State, in order to ensure the object of his 
first choice. But it could hardly be supposed that 
the citizens of many States would be so sanguine of 
having their favorite elected, as not to give their 
second vote with sincerity to the next object of their 
choice. It might, moreover, be provided, in favor of 
the smaller States, that the Executive should not be 

eligible more than times in years from 

the same State. 

Mr. Gerry. A popular election in this case is 
radically vicious. The ignorance of the people 
would put it in the power of some one set of men 
dispersed through the Union, and acting in concert, 
to delude them into any appointment. He observed 
that such a society of men existed in the Order of 
the Cincinnati. They are respectable, united and 
influential. They will, in fact, elect the Chief Mag- 
istrate in every instance, if the election be referred 
to the people. His respect for the characters com- 
posing this Society, could not blind him to the dan- 
ger and impropriety of throwing such a power into 
their hands. 

Mr. Dickinson. As far as he could judge from 
the discussions which had taken place during his 



1206 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

attendance, insuperable objections lay against an 
election of the Executive by the National Legisla- 
ture ; as also by the Legislatures or Executives of 
the States. He had long leaned towards an election 
by the people, which he regarded as the best and 
purest source. Objections he was aware lay against 
this mode, but not so great, he thought, as against 
the other modes. The greatest difficulty, in the 
opinion of the House, seemed to arise from the par- 
tiality of the States to their respective citizens. But 
might not this very partiality be turned to a useful 
purpose ? Let the people of each State choose its 
best citizen. The people will know the most em- 
inent characters of their own States ; and the peo- 
ple of different States will feel an emulation in 
selecting those of whom they will have the greatest 
reason to be proud. Out of the thirteen names thus 
selected, an Executive Magistrate may be chosen 
either by the National Legislature, or by Electors 
appointed by it. 

On a question which was moved, for postponing 
Mr. Pinckney's motion, in order to make way for 
some such proposition as had been hinted by Mr. 
Williamson and others, it passed in the negative, — 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
Virginia, aye — 5 ; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
no — 6. 

On Mr. Pinckney's motion, that no person shall 
serve in the Executive more than six years in 
twelve years, it passed in the negative, — New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5; Connecticut, New Jersey, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1207 

Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no 
—6. 

On a motion that the members of the Committee 
be furnished with copies of the proceedings, it was 
so determined, South Carolina alone being in the 
negative. 

It was then moved, that the members of the 
House might take copies of the Resolutions which 
had been agreed to ; which passed in the negative, 
— Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, 
North Carolina, aye — 5 ; New Hampshire, Massa- 
chusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 6. 

Mr. Gerry and Mr. Butler moved to refer the 
resolution relating to the Executive (except the 
clause making it consist of a single person) to the 
Committee of detail. 

Mr. Wilson hoped that so important a branch 
of the system would not be committed, until a 
general principle should be fixed by a vote of the 
House. 

Mr. Langdon was for the commitment. 

Adjourned. 



Thursday, July 26th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Mason. In every stage of 
the question relative to the Executive, the difficulty 
of the subject and the diversity of the opinions con- 
cerning it, have appeared. Nor have any of the 
modes of constituting that Department been satis- 



1208 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

factory. First, it has been proposed that the elec- 
tion should be made by the people at large ; that is, 
that an act which ought to be performed by those 
who know most of eminent characters and qualifica- 
tions, should be performed by those who know least; 
secondly, that the election should be made by the 
Legislatures of the States; thirdly, by the Executives 
of the States. Against these modes, also, strong ob- 
jections have been urged. Fourthly, it has been 
proposed that the election should be made by Elec- 
tors chosen by the people for that purpose. This 
was at first agreed to ; but on further consideration 
has been rejected. Fifthly, since which, the mode 
of Mr. Williamson, requiring each freeholder to 
vote for several candidates, has been proposed. This 
seemed, like many other propositions, to carry a 
plausible face, but on closer inspection is liable to 
fatal objections. A popular election in any form, as 
Mr. Gerry has observed, would throw the appoint- 
ment into the hands of the Cincinnati, a society for 
the members of which he had a great respect, but 
which he never wished to have a preponderating in- 
fluence in the government. Sixthly, another ex- 
pedient was proposed by Mr. Dickinson, which is 
liable to so palpable and material an inconvenience, 
that he had little doubt of its being by this time 
rejected by himself. It would exclude every man 
who happened not to be popular within his own 
State ; though the causes of his local unpopularity 
might be of such a nature, as to recommend him to 
the States at large. Seventhly, among other ex- 
pedients, a lottery has been introduced. But as the 
tickets do not appear to be in much demand, it will 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1209 

probably not be carried on, and nothing therefore 
need be said on that subject. After reviewing all 
these various modes, he was led to conclude, that 
an election by the National Legislature, as originally 
proposed, was the best. If it was liable to objec- 
tions, it was liable to fewer than any other. He 
conceived, at the same time, that a second election 
ought to be absolutely prohibited. Having for his 
primary object — for the polar star of his political 
conduct — the preservation of the rights of the 
people, he held it as an essential point, as the very 
palladium of civil liberty, that the great officers of 
state, and particularly the Executive, should at fixed 
periods return to that mass from which they were 
at first taken, in order that they may feel and re- 
spect those rights and interests which are again to 
be personally valuable to them. He concluded with 
moving, that the constitution of the Executive, as 
reported by the Committee of the Whole, be re- 
instated, viz. " that the Executive be appointed for 
seven years, and be ineligible a second time." 

Mr. Davie seconded the motion. 

Doctor Franklin. It seems to have been imagined 
by some, that the returning to the mass of the people 
was degrading the magistrate. This he thought 
was contrary to republican principles. In free gov- 
ernments the rulers are the servants, and the people 
their superiors and sovereigns. For the former, 
therefore, to return among the latter, was not to de- 
grade, but to promote, them. And it would be im- 
posing an unreasonable burden on them, to keep 
them always in a state of servitude, and not allow 
them to become again one of the masters. 

Vol. I.— 76* 



1210 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

On the question on Col. Mason's motion, as above, 
it passed in the affirmative, — 

New Hampshire, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7; 
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no — 3; Mas- 
sachusetts, not on the floor. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was now against the 
whole paragraph. In answer to Col. Mason's posi- 
tion, that a periodical return of the great officers of 
the state into the mass of the people was the palla- 
dium of civil liberty, he would observe, that on the 
same principle the Judiciary ought to be periodically 
degraded ; certain it was, that the Legislature ought, 
on every principle, yet no one had proposed, or con- 
ceived that the members of it should not be re-eli- 
gible. In answer to Doctor Franklin, that a return 
into the mass of the people would be a promotion, 
instead of a degradation, he had no doubt that our 
Executive, like most others, would have too much 
patriotism to shrink from the burthen of his office, 
and too much modesty not to be willing to decline 
the promotion. 

On the question on the whole Resolution, as 
amended, in the words following : " that a National 
Executive be instituted, to consist of a single person, 
to be chosen by the National Legislature, for the 
term of seven years, to be ineligible a second time, 
with power to carry into execution the national 
laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise pro- 
vided for, to be removable on impeachment and con- 
viction of mal-practice or neglect of duty, to receive 
a fixed compensation for the devotion of his time to 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1211 

the public service, to be paid out of the national 
Treasury,"— it passed in the affirmative, — 

New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Pennsyl- 
vania, Delaware, Maryland, no — 3 ; Massachusetts, 
not on the floor ; Virginia, divided — Mr. Blair and Col. 
Mason, aye ; General Washington and Mr. Madison, 
no. Mr. Randolph happened to be out of the House. 

Mr. Mason moved, " that the Committee of Detail 
be instructed to receive a clause requiring certain 
qualifications of landed property, and citizenship of 
the United States, in members of the National Le- 
gislature ; and disqualifying persons having unsettled 
accounts with, or being indebted to, the United States, 
from being members of the National Legislature." 
He observed that persons of the latter descriptions 
had frequently got into the State Legislatures, in 
order to promote laws that might shelter their delin- 
quencies ; and that this evil had crept into Congress, 
if report was to be regarded. 

Mr. Pinckney seconded the motion. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. If qualifications are 
proper, he would prefer them in the electors, rather 
than the elected. As to debtors of the United 
States, they are but few. As to persons having un- 
settled accounts, he believed them to be pretty many. 
He thought, however, that such a discrimination to 
be both odious and useless, and in many instances, 
unjust and cruel. The delay of settlement had 
been more the fault of the public, than of the indi- 
viduals. What will be done with those patriotic 
citizens who have lent money, or services, or prop- 
erty, to their country, without having been yet able 



1212 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

to obtain a liquidation of their claims ? Are they 
to be excluded ? 

Mr. Gorham was for leaving to the Legislature 
the providing against such abuses as had been men- 
tioned. 

Col. Mason mentioned the parliamentary qualifi- 
cations adopted in the reign of Queen Anne, which 
he said had met with universal approbation. 

Mr. Madison had witnessed the zeal of men hav- 
ing accounts with the public, to get into the Legis- 
latures for sinister purposes. He thought, however, 
that if any precaution were taken for excluding 
them, the one proposed by Col. Mason ought to be 
re-modelled. It might be well to limit the exclu- 
sion to persons who had received money from the 
public, and had not accounted for it. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. It was a precept of great 
antiquity, as well as of high authority, that we should 
not be righteous overmuch. He thought we ought 
to be equally on our guard against being wise over- 
much. The proposed regulation would enable the 
Government to exclude particular persons from office 
as long as they pleased. He mentioned the case of the 
Commander-in-Chief's presenting his account for se- 
cret services, which, he said, was so moderate that ev- 
ery one was astonished at it ; and so simple that no 
doubt could arise on it. Yet, had the Auditor been dis- 
posed to delay the settlement, how easily he might 
have effected it, and how cruel would it be in such a 
case to keep a distinguished and meritorious citizen 
under a temporary disability and disfranchisement. 
He mentioned this case, merely to illustrate the objec- 
tionable nature of the proposition. He was opposed to 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1213 

such minutious regulations in a Constitution. The 
parliamentary qualifications quoted by Col. Mason 
had been disregarded in practice ; and were but a 
scheme of the landed against the moniel interest. 

Mr. Pinckney and General Pinckney moved to 
insert, by way of amendment, the words, " Judiciary 
and Executive," so as to extend the qualifications to 
those Departments ; which was agreed to, nem. con. 

Mr. Gerry thought the inconvenience of excluding 
a few worthy individuals, who might be public 
debtors, or have unsettled accounts, ought not to be 
put in the scale against the public advantages of 
the regulation, and that the motion did not go far 
enough. 

Mr. King observed, that there might be great 
danger in requiring landed property as a qualifica- 
tion : since it might exclude the moneyed interest, 
whose aids may be essential in particular emer- 
gencies to the public safety. 

Mr. Dickinson was against any recital of qualifi- 
cations in the Constitution. It was impossible to 
make a complete one ; and a partial one would, by 
implication, tie up the hands of the Legislature from 
supplying the omissions. The best defence lay in 
the freeholders who were to elect the Legislature. 
Whilst this resource should remain pure, the public 
interest would be safe. If it ever should be corrupt, 
no little expedients would repel the danger. He 
doubted the policy of interweaving into a republican 
Constitution a veneration for wealth. He had al- 
ways understood that a veneration for poverty and 
virtue were the objects of republican encourage- 
ment. It seemed improper that any man of merit 



1214 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

should be subjected to disabilities in a republic, 
where merit was understood to form the great title 
to public trust, honors, and rewards. 

Mr. Gerry. If property be one object of gov- 
ernment, provisions to secure it cannot be im- 
proper. 

Mr. Madison moved to strike out the word " land- 
ed" before the word " qualifications." If the propo- 
sition should be agreed to, he wished the Committee 
to be at liberty to report the best criterion they 
could devise. Landed possessions were no certain 
evidence of real wealth. Many enjoyed them to a 
great extent who were more in debt than they were 
worth. The unjust laws of the States had proceed- 
ed more from this class of men, than any others. It 
had often happened that men who had acquired 
landed property on credit got into the Legislatures 
with a view of promoting an unjust protection 
against their creditors. In the next place, if a 
small quantity of land should be made the standard, 
it would be no security ; if a large one, it would 
exclude the proper representatives of those classes 
of citizens, who were not landholders. It was 
politic as well as just, that the interests and rights 
of every class should be duly represented and under- 
stood in the public councils. It was a provision 
every where established, that the country should be 
divided into districts, and representatives taken from 
each, in order that the Legislative assembly might 
equally understand and sympathize with the rights 
of the people in every part of the community. It 
was not less proper, that every class of citizens 
should have an opportunity of making their rights 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1215 

be felt and understood in the public councils. The 
three principal classes into which our citizens were 
divisible, were the landed, the commercial, and the 
manufacturing. The second and third class bear, as 
yet, a small proportion to the first. The proportion, 
however, will daily increase. We see in the popu- 
lous countries of Europe now, what we shall be 
hereafter. These classes understand much less of 
each other's interests and affairs, than men of the 
same class inhabiting different districts. It is par- 
ticularly requisite, therefore, that the interests of 
one or two of them, should not be left entirely to the 
care or impartiality of the third. This must be the 
case, if landed qualifications should be required ; 
few of the mercantile, and scarcely any of the manu- 
facturing, class, choosing, whilst they continue in 
business, to turn any part of their stock into landed 
property. For these reasons he wished, if it were 
possible, that some other criterion than the mere 
possession of land should be devised. He concurred 
with Mr. Gouverneur Morris in thinking that 
qualifications in the electors would be much more 
effectual than in the elected. The former would 
discriminate between real and ostensible property 
in the latter ; but he was aware of the difficulty of 
forming any uniform standard that would suit the 
different circumstances and opinions prevailing in 
the different States. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion. 

On the question for striking out " landed," — New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina,, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 10; Maryland, no. 1. 



1216 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

On the question on the first part of Colonel Ma- 
son's proposition, as to " qualification of property 
and citizenship," as so amended, — New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; 
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no — 3. 

The second part, for disqualifying debtors, and 
persons having unsettled accounts, being under con- 
sideration, — 

Mr. Carroll moved to strike out, " having unset- 
tled accounts." 

Mr. Gorham seconded the motion ; observing, that 
it would put the commercial and manufacturing part 
of the people on a w r orse footing than others, as they 
would be most likely to have dealings with the 
public. 

Mr. L. Martin. If these words should be struck 
out, and the remaining words concerning debt- 
ors retained, it will be the interest of the latter 
class to keep their accounts unsettled as long as 
possible. 

Mr. Wilson was for striking them out. They put 
too much power in the hands of the auditors, who 
might combine with rivals in delaying settlements, 
in order to prolong the disqualifications of particular 
men. We should consider that we are providing a 
Constitution for future generations, and not merely 
for the peculiar circumstances of the moment. The 
time has been, and will again be, when the public 
safety may depend on the voluntary aids of individ- 
uals, which will necessarily open accounts with the 
public ; and when such accounts will be a charac- 
teristic of patriotism. Besides, a partial enumera- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1217 

tion of cases will disable the Legislature from dis- 
qualifiying odious and dangerous characters. 

Mr. Langdon was for striking out the whole 
clause, for the reasons given by Mr. Wilson. So 
many exclusions, he thought, too, would render the 
system unacceptable to the people. 

Mr. Gerry. If the arguments used to-day were 
to prevail, we might have a Legislature composed 
of public debtors, pensioners, placemen and contrac- 
tors. He thought the proposed disqualifications 
would be pleasing to the people. They will be con- 
sidered as a security against unnecessary or undue 
burdens being imposed on them. He moved to add, 
" pensioners" to the disqualified characters ; which 
w T as negatived, — Massachusetts, Maryland, Georgia, 
aye — 3 ; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, 
no — 7; North Carolina, divided. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The last clause, rela- 
ting to public debtors, will exclude every importing 
merchant. Revenue will be drawn, it is foreseen, as 
much as possible from trade. Duties, of course, will 
be bonded ; and the merchants will remain debtors 
to the public. He repeated that it had not been so 
much the fault of individuals, as of the public, that 
transactions between them, had not been more gen- 
erally liquidated and adjusted. At all events, to 
draw from our short and scanty experience rules 
that are to operate through succeeding ages, does 
not savor much of real wisdom. 

On the question for striking out, " persons having 
Unsettled accounts with the United States," — New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylva- 

Vol. I.— 77 



1218 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

nia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, aye — 9; New Jersey, Georgia, 
no— 2. 

Mr. Ellsworth was for disagreeing to the re- 
mainder of the clause disqualifying public debtors ; 
and for leaving to the wisdom of the Legislature, 
and the virtue of the citizens, the task of providing 
against such evils. Is the smallest as well as the 
largest debtor to be excluded ? Then every arrear 
of taxes will disqualify. Besides, how is it to be 
known to the people, when they elect, who are, or 
are not, public debtors. The exclusion of pension- 
ers and placemen in England is founded on a con- 
sideration not existing here. As persons of that 
sort are dependent on the crown, they tend to in- 
crease its influence. 

Mr. Pinckney said he was at first a friend to the 
proposition, for the sake of the clause relating to 
qualifications of property ; but he disliked the exclu- 
sion of public debtors ; it went too far. It would 
exclude persons who had purchased confiscated 
property, or should purchase western territory of the 
public ; and might be some obstacle to the sale of 
the latter. 

On the question for agreeing to the clause dis- 
qualifying public debtors, — 

North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 2; New Hamp- 
shire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South 
Carolina, no — 9. 289 

Colonel Mason observed that it would be proper, 
as he thought, that some provision should be made in 
the Constitution against choosing for the seat of the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1219 

General Government the city or place at which 
the seat of any State Government might be fixed. 
There were two objections against having them at 
the same place, which, without mentioning others, 
required some precaution on the subject. The first 
was, that it tended to produce disputes concerning 
jurisdiction. The second and principal one was, 
that the intermixture of the two Legislatures tended 
to give a provincial tincture to the national delibe- 
rations. He moved that the Committee be instructed 
to receive a clause to prevent the seat of the Na- 
tional Government being in the same city or town 
with the seat of the Government of any State, long- 
er than until the necessary public buildings could 
be erected. 

Mr. Alexander Martin seconded the motion. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris did not dislike the idea, 
but was apprehensive that such a clause might make 
enemies of Philadelphia and New York, which had 
expectations of becoming the seat of the General 
Government. 

Mr. Langdon approved the idea also; but suggest- 
ed the case of a State moving its seat of government 
to the national seat after the erection of the public 
buildings. 

Mr. Gorham. The precaution may be evaded by 
the National Legislature, by delaying to erect the 
public buildings. 

Mr. Gerry conceived it to be the general sense of 
America, that neither the seat of a State Govern- 
ment, nor any large commercial city should be the 
seat of the General Government. 

Mr. Williamson liked the idea ; but knowing how 



1220 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

much the passions of men were agitated by this 
matter, was apprehensive of turning them against 
the system. He apprehended, also, that an evasion 
might he practised in the way hinted by Mr. Gor- 
ham. 

Mr. Pinckney thought the seat of a State Govern- 
ment ought to be avoided ; but that a large town, 
or its vicinity, would be proper for the seat of the 
General Government. 

Col. Mason did not mean to press the motion at 
this time, nor to excite any hostile passions against 
the system. He was content to withdraw the mo- 
tion for the present. 

Mr. Butler was for fixing, by the Constitution, 
the place, and a central one, for the seat of the Na- 
tional Government. 

The proceedings since Monday last were unani- 
mously referred to the Committee of Detail ; and 
the Convention then unanimously adjourned till 
Monday, August 6th, that the Committee of Detail 
might have time to prepare and report the Consti- 
tution. The whole Resolutions, as referred, are as 
follows : 

1. Resolved, That the Government of the United 
States ought to consist of a supreme Legislative, Ju- 
diciary, and Executive. 

2. Resolved, That the Legislature consist of two 
branches^/ 

3. Resolved, That the members of the first branch 
of the Legislature ought to be elected by the people 
of the several States for the term of two years ; to 
be paid out of the public treasury ; to receive an 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1221 

adequate compensation for their services ; to be of 
the age of twenty-five years at least ; to be ineligi- 
ble to, and incapable of holding, any office under the 
authority of the United States (except those pecu- 
liarly belonging to the functions of the first branch) 
duping the term of service of the first branch, 
f 4. Resolved, That the members of the second 
branch of the Legislature of the United States ought 
to be chosen by the individual Legislatures ; to be 
of the age of thirty years at least ; to hold their offi- 
ces for six years, one-third to go out biennally ; to 
receive a compensation for the devotion of their time 
to the public service ; to be ineligible to, and inca- 
pable of holding, any office under the authority of 
the United States (except those peculiarly belonging 
to the functions of the second branch) during the 
term for which they are elected, and for one year 
thereafter. / 

5. Resolved, That each branch ought to possess 
the right of originating acts. 

6. Resolved, That the National Legislature ought 
to possess the legislative rights vested in Congress 
by the Confederation ; and, moreover, to legislate in 
all cases for the general interests of the Union, and 
also in those to which the States are separately in- 
competent, or in which the harmony of the United 
States may be interrupted by the exercise of indi- 
vidual legislation. 

7. Resolved, That the legislative acts of the Uni- 
ted States, made by virtue and in pursuance of the 
Articles of Union, and all treaties made and ratified 
under the authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme law of the respective States, as far as 



1222 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

those acts or treaties shall relate to the said States, 
or their citizens and inhabitants ; and that the Judi- 
ciaries of the several States shall be bound thereby 
in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws 
of the individual States to the contrary notwith- 
standing. 

8. Resolved, That in the original formation of the 
Legislature of the United States, the first branch 
thereof shall consist of sixty-five members; of which 
number, 

New Hampshire shall send . three, 

Massachusetts eight, 

Rhode Island one, 

Connecticut , five, 

New York six, 

New Jersey four, 

Pennsylvania eight, 

Delaware one, 

Maryland . . . . . . six, 

Virginia ten, 

North Carolina five, 

South Carolina five, 

Georgia three. 

But as the present situation of the states, may prob- 
ably alter in the number of their inhabitants, the Le- 
gislature of the United States shall be authorized, 
from time to time, to apportion the number of represen- 
tatives ; and in case any of the States shall hereafter 
be divided, or enlarged by addition of territory, or 
any two or more States united, or any new States cre- 
ated within the limits of the United States, the Le- 
gislature of the United States shall possess authority 
to regulate the number of representatives, in any of 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1223 

the foregoing cases, upon the principle of their num- 
ber of inhabitants, according to the provisions here- 
after mentioned, namely — Provided always, that 
representation ought to be proportioned to direct 
taxation. And in order to ascertain the alteration 
in the direct taxation, which may be required from 
time to time, by the changes in the relative circum- 
stances of the States, — 

9. Resolved, That a census be taken within six 
years from the first meeting of the Legislature of 
the United States, and once within the term of every 
ten years afterwards, of all the inhabitants of the 
United States, in the manner and according to the 
ratio recommended by Congress in their resolution 
of the eighteenth of April, 1783 ; and that the Le- 
gislature of the United States shall proportion the 
direct taxation accordingly. 

| 10. Resolved, That all bills for raising or appro- 
priating money, and for fixing the salaries of the 
officers of the Government of the United States, 
shall originate in the first branch of the Legisla- 
ture of the United States, and shall not be altered 
or amended by the second branch; and that no 
money shall be drawn from the public treasury, but 
in pursuance of appropriations to be originated by 
the first branch,/ 

11. Resolved, That in the second branch of the 
Legislature of the United States, each State shall 
have an equal vote^Y 

12. Resolved, That a National Executive be insti- 
tuted, to consist of a single person ; to be chosen by 
the National Legislature, for the term of seven 
years ; to be ineligible a second time ; with power 



1224 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

to carry into execution the national laws ; to appoint 
to offices in cases not otherwise provided for; to be 
removable on impeachment, and conviction of mal- 
practice or neglect of duty ; to receive a fixed com- 
pensation for the devotion of his time to the public 
service, to be paid out of the public treasury. 

13. Resolved, That the National Executive shall 
have a right to negative any legislative act ; which 
shall not be afterwards passed, unless by two third 
parts of each branch of the National Legislature. 

14. Resolved, That a National Judiciary be estab- 
lished, to consist of one supreme tribunal, the Judges 
of which shall be appointed by the second branch 
of the national Legislature ; to hold their offices du- 
ring good behaviour; to receive punctually at stated 
times, a fixed compensation for their services, in 
which no diminution shall be made so as to affect 
the persons actually in office at the time of such di- 
minution. 

15. Resolved, That the National Legislature be 
empowered to appoint inferior tribunals. 

16. Resolved, That the jurisdiction of the Na- 
tional Judiciary shall extend to cases arising under 
laws passed by the General Legislature ; and to such 
other questions as involve the national peace and 
harmony. 

17. Resolved, That provision ought to be made 
for the admission of States lawfully arising within 
the limits of the United States^ whether from a 
voluntary junction of government and territory, 
or otherwise, with the consent of a number of 
voices in the National Legislature less than the 
whole. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1225 

18. Resolved, That a republican form of govern- 
ment shall be guaranteed to each State ; and that 
each State shall be protected against foreign and 
domestic violence. 

19. Resolved, That provision ought to be made 
for the amendment of the Articles of Union, when- 
soever it shall seem necessary. 

20. Resolved, That the Legislative, Executive and 
Judiciary powers, within the several States, and of 
the National Government, ought to be bound, by 
oath, to support the Articles of Union. 

21. Resolved, That the amendments which shall 
be offered to the Confederation by the Convention 
ought, at a proper time or times, after the approba- 
tion of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly, or 
assemblies, of representatives, recommended by the 
several Legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the 
people to consider and decide thereon. 

22. Resolved) That the representation in the sec- 
ond branch of the Legislature of the United States 
shall consist of two members from each State, who 
shall vote per capita. 

23. Resolved) That it be an instruction to the 
Committee to whom were referred the proceedings 
of the Convention for the establishment of a Nation- 
al Government, to receive a clause, or clauses, re- 
quiring certain qualifications of property and citizen- 
ship in the United States, for the Executive, the 
Judiciary, and the members of both branches of the 
Legislature of the United States. m 

With the above Resolutions were referred the 
propositions offered by Mr. C. Pinckney on the 
Vol. L— 77* 



1226 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

twenty-ninth of May, and by Mr. Patterson on the 
fifteenth of June. 
Adjourned. 



Monday, August 6th. 

In Convention, — Mr. John Francis Mercer, from 
Maryland, took his seat. 

Mr. Rutledge delivered in the Report of the Com- 
mittee of Detail, as follows — -a printed copy being 
at the same time furnished to each member : 

We the people of the States of New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Providence Plan- 
tations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Car- 
olina, South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, de- 
clare, and establish the following Constitution for 
the government of ourselves and our posterity. 

Article I. 

The style of the Government shall be, " The Uni- 
ted States of America." 

Article II. 

The Government shall consist of supreme Legis- 
lative, Executive, and Judicial powers. 

Article III. 

The legislative power shall be vested in a Con- 
gress, to consist of two separate and distinct bodies 
of men, a House of Representatives and a Senate ; 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1227 

each of which shall in all cases have a negative on 
the other. The Legislature shall meet on the first 
Monday in December in every year. 

Article IV. 

Sect. 1. The members of the House of Represen- 
tatives shall be chosen every second year, by the 
people of the several States comprehended within 
this Union. The qualifications of the electors shall 
be the same from time to time, as those of the elec- 
tors in the several States, of the most numerous 
branch of their own Legislatures. 

Sect. 2. Every member of the House of Repre- 
sentatives shall be of the age of twenty-five years at 
least ; shall have been a citizen in the United States 
for at least three years before his election ; and shall 
be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State 
in which he shall be chosen. 

Sect. 3. The House of Representatives shall, at 
its first formation, and until the number of citizens 
and inhabitants shall be taken in the manner here- 
inafter described, consist of sixty-five members, of 
whom three shall be chosen in New Hampshire, 
eight in Massachusetts, one in Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations, five in Connecticut, six in 
New York, four in New Jersey, eight in Pennsylva- 
nia, one in Delaware, six in Maryland, ten in Vir- 
ginia, five in North Carolina, five in South Carolina, 
and three in Georgia. 

Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in differ- 
ent States will alter from time to time ; as some of 
the States may hereafter be divided ; as others may 



1228 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

be enlarged by addition of territory ; as two or more 
States may be united ; as new States will be erected 
within the limits of the United States, the Legisla- 
ture shall, in each of these cases, regulate the num- 
ber of Representatives by the number of inhabit- 
ants, according to the provisions hereinafter made, 
at the rate of one for every forty thousand. 
' Sect. 5. All bills for raising or appropriating 
money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of 
government, shall originate in the House of Repre- 
sentatives, and shall not be altered or amended by 
the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the 
public treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations 
that shall originate in the House of Representa- 
tives. 

Sect. 6. The House of Representatives shall have 
the sole power of impeachment. It shall choose its 
Speaker and other officers. 

Sect. 7. Vacancies in the House of Representa- 
tives shall be supplied by writs of election from the 
Executive authority of the State in the representa- 
tion from which they shall happen. 

Article V. 

Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall be 
chosen by the Legislatures of the several States. 
Each Legislature shall choose two members. Va- 
cancies may be supplied by the Executive until the 
next meeting of the Legislature. Each member 
shall have one vote. 

Sect. 2. The Senators shall be chosen for six 
years ; but immediately after the first election, they 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1229 

shall be divided, by lot, into three classes, as nearly 
as may be, numbered one, two, and three. The 
seats of the members of the first class shall be 
vacated at the expiration of the second year ; of the 
second class at the expiration of the fourth year; 
of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year; 
so that a third part of the members may be chosen 
every second year. 

Sect. 3. Every member of the Senate shall be of 
the age of thirty years at least ; shall have been a 
citizen in the United States for at least four years 
before his election ; and shall be, at the time of his 
election, a resident of the State for' which he shall 
be chosen. 

Sect. 4. The Senate shall choose its own Presi- 
dent and other officers./ 

Article VI. 
y 

' Sect. 1. The times, and places, and manner of 
holding the elections of the members of each House, 
shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each State; 
but their provisions concerning them may, at any 
time, be altered by the Legislature of the United 
States. 

Sect. 2. The Legislature of the United States 
shall have authority to establish such uniform quali- 
fications of the members of each House, with regard 
to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem 
expedient. 

Sect. 3. In each House a majority of the members 
shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a 
smaller number may adjourn from day to day. 



1230 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Sect. 4. Each House shall be the judge of the 
elections, returns, and qualifications, of its own 
members. 

Sect. 5. Freedom of speech and debate in the 
Legislature shall not be impeached or questioned in 
any court or place out of the Legislature ; and the 
members of each House shall, in all cases, except 
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privi- 
leged from arrest during their attendance at Con- 
gress, and in going to and returning from it. 

Sect. 6. Each House may determine the rules of 
its proceedings ; may punish its members for dis- 
orderly behaviour ; and may expel a member. 

Sect. 7. The House of Representatives, and the 
Senate, when it shall be acting in a legislative 
capacity, shall keep a journal of their proceedings; 
and shall, from time to time, publish them ; and the 
yeas and nays of the members of each House, on 
any question, shall, at the desire of one fifth part of 
the members present, be entered on the Journal. 

Sect. 8. Neither House, without the consent of the 
other, shall adjourn for more than three days, nor to 
any other place than that at which the two Houses 
are sitting. But this regulation shall not extend to 
the Senate when it shall exercise the powers men- 
tioned in the Article. 

Sect. 9. The members of each House shall be in- 
eligible to, and incapable of holding, any office under 
the authority of the United States, during the time 
for which they shall respectively be elected : and 
the members of the Senate shall be ineligible to, 
and incapable of holding, any such office for one 
year afterwards. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1231 

Sect. 10. The members of each House shall re- 
ceive a compensation for their services, to be ascer- 
tained and paid by the State in which they shall be 
chosen.j 

Sec. 11. The enacting style of the laws of the 
United States shall be, "Be it enacted, and it is 
hereby enacted, by the House of Representatives, 
and by the Senate of the United States, in Congress 
assembled." 

\ Sect. 12. Each House shall possess the right of 
originating bills, except in the cases before men- 
tioned. . 

Sect. 13. Every bill, which shall have passed the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, be- 
fore it becomes a law, be presented to the Presi- 
dent of the United States for his revision. If, upon 
such revision, he approve of it, he shall signify his 
approbation by signing it. But if, upon such re- 
vision, it shall appear to him improper for being 
passed into a law, he shall return it, together with 
his objections against it, to that House in which it 
shall have originated; who shall enter the objec- 
tions at large on their Journal, and proceed to re- 
consider the bill. But if, after such reconsideration, 
two-thirds of that House shall, notwithstanding the 
objections of the President, agree to pass it, it shall, 
together with his objections, be sent to the other 
House, by which it shall likewise be re-considered, 
and if approved by two-thirds of the other House 
also, it shall become a law. But in all such cases, 
the votes of both Houses shall be determined by 
Yeas and Nays ; and the names of the persons 
voting for or against the bill, shall be entered on 



1232 DEBATES IN THE [ 1787. 

the Journal of each House respectively. If any hill 
shall not be returned by the President within seven 
days after it shall have been presented to him, it 
shall be a law, unless the Legislature, by their ad- 
journment, prevent its return ; in which case it shall 
not be a law. 

Article VII. 

Sect. 1. The Legislature of the United States 
shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, du- 
ties, imposts and excises; 

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several States ; 

To establish an uniform rule of naturalization 
throughout the United States ; 

To coin money ; 

To regulate the value of foreign coin ; 

To fix the standard of weights and measures; 

To establish post-offices; 

To borrow money, and emit bills on the credit of 
the United States; 

To appoint a Treasurer by ballot ; 

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme 
Court ; 

To make rules concerning captures on land and 
water ; 

To declare the law and punishment of piracies 
and felonies committed on the high seas, and the 
punishment of counterfeiting the coin of the United 
States, and of offences against the law of nations ; 

To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the appli- 
cation of its Legislature ; 



1787."] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1233 

To make war ; 

To raise armies ; 

To build and equip fleets ; 

To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to 
execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, sup- 
press insurrections, and repel invasions ; 

And to make all laws that shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing 
powers, and all other powers vested by this Consti- 
tution in the Government of the United States, or 
in any department or office thereof. 

Sect. 2. Treason against the United States shall 
consist only in levying war against the United 
States, or any of them ; and in adhering to the ene- 
mies of the United States, or any of them. The 
Legislature of the United States shall have power 
to declare the punishment of treason. No person 
shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimo- 
ny of two witnesses. No attainder of treason shall 
work corruption of blood, nor forfeiture, except du- 
ring the life of the person attainted. 

Sect 3. The proportions of direct taxation shall 
be regulated by the whole number of white and 
other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex 
and condition, including those bound to servitude 
for a term of years, and three-fifths of all other per- 
sons not comprehended in the foregoing description, 
(except Indians not paying taxes) ; which number 
shall, within six years after the first meeting of the 
Legislature, and within the term of every ten years 
afterwards, be taken in such a manner as the said 
Legislature shall direct. 

Sect. 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the Le- 
78 



1234 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

gislature on articles exported from any State ; nor 
on the migration or importation of such persons as 
the several States shall think proper to admit ; nor 
shall such migration or importation be prohibited. 

Sect. 5. No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in 
proportion to the census herein before directed to be 
taken. 

Sect. 6. No navigation act shall be passed with- 
out the assent of two-thirds of the members present 
in each House. 

Sect. 7. The United States shall not grant any 
title of nobility. 

Article VIII. 

The acts of the Legislature of the United States 
made in pursuance of this Constitution, and all trea- 
ties made under the authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme law of the several States, and 
of their citizens and inhabitants ; and the Judges in 
the several States shall be bound thereby in their de- 
cisions, any thing in the Constitutions or laws of the 
several States to the contrary notwithstanding. 

Article IX. 

Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall 
have power to make treaties, and to appoint ambas- 
sadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court. 

Sect. 2. In all disputes and controversies now sub- 
sisting, or that may hereafter subsist, between two 
or more States, respecting jurisdiction or territory, 
the Senate shall possess the following powers : — 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1235 

Whenever the Legislature, or the Executive authori- 
ty, or lawful agent of any State, in controversy 
with another, shall by memorial to the Senate, state 
the matter in question, and apply for a hearing, no- 
tice of such memorial and application shall be given, 
by order of the Senate, to the Legislature, or the 
Executive authority, of the other State in contro- 
versy. The Senate shall also assign a day for the 
appearance of the parties, by their agents, before 
that House. The agents shall be directed to ap- 
point, by joint consent, commissioners or judges to 
constitute a court for hearing and determining the 
matter in question. But if the agents cannot agree, 
the Senate shall name three persons out of each of 
the several States; and from the list of such per- 
sons, each party shall alternately strike out one, un- 
til the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and 
from that number, not less than seven, nor more 
than nine, names, as the Senate shall direct, shall, 
in their presence, be drawn out by lot ; and the per- 
sons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of 
them, shall be commissioners or judges to hear and 
finally determine the controversy ; provided a major- 
ity of the judges w T ho shall hear the cause agree in 
the determination. If either party shall neglect to 
attend at the day assigned, without showing suffi- 
cient reasons for not attending, or being present 
shall refuse to strike, the Senate shall proceed to 
nominate three persons out of each State, and the 
Clerk of the Senate shall strike in behalf of the 
party absent or refusing. If any of the parties 
shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, 
or shall not appear to prosecute or defend their 



1236 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed 
to pronounce judgment. The judgment shall be final 
and conclusive. The proceedings shall be transmitted 
to the President of the Senate, and shall be lodged 
among the public records for the security of the par- 
ties concerned. Every commissioner shall, before 
he sit in judgment, take an oath to be administered 
by one of the Judges of the Supreme or Superior 
Court of the State where the cause shall be tried, 
" well and truly to hear and determine the matter in 
question, according to the best of his judgment, 
without favor, affection, or hope of reward." 

Sect. 3. All controversies concerning lands claimed 
under different grants of two or more States, whose 
jurisdictions, as they respect such lands, shall have 
been decided or adjusted subsequently to such 
grants, or any of them, shall, on application to the 
Senate, be finally determined, as near as may be, 
in the same manner as is before prescribed for de- 
ciding controversies between different States. / 

Article X. 

Sect. 1. The Executive power of the United 
States shall be vested in a single person. His style 
shall be, " The President of the United States of 
America," and his title shall be, " His Excellency." 
He shall be elected by ballot by the Legislature. 
He shall hold his office during the term of seven 
years ; but shall not be elected a second time. 

Sect. 2. He shall, from time to time, give informa- 
tion to the Legislature, of the state of the Union. 
He may recommend to their consideration such 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1237 

measures as he shall judge necessary, and expedient. 
He may convene them on extraordinary occasions. 
In case of disagreement between the two Houses, 
with regard to the time of adjournment, he may 
adjourn them to such time as he thinks proper. He 
shall take care that the laws of the United States 
be duly and faithfully executed. He shall commis- 
sion all the officers of the United States ; and shall 
appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided 
for by this Constitution. He shall receive Ambas- 
dors, and may correspond with the supreme execu- 
tives of the several States. He shall have power 
to grant reprieves and pardons, but his pardon shall 
not be pleadable in bar of an impeachment. He 
shall be Commander-in-chief of the army and navy 
of the United States, and of the militia of the sev- 
eral States. He shall, at stated times, receive for 
his services a compensation, which shall neither be 
increased nor diminished during his continuance in 
office. Before he shall enter on the duties of his 
department, he shall take the following oath or af- 
firmation, " I solemnly swear, (or affirm) that 

I will faithfully execute the office of President of 
the United States of America." He shall be re- 
moved from his office on impeachment by the House 
of Representatives, and conviction, in the. Supreme 
Court, of treason, bribery or corruption. I In case of 
his removal, as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disa- 
bility to discharge the powers and duties of his of- 
fice, the President of the Senate shall exercise those 
powers and duties, until another President of the 
United States be chosen, or until the disability of 
the President be removed. 



1238 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 



Article XI. 

Sect. 1. The Judicial power of the United States 
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such 
inferior courts, as shall, when necessary, from time 
to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the 
United States. 

Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and 
of the inferior courts, shall hold their offices during 
good behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive 
for their services a compensation, which shall not 
be diminished during their continuance in office. 

Sect. 3. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
shall extend to all cases arising under laws passed 
by the Legislature of the United States ; to all cases 
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and 
consuls ; to the trial of impeachments of officers of 
the United States ; to all cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction ; to controversies between two 
or more States, (except such as shall regard territory | 
or jurisdiction) ; between a state and citizens of ) 
another State ; between citizens of different States ; 
and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and for- 
eign states, citizens or subjects. In cases of im- 
peachment, cases affecting ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls, and those in which a State 
shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. 
In all the other cases beforementioned, it shall be 
appellate, with such exceptions, and under such reg- 
ulations, as the Legislature shall make. The Le- 
gislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction 
above mentioned (except the trial of the President 






1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1239 

of the United States) in the manner, and under the 
limitations which it shall think proper, to such infe- 
rior courts, as it shall constitute from time to time. 

Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except 
in cases of impeachment) shall be in the State 
where they shall be committed; and shall be by 
jury. 

Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of impeachment, shall 
not extend further than to removal from office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, 
trust or profit, under the United States. But the 
party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and sub- 
ject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment 
according to law. 

Article XII. 

No State shall coin money ; nor grant letters of 
marque and reprisal ; nor enter into any treaty, alli- 
ance or confederation ; nor grant any title of no- 
bility. 

Article XIII. 

No State, without the consent of the Legislature 
of the United States, shall emit bills of credit, or 
make any thing but specie a tender in payment of 
debts ; nor lay imposts or duties on imports ; nor 
keep troops or ships of war in time of peace ; nor 
enter into any agreement or compact with another 
State, or with any foreign power ; nor engage in any 
war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, 
or the danger of invasion be so imminent as not to 
admit of a delay until the Legislature of the United 
States can be consulted. 



1240 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 



Article XIV. 

The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
States. 

Article XV. 

Any person charged with treason, felony or high 
misdemeanour in any State, who shall flee from 
justice, and shall be found in any other State, shall, 
on demand of the Executive power of the State from 
which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the 
State having jurisdiction of the offence. 

Article XVI. 

Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts 
of the Legislatures, and to the records and judicial 
proceedings of the courts and magistrates, of every 
other State. 

Article XVII. 

New States lawfully constituted or established 
within the limits of the United States may be ad- 
mitted, by the Legislature, into this government ; but 
to such admission the consent of two-thirds of the 
members present in each House shall be necessary. 
If a new State shall arise within the limits of any 
of the present States, the consent of the Legislatures 
of such States shall be also necessary to its admis- 
sion. If the admission be consented to, the new 
States shall be admitted on the same terms with 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 1241 

the original States. But the Legislature may make 
conditions with the new States, concerning the pub- 
lic debt which shall be then subsisting. 

Article XVIII. 

The United States shall guarantee to each State 
a republican form of government ; and shall protect 
each State against foreign invasions, and, on the 
application of its Legislature, against domestic vio- 
lence. 

Article XIX. 

On the application of the Legislatures of two- 
thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment 
of this Constitution, the Legislature of the United 
States shall call a convention for that purpose. 

Article XX. 

The members of the Legislatures, and the Execu- 
tive and Judicial officers of the United States, and 
of the several States, shall be bound by oath to sup- 
port this Constitution. 

Article XXI. 

The ratification of the Conventions of States 

shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution. 

Article XXII. 

This Constitution shall be laid before the United 
States in Congress assembled, for their approbation ; 
and it is the opinion of this Convention, that it 
78* 



1242 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

should be afterwards submitted to a Convention 
chosen in each State, under the recommendation of 
its Legislature, in order to receive the ratification of 
such Convention. 

Article XXIII. 

To introduce this government, it is the opinion of 
this Convention, that each assenting Convention 
should notify its assent and ratification to the Uni- 
ted States in Congress assembled ; that Congress, 
after receiving the assent and ratification of the 

Conventions of States, should appoint and 

publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a 
place, for commencing proceedings under this Con- 
stitution ; that after such publication, the Legisla- 
tures of the several States should elect members of 
the Senate and direct the election of members of the 
House of Representatives ; and that the members 
of the Legislature should meet at the time and place 
assigned by Congress, and should, as soon as may 
be after their meeting, choose the President of the 
United States, and proceed to execute this Consti- 
tution. 291 

A motion was made to adjourn till Wednesday, in 
order to give leisure to examine the Report ; which 
passed in the negative, — Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
Virginia, aye — 3 ; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina, no — 5. 

The House then adjourned till to-morrow at 
eleven o'clock. 



MAR 1959 



V 



HH 



H 



• MmM 



mm 

I 



^■1 



mm 

! ^H 









■I 



[ffi 



■HMH ,'■:'.»:< HI 'if in mil 



mm 



mat mm 

m 

mm 



inr 



HHH H 

Hi H Hi 

H 

I ^^HHll 

Hi 

^HHH 






EhHrw H 



1111 Hi H 

bHbb ft i^ytMtffiflnfmft raw JOS f > ■ 

IBliiM H H 

WBBSKl WBm 



